Ελλαδικές και Κυπριακές ιλαροτραγωδίες πριν και μετά την δεκαετία του 1960. Περί σχεδίου Άτσεσον το ανάγνωσμα.

Περιεχόμενα. Εισαγωγή: Μερικές επισημάνσεις για την ιστορία και την ιστορική ανεκδοτολογία και το σχέδιο Άτσεσον. 1. Ο χαρακτήρας των ηγεμονικών παρεμβάσεων στην νεότερη ελληνική ιστορία και στην διεθνή πολιτική της ύστερης εποχής. 2. Το «σχέδιο Άτσεσον» ως ένα «επεισόδιο» για την Ελλάδα και το διεθνές σύστημα. 3. Σχέδια Άτσεσον τον Αύγουστο και Σεπτέμβριο 1964. 4. (7.7.2013 Απάντηση σε σχόλια για το κουράγιο της … Πηνελόπης: Αντίσταση στα θανατηφόρα εμφυλιακά σύνδρομα και στα σύνδρομα ενοχής. 5. (20.1.2013) Τα σχέδια Άτσεσον τον Αύγουστο και Σεπτέμβριο του 1964. 6. Το «σχέδιο Άτσεσον» ως αφετηρία νέου κατήφορου που έφερε την χούντα και το 1974. 7. Προσωρινά συμπεράσματα και στοιχειώδεις αναφορές σε διαθέσιμο αρχειακό υλικό – τα σημεία που ακολουθούν θα συμπληρωθούν, τεκμηριωθούν. 8. Η στρατηγική συγκυρία της δεκαετίας του 1960 και τα σχέδια Άτσεσον: Συμπληγάδες πραξικοπημάτων που θα οδηγούσαν … στο σφαγείο των στρατηγικών παιγνίων (Ι). 9. Αρχειακό υλικό που καταμαρτυρεί την χαώδη κατάσταση του πολιτικού συστήματος στην Αθήνα και τον τρόπο που αντιμετώπιζαν το ένα δέκατο του Ελληνισμού

Εισαγωγή΄Οκτώβριος 2013: Μερικές επισημάνσεις για την ιστορία και την ιστορική ανεκδοτολογία και το σχέδιο Άτσεσον.

Το κείμενο που ακολουθεί δεν αποτελεί επιστημονική πραγματεία αλλά παράθεση κάποιων απόψεων και πληροφοριών, κάποιων προσωρινών συμπερασμάτων και παράθεση αρχειακού υλικού, κυρίως του Αμερικανικού Πενταγώνου. Η επιστημονική έρευνα διεξάγεται σε άλλο πλαίσιο και ως είθισται είναι πολυετής και δημοσιεύεται όταν ωριμάσει η έρευνα, ο συνδυασμός των στοιχείων, η ένταξή τους στο ευρύτερο στρατηγικό και εθνικό πλαίσιο των εμπλεκομένων και η διασταύρωσή τους με άλλες δευτερογενείς μελέτες. Μαζί και άλλοι συνάδελφοι είχαμε αποφασίσει να γράψουμε κείμενο για την Ελληνική εξωτερική πολιτική από τον εμφύλιο μετά το 1945 μέχρι το 1974 όταν εκτελέστηκε το έγκλημα κατά της νόμιμης κυβέρνησης της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας. Βασικά, έκτοτε, περίπου το ένα δέκατο του Ελληνισμού είναι στρατηγικός όμηρος της Τουρκίας. Η όξυνση της κρίσης των μνημονίων έθεσε άλλες προτεραιότητες και η ολοκλήρωση της έρευνας εκκρεμεί. Η έρευνα αυτή, βέβαια, πήρε τον δρόμο της και θα ολοκληρωθεί όταν εξεταστούν όλα τα κριτήρια και παράγοντες και όλα τα συμπλεκόμενα επίπεδα. Ως είθισται στην καλή ιστορική έρευνα, βέβαια, ιστορικά άλματα, προφητείες του παρελθόντος, δίκες προθέσεων ιστορικών προσώπων και άλλες τέτοιες ιστοριογραφικές φάρσες, αποκλείονται. Κρίνοντας διεθνολογικά τα ιστορικά γεγονότα μόνο εναλλακτικές εκτιμήσεις υψηλού ρίσκου μπορείς να κάνεις. Τα υπόλοιπα είναι ιστοριογραφικές τσαρλατανιές και προσωπικές γνώμες αγνώστων κινήτρων.

Τα βασικά συμπεράσματα, βέβαια, έχουν ήδη εδραιωθεί. 

Η συγγραφή του παρόντος σημειώματος αποφασίστηκε μετά από διαδικτυακές συζητήσεις και τις όχι κατ’ ανάγκη συνδεδεμένες με την προαναφερθείσα έρευνα της περιόδου 1945-74. Τυγχάνει τέλη του 2012 αρχές του 2013 εκεί που γινόταν ανταλλαγή απόψεων για τις πολιτικές προϋποθέσεις των υποψηφίων και ιδιαίτερα την σχέση τους με το σχέδιο Αναν (παλαιό και επερχόμενο), οι συντρέχουσες πολιτικές εξελίξεις συνδέθηκαν με το σχέδιο Άτσεσον, τους δεξιούς και αριστερούς των δεκαετιών 1960 και 1970, την διαδρομή των ιδεολογικό-κομματικών συγκρούσεων σε Ελλάδα και Κύπρο έκτοτε, την σχέση ηρώων του αγώνα της ΕΟΚΑ όπως ο Αυξεντίου με αμετανόητους «ανανικούς» υποψηφίους και το μέλλον του ελληνισμού της Κύπρου ο οποίος, κατά μια άποψη πρώην δραστών ανανικών, δεν του αξίζει ελευθερία όπως όλων των άλλων ή ότι θα την βρει μέσα στην σαπουνόφουσκα της «μεταεθνικής εποχής». Τέτοιες περίεργες ιδέες είχε γράψει το 2003 ο Στέλιος Ράμφος αλλά συχνά τις επαναλαμβάνουν και άλλοι. Ιδιαίτερα όσοι θέλουν με το να εισέλθουν σε ένα κενό πνευματικού αέρα και αλματωδών ιστοριογραφικών ανεκδότων, να δικαιολογήσουν το σχέδιο Αναν παλαιό και επερχόμενο. Κάποιοι επιλέγουν ανανικούς πολιτικούς επειδή αυτοί θα μας οδηγήσουν ειρηνικά και εξ ανάγκης στον αιώνιο υποβιβασμό μας στις κατώτερες πολιτικές ιεραρχίες (των υποδούλων και υποτελών, αν κανείς μπορεί να τις ονομάσει «πολιτικές»). Το κράτος των Αθηνών, αναιρώντας τον ρόλο του ως Μητρόπολη του Ελληνισμού υποστήριξε και συνεχίζει να υποστηρίζει σχέδια Αναν και ακόμη χειρότερες προτάσεις που διαρκώς προτείνονται από τα επιτελεία των ίδιων ηγεμονικών δυνάμεων που ευθύνονται για την δημιουργία του κυπριακού προβλήματος και του εγκληματικού πραξικοπήματος.    

Έτσι, στον ελληνικό πολιτικοστοχαστικό χώρο όπου η λέξη «αλαλούμ» και «χαβαλές» αποτυπώνει με τον ποιο γλαφυρό αλλά αληθινό τρόπο τις χαμηλές ποιοτικές βαθμίδες των συζητήσεων μέσα στην δημόσια σφαίρα, ούτε λίγο ούτε πολύ κάποιοι αναφέρονται στο σχέδιο Άτσεσον ως «χαμένη ευκαιρία» «ατόφιας ένωσης» της Κύπρου με την Ελλάδα το 1964. Το εκπληκτικό όμως δεν είναι αυτές οι προφητείες του παρελθόντος οι οποίες υποδηλώνουν πνευματική παρακμή και οι οποίες μπορεί να εκδηλωθούν και στις «καλύτερες (πολιτειακές) οικογένειες» όταν αυτές παρακμάσουν και υποδουλωθούν.

Το εκπληκτικό είναι οι γραμμικές ιστορικές ερμηνείες που καταλήγουν με τέτοιο ασυνάρτητο τρόπο σε τόσο αλματώδη συμπεράσματα δεν υπόκεινται σε ελέγχους και εξισορροπήσεις. Δεν εννοώ τους επιστήμονες γιατί αυτοί δεν συνομιλούν με παραγωγούς ιστοριογραφικών τσαρλατανιών. Εννοώ το κοινωνικοπολιτικό περιβάλλον στο οποίο ακόμη βρίσκονται άτομα που ξέρουν πολύ καλά την αλήθεια και από πρώτο χέρι για τα γεγονότα 1955-1974. Βρίσκονται βέβαια και πολλοί πολιτικά βεβαρημένοι με συμμετοχές σε ενέργειες κατά του κράτους και με αποκορύφωση τέτοιων στάσεων την υποστήριξη του σχεδίου Αναν πολλές δεκαετίες μετά. Το εάν κανείς ήταν οπαδός των δύο πόλων, του Μακαρίου και του Γρίβα, δεν έχει σημασία. Σημασία έχει η δικαιολόγηση των προσωπικών ενοχών και συνδρόμων μετατρέπεται σε ιστορική ανεκδοτολογία που ξεγελά όσους δεν ξέρουν το κυπριακό και ρυπαίνουν εμφυλιακά τις συζητήσεις μέσα στον δημόσιο χώρο.

Μοιάζει σαν και το και κοινωνικοπολιτικό και πολιτικοστοχαστικό περιβάλλον της Ελλάδας και της Κύπρου να είναι ανύπαρκτο ή παντελώς ροκανισμένο. Σίγουρα, εισήλθαμε πλέον σ’ ένα απελπιστικά ανιστόρητο και πολιτικά άκρως επικίνδυνο τέλμα αφελειών και ασυναρτησιών. Με ολίγη φαντασία, κάποιο αποσπασματικά παρατιθέμενο έγγραφο που ερμηνεύεται κατά βούληση, με ολίγα άλματα συλλογισμών, με δίκη προθέσεων ιστορικών προσώπων ή και ολόκληρων πληθυσμών και με πολωτική δεξιοαριστερή προδιάθεση, καταλήγει στο ιδεολόγημα των «χαμένων ευκαιριών» που μπορεί να δικαιολογήσει ακόμη και την σκλαβιά.

Σίγουρα, πάντως, σε αποκλεισμό πολιτικών προσώπων που υπερασπίζονται την εθνική ανεξαρτησία και στην θεοποίηση πολιτικών προσώπων που προγραμματικά δηλώνουν ότι είναι έτοιμοι να συζητήσουν την κατάργηση του κράτους.

Μετά τις πρώτες και λίγο πολύ αμυντικές αντιδράσεις του υποφαινόμενου μερικά κείμενα αναρτήθηκαν στο διαδίκτυο. Υπάρχουν επίσης και άλλα κείμενα σε ιδιωτικές λίστες διαδικτυακής συζήτησης που για ευνόητους δεοντολογικούς λόγους δεν αναρτώ–, οι πληροφορίες άρχισαν να εισρέουν ορμητικά. Φίλοι από όλο τον κόσμο άρχισαν να μου αποστέλλουν φωτοτυπίες από βιβλία, τεράστια αρχεία τα οποία περιείχαν εκατοντάδες δημοσιοποιημένα έγγραφα της αμερικανικής και βρετανικής κυβέρνησης, εκθέσεις διπλωματικών αντιπροσώπων, συζητήσεις στο επιτελείο του αμερικανού προέδρου, συνδέσμους σε αποδεσμευμένο αρχειακό υλικό και πολλά άλλα που αριθμούν ήδη χιλιάδες σελίδες. Μερικά περιέχουν αξιολογήσιμες πληροφορίες, άλλα είναι κείμενα ρουτίνας που θα πρέπει να ειδωθούν σε συνάρτηση με άλλα σημαντικότερα και κάποια άλλα είναι «παλιοχάρτια», όπως λέμε όσοι συχνά βρεθήκαμε μπροστά σε όγκους πηγών αγωνιζόμαστε να τα αξιολογήσουμε και ιεραρχήσουμε παραμερίζοντας τα περισσότερα ως άχρηστα ή αποπροσανατολιστικά.  

Κατ’ αρχάς και με δεδομένο ότι υπήρξαν ήδη τοποθετήσεις πριν διατρέξω πολλές από αυτές τις πληροφορίες, υπάρχει μια ανακούφιση καθότι ως «πολιτικός επιστήμονας» ο οποίος συχνά ανθρώπινα εξοργισμένος παρεμβαίνει για να πει τα αυτονόητα, διυποκειμενικά και πασίδηλα, φαίνεται να μην έχω πέσει έξω στις πρώτες μου εκτιμήσεις για την δεκαετία του 1960. Στην βάση στοιχειωδών γνώσεων –και κυρίως στο πεδίο της στρατηγικής ανάλυσης– οι πρώτες εκτιμήσεις που έγιναν και που βρίσκονται αναρτημένες κινούνται εντός λογικών και σωστών επιστημολογικών και επιστημονικών ορίων.

Κατά δεύτερον, μια γρήγορη η ανάγνωση μερικών κειμένων που κατέφθασαν βεβαιώνει την εκτίμηση ότι η περίοδος 1960-1964 ήταν ένα επεισόδιο της νεότερης ελληνικής ιστορίας το οποίο επειδή συνέβηκε σε μια κομβική στιγμή ενδέχεται ενταγμένο υπό ευρύτερο πρίσμα να είναι διδακτικό. Επαληθεύεται, επίσης, ότι το κυπριακό αποτελεί την σημαντικότερη αχίλλειο πτέρνα του νεοελληνικού κράτους στην μεταπολεμική και μεταψυχροπολεμική εποχή. Πιο σημαντικό, για ένα οποιοδήποτε πολιτικό επιστήμονα του διεθνούς συστήματος καθίσταται ακαριαία ολοφάνερο ότι στην στρατηγική των εμπλεκομένων με τις ελληνικές διεθνείς σχέσεις και ιδιαίτερα των μεγάλων δυνάμεων και της Τουρκίας υπάρχει μακροχρόνιος στρατηγικός σχεδιασμός γεωπολιτικής και γεωστρατηγικής υφής που αφορά ευθέως μια αλυσίδα από αλληλένδετα ζητήματα της νεότερης ελληνικής ιστορίας.

Ζητήματα που βλέπει κανείς να ξεδιπλώνονται μέσα από αρχειακό υλικό που ήδη κατέφθασε, άλλο που αναμένεται και πολύ περισσότερο που δεν έχει ακόμη αποδεσμευτεί αλλά ερευνητές έχουν ήδη πολλά στοιχεία. Ορίστε, μεταξύ άλλων, μερικά ζητήματα που φωτίζονται με αρχειακό υλικό που ήδη διαθέτουμε και με άλλες αξιόπιστες πληροφορίες που έχουμε ή αναμένουμε:

·         Εμφύλιος πόλεμος, τριμερής Διάσκεψη και εθνικοαπελευθερωτικός αγώνας 1955-59.

·         Βασικές ιδιότητες του εξαρτημένου μετά-εμφυλιακού ελληνικού κράτους, εσωτερικές διαιρέσεις, εσωτερικές αδυναμίες, πλαίσιο συνηγορίας με το εθνικοαπελευθερωτικό αγώνα των κυπρίων, στάσεις, αποφάσεις και συμπεριφορές.

·         Κωνσταντινούπολη 1955 υπό το πρίσμα τουρκικών στρατηγικών σχεδιασμών.

·         Ο εθνικοαπελευθερωτικός αγώνας των κυπρίων και τα κύρια χαρακτηριστικά του.

·         Ζυρίχη 1959-60 και ο τρόπος που επιβλήθηκε, οι δρώντες και οι αιτιολογήσεις τους.

·         Το πολιτικό σκηνικό και οι εναλλακτικές επιλογές των δρώντων μερικά χρόνια μετά επιβολή της συμφωνίας της Ζυρίχης από το Λονδίνο και την Αθήνα.

·         Η εμφυλιακή, μετά-εμφυλιακή, διδακτορική και μετά-διδακτορική εμπειρία, τα δεδομένα, οι δομές, η εξέλιξη των πολιτικών επιλογών των πολλών τάσεων, η πολιτειακή συνοχή του Ελλαδικού κράτους, τα εκκολαπτόμενα πραξικοπήματα, ο διπλωματικός ορθολογισμός των πολιτικών ηγετών και οι κοινωνικές τάσεις.

·         Αίτια για κατά τα άλλα πασίδηλα σχιζοφρενή πολιτικά και πολιτειακά χαρακτηριστικά του κυπριακού κράτους και του Ελλαδικού κράτους.

·         Κυπριακές προτάσεις αλλαγής της Συντάγματος αμέσως μετά από αγγλική ενθάρρυνση.

·         Έναρξη τουρκοκυπριακών αρνησικυριών και ανταρσία του 1963.

·         Τουρκική επιθετικότητα και απελπισμένη αν όχι απονενοημένη κυπριακή προσέγγιση της ΕΣΣΔ

·         Αλματώδης άνοδος της γεωπολιτικής σημασίας της Τουρκίας λόγω εξελίξεων στον Ψυχρό Πόλεμο.

·         Στρατηγικός σχεδιασμός και επανασχεδιασμός των μεγάλων δυνάμεων και άλλων κρατών.

·         Ταραχώδης ελληνική πολιτική ζωή από το 1960 μέχρι το 67 (οι αμερικανοί την χαρακτηρίζουν «δημαγωγική» με επιθετικούς προσδιορισμούς κατά του Γεωργίου Παπανδρέου).

·         Σχέδιο Άτσεσον και όλα τα συμπαρομαρτούντα στρατηγικά παρασκήνια, εναλλακτικά σενάρια δράσης (contingency plans) και χαρακτηριστικές μεθοδεύσεις που προσδιορίζουν τις συμπεριφορές στο άναρχο διεθνές σύστημα.

·         Συμπεριφορές και στάσεις που προσδιορίζουν τον ρόλο της ισχύος στην εξέλιξη των διακρατικών σχέσεων και εκτιμήσεις για την κάθε συγκυρία της περιόδου 1945-1974.

·         Συμπεριφορές και στάσεις που προσδιορίζουν με μαθηματική ακρίβεια την έννοια «ηθική» στην διεθνή πολιτική.

·         Συμπεριφορές και στάσεις που προσδιορίζουν τον τρόπο που τίθενται ζητήματα όπως η αυτοσυντήρηση και η επιβίωση.

·         Οι επανειλημμένες υποσχέσεις του Γεωργίου Παπανδρέου (και ασφαλώς πολλών άλλων που είχαν εμπλακεί) να εκτελέσει πραξικόπημα στην Κύπρο κατά του εκλεγμένου Προέδρου αρχές της δεκαετίας του 1960 και ανάλυση των δεδομένων στον Ελλαδικό και κυπριακό πολιτικό χώρο (υπάρχουν άφθονα πρωτογενή στοιχεία και αναρίθμητες δευτερογενείς αναλύσεις που πρέπει να συνεκτιμηθούν).

·         Εκκόλαψη και διαρκώς μετεξέλιξη των εναλλακτικών στρατηγικών σχεδίων αμερικανοτουρκικής νομής του κυπριακού χώρου και οι στρατηγικές επιλογές της Βρετανίας.

·         Η σημασία της ύπαρξης ισχυρών κομμουνιστικών ρευμάτων στην Ελλάδα και Κύπρο και χαρακτηριστικές ανεύθυνες στάσεις όπως του τότε πρωθυπουργού Γεωργίου Παπανδρέου ο οποίος εκτός από πραξικοπήματα δεν έχανε ευκαιρία να τροφοδοτεί τον αμερικανικό αντί-κομμουνιστικό οίστρο.

·         Η μετάβαση από τη μετά-εμφυλιακή φάση στην φάση της δεκαετίας του 1960 και οι παραστάσεις των ηγεμονικών δυνάμεων.

·         Διαδηλώσεις στην Αθήνα και δημαγωγίες από τα μπαλκόνια που εκτιμούμενα λεπτομερέστερα προσδιορίζουν με ακρίβεια το επίπεδο της ελληνικής πολιτικής συνοχής ενόψει εμπλοκής σε στρατηγικά σχέδια που αφορούν ζητήματα ζωής και θανάτου.

·         Αποστασίες στην Ελλάδα, Παύλος, Φρειδερίκη, Διάδοχος, 4-5 τουλάχιστον υπό εκκόλαψη πραξικοπήματα στην Αθήνα και ολοφάνερες μέσα από τα αρχεία διασυνδέσεις των αμερικανικών υπηρεσιών με πολλούς.

·         Κάθοδος της ελληνικής επαρχίας στην Κύπρο που ενώ υπό άλλες συνθήκες θα μπορούσε να αποτελέσει τρόπο επίλυσης του κυπριακού και σταθεροποίησης όλων των περιφερειακών σχέσεων διολίσθησε στο να είναι εργαλείο των αμερικανών για πραξικόπημα στην Κύπρο. Εξέταση του ζητήματος αυτού όσο το δυνατό πιο βαθιά καθώς επίσης κα εξέταση του κυπριακού και ελλαδικού πολιτικού περιβάλλοντος ενόψει σεναρίων έναρξης περιπετειών στην Κύπρο με αποβίβαση, για πρώτη φορά, τουρκικών στρατευμάτων πάνω στο νησί υπό ασταθείς συνθήκες (η Τουρδύκ είναι άλλη περίπτωση άκρως αμφιλεγόμενη ως προς την νομιμότητά της όσο και οι «εγγυήσεις» και ενταγμένες σε ένα άλλο νομικοπολιτικό πλαίσιο). Στάσεις και εξέλιξη αυτών των στάσεων στο επίπεδο των ηγεμονικών δρώντων.

·         Εξέταση των εναλλακτικών θέσεων και στάσεων στα βαθιά κέντρα λήψης απόφασης του αμερικανικού πενταγώνου και του foreign office και η εξέλιξη αυτών των θέσεων ή σχεδίων ανάλογα με το πώς άλλαζαν οι στάσεις των εμπλεκομένων, ιδιαίτερα της Άγκυρας, της Αθήνας, της Βρετανίας και των υπερδυνάμεων.

·         Διευκόλυνση μιας εν δυνάμει και για πρώτη φορά τουρκικής στρατιωτικής εισβολής στην Κύπρο (την ίδια στιγμή που ο ίδιος ο Έλληνας πρωθυπουργός θολά, παραπονιάρικα και αδύναμα υπενθύμιζε την Συνθήκη της Λοζάνης.

·         Αρχές της δεκαετίας του 1960, διολίσθηση για παραχώρηση ελληνικής γης ως «αντάλλαγμα» για να εισέλθουμε μέσα σε ένα τέτοιο ασταθές ναρκοπέδιο.

·         Υπόγειες δραστηριότητες του αεικίνητου Υπουργού Εθνικής Άμυνας Γαρουφαλιά τον οποίο οι αμερικανοί θεωρούσαν τον «ισχυρό άνδρα» με τον οποίο η CIA θα μπορούσε με την πρώτη ευκαιρία να συνεννοηθεί για να εκτελεστεί αδίστακτα (σε αντίθεση με τον «ανίκανο» Παπανδρέου, όπως τον χαρακτήριζαν οι αμερικανοί) ένα ελλαδικό πραξικόπημα κατά του Μακαρίου για να  για να διευκολυνθεί η «ελεγχόμενη» τουρκική εισβολή στην Κύπρο που θα μετάτρεπε το νησί σε αμερικανική βάση (συν βέβαια Βρετανική και τουρκική παρουσία οπότε το ερώτημα που θα ζούσαν οι αυτόχθονες κάτοικοι).

·         Έλληνες πρέσβεις να εισηγούνται στους Αμερικανούς (αυτοί που διαπραγματευόντουσαν υποσχόμενοι λαγούς και πετραχήλια) την κατάληψη της Καρπασίας από τους Τούρκους.

·         Στρατηγικά σημαίνουσες συναλλαγές ΗΠΑ και Τουρκίας και Τουρκίας-ΕΣΣΔ.

·         Διαρκή τουρκική άρνηση και απόρριψη των πάντων από την Τουρκία με ολοφάνερο σκοπό να διευρύνει τις δυνατότητές της σε μια ευνοϊκή στιγμή για αυτή (που δεν άργησε να έλθει το 1974).

·         Διαρκείς επαφές των Τούρκων με όλους συμπεριλαμβανομένης της Σοβιετικής Ένωσης. Είδος, τακτικού ή στρατηγικού χαρακτήρα, μπλόφα και αποτελέσματα.

·         Δραστήρια Βρετανικά ενεργήματα στο παρασκήνιο των εξελίξεων.

·         Το Αμερικανικό σκεπτικό στο πιο υψηλό επίπεδο που δείχνει ότι γνώριζαν ότι η Σοβιετική κάθοδος στην Κύπρο είναι απίθανη κατιτί που υποδηλώνει τον προσχηματικό χαρακτήρα πολλών δηλώσεων στο διπλωματικό πεδίο και τον δημόσιο λόγο.

·         Ρητές και άρρητες διασυνδέσεις του παρακράτους πολλών ειδών και αποχρώσεων της Ελλάδας και της Κύπρου και όλων μαζί με ξένες δυνάμεις.

·         Τον τρόπο που συνδεόταν το ασταθές κοινωνικοπολιτικό πεδίο στην Αθήνα με το εξίσου ασταθές πολιτικό πεδίο της Κύπρου.

·         Τα γεγονότα που αυτά οδήγησαν στο πραξικόπημα του 1967

·         Οι σχέσεις Αθήνας – Λευκωσίας κατά την διάρκεια της διδακτορίας

·         Οι διπλωματικές επιλογές της Αθήνας και της Λευκωσίας μετά το 1967

·         Οι εξεγέρσεις κατά του κυπριακού κράτους αρχές του 1970, ρόλος όλων των πιο πάνω εμπλεκομένων

·         Πραξικόπημα σε όλες τους διασυνδέσεις με τα πιο πάνω και όλους τους εμπλεκόμενους

·         Εισβολή με όλες τις διασυνδέσεις του με τα πιο πάνω και όλους τους εμπλεκόμενους

·         Εκτιμήσεις για τη πορεία της Ελλάδας και της Κύπρου υπό το πρίσμα εναλλακτικών διλημμάτων και αποφάσεων. Εκτιμήσεις υψηλότερου ρίσκου αναφορικά με αυτές τις αποφάσεις και τις δυνατότητες, στρατηγικές και σκοπούς των δρώντων.

Τα πιο πάνω είναι μερικά ζητήματα που εκτυλίσσονται μέσα από το αρχειακό υλικό που ήδη διαθέτουμε και του οποίου η επεξεργασία άρχισε πριν μερικούς μήνες. Αυτά και πολλά άλλα μπορούν να συνεκτιμηθούν με τον σωστό τρόπο σε αναφορά με την στρατηγική δίνη της εποχής εκείνης όπως εξελίχθηκε την δεκαετία του 1960 στο πλαίσιο της αντιπαράθεσης του Ψυχρού Πολέμου. Αντιπαράθεση η οποία δημιουργούσε ένα πολύ ρευστό, ασταθές και δυναμικά κινούμενο ενδοκρατικό και διεθνές περιβάλλον. Υπό αυτό το πρίσμα οι παράγοντες που υπεισέρχονται σε κάθε ζήτημα διεθνούς πολιτικής όπως το επεισόδιο του σχεδίου Αναν είναι αναρίθμητοι και οι μεταξύ τους συνδυασμοί αμέτρητοι.

Γι’ αυτό και αποτελεί παρακμή η συναγωγή προφητειών του παρελθόντος για το πώς θα εξελίσσονταν τα πράγματα μιας και η ιστορία διδάσκει ότι όλα μαζί θα εισέλθουν μέσα στην δυναμική κινούμενη δίνη της διεθνούς πολιτικής όπου όπως μας πληροφορεί ο Υποδειγματικός –για την θεωρία διεθνών σχέσεων– Θουκυδίδης, η έκβαση κατά πάσα πιθανότητα θα είναι η εξής: «Δίκαιο (αυτού που το επιδιώκει) υπάρχει όταν υπάρχει ίση δύναμη για την επιβολή του και όταν αυτό δεν συμβαίνει ο ισχυρός κάνει ότι του επιτρέπει η δύναμή του και οι αδύναμοι υποχωρούν και προσαρμόζονται» ή σκοτώνονται και εξαφανίζονται (όπως έκαναν οι Αθηναίοι στους Μήλιους).

Ακόμη και αυτή η αξιωματική θέση, βέβαια, βρίσκεται υπό την αίρεση επαληθεύσεων και διαψεύσεων, λένε κάποιοι: Που ξέρεις, μπορεί να ήλθε η στιγμή όπου πλέον τα κράτη συμπεριφέρονται αλτρουιστικά και μεγαλόψυχα. Οπότε ξανά ο Θουκυδίδης μας προειδοποιεί: «λόγια που να στηρίζονται στο δίκαιο δεν λείπουν από κανένα, πιστεύουν όμως πως όσοι διατηρούν την ελευθερία τους το χρωστούν στη δύναμή τους … Η ελπίδα, παρηγοριά την ώρα του κινδύνου, όσους την έχουν από περίσσια δύναμη κι αν τους βλάψει δεν τους καταστρέφει  όσοι όμως, στηριγμένοι πάνω της, τα παίζουν όλα για όλα (γιατί απ’ τη φύση της είναι σπάταλη), μονάχα όταν αποτύχουν την γνωρίζουν, όταν πια, για κείνον που έκαμε τη γνωριμία της, δεν έχει απομείνει τίποτε για να το προφυλάξει απ’ αυτήν».

Ο λόγος για τον οποίο οι πολιτικοί επιστήμονες του διεθνούς συστήματος προχωρούν στην μελέτη των ιστορικών γεγονότων μπορεί να είναι μόνο ένας και μοναδικός: Η άντληση διδαγμάτων, η αναγνώριση των φυσιογνωμικών χαρακτηριστικών των δρώντων, η επαλήθευση ή διάψευση σταθερότερων κριτηρίων της διεθνούς πολιτικής, η ερμηνεία της διακρατικής δομής όπως προσδιορίζεται σήμερα και η συναγωγή αξιόπιστων πορισμάτων που αφορούν όλους ανεξάρτητα το τι μπορούν να κάνουν ή το πώς θα το κάνουν. Οι προφητείες και οι δίκες προθέσεων απαγορεύονται. Είναι τσαρλατανιές ή φτηνές εκλογικεύσεις δικαιολόγησης διαφόρων πραγμάτων.

            Υπό το ίδιο πρίσμα, η συνωμοτική ερμηνεία της ιστορίας ή η απόδοση προθέσεων και οι αλματώδεις προφητείες του παρελθόντος οδηγούν σε έωλα πολιτικοστοχαστικά εγχειρήματα τα οποία άμα συνδυαστούν πνευματικούς εκτροχιασμούς προκαλούν αβάστακτα λανθασμένες αποφάσεις. Για παράδειγμα, είναι ένα πράγμα η συνομωσιολογία ως δήθεν πολιτική ανάλυση της διεθνούς πολιτικής και άλλο η εξέταση της στρατηγικής των κρατών που εμπεριέχει τόσο φανερές όσο και μη διαφανείς ή μυστικές πτυχές. Το ίδιο ισχύει για την εξέταση πάγιων κριτηρίων στρατηγικών στάσεων, συμπεριφορών και ιεραρχήσεων και υπό το πρίσμα του γεγονότος ότι ένα κράτος είναι τόσο περισσότερο ανταγωνιστικό όσο περισσότερο μπορεί να συγκροτήσει σκοπούς και στρατηγικές επιλογές εκπλήρωσής τους.

Έτσι, για παράδειγμα, εξετάζοντας συγκριτικά την Ελλάδα και την Τουρκία ή άλλα κράτη με αφορμή το επεισόδιο των σχεδίων Άτσεσον την δεκαετία του 1990 διερευνούμε ζητήματα όπως τα εξής που προσδιορίζουν το ρίσκο, τις πιθανότητες επιτυχίας και τα διδάγματα για το παρόν και το μέλλον:

·         Ποια είναι η κοινωνικοπολιτική συνοχή.

·         Ποια δέσμευση της κοινωνίας στα εθνικά συμφέροντα επιβίωσης ενός κράτους.

·         Ποια είναι η ποιότητα του στρατηγικού προβληματισμού στο επίπεδο της πολιτικής και στρατιωτικής ηγεσίας και των επιστημονικών συζητήσεων.

·         Ποια είναι η σχέση δυνατοτήτων-σκοπών που τίθενται όταν ένα κράτος χαράσσει –εάν χαράσσει– μακροχρόνιους, μεσοπρόθεσμους και βραχυχρόνιους σκοπούς και όταν σχεδιάζει-εφαρμόζει στρατηγικές εκπλήρωσής τους.

·         Ποια είναι η ικανότητα των πολιτικών ηγετών να κατανοήσουν τον χαρακτήρα και τις λειτουργίες του διεθνούς συστήματος.

·         Ποια είναι η ποιότητα της διπλωματίας.

·         Ποιες είναι οι ποιοτικές βαθμίδες του επιστημονικού έργου που παράγεται σε εξειδικευμένους θεσμούς του κράτους ή στα πανεπιστήμια όσον αφορά την διεθνή πολιτική και την στρατηγική των άλλων κρατών.

·         Ποια είναι η σύνδεση αυτού του επιστημονικού έργου (το οποίο όταν εκπορεύεται πανεπιστημιακά δεσμεύει γιγαντιαίους σπάνιους πόρους) με τα πολιτικά δρώμενα.

·         Ποια η σχέση πολιτικής, στρατιωτικής και πνευματικής ηγεσίας.

·         Ποια είναι η πολιτική συναίνεση μεταξύ των πολιτικών παρατάξεων μιας χώρας γύρω από το έσχατο και υπέρτατο εθνικό συμφέρον της επιβίωσης.

·         Ποιος είναι ο βαθμός διάβρωσης της πολιτικής και πνευματικής ζωής (και των Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων) από ξένα συμφέροντα και από διεθνικούς δρώντες,

·         και τα λοιπά.

Πάντα υπό αυτό το πρίσμα, λοιπόν, και με δεδομένο ότι το μέχρι στιγμής (2013) το υλικό που καταφθάνει αφορά κυρίως την δεκαετία τις δεκαετίες του 1950 και 1960, ενώ υπάρχει περισσότερο αν όχι άφθονο για όλες τις περιόδους μέχρι και σήμερα, κανείς μπορεί να επιχειρήσει μια λογική διασύνδεση της στρατηγικής και των σκοπών των εμπλεκομένων γεγονότων παρελθουσών εποχών για να αντλήσει διδάγματα για το σήμερα ή το αύριο. Για παράδειγμα πως στοιχειοθετείται μια αλληλουχία αλληλένδετων γεγονότων και πως αυτό σχετίζεται με την συγκαιρινή συγκυρία. Μεταξύ άλλων:

·         Η δικτατορία στην Ελλάδα.

·         Το παρακράτος στην Ελλάδα και στην Κύπρο την δεκαετία του 1960.

·         Η ΕΟΚΑ Β στην Κύπρο.

·         Το πραξικόπημα του 1974 στην Κύπρο.

·         Το πώς εξελίχθηκε η τουρκική εισβολή και ποιες οι ομοιότητες με στρατηγικές περιγραφές πχ του επεισοδίου των σχεδίων Άτσεσον ή και προγενέστερων περιπτώσεων.

·         Πώς μεθοδεύτηκε διπλωματικά (και από τα ίδια μάλιστα πρόσωπα, πχ τον Μπώλλ) η διολίσθηση των ελλήνων σε διαπραγματεύσεις για δικοινοτική ομοσπονδία, στην συνέχεια σε διζωνική και λίγα χρόνια μετά στην αποκρυσταλλωμένη μορφή του σχεδίου Αναν που σήμαινε κατάλυση του κυπριακού κράτους, διασκορπισμό του πλούτου του και υποδούλωση της κοινωνίας του.

·         Το ίδιο το σχέδιο Αναν ως μια καταγεγραμμένη αποτύπωση στρατηγικών σκοπών που βλέπουμε να επιχειρείται να εκπληρωθούν ήδη από τις δεκαετίες του 1950, του 1960 και 1970.

·         Τον εξαρτημένο ή ανεξάρτητο ρόλο των διεθνών θεσμών και τα διδάγματα.

·         Την εξέλιξη της Ελλάδας και της Κύπρου στην μεταψυχροπολεμική εποχή υπό το φως πιο μακροχρόνιων τάσεων και ιδιαίτερα της στρατηγικής των μεγάλων δυνάμεων στις υπερπόντιες εξισορροπήσεις και ανταγωνισμούς.        

1.     Ο χαρακτήρας των ηγεμονικών παρεμβάσεων στην νεότερη ελληνική ιστορία και στην διεθνή πολιτική της ύστερης εποχής.

Κάθε διεθνές ζήτημα άμα τεθεί ενώπιο ενός πολιτικού επιστήμονα του διεθνούς συστήματος –πχ τα γεγονότα του 1955 στην Κωνσταντινούπολη ή το επεισόδιο του σχεδίου Άτσεσον– ακαριαία κατηγοριοποιείται και αρχίζει η εξέτασή του σε αναφορά με τα τρία επίπεδα ανάλυσης: Του Ανθρώπου, του κράτους και του διεθνούς συστήματος. Η λογική αλληλουχία μιας τέτοιας εξέτασης είναι, ιεραρχικά, πρώτον, η αναζήτηση λογικών ερμηνειών για την ένταξη του ερωτήματος στο διεθνές σύστημα, δεύτερον, η αναζήτηση στρατηγικών και σκοπών εντός των κρατών που το φωτίζουν, τρίτον, εξέταση αυτών των στρατηγικών και σκοπών κατά κράτος, τέταρτον, επιδίωξη βάσιμων εκτιμήσεων για την κατανομή ισχύος και πέμπτον, προσπάθεια σταθεροποίησης ερμηνευτικών πορισμάτων γενικότερου χαρακτήρα απαλλαγμένων συνδρόμων προφητειών του παρελθόντος ή του μέλλοντος.

Η επιτυχία ποτέ δεν είναι δεδομένη και γι’ αυτό υπάρχει μόνιμη βάσανος συνάρτησης των λεπτομερειών με τις γενικότερες διαπιστωμένες τάσεις (πχ μακροχρόνιες στρατηγικές ή πάγια χαρακτηριστικά των ηγεμονικών στρατηγικών), πειθαρχημένη περιγραφική αντικειμενικότητα, εστίαση του ενδιαφέροντος σε σημαντικά γεγονότα και σημαντικούς σκοπούς ανεξάρτητα από το επίπεδο ανάλυσης, προσπάθεια κατανόησης τι ενέχει διαχρονική και τι στιγμιαία σημασία, παραμερισμό γνωμών, προθέσεων  και δικών προθέσεων, εστίαση στην σχέση αιτίων και αιτιατών υπό περιπτωσιολογικό πρίσμα αλλά και υπό το πρίσμα πιο εδραιωμένων τυπολογιών στρατηγικής συμπεριφοράς, ανάδειξη διλημμάτων και προβλημάτων, εκτιμήσεις ρίσκου χωρίς τολμηρές εκτιμήσεις και προφητείες και αναζήτηση διδαγμάτων ηθικοπρακτικών και κοινωνικοπρακτικών προεκτάσεων.

Επειδή στο πεδίο της πολιτικής σκέψης η πολιτική θεολογία αφθονεί και επειδή στο μεγάλο αλισβερίσι του πνεύματος –το κυριότερο εκ των οποίων είναι το παρασιτικό αλισβερίσι στους ακαδημαϊκούς χώρους όπως διαμορφώθηκαν τους τελευταίους αιώνες και τα ιστοριογραφικά καφενεία ή τα στρεβλά απομνημονεύματα καταστροφικών πολιτικών ηγετών– οι πασαρέλες είναι πολλές. Αυτά δεν ενδιαφέρουν. Εμείς θα εμείνουμε σε μερικά ακόμη βασικά, ουσιώδη, αναγκαία και μη εξαιρετέα επιστημονικά και επιστημολογικά ζητήματα που προτάσσονται σε κάθε θεώρηση της διεθνούς πολιτικής. Αρχίζουμε με ιεραρχικά αντίστροφη αναφορά στα προαναφερθέντα τρία επίπεδα ανάλυσης.

Πρώτο επίπεδο: Άνθρωπος. Ο Άνθρωπος ότι και να πιστεύουμε παραμένει γεγονός ότι εξ αντικειμένου είναι πολιτειακά ενταγμένος. Γωνιές στον πλανήτη όπου κανείς θα μπορούσε να διαφύγει την πολιτειακή ένταξη πλέον δεν υπάρχουν. Πολιτικά ορθολογιστικά μιλώντας και επειδή κανείς δεν μπορεί να κατέβει μέσα στον άγνωστο υπαρξιακό ψυχικό και πνευματικό πυρήνα των όντων, ο άνθρωπος σταθμίζεται και εκτιμάται πολιτικά αναφορικά με τον τρόπο που είναι ενταγμένος στο πολιτειακό περιβάλλον.

Μεταξύ άλλων, οι βαθμίδες συμμετοχής του στο πολιτικό γίγνεσθαι, η πίστη και η νομιμοφροσύνη στην πολιτική κοινότητα στην οποία ανήκει, οι βαθμίδες ιδιωτείας ή πολιτειακά συμβατών πολιτικών στάσεων και η θέση του στην πολιτική ιεραρχία. Κανείς βουλιάζει στο βούρκο των ασυναρτησιών και των δικών ιδιοτελών προθέσεων –και πολλοί έτσι βουλιάζουν, διολισθαίνοντας συχνά και στο χείριστο είδος πολιτικής σκέψης, την απόδοση συλλογικών ευθυνών–  αν δεν κατανοήσει ότι η ανθρώπινη φύση είναι παντελώς άγνωστη στις αισθήσεις.

Η δίκη προθέσεων ιστορικών προσώπων είναι στοχαστική και πολιτική αθλιότητα. Η ανθρώπινη φύση είναι ευμετάβλητη και αστάθμητη και μπορεί να κυμαίνεται άγρια και απρόβλεπτα πάνω στο εκκρεμές όπου στον ένα πόλο είναι το κατά εποχή και κατά συγκυρία πολιτικά προσδιορισμένο ηθικά «χείριστο» ή «βέλτιστο» και το «θηριώδες και απολίτιστο» ή το «αγαθό και ενάρετο».

Μέτρο στάθμισης εκτίμησης της κάθε ατομικής ανθρώπινης φύσης δεν υπάρχει παρά μόνο ένα: Οι βαθμίδες προσαρμογή της ανθρώπινης ετερότητας στις πολιτικά πολιτισμένες προϋποθέσεις ενός έκαστου πολιτειακού βίου ανάλογα με την περίπτωση, την εποχή και την συγκυρία. Αυτές όπως λογικό κυμαίνονται ανάλογα με την πολιτική ανάπτυξη του πολιτικού πολιτισμού στις βαθμίδες της δημοκρατίας –όχι των ιδεολογικά και δογματικά προσδιορισμένων καθεστώτων αλλά τις καθοδικής ή ανοδικής φοράς κίνησης προς την πολιτική ελευθερία– και στις βαθμίδες κοσμοθεωρητικής δέσμευσης στην συλλογική Ελευθερία.

Συλλογική Ελευθερία η οποία, όπως είναι επίσης λογικό, προηγείται του πολιτικού πολιτισμού της δημοκρατίας ή καλύτερα αποτελεί προγραμματική προϋπόθεσή του. Αυτά είναι μερικά από τα πολλά κριτήρια που προσδιορίζουν τις βαθμίδες και ποιότητες της πολιτειακής συγκρότησης και που αξιολογούν το άτομο ως πολίτη πάνω στο ευρύ φάσμα του εκκρεμούς των κοσμοθεωρητικών, ηθικών, νομικών και εθιμικών στάσεων και συμπεριφορών. Δεδομένου μάλιστα ότι η ανθρώπινη φύση είναι εξ ορισμού ευμετάβλητη και αστάθμητη μόνο πολιτικές τυπολογίες την σταθμίζουν και εκτιμούν και όχι οι δίκες προθέσεων και ο ημέτερος υποκειμενικός κόσμος. Σπαρτιάτης ήταν τόσο ο Λεωνίδας όσο και ο Εφιάλτης πλην ο δεύτερος Μήδισε και ο πρώτος αποτύπωσε την διαχρονική υπέρτατη στάση υπεράσπισης της Ελευθερίας. Αμφότερα είναι φαινόμενα που ερμηνεύονται πολιτικά και όχι με παρατηρήσεις του υπαρξιακού τους πυρήνα ο οποίος μας είναι άγνωστος.

Εκτός αυτής της λογικής μόνο «αστυνομικές» αρμοδιότητες υπάρχουν. Οι δε επιθυμητές αξιολογήσεις μπορούν να γίνονται μόνο σύμφωνα με σταθεροποιημένα κοσμοθεωρητικά και πολιτικά πρότυπα για την (συλλογική) Ελευθερία. Τέλος, όσον αφορά τον άνθρωπο, πρέπει να πούμε ότι πάντοτε στην ιστορία της πολιτικής οργάνωσης υπήρχαν λιγότερο ή περισσότερο πολιτικά αξιολογήσιμα φαινόμενα που σχετίζονται με άτομα μεγαλύτερης ή μικρότερης  βαθμίδας ιδιωτείας. Είναι εκείνα τα άτομα που διαφεύγουν εν μέρει ή εν όλω της πολιτειακής ένταξης και των δια-πολιτειακών (διεθνών) ελέγχων.

Αυτοί μπορεί να είναι ανεξάρτητες μεταβλητές ή αντίστοιχα εξαρτημένες μεταβλητές πρακτικών ιδιωτείας ή στον διακρατικό ανταγωνισμό εξαρτημένες μεταβλητές άλλων κρατών εχθρικών προς το δικό τους. Η ιδιωτεία, δηλαδή, είναι και αυτή ένα πολιτικό φαινόμενο το οποίο υπό ορισμένες προϋποθέσεις μπορεί να σταθμιστεί και να εκτιμηθεί.  

Δεύτερο επίπεδο: Κράτος. Τα προαναφερθέντα μας οδηγούν στο δεύτερο επίπεδο: Το πολιτικό άτομο υπάρχει μόνο στον πολιτειακά ενταγμένο βίο τον οποίο και κρίνουμε σύμφωνα με τις εκάστοτε οντολογικές, ανθρωπολογικές και πολιτικές προϋποθέσεις. Η σύμμειξη και μέθεξη του απέραντου πνευματικοψυχικού κόσμου των πολιτών με όσα κριτήρια και παράγοντες του αισθητού κόσμου γνωρίζουμε, προσδιορίζει τις ανά πάσα στιγμή οντολογικές και ανθρωπολογικές προϋποθέσεις και την ανθρωπολογική ετερότητα κάθε πολιτικά οργανωμένης κοινωνικής οντότητας.

Προσδιορίζει επίσης τις βαθμίδες και τις ποιότητες κοινωνικοπολιτικής ωριμότητας στην προαναφερθείσα ανοδική ή καθοδική φορά του πολιτικού πολιτισμού. Τι μπορούμε λοιπόν να περιγράψουμε και να διδαχθούμε από την συγκρότηση των κρατών ή άλλων δρώντων στις κλίμακες, βαθμίδες και ιεραρχίες εάν κανείς επιχειρήσει να εξετάσει την διαδρομή της ελληνικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής από το 1945 μέχρι σήμερα.

Πως κινείται, πως δομείται, πως λειτουργεί και πως συγκροτείται το διεθνές σύστημα της Βεστφαλίας μεταπολεμικά και μεταψυχροπολεμικά με δεδομένο ότι αποτελείται από κυρίαρχα κράτη που δεν αποδέχονται καμιά εξουσία εκτός του δικού τους κράτους. Πως κρίνονται σημαντικά χαρακτηριστικά και λειτουργίες που αφορούν τις ιεραρχίες και την κατανομή συμφερόντων σε αναφορά με ζητήματα όπως η κρατική κυριαρχία, η συνεπαγόμενη διεθνής αναρχία, οι συναρτημένοι –με αυτή την αναρχία– διεθνείς θεσμοί, η κρατική ισχύς ως μέσο επιβίωσης ή ως μέσο πρόκλησης διεθνών αλλαγών και τα μονιμότερα χαρακτηριστικά της στρατηγικής των μεγάλων δυνάμεων απόρροια του μεγέθους τους, των στρατηγικών τους βλέψεων ή και των φόβων επιβίωσης από κινδύνους που προέρχονται από άλλες μεγάλες δυνάμεις.

Αυτό που θέλουμε να τονίσουμε εδώ είναι ότι σημασία έχει να εκτιμήσουμε όχι το καθεστώς κάθε κράτους αλλά τις βαθμίδες πολιτικής του ανάπτυξης και τον τρόπο που θέτει την ιεραρχία των σκοπών της διεθνούς πολιτικής. Ποιες ήταν για παράδειγμα οι βαθμίδες ανάπτυξης του νεοελληνικού κράτους τις δεκαετίες του 1950 και 1960 και πως αυτό συνδέεται με την εξωτερική πολιτική στην ιεραρχία της τυπολογίας των εθνικών συμφερόντων. Για να μιλήσουμε υπαινιχτικά, από τις ποιοτικές βαθμίδες τέτοιων πορισμάτων της πολιτικής επιστήμης της διεθνούς πολιτικής είναι που κρίθηκαν τα συμφέροντα της Ελλάδας –όπως κάθε άλλου κράτους και πρωτίστως σε αναφορά με την επιβίωση και την ευημερία– όταν η πανεπιστημιακά παραγόμενη γνώση ή γνώμη οδηγούσε σε ορθές ή αντίστροφα λανθασμένες εκτιμήσεις του μεταψυχροπολεμικού περιβάλλοντος ή του χαρακτήρα και των λειτουργιών της ευρωπαϊκής ενοποιητικής διαδικασίας και των διεθνών θεσμών.

Τρίτο επίπεδο: Διεθνές σύστημα. Λογικά έχει ήδη γίνει κατανοητός ο αλληλένδετος χαρακτήρας των τριών επιπέδων ανάλυσης και κυρίως του τρόπου που ο άνθρωπος συνδέεται με το κράτος και το κράτος με το διεθνές σύστημα. Το κρατικό γίγνεσθαι και κυρίως η εθνοκρατική του συγκρότηση τους τελευταίους αιώνες προσδιόρισε τα ήδη αναφερθέντα χαρακτηριστικά της διεθνούς πολιτικής και του πολιτικού ορθολογισμού ή αντίστροφα του πολιτικού ανορθολογισμού: Κρατική κυριαρχία, διεθνής αναρχία, εξαρτημένοι διεθνείς θεσμοί, εθνική ανεξαρτησία ως υπέρτατη κοσμοθεωρητική δέσμευση που προσδιορίζει την Ελευθερία όσων εθνοκρατών είναι πολιτικά κυρίαρχα, σωστή κατανόηση της ισχύος ενδοκρατικά και διακρατικά και σωστή κατανόηση της απουσίας παγκόσμιας πολιτικής ανθρωπολογίας και παγκόσμιου συστήματος διανεμητικής δικαιοσύνης. Σωστή επίσης σύγκριση με τις κοσμοσυστημικές δομές της προ-νεοτερικής εποχής που προϋποθέτει μια σωστή κατανόηση της συνεπαγόμενης εθνοκρατοκεντρικής δομής.

Όλως ιδιαιτέρως ως προς το τελευταίο, δύο επισημάνσεις: Πρώτον, η εξόχως πολιτικά αναπτυγμένη προ-νεοτερική εποχή (πριν τον 15ο αιώνα) δεν ήταν ανθρωπολογικά εξομοιωτική και δεν ήταν γραμμικά πολιτικά εξισωτική. Για να μην επεκταθούμε στο ανθρωποκεντρικά ώριμο κοσμοσυστημικό Παράδειγμα της Βυζαντινής Οικουμένης αναφέρουμε μόνο ότι σε καμιά ιστορική φάση της προ-νεοτερικής εποχής δεν παρατηρήθηκε κυριαρχία ιδεολογικών αντιλήψεων παρόμοιων με τα πολιτικά εξισωτικά και ανθρωπολογικά εξομοιωτικά ιδεολογικά δόγματα της μοντερνιστικής εποχής. Ακόμη και στις πιο δεσποτικές εποχές και με την εξαιρουμένων των λεηλασιών και εθνοκαθάρσεων εκ μέρους πολλών ηγεμονιών του παρελθόντος, η κοινωνική ετερότητα του κάθε έθνους εντός των αυτοκρατοριών προσδιόριζε και τον τρόπο της πολιτικής και πολιτισμικής του συγκρότησης όσο και, ανάλογα με τις βαθμίδες των κατά περίπτωση πολιτικών ιεραρχιών, την συμμετοχή του κάθε έθνους στο κοσμοσυστημικό πολιτικό γίγνεσθαι. Δεύτερον, η αντιστροφή αυτών των ιστορικών τάσεων μετά τον 16ο αιώνα οδήγησε σε δύο αντίρροπες τάσεις.

Από την μια πλευρά η εδαφικά οριοθετημένη εθνοκρατική συγκρότηση (παρακάμπτω το πώς έγινε υπό μοντερνιστικό πρίσμα, καθότι έχει εξεταστεί εκτενώς στο Κοσμοθεωρία των Εθνών) η οποία εισερχόμενοι στον 20 αιώνα είχε ήδη ριζώσει βαθύτατα εμπεδώνοντας το προαναφερθέν καθεστώς της κρατικής κυριαρχίας με όλα τα συμπαρομαρτούντα που κωδικοποιήθηκαν και ή επικυρώθηκαν στον Οργανισμό Ηνωμένων Εθνών το 1945. Αυτό το σύστημα δεν είναι καλό ή κακό αλλά Υπαρκτό και επιδεχόμενο περιγραφής και ερμηνείας. Αφετέρου, την αλλόκοτη και αντίρροπη τάση των ανθρωπολογικά και πολιτικά εξισωτικών και ανθρωπολογικά εξομοιωτικών διεθνιστικών δογμάτων.

Οι ανθρωπολογικά εξισωτικοί διεθνισμοί του 19ου και 20ου αιώνα γεννήθηκαν, κατά κάποιο τρόπο, εκ του γεγονότος της εθνοκρατοκεντρικής ανάπτυξης της διεθνούς πολιτικής και της νοσταλγίας των ανθρώπων να συνεχιστεί η κοσμοσυστημική δύο χιλιετιών μετά την κρατοκεντρική κλασική εποχή. Αφήνοντας κατά μέρος την συναρτημένη με τις ανθρωπολογικές προϋποθέσεις της νεότερης εποχής ερμηνεία της γένεσης των ιδεολογιών, στο σημείο αυτό στεκόμαστε σ’ ένα τρισδιάστατο κύριο ζήτημα χωρίς την κατανόηση του οποίου δύσκολα γίνονται αντιληπτά πολλά από τα ελλείμματα της σύγχρονης εποχής και του κάθε κράτους ξεχωριστά:

α) Η εθνοκρατοκεντρική πορεία μετά τον 16ο αιώνα έθρεφε, ταυτόχρονα, νοσταλγικές αναμνήσεις κοσμοσυστημικών εποχών. Αντί αυτό να οδηγήσει την πολιτική σκέψη στην αναζήτηση κοσμοσυστημικών προϋποθέσεων στα Παραδείγματα του παρελθόντος που λίγο πολύ άφηναν άθικτη την πνευματική ετερότητα κάθε κοινωνικής οντότητας κατάληξαν λόγω κυριαρχίας του μοντερνιστικού υλισμού στα κυρίαρχα υλιστικά ιδεολογικά δόγματα του 20ου αιώνα. Μια δηλαδή επίπεδη, εξισωτική και εξομοιωτική αντίληψη ένωσης του πλανήτη που παραγνωρίζει τις συλλογικές ουσίες και νοήματα παλιών και νέων εθνών.

β) Η αλληλεπίδραση εθνοκρατικής υποστασιοποίησης, διεθνιστικών εκκλήσεων και υλιστικών κρατικών δομών προκάλεσε αλλόκοτες, παράδοξες και μπερδεμένες κρατικοεθνικιστικές συμπεριφορές που έφθαναν μέχρι τα άκρα μιας μονοσήμαντης ρατσιστικής νοηματοδότησης του Κοινωνικού: Συμπληγάδες, από την μια μονοσήμαντες αξιώσεις ένωσης του πλανήτη και από την άλλη καθοδική πορεία του πολιτικού πολιτισμού προς ζωώδεις ρατσιστικές αντιλήψεις.

γ) Αναπόδραστα –και για κάθε λογικό πολιτικό επιστήμονα ορατό και αναμενόμενο– οι εκάστοτε ηγεμονικές δυνάμεις των δύο τελευταίων αιώνων δεν έχασαν την ευκαιρία να αδράξουν αυτά τα διεθνιστικά και ή κοσμοπολίτικα δόγματα για να μεταμφιέσουν οικουμενικιστικά τις πλανητικές αξιώσεις ισχύος στο πλαίσιο του πλανητικού τους ανταγωνισμού.

Εκτιμάται λοιπόν ότι η μελέτη της ελληνικής περίπτωσης σε μια κομβική ιστορική στιγμή που καλύπτει τον Ψυχρό Πόλεμο και την μεταψυχροπολεμική εποχή προσφέρεται ως έξοχο παράδειγμα μελέτης των ποικίλων πτυχών του διεθνούς συστήματος της ύστερης εποχής μέχρι όπως αυτό ταξιδεύει σε πολυτάραχες θάλασσες. Μια τέτοια ανάλυση είναι συγκρίσιμη με πολλές άλλες που αφορούν άλλες περιοχές, άλλα κράτη και παρόμοιες συνθήκες διεθνούς πολιτικής όπου λιγότερο ισχυρά περιφερειακά κράτη είτε λόγω απροσεξίας είτε λόγω ατυχίας βρέθηκαν στις συμπληγάδες των ηγεμονικών ανταγωνισμών.

2. Το «σχέδιο Άτσεσον» ως ένα «επεισόδιο» για την Ελλάδα και το διεθνές σύστημα      

Σκοπός. Σκοπός στις γραμμές που ακολουθούν δεν είναι να αναλυθεί το σχέδιο Άτσεσον καθότι δεν είναι παρά μόνο ένα επεισόδιο της ελληνικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής της περιόδου 1945-1974. Λόγω φλύαρων δημόσιων παρεμβάσεων που θολώνουν το τοπίο της δημόσιας συζήτησης θα κάνουμε μερικές μόνο αναφορές.

Θα δούμε λοιπόν συνοπτικά το τι θα μπορούσε και τι θα έπρεπε, μεταξύ άλλων και στοιχειωδώς, να συνεκτιμήσει κανείς πριν σταθμίσει και αποφανθεί για το σχέδιο Άτσεσον. Ενδεικτικά και αλληλένδετα θα αναφερθώ σε πέντε ζητήματα τα οποία στο πλαίσιο που αναφέρθηκε πιο πάνω επιβάλλεται να εξεταστούν περαιτέρω.

Πρώτον, την πολιτική δομή στην Ελλάδα και στην Κύπρο η οποία αν και διϋποκειμενικά γνωστή και αληθής είναι υπό την αίρεση βαθύτερων διερευνήσεων.

Δεύτερον, τις στρατηγικές ή την ανυπαρξία στρατηγικών των εμπλεκομένων.

Τρίτον, στοιχειώδεις αναφορές της στρατηγικής συγκυρίας της περιόδου 1955-1967 που αναβάθμισαν αλματωδώς την γεωπολιτική σημασία της Τουρκίας στην ιεραρχία των αμερικανικών μεθοδεύσεων.

Τέταρτον, στις στρατηγικές των μεγάλων εμπλεκομένων δυνάμεων και κυρίως στα τυπολογικά χαρακτηριστικά στην χάραξη, σχεδιασμό και εφαρμογή της αμερικανικής υψηλής στρατηγικής, καθώς επίσης και σε παγιωμένες ιεραρχίες σκοπών και μεθοδεύσεων.

Πέμπτον, εκλεκτικές παραθέσεις μερικών μόνο ενδεικτικών αποσπασμάτων οι οποίες από μόνες τους ανατρέπουν πλήρως τις γραμμικές ερμηνείες και τις προφητείες του παρελθόντος. Διαδοχικά, ο οξυδερκής αναγνώστης θα παρατηρήσει ολοφάνερα το γεγονός ότι η τύχη της Κύπρου και της Ελλάδας παίχτηκε στην κόψη του ξυραφιού και ότι σχεδόν συμπτωματικά διασώθηκαν προσωρινά εκ συμπτώσεως ή συγκυριών που θα φωτιστούν και αυτές δοκιμαστικά.

Επαναλαμβάνω ότι ανεξαρτήτως της ευκολίας με την οποία κανείς καταλήγει σε εύλογες εκτιμήσεις για τα γεγονότα και την σημασία τους, α) προφητείες του παρελθόντος δεν μπορούν να γίνουν, β) βαθύτερη γνώση θα απαιτήσει μια συγκροτημένη έρευνα, αξιολόγηση των διαφόρων επιπέδων ανάλυσης και κυρίως συνάρτησής τους με μετέπειτα γεγονότα που καταμαρτυρούν την αλληλουχία στρατηγικών σκοπών και μεθοδεύσεων.              

Σκιαγράφηση της συγκυρίας των αρχών του 1960. Αρχές της δεκαετίας του 1960 διαφαίνεται τόσο ο εύθραυστος χαρακτήρας των διευθετήσεων της Ζυρίχης όσο και οι τουρκικές μεθοδεύσεις να λησμονήσει τελείως την Συνθήκη της Λοζάνης και να κτίσει πάνω στα «εγγυητικά δικαιώματα» (κατά πολλούς αντίθετα στο διεθνές δίκαιο).

Στο πεδίο της ελλαδικής πολιτικής το λιγότερο που θα μπορούσε να πει κανείς είναι ότι όλοι εισήλθαν σε μια αστάθμητη δίνη κάτω από την οποία εκκολάπτονταν πολλά σχέδια πραξικοπημάτων από πολλούς σχεδόν πάντοτε συνδεδεμένων με στρατηγικές ξένων κρατών και τις μυστικές τους υπηρεσίες (εδώ τα αρχεία μπορούν να φανούν χρήσιμα καθότι μας πληροφορούν για σχέδια όχι και τόσο γνωστά).

Στο στρατηγικό πεδίο, έχουμε την κορύφωση της έντασης του Ψυχρού Πολέμου. Μετά την κρίση της Κούβας οι ΗΠΑ στην βάση πάγιων γεωπολιτικών κριτηρίων και σε αναφορά με το δόγμα της ανάσχεσης στην περίμετρο της Ευρασίας πίεζε την Σοβιετική Ένωση να συγκρατηθεί στην γεωπολιτική ενδοχώρα ενώ η τελευταία χωρίς να φθάνει στα άκρα πίεζε αντίστροφα.

Η ζώνη που κάλυπτε το CENTO βρισκόταν στον πυρήνα αυτής της στρατηγικής και η Τουρκία αναβαθμίστηκε στις ιεραρχίες των Δυτικών στρατηγικών ως υψίστης σημασίας κράτος. Στο πεδίο της ισχύος και των συμμαχιών η πλάστιγγα έγερνε υπέρ της Τουρκίας και εις βάρος της Ελλάδας. Με δεδομένη την ιστορική συγκυρία και στα δύο επίπεδα ανάλυσης (κράτη και στρατηγικό) η μόνη στρατηγική συμβουλή που θα μπορούσε να δώσει κανείς είναι η Ελλάδα και η Κύπρος ευφυώς να αποφύγουν να εισέλθουν στις συμπληγάδες του ηγεμονικού ανταγωνισμού γιατί θα βρίσκονταν σε άκρως μειονεκτική θέση.

Επίσης, ότι στην βάση πάγιων στάσεων και συμπεριφορών το ηγεμονικό κράτος όταν δύο περιφερειακά κράτη συγκρούονται επιλέγει ενεργήματα που οδηγούν σε κατανομή ισχύος που ωφελούν τον γι’ αυτό το ηγεμονικό κράτος γεωπολιτικά σημαντικότερο σύμμαχο. Εξίσου χρήσιμη συμβουλή είναι να μην εμπιστεύεται κανείς οποιονδήποτε και να συνομιλεί –πάντοτε με επιφύλαξη και αξιόπιστα– με τους ιεραρχικά σημαντικότερους συντελεστές του συστήματος λήψης αποφάσεων (στις ΗΠΑ με συντελεστές του Συμβουλίου Εθνικής Ασφαλείας και κατ’ ευθείαν με τον Πρόεδρο, ο ρόλος του Υπουργού Εξωτερικών εξαρτάται από το πρόσωπο και είναι κατά κύριο λόγο βοηθητικός και ενίοτε δεύτερης ή και τρίτης τάξης).

Την περίοδο 1960-63 η Τουρκία διαρκώς απειλούσε την Κύπρο,  συνωμοτούσε ακατάπαυστα και στην Ελλαδική και Κυπριακή πλευρά αντί συντεταγμένης συνεννόησης πάρθηκαν αποφάσεις χωρίς να υπάρχει το αναγκαίο υπόστρωμα πολιτικής συνοχής, στρατηγικής οργάνωσης και εφαρμογής στρατηγικής σε όλα τα πιθανά επίπεδα.

Έτσι, η αποστολή της Ελληνικής Μεραρχίας στην Κύπρο (λογική κατά τα άλλα απόφαση και στο κλίμα της εποχής και των αντιπαλοτήτων γύρω από την Κύπρο – όπως είπαμε όπως και όλα τα άλλα διερευνάται επιστημονικά αρμοδίως)  αντί μέσο διεξόδου κατάντησε να είναι πιόνι έξωθεν υποκινούμενων σχεδίων ενδό-ελληνικού πραξικοπήματος και διολίσθησης στο κενό ή καλύτερα στα χέρια των αντίπαλων κρατών.

Τέλος αλλά όχι το τελευταίο που θα μπορούσε να αναφερθεί για την τότε συγκυρία, ενώ οι παίχτες απέναντι στην Ελλάδα και στην Κύπρο λειτουργούσαν με σιδερένια συνοχή, οργάνωση και πειθαρχία η εικόνα στα δύο ελληνικά κράτη υποδήλωνε διάλυση, ασυνεννοησία, διλήμματα ασφαλείας!, αντιπάθειες, αποδιοργάνωση, παντελή άγνοια των στρατηγικών σκοπών και ιεραρχιών, διάβρωση από ξένες υπηρεσίες, καταστάσεις παρακράτους που και αυτές βρίσκονταν υπό ξένη επήρεια και αποδυναμωτική σπασμωδικότητα και νευρικότητα.     

3. Σχέδια Άτσεσον τον Αύγουστο και Σεπτέμβριο 1964.

Η ανάγνωση του υλικού που έχουμε μέχρι στιγμής στην διάθεσή μας καθιστά σαφές ότι το σχέδιο Άτσεσον αποτελούσε μια αμερικανική στρατηγική ελέγχου της Κύπρου με σκοπούς η ιεραρχία των οποίων αναμενόμενα θα άλλαζε (και έτσι έγινε) ανάλογα με την ισχύ, την στρατηγική και τους ελιγμούς των εμπλεκομένων. Μια τέτοια στρατηγική εμπλοκή για τις ΗΠΑ σήμαινε πολλές στρατηγικά ιεραρχημένες αποχρώσεις. Έτσι είναι πάντα στο πλαίσιο των εναλλακτικών σχεδίων δράσης ανάλογα με την συγκυρία και την εξέλιξη της κατανομής ισχύος, συμφερόντων και στρατηγικών. Όποιος πει ότι ανά πάσα στιγμή μια θέση θεωρείται δεδομένη είναι λάθος και στις πολιτικές της προεκτάσεις άκρως επικίνδυνη για την κοινωνία που απορροφά άκριτα τέτοιες τσαρλατανιές. Άλλη είναι η λογική λειτουργίας των μεγάλων δυνάμεων και εάν δεν την ξέρεις μένεις στην άβυσσο της άγνοιας και των επικίνδυνων απλουστεύσεων. Οι πασίδηλοι σκοποί λοιπόν που διερευνώνται περαιτέρω ήταν οι εξής:

α) Να καταστεί η Κύπρος ορμητήριο των ΗΠΑ και του ΝΑΤΟ στην αντιπαράθεση Ανατολής-Δύσης (και ασφαλώς να μην περιπέσει η Κύπρος στην Σοβιετική Σφαίρα, κατιτί που όπως και θα ειπωθεί από τον Μπωλλ στον Πρόεδρο στην κρίσιμη σύσκεψη της 8ης Σεπτεμβρίου δεν ήταν κάτι το αναμενόμενο).

β) Προσπάθεια μεν να εκπληρωθεί αυτός ο στόχος χωρίς όμως κατά προτίμηση να συγκρουστούν Ελλάδα και Τουρκία (αυτό ακαριαία και άκαμπτα οριοθετούσε το εγχείρημα και τα εναλλακτικά σχέδια των ΗΠΑ εκτός και αν κανείς έχει ένδειξη ότι η Τουρκία θα δεχόταν οτιδήποτε άλλο εκτός από μια εδραία και μόνιμη παρουσία στην Κύπρο ως αφετηρία του επόμενου βήματος στο πλαίσιο της ελληνοτουρκικής αντιπαράθεσης που ποτέ δεν σταμάτησε – και που αποτελούσε συστημικού χαρακτήρα διένεξη, όπως τα γεγονότα καταμαρτυρούν διαχρονικά).

γ) Εάν η Τουρκία δεν συναινέσει σε μια περιορισμένη (σύμφωνα με τα αμερικανικά κριτήρια) κατάκτηση στρατιωτικού προγεφυρώματος στην Κύπρο (κατά την εκτίμησή μου ενοίκιο ή μόνιμη είναι δευτερεύον εκτός και αν τερματιζόταν για πάντα η ελληνοτουρκική αντιπαράθεση κατιτί που όπως γνωρίζουμε δεν ισχύει) τότε εξώθηση σε «ελεγχόμενη κρίση που θα έφερνε την Τουρκία σε διαπραγματευτική ισχυρή θέση» (βλ. στα έγγραφα πιο κάτω) και επιβολή των προδιαγεγραμμένων σκοπών.

δ) Οι Αμερικανοί με συγκλονιστικό για την Ελλάδα τρόπο –αλλά και καθοριστικό για την έκβαση της κρίσης αν άρχιζε κατιτί με σπασμωδικές ανακηρύξεις εν μέσω ελληνικού εμφυλίου– θεωρούσαν δύο πράγματα δεδομένα: Αφενός ο Έλληνας πρωθυπουργός ήταν αναλώσιμο υποχείριό τους απαξιώνοντάς τον διαρκώς ως δημαγωγό, ανίκανο κτλ. Αφετέρου, ότι ανά πάσα στιγμή ήλεγχαν πλήρως το ελλαδικό πολιτικοστρατιωτικό πεδίο με προεξάρχοντα βέβαια «άνθρωπό τους» τον Υπουργό Άμυνας Γαρουφαλιά. Είναι εξίσου συγκλονιστική, επιπλέον, προσδοκία των ΗΠΑ και ο θυμός τους αργότερα όταν δεν εκπληρώθηκε, ότι έλληνες θα εκτελούσαν ενδό-ελληνικά στρατιωτικά πραξικοπήματα τα οποία αυτοί στην συνέχεια θα ενέτασσαν στα γνωστά εναλλακτικά σενάρια δράσης (contingency plans μερικά από τα οποία αναδύονται εδώ και εκεί μέσα από όσες πληροφορίες διέτρεξα μέχρι στιγμής.

ε) Οι Τούρκοι απέρριπταν πάντοτε όλες τις προτάσεις αναμένοντας καλύτερη ευκαιρία που ήλθε το 1974. Τελεσιδίκως απέρριψαν το σχέδιο Αναν με την αποστολή της επιστολής Ερκίν ενώ η Τουρκία την ίδια στιγμή είχε δίαυλους επικοινωνίας με την Σοβιετική Ένωση για το θέμα της «ομοσπονδίας» (που ευνοούσε την περαιτέρω ενδό-Νατοϊκή διχόνοια που κατά βάση ήθελε η ΕΣΣΔ). Ο πασίδηλος σκοπός της Άγκυρας ήταν να συρθούν όλοι στο πεδίο στρατιωτικών παιγνίων όπου η γεωπολιτική της σημασία θα μετρούσε εξαιρετικά. Τρόπος να γίνει διαφορετικά ότι εκδουλεύσεις και να προσέφεραν οι ελλαδίτες συνομιλητές τους δεν υπήρχε γιατί η Τουρκία χαρακτηριστικά είπε αν ανακηρυχθεί η ένωση θα εισβάλει «ακόμη και εάν όλος ο κόσμος θα στραφεί εναντίον της». Εξαιρετικά σημαντικό και συναφές, πολλά κείμενα που έχουμε ήδη στην διάθεσή μας οι αμερικανοί καθιστούν ξανά και ξανά σαφές (μεταξύ τους και σε συνομιλίες με Έλληνες) αφενός ότι ποτέ δεν θα πολεμήσουν τον τουρκικό στρατό και αφετέρου ότι ποτέ δεν θα παρεμβληθούν μεταξύ τουρκικού στρατού και Κύπρου. Μόνο και μόνο αυτή η ανέλπιστα ξεκάθαρη θέση (γιατί είναι ανέλπιστο να υπάρχει έστω και μια σταθερή θέση, πλην αυτή δικαιολογείται από την στρατηγική συγκυρία) δείχνει τους κινδύνους που διέτρεξαν οι Έλληνες εάν σύρονταν στην κλίνη του Προκρούστη των στρατηγιών παιγνίων.

στ) Το πώς θα εξελίσσονταν τα εναλλακτικά σενάρια δράσης κανείς δεν μπορεί να ξέρει γιατί έχουν όπως θα εξηγήσουμε πιο κάτω την δική τους δυναμική πάντοτε αρνητική για τον λιγότερο ισχυρό.                

Μια πρώτη εκτίμηση είναι ότι το πραξικόπημα που ο πρωθυπουργός της Ελλάδας σχεδίαζε, υποσχέθηκε και τελικά δεν έκανε συνωμοτώντας με ξένες δυνάμεις θα έβαζε Ελλάδα και Κύπρο σε ναρκοπέδιο τελικού θανάτου. Για τι επιτυχία να μιλάμε όταν θα διατρέχαμε ένα κίνδυνο ενδο-ελληνικού εμφυλίου και ταυτόχρονης πολυμέτωπης στρατιωτικής σύγκρουσης. Κάτι σημαντικό που δεν μπόρεσα να δω μέχρι στιγμής είναι το κατά πόσο είχε εμπλακεί και η σοβιετική ένωση, με την οποία η Άγκυρα βρισκόταν σε επικοινωνία.  Ότι διάβασα μέχρι στιγμής επιβεβαιώνουν αυτές τις πρώτες εκτιμήσεις και επιφυλάσσομαι.

Σε μια πολιτική συζήτηση και περισσότερο σε μια συγγραφή πολιτικής ιστορίας δίκη προθέσεων, όπως είπαμε, δεν χωρεί. Υπάρχει όμως ένα κόκκινο σύνορο και μια διόλου αμελητέα ελαστική κλίμακα. Όσοι στην κυπριακή πλευρά το 1964 δεν δέχθηκαν τους κινδύνους μιας εισόδου σε ναρκοπέδιο ή αντέδρασαν με θυμό στις συνομωσίες (με ξένους!) του Γεωργίου Παπανδρέου για πραξικοπήματα, η στάση τους συνάδει με μια βασική αρχή εξωτερικής πολιτικής: Σεν χωρούν τυχοδιωκτικές στάσεις επί ζητημάτων που αφορούν την εθνική επιβίωση. Εδώ έχουμε όχι πρόθεση αλλά σύνεση και διπλωματικό ορθολογισμό. Ο Μακάριος και στο τέλος ο Γρίβας φαίνεται ότι έτσι στάθηκαν.

Μελετώντας τα παθήματα για να αντλήσουμε μαθήματα, κανείς θα πρέπει να καταλήξει σε εκτιμήσεις για το χαμηλό ή υψηλό ρίσκο μιας απόφασης ή μιας στάσης. Για παράδειγμα, είναι ένα πράγμα να εισέλθεις εντός ενός ναρκοπεδίου απροετοίμαστος και έχοντας πλήρη άγνοια του πεδίου και άλλο να ριψοκινδυνέψεις μια μάχη ακόμη και ένοπλη συνεκτιμώντας τους παράγοντες που την επηρεάζουν και προσπαθώντας να σχεδιάσεις μια στρατηγική ελέγχου και επηρεασμού αυτών των παραγόντων σύμφωνα με τα συμφέροντά σου.

            Για να φωτίσουμε έστω και λίγο –για όνομα του Θεού, να φωτίσουμε λίγο, όχι για να γίνουμε προφήτες του παρελθόντος– μείζον είναι αφενός έγκυρη γνώση πάγιων στρατηγικών συμπεριφορών των κρατών που κάθε καλός διεθνολόγος (ή ως προς τούτο πολιτικός ηγέτης πρέπει να) γνωρίζει και αφετέρου, οι μακροπρόθεσμοι στρατηγικοί σκοποί στους οποίους προσαρμόζονται ευέλικτα και ελαστικά οι βραχυπρόθεσμοι και μακροπρόθεσμοι στρατηγικοί σκοποί. Για παράδειγμα, την στιγμή που γράφονται αυτές οι γραμμές, αυτό πρέπει να ξέρουμε για να διατυπώσουμε έγκυρες εκτιμήσεις στην Συρία ή την Αίγυπτο, το Ιράν ή την Λιβύη και όχι για να έλθουμε μετά από εκατό χρόνια για να προφητέψουμε τι θα γινόταν εάν ο Α ή Β τηρούσε την Α έως Ω στάση την στιγμή που πολλά για να μην πω σχεδόν όλα είναι αγνώστων συνδυασμών και αγνώστου επενέργειας.

Σε κάθε ιστορική εποχή, σε κάθε περιοχή, σε κάθε κράτος, σε κάθε στιγμή και σε κάθε φάση όπως εξελίσσονται τα πράγματα έχουμε μια δυναμική δίνη ενδοκρατικών, διεθνών και συχνά τυχαίων και πάντοτε ρευστών γεγονότων και ρευστών διαμορφωτικών δυνάμεων.

Το υπόβαθρο είναι άγνωστο πως συγκροτήθηκε και εξελίχθηκε. Κυρίως είναι άγνωστη η δυναμική αλληλεπίδραση της ετερογονίας και ρευστότητας των σκοπών και των εκατοντάδων ή και χιλιάδων κριτηρίων και παραγόντων εσωτερικής και εξωτερικής πολιτικής που μεταξύ τους επιδέχονται δισεκατομμύρια!!! συνδυασμούς ανάλογα με τις ποιοτικές βαθμίδες στην χάραξη, σχεδιασμό και εφαρμογή μιας κρατικής δύναμης.

Συχνά, εάν ένα εθνοκράτος είναι ανεπαρκές στην χάραξη και εφαρμογής εθνικής στρατηγικής ή εάν οι σκοποί είναι αντικειμενικά ανέφικτοι αυτά τα δισεκατομμύρια συμπλέκονται δυναμικά και αυτόνομα και «ότι βγάλει το χάος» (αυτό συμβαίνει πολύ συχνά στους Έλληνες αλλά και σε πολλούς άλλους απρόσεκτους και ασθενείς ως συλλογικότητα εξ ου και συχνά αγόμαστε και φερόμαστε άβουλα, σπασμωδικά και απρόβλεπτα).

Για αυτούς και πολλούς άλλους λόγους ιστορικοί προφήτες του μέλλοντος δεν υπάρχουν!! Είτε κατανοεί κανείς αυτή την αλήθεια είτε κοιτάζει το δάκτυλο του ποδιού του εθελοτυφλώντας και φορώντας παρωπίδες για να εκπληρώσει άλλους σκοπούς (κατά τα άλλα ενδεχομένως για αυτόν και τους φίλους τους στην βάση ιδιοτελούς αντίληψης της ζωής αυτοί οι σκοποί να είναι πολύ θεμιτοί αλλά δεν κρίνεται αυτό εδώ αλλά η επιστημολογία και η μεθοδολογία της πολιτικής επιστήμης του διεθνούς συστήματος και οι επικίνδυνα αιωρούμενες εκτιμήσεις ή οι πιο γήινες, νηφάλιες και σταθμισμένες εκτιμήσεις). 

            Το ζήτημα κατά συνέπεια άρχισε να γίνεται πιο σοβαρό και ξεφεύγει τελείως της συζήτησης που άρχισε στο διαδίκτυο με αφορμή μια επιφυλλίδα στον Φιλελεύθερο και με αιτιολογημένα επιχειρήματα στην βάση θέσεων και όχι προσώπων συνηγόρησα με την υποψηφιότητα του Γιώργου Λιλλήκα για πρόεδρο της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας.

Η αγριότητα των εχθρικών αντιδράσεων σε αναφορά με πρόσωπα και ιστορικά γεγονότα ήταν ενδεικτική και χαρακτηριστική και πυροδότησε δεκάδες απρόκλητους διαξιφισμούς ενταγμένους στην ανεπίτρεπτη για μια πολιτεία, διχοτομία «εχθρών» και «φίλων» επί υποθέσεων που αποτελούν έσχατες λογικές κάθε βιώσιμης κοινωνίας, δηλαδή για το θέσφατο της Ελευθερίας-Εθνικής Ανεξαρτησίας (το μοναδικό ζήτημα που ανέδειξα στις παρεμβάσεις μου θεωρώντας το ως είθισται απαραβίαστο και ανεύθυνο να το θέτεις σε κίνδυνο).

Προσωρινά λοιπόν για τις ανάγκες του παρόντος προκαταρτικού σημειώματος βάζω τίτλους και συνδέσμους για να διευκολύνω όποιο θα ήθελε να το δει κάποιες άλλες αναλύσεις. Τα ζητήματα που θίγονται στο παρόν τυγχάνουν, όπως αναφέρθηκε στην αρχή, επιστημονικής έρευνας που αναγκαστικά θα είναι μακρόχρονη.

Τα παρόν κείμενο ως εκ της φύσεώς του περισσότερο την λογική επικαλείται και όχι κάποια αξίωση για βαθυστόχαστες αναλύσεις. Ούτως ή άλλως, στα επίπεδα και πρόχειρα ιστορικά ανέκδοτα που πρέπει να απαντώνται στη εκάστοτε συγκυρία που εκδηλώνονται, το παρόν όπως διαμορφώθηκε επαρκεί. 

Μέρος διατυπώσεων που αφορούν επιστημολογικές και ιστορικές πτυχές είναι χρήσιμες ως μαγιά μιας ερευνητικής αφετηρίας. Πολλές από τις τυπολογίες και πολλοί από τους ορισμούς είναι πρωτότυποι και προσαρμοσμένοι στην επιστημονική ανάπτυξη ενός πολιτικού επιστήμονα ή μιας ομάδας επιστημόνων.

Υπογραμμίζω: Δεν με ενδιαφέρουν τα ιδεολογικό-κομματικά, λειτουργώ αναλυτικά με όρους πολιτικής τυπολογίας, όρων και εννοιών με τα οποία είμαι από καιρό δεσμευμένος, παρεμβαίνω μόνο για ζητήματα που αφορούν την Ελευθερία και την Εθνική Ανεξαρτησία, τα επιχειρήματα σχετίζονται με θέσεις και τυποποιημένους πολιτικούς ελέγχους και όχι πρόσωπα και η ιεράρχηση των προσώπων στην κλίμακα των προτιμήσεων εντάσσεται και πειθαρχείται από αυτή την λογική.    

Το «παλιοχάρτια», τώρα. Είναι γνωστός αυτος ο προκλητικός όρος για πολλούς ασκητικούς τύπους οι οποίοι αφοσιώνονται στην αρχειακή δουλειά ή στο ξεφύλλισμα χιλιάδων σελίδων οι οποίες υποχρεωτικά παρελαύνουν μπροστά τους και τους κατακλύζουν.

Η ιεράρχηση τω σημασιών αποτυπώνει μια αναπόφευκτη και αναγκαία βάσανο των σοβαρών ερευνητών όταν κολυμπώντας μέσα σε ένα ωκεανό «εγγράφων», εκθέσεων και δηλώσεων ή αναλύσεων που τα αξιολογούν «ιστορικά» προσπαθούν να μιλούν γήινα και όχι προπαγανδιστικά η με όρους πολιτικής θεολογίας ή αυθαίρετων αλμάτων συλλογισμών που εξυπηρετούν γούστα και ιδιοτροπίες.

Τα έγγραφα και άλλες αποτυπωμένες πληροφορίες σχεδόν πάντα τα γράφουν διαφορετικά άτομα ή ομάδες και σε χρονικά κα πολιτικά διαφορετικές περιόδους και περιστάσεις. Για το ζήτημα αυτό, βέβαια, υπάρχου έξοχα κείμενα ιστορικής μεθοδολογίας τα οποία κανείς μπορεί να αναζητήσει.

Τα «έγγραφα» λογικό είναι συχνά να αποτυπώνουν την στιγμή και συχνά την προσωπική γνώμη ή εκτίμηση χωρίς την παραμικρή αξία. Λογικό είναι επίσης είναι ακόμη και αν αξίζουν κάτι να πρέπει να αξιολογηθούν μέσα σε ένα μεγάλο ιστορικό χείμαρρο που τα παρασέρνει ή μέσα σε μια δυναμική δίνη ενδοκρατικών και διακρατικών επιλογών οι οποίες σχεδόν πάντοτε ακόμη και εάν είναι συμμαχικές (η ακόμη και να συγκρούονται για ενδοκρατικούς λόγους ή και ενδο-κυβερνητικούς λόγους). Αυτά όλα και πολλά άλλα «αξιολογούνται». Δηλαδή: «τρέχα γύρευε». Γι’ αυτό και με τα έγγραφα κανείς θα πρέπει να είναι επιφυλακτικός εάν δεν συνδέονται με αποτελέσματα και διϋποκειμενική εμπειρία όπως η ιστορία ρέει.

Το κάθε τι από αυτά είναι καραβάκι μέσα στην τρικυμισμένη θάλασσα της ενδοκρατικής και διεθνούς πολιτικής, για να μην μιλήσω για τα τυχαία γεγονότα. Επίσης, τις σκόπιμες ή μη παρανοήσεις ή παραπληροφορήσεις επί μιας υπόθεσης της εξωτερικής πολιτικής η οποία την «στιγμή» της πολιτικής πράξης για τα σοβαρά κράτη είναι μέσα σε «κλειστό και αδιαφανές διπλωματικό κουτί» όπου χαράσσεται, σχεδιάζεται και εφαρμόζεται η στρατηγική της οποίας μερικοί σκοποί είναι γνωστοί και σκόπιμα διακηρυγμένοι και άλλοι άγνωστοι συχνά ακόμη και στους ίδιους τους εργαλειακά κινούμενους αντιπροσώπους και διαπραγματευτές στην βάση ρητών οδηγιών που διαρκώς αλλάζουν.

Αυτός είναι εξάλλου ο ρόλος των διπλωματών και συχνά και των υπουργών εξωτερικών οι οποίοι συχνά κινούνται με τις παρωπίδες που τους φορούν τα «γεράκια» που σχεδιάζουν, χαράσσουν και συνεχώς επαναπροσδιορίζουν την στρατηγική. Θα τόνιζα ότι ο καλός διπλωμάτης και ο καλός υπουργός εξωτερικών εάν κατ’ εξαίρεση δεν είναι ο ίδιος που χαράσσει και εφαρμόζει την στρατηγική όπως η περίπτωση ενός Κίζιγκερ, πρέπει να φορά αυτές τις παρωπίδες αδιαμαρτύρητα για να αφήνει τους «κεντρικούς» να ενώνουν τα νήματα και να επαναπροσανατολίζουν.

Αυτός είναι και ο λόγος για τον οποίο διαβάζουμε δηλώσεις η θέσεις ενός Υπέξ και ο γνώστης διερωτάται γόνιμα για να βοηθήσει ή αν συνοψίζει ότι ξέρει για να δείξει ότι υπάρχει ή για να εκμαιεύσει πληροφορίες, οδηγίες ή και εντολές.         Συχνά οι διπλωμάτες και μερικές φορές οι ίδιοι οι υπουργοί εξωτερικών είναι άβουλοι και εργαλειακοί μεταδότες λανθασμένων μηνυμάτων προς του υπόλοιπους δρώντες. Στις ΗΠΑ πχ είναι γνωστός ο παραγκωνισμός των υπουργών εξωτερικών οι οποίοι είθισται να είναι αγγελιαφόροι ή και κράχτες παραπληροφόρησης, εξ ου και υπάρχουν παράπονα και παραιτήσεις.

Αν νομίσουμε ότι μια «άποψη» ή κάποια άλλη που είδαμε μετά από 100 χρόνια είναι «μπάμπ και κάτω» ερμηνεία πολύ πιθανό σφάλλουμε φρικτά. Και την στιγμή της πολιτικής πράξης αν κανείς κάνει τέτοια λάθη είτε παθαίνει μεγάλες ζημιές είτε πεθαίνει. Για τις ΗΠΑ θα επανέλθω πιο κάτω γιατί η δομή και τρόπος λήψης αποφάσεων και οι ιεραρχίες των συντελεστών αν δεν είναι γνωστές δυνατό να οδηγήσουν σε αναπόδραστα και ιλαροτραγικά λάθη μοιραίων προεκτάσεων.

Τα έγγραφα λοιπόν, οι εκθέσεις και κάθε άλλο που σήμερα είναι μπροστά μας ή και κατά εκατομμύρια αναρτημένες πληροφορίες στο διαδίκτυο, απαιτούν βασανιστική αξιολόγηση και ιεράρχηση. Αυτό είναι προϋπόθεση για να ξεπεταχθούν τα δευτερεύοντα ή αποπροσανατολιστικά και να κρατηθούν τα ενδεχομένως σημαντικά τα οποία στην συνέχεια είναι νόμος πως πρέπει να αναλυθούν και αξιολογηθούν «in context». Με επιφύλαξη, επίσης, του γεγονότος ότι είναι μια σταγόνα του ωκεανού ή και μια παραπληροφόρηση της στιγμής ή μια διατύπωση γνώμης σε ένα μεγάλο σύστημα λήψης αποφάσεων.

Διόλου τυχαία πολλοί διεθνολόγοι, και πολύ σωστά κάνουν, στέκονται στα μακροϊκονομικά γεγονότα και μόνο όταν αυτά έχουν τελείως και πασιφανώς εμπεδωθεί ως πραγματικότητα. Κρατούν έτσι τον ρόλο, κατά το δυνατό, του αξιολογικά ελεύθερου αναλυτή που σταθμίζει, εκτιμά και αντλεί σωστά μαθήματα αφήνοντας την εμπράγματη στρατηγική και πολιτική τέχνη στους πολιτικούς δρώντες οι οποίοι ανά πάσα στιγμή είναι επιτυχείς και αποτελεσματικοί μόνο εάν εκπληρώσουν προδιαγεγραμμένους και ιεραρχημένους σκοπούς.

Υπέρτατος αξιολογικά ελεύθερος, σωστά περιγραφικός και παραγωγός ερμηνειών διαχρονικής σημασία είναι, αναμφίβολα, ο Θουκυδίδης. Όπως εξήγησα σε προγενέστερο σημείωμά μου, μεταξύ άλλων, αποσυνδέει την ιδιοτέλειά του ή τις προτιμήσεις του από την περιγραφή, βλέπει καθαρά την λογική και την ιδιοτέλεια των φορέων πολιτικής δράσης, κρατά ότι είναι σημαντικό από τις στιγμές (το μεγαλύτερό του επίτευγμα, κατά πολλούς), είναι επιφυλακτικός και συγκρατημένος στις εκτιμήσεις δυναμικών και αστάθμητων γεγονότων και αναδεικνύει σε αξιωματικά πορίσματα διαχρονικής και αναλλοίωτης σημασίας ότι είναι μάθημα της ιστορίας.

Μπορούμε να ξέρουμε έτσι τα αίτια του Πελοποννησιακού Πολέμου και πάγιες συμπεριφορές των ανθρώπων ως άτομα και ως συλλογικότητες αλλά δεν μπορούμε να κάνουμε τους προφήτες για το τι θα γινόταν αν πχ ο Περικλής δεχόταν ή δεν δεχόταν το ένα ή το άλλο ή πως θα εξελισσόταν η ιστορία αν το πρωί πριν πάει στον Δήμο είχε πονοκέφαλο ή τσακώθηκε με την γυναίκα του. Σίγουρα δεν μπορούμε να κάνουμε δίκη προθέσεων του Περικλή. Μπορούμε να πούμε όμως ότι διαβάζοντας τις δημηγορίες του πάνω στο εκκρεμές της πίστης και της νομιμοφροσύνης είναι αδιατάραχτα προσκολλημένος στην Ελευθερία, την εθνική συμφέροντα και τα έσχατα συμφέροντα επιβίωσης της πατρίδας του Αθήνας.

Με βάση την αξιωματική γνώση ή νόμο του Θουκυδίδη και τις μετέπειτα θεμελιωμένες επεξεργασίες αιτίων και αιτιατών στην διαχρονική αλυσίδα της ενδοκρατικής και διακρατικής ζωής κρίνονται και οι ποιοτικές βαθμίδες της γνώσης στην πολιτική επιστήμη και στην πολιτική επιστήμη του διεθνούς συστήματος. Αυτό, παρεπιπτόντως είναι και το μέτρο στάθμισης της θεωρητικής γνώσης και των ποιοτικών βαθμίδων όσων εμφανίζονται με κάποιο τίτλο λέγοντας ότι είναι «θεωρία». Η καλή θεωρία κτίζει πάνω στο Υπόδειγμα της αξιωματικής γνώσης –εκτός και αν ανατραπεί το Υπόδειγμα, πχ έχουμε ένα βιώσιμο και κοινωνικά νομιμοποιημένο παγκόσμιο κράτος– και βασανιστικά  επιχειρεί ασταμάτητα να αντλήσει μαθήματα χρήσιμα για την εμπράγματη πολιτική ζωή που φωτίζουν καλύτερα την Υποδειγματική γνώση.

Τα «μαθήματα» του Υποδείγματος και της καλής θεωρίας είναι οντολογικά εδρασμένα και αυτή ενώ όταν δεν είναι μια από τις πολλές σαπουνόφουσκες της πολιτικής θεολογίας που κατά καιρούς παράγουν οι άνθρωποι.

Η καλή γνώση έχει γήινη σημασία –πνευματική και αισθητή– και όχι εναέρια ή επουράνια. Εδώ ακριβώς πρέπει να αναζητήσουμε και τα εκατομμύρια σαπουνόφουσκες των ιδεολογιών, των ιδεολογημάτων και των θεωρημάτων των τριών τελευταίων αιώνων όταν κυριάρχησαν επίπεδες υλιστικές θεωρήσεις πνευματικά στερημένες («ανάγκη» διαμόρφωσης των δουλοπαροίκων) και που ακούνε σε διάφορα αριστερά και δεξιά ονόματα και στις άπειρες αποχρώσεις τους. Από την μια πλευρά είναι οι ιδεολογικά εκπαιδευμένοι μέσα στα προπαγανδιστικά εκκολαπτήρια της Δύσης και της Ανατολής (πολλά έχουν και επιθετικό προσδιορισμό προγραμματικής «εγκυρότητας»: «πανεπιστήμιο») και από την άλλη πλευρά είναι οι αναρίθμητοι «οπαδοί». Όλοι μαζί –αφθονούν στα ασθενή και λικνιζόμενα μη βιώσιμα κράτη ή κρατίδια– είναι εξ αντικειμένου παρωχημένοι και απαρχαιωμένοι γιατί οι άνθρωποι και όσο έθνη αξίζουν αυτό τον προσδιορισμό οντοποιήθηκαν βαθειά και υποστασιοποιήθηκαν εθνοκρατικά. Όλοι μαζί –«διανοούμενοι» και  ο «λαουτσίκος», δεξιοί, αριστεροί και όλες οι αποχρώσεις τους– είναι εμπόδιο στην δημοκρατική συγκρότηση των ανθρώπων. Δηλαδή μια εθνικά ανεξάρτητη φορά κίνησης προς πολιτική ελευθερία. Το πρώτο και ανελαστικά ασυμβίβαστο σημαίνει συλλογική Ελευθερία απαλλαγμένη εξωτερικών καταναγκασμών και το δεύτερο εσωτερικό άθλημα κατ’ αλήθειαν βίου και συγκρότησης κοινού τρόπου ζωής.

Μόνο μοντερνιστικά τυφλωμένοι δεν βλέπουν –και μέχρι στιγμής οι τυφλωμένοι είναι πολλοί– ότι δεν χρειαζόμαστε κόμματα ή τα παρωχημένα δεξιοαριστερά κλουβιά και ότι μέχρι να έχουμε αν ποτέ έχουμε άμεση δημοκρατία, τουλάχιστον, εάν πρέπει να στέλνουμε αντιπροσώπους σε κάποιο κοινοβούλιο ή εθνοσυνέλευση, οι πολίτες μπορούν ευθέως να τους εκλέγουν στους τόπους που ζουν, στα χωριά και στις περιφέρειες ενός εθνοκράτους. Η εκτελεστική εξουσία να ορίζεται από αυτούς και όλοι μαζί να επανεκλέγονται κάθε έξη μήνες ή κάθε ένα χρόνο. Αυτό είναι ανέφικτο;

Η καλή γνώση του εαυτού μας, των κρατών και των σχέσεών τους, λοιπόν, εξ αντικειμένου και λογικά μπορεί να είναι μόνο απαλλαγμένη από κατασκευαστικά των ανθρώπων ιδεολογήματα και να προσκολλάται στην απορρέουσα επιστημονική δεοντολογία λόγω ύπαρξης οντολογικών και ανθρωπολογικών προϋποθέσεων που προηγούνται κάθε αναλυτή. Ο «μικρός» αναλυτής γονατίζει με δέος μπροστά στην οντολογία και ότι λέει δεσμεύεται από αυτή. Αν πρωτογενώς ή ως ηθικός αυτουργός θέλει να την κατασκευάσει είναι γελοίος ή χυδαίος προπαγανδιστής ή γενοκτόνος. Κοσμοπλάστης και ανθρωποπλάστης είναι μόνο ο Θεός, για όσους πιστεύουν. Επίγεια αυτόν προγραμματικά πλασμένο άνθρωπο τον σμιλεύει η πολιτική καθημερινά προσαρμόζοντας έτσι την απέραντη ετερότητα των πολιτών στον ηθικά και κανονιστικά εύτακτο συλλογικό κατ’ αλήθειαν Πολιτιειακό βίο. Ο κάθε συλλογικός βίος είναι ένας τρόπος ζωής διαρκώς διαμορφούμενος σύμφωνα με την ανθρωπολογική ετερότητα κάθε κοινωνικής οντότητας όπως αυτή προϋπήρχε και όπως αυτή εξελίσσεται πολιτειακά. Η γνώση και η πολιτική πράξη μπορεί να είναι μόνο συναρτημένη με τις οντολογικές και ανθρωπολογικές προϋποθέσεις που γεννά η ιστορία όπως κινούνται πρόσω (ή όπισθεν) οι άνθρωποι τα κράτη και οι μεγάλες δυνάμεις. Τίποτα λιγότερο και τίποτα περισσότερο. Το ότι αυτό δεν συμβαίνει πάντοτε είναι και το πρόβλημα.

Αναλύοντας ιστορικά κείμενα για να ενταχθούν στην εξέταση της διεθνούς πολιτικής, κάθε έγγραφο, έκθεση ή άλλες πληροφορίες χρήζουν αξιολόγησης και ιεράρχησης και όχι στοιβάγματος ή πολύ χειρότερα δολοφονία των πληροφοριών με το να τις αρπάζει κανείς και να τις χρησιμοποιεί επιλεκτικά σύμφωνα με τις προσωπικές ιδεολογικο-κομματικές προτιμήσεις, επιθυμίες για αυτό-δικαίωση υποκειμενικών στάσεων και εκδικητικών συνδρόμων κατά ιστορικών προσώπων σύμφωνα με πολωτικά κριτήρια της ιστορικής διαδρομής ενός κράτους.

            Τα έγγραφα είναι άχρηστα εάν δεν συνεκτιμούν απόλυτα το απέραντο και απροσμέτρητο περιβάλλον της διεθνούς πολιτικής. Και επειδή ακόμη και ο Θεός της διεθνολογίας θα σας πει ότι αυτό είναι ανέφικτο συνιστάται περισυλλογή, νηφαλιότητα, επιστημονική ταπεινότητα, δέος μπροστά στην απεραντοσύνη της εμπράγματης διεθνούς και κρατικής ζωής και στις άκρως επιφυλακτικές εκτιμήσεις- συμπεράσματα. Ο σοβαρός πολιτικός επιστήμονας της διεθνούς ζωής δεν παραπέμπει σε κάποιο υψιτενή τίτλο αλλά σε εκείνη την ταπεινή αναλυτική υπευθυνότητα που αποκτά κανείς όταν συνειδητοποιήσει πόσο μικρός είναι «για να γράψει ιστορία».

Πολύ περισσότερο υπευθυνότητα εμποδίζει κάποιον να διαπράξει ένα επιστημονικό έγκλημα με το να γίνει επιθετικός προφήτης του παρελθόντος και μάλιστα με τρόπο που ισοπεδώνει ευθύγραμμα και απλουστευτικά τα πάντα για να εκτελέσει ένα τεράστιο αυθαίρετο άλμα που καταλήγει σε … δίκη προθέσεων. Αυτό εν τούτοις γίνεται καθημερινά στην μοντερνιστική ζωή που είναι γεμάτη με επιστήμονες, ιδεολόγους και κοσμοπλάστες. Εξ ου και το πρόβλημα.

            Για την αρχειακή αξιολόγηση που επιδιώκει να κάνει ιστορική αποτίμηση και πολύ περισσότερο διεθνολογική κανείς κινείται επιστημονικά στο σκοτάδι και πολιτικά στο κενό (ως προς τις εκτιμήσεις του) εάν δεν διαβάσει σοβαρά κείμενα που το εξηγούν. Αν δεν διαβάσει χωρίς παρωπίδες, κυρίως, τον Θουκυδίδη και εάν καταλάβει την ανελέητα πειθαρχημένη επιστημολογία του διαχρονικής και αναλλοίωτης εμβέλειας.

Υπάρχουν και σύγχρονα κείμενα. Για παράδειγμα, το «προειδοποιητικό» κείμενο, του E.H.Carr, Whats History για το πόσο παραπλανητικά μπορεί να είναι τα ιστορικά αρχεία, ανάλυση που επηρέασε όσο καμιά άλλη την καλή ιστορική έρευνα. Το λέμε, το ξαναλέμε, αλλά κανείς δεν ακούει, γιατί στην πολιτική διαπάλη, ιδιαίτερα την αυτοκτονική, οι παρωπίδες αποτελούν ασφαλή προσανατολισμό που εξυπηρετούν εκείνους τους σκοπούς που παράγει η ιδιωτεία (ιδιωτεία υπάρχει σε κάθε τι το οποίο εν μέρει ή εν όλω δεν είναι Πολιτειακά ενταγμένο, κοινωνικοπολιτικά σμιλευμένο, κοινωνικά-δημοκρατικά νομιμοποιημένο και διαρκώς υποκείμενο την βάσανο των δημοκρατικών ελέγχων του συλλογικού κατ’ αλήθειαν βίου).

Συνοψίζω λοιπόν λέγοντας ότι κανένας σοβαρός πολιτικός επιστήμονας του διεθνούς συστήματος (με την έννοια που μόλις ανέφερα) δεν θα προσποιηθεί ότι είναι κοσμοϊστορικός κριτής και πολύ λιγότερο προφήτης του παρελθόντος στηριγμένος σε κοντόφθαλμες κομματικές προσωπικές δίκες προθέσεων οι οποίες δεκάδες χρόνια ή και αιώνες μετά στηλιτεύουν αγέννητους, αθωώνουν ενόχους και εξομοιώνουν ανόμοια.

Ιστορικοί δικαστές δεν υπάρχουν. Στις συνοικιακές λαχαναγορές μπορεί. Στη αντικειμενική επιστήμη ή στην λογικά επεξεργασμένη πολιτική ανάλυση όχι. Όπως τα κράτη και οι σχέσεις τους εξελίσσονται δυναμικά μέσα στην δίνη της διεθνούς πολιτικής όπου επενεργούν άπειροι παράγοντες οι περισσότεροι άγνωστοι, η ίδια η ιστορία είναι το «παγκόσμιο δικαστήριο» (Hegel) και «κάθε εγχείρημα που δεν στέφεται με επιτυχία είναι λάθος» (Βενιζέλος). 

Η πολιτική πάλη (ιδανικά εντός του Δημοκρατικού Δήμου) έπεται δεν προηγείται του αντικειμενικού πολιτικού στοχασμού. Συχνά στην ατελέστατη μοντερνιστική ζωή τα προαναφερθέντα κατασκευαστικά ιδεολογικά δόγματα προτάσσονται στην πολιτική. Προηγούνται για παράδειγμα στα πεδία του εθνομηδενισμού όταν προγραμματικά ιδεολογικά ταγμένοι να δουν ένα έθνος να ισοπεδώνεται αυθαίρετα σβήνουν την οντολογία, τις διαχρονικά σμιλευμένες ανθρώπινες ουσίες και νοήματα και επιχειρούν έτσι να εξανεμίσουν την εθνοκρατική του υποστασιοποίηση. Πετάνε έτσι υψιτενείς και συχνά επιστημονικά μεταμφιεσμένες σαπουνόφουσκες. Στον εθνομηδενισμό επίσης δεν κατηγοριοποιούνται μόνο τα ιδεολογικά εγγόνια του Μαρκησίου de Sade (βλ. Κονδύλης, Ευρωπαϊκός διαφωτισμός, τ. ΙΙ, Ήφαιστος, Κοσμοθεωρία των Εθνών κεφ. 5) αλλά και κάθε ανάλυση που κλείνει τα μάτια μπροστά στις Υπαρκτές οντολογικές και ανθρωπολογικές προϋποθέσεις και που επικαλείται «αναγκαιότητες» αναίρεσης της Ελευθερίας τους.

Μπορεί με ακριβώς τον ίδιο τρόπο να αξιολογηθούν και όσοι για τον ένα ή άλλο λόγο πίστεψαν και αυθαίρετα επιδιώκουν να μεταδώσουν στους άλλους αυτή την πίστη και με λόγια που εδράζονται σε θολές «αναγκαιότητες» καλούν για προσωρινή ή παντοτινή και μερική ή ολική υποστολή της σημαίας της εθνικής ανεξαρτησίας μιας κοινωνικής οντότητας και για εν μέρει ή εν όλω κατάργηση της συλλογικής της ελευθερίας.

Δεν εξετάζουμε προθέσεις ή κίνητρα γιατί αυτό όπως είπαμε είναι ανέφικτό και μέγιστη αθλιότητα. Αυτό είναι αδύνατο και άβυσσος η ψυχή όλων των ανθρωπίνων όντων. Ενδιαφέρει μόνο η πολιτική στάση και η πολιτική θέση. Να πάψει να υφίσταται αυτό που είναι η Ελευθερία χωρίς την οποία δεν αξίζει να ζεις: Δυνατότητα ελεύθερης πολιτειακής ζωής απαλλαγμένης κάθε εξωτερικού καταναγκασμού που καταστέλλει την απροκαθόριστη απόλαυση της ανθρωπολογικής ετερότητας μιας κοινωνικής οντότητας.

Αυτά είναι θέσφατα και έσχατα χωρίς τα οποία πολιτικός πολιτισμός δεν υπάρχει και για αυτό η εγκατάλειψη της Ελευθερίας-Εθνικής Ανεξαρτησίας είναι «έσχατη προδοσία» του οικείου εαυτού ως άτομο ή ως συλλογικότητα. Τέτοιες στάσεις μας οπισθοδρομούν στην βαρβαρότητα. Η ενδοκρατική και διακρατική πάλη εντάσσεται στο ένα ή το άλλο και όποιος δεν το συνειδητοποιεί είτε νεφελοβατεί είτε είναι επικίνδυνος για τον ίδιο τον εαυτό του και για την κοινωνία στην οποία ανήκει.

Ένα σύνηθες εργαλείο είτε αυτοτραυματισμού είτε ιδιοτελούς πρόκλησης ζημιάς κατά άλλων, επίσης, είναι η θανατηφόρα απόδοση συλλογικών ευθυνών στα μέλη μιας κοινωνίας. Μεταμφιέζεται με φιλοσοφήματα, ιδεολογήματα και ποικίλους υποκειμενισμούς και ιδιοτέλειες ή λογοτεχνικές ασυναρτησίες που εκμηδενίζουν κάθε πολιτική λογική και κάθε πολιτικό ορθολογισμό. Οι άνθρωποι επιστρέφουν στην ιδιωτεία και στην βαρβαρότητα (δηλαδή στην απουσία πολιτικής) όταν διολισθήσουν στο σημείο μηδέν (το κατά πόσο έτσι χάνουν τις εθνικές ουσίες και τα νοήματα είναι ένα ερώτημα που απαντάται με ένα άλλο: Σε ποιο βαθμό τις έχασαν). Μετά από αυτό το σημείο αρχίζει μια νέα ανηφόρα … πολλών αιώνων, ανθρωπολογικής, κοινωνικής και πολιτικής συγκρότησης και εθνοκρατικής υποστασιοποίησης, ενδεχομένως με μεταλλαγμένη πλέον υποστασιοποίηση (εξισλαμισμοί, εκτουρκισμοί κτλ). «Συμβαίνει και στις καλύτερες οικογένειες», όπως λέμε. Το ζήτημα είναι να μην συμβεί!!

Στο σημείο αυτό, παρενθετικά, θα μπορούσα να αναφερθώ περαιτέρω στην «εσχάτη προδοσία. Πρόκειται για επιστημονικό όρο που έχω από καιρό επεξεργαστεί σε δεκάδες κείμενα ως τυπολογία πολιτικών στάσεων συναρτημένων με την Εθνική Ανεξαρτησία ως διαχρονικού άξονα του πολιτικού πολιτισμού από καταβολής του. Από αρχαιοτάτων χρόνων (κλασική εποχή όπου η πολιτική ελευθερία και το «ιδεώδες της ανεξαρτησίας ήταν οι δύο έσχατες λογικές των δύο όψεων του πολιτικού πολιτισμού) η Εθνική Ανεξαρτησία ήταν το θεμέλιο του πολιτικού πολιτισμού και το θέσφατο της Ελευθερίας. Είναι έννοιες πέραν και υπεράνω κάθε εκλογίκευσης περί της μιας ή άλλης αναγκαιότητας, πολύ δε περισσότερο ανώτερης τάξης από τα πεζά και δεσποτικά ιδεολογήματα του μοντερνισμού. Τίποτα και ποτέ δεν εκλογικεύει την καταστολή την συλλογική ελευθερία μιας κοινωνίας ούτε είναι αποδεκτές οι πλειοψηφίες και οι μειοψηφίες επί ζητημάτων εθνικής ανεξαρτησίας. Μιλώντας για οποιονδήποτε εθνοκράτος αν κανείς θέλει να μην είναι ελεύθερος τιμιότερο είναι να προσχωρήσει στο αντίπαλο εθνοκράτος για να ζει εκεί αξιοπρεπώς. Κάθε βαθμίδα «εσχάτης προδοσίας» μικρής ή μεγάλης κλίμακας όπως την ορίζω συνιστά πολιτικό ανορθολογισμό για όλους και όχι μόνο για το πολιτικό σύστημα της πατρίδας του «δράστη» ή των «δραστών».  

Εξ αντικειμένου και εξ ορισμού βρίσκεται στο επίκεντρο των στοχαστικών μου δραστηριοτήτων και ο όρος «εσχάτη προδοσία» επιστημονικά αποστασιοποιημένα συναρτά την Ελευθερία, τη Εθνική Ανεξαρτησία, το σύγχρονο Εθνοκράτος και τις στάσεις των πολιτών (απέναντι στην Εθνική Ανεξαρτησία).

Το σχέδιο Αναν αιτιολογημένα εμπίπτει πλήρως σε αυτή την κατηγορία και αυτός και μόνο αυτός είναι ο λόγος που έκανα όλες αυτές τις παρεμβάσεις που μέχρι σήμερα συνεχίζουν να συνδέουν θέσεις αρχής με την κυπριακή πολιτική όχι σε αναφορά με κόμματα ή πρόσωπα (τα πρόσωπα εμπλέκονται φυσιολογικά με τις πολιτικές τους στάσεις) αλλά σε αναφορά με πολιτικές θέσεις συναρτημένες με την εν λόγω επιστημονική τυπολογία. Κατά βάση με το ακροτελεύτιο πολύ σημαντικό κείμενό σου συμφωνούμε να διαφωνούμε ότι βρισκόμαστε στον αντίποδα των εκατέρωθεν παραδοχών.

Όχι επειδή είσαι λιγότερο έλληνας κα εγώ περισσότερο αλλά επειδή για τους λόγους που διατυπώνεις θεωρείς ότι θα μπορούσε η συλλογική ελευθερία των ελλήνων της Κύπρου εξ ανάγκης να συμβιβαστεί. Δεν βλέπω καμιά τέτοια ανάγκη και αν έβλεπα καλύτερα να μετοικούσα παρά να είμαι υποτελής στην ίδια την πατρίδα μου.

Η τυπολογία της «εσχάτης προδοσίας» πιο συγκεκριμένα αρχίζει από την στιγμή που προτείνεται ή επιχειρείται η καταστολή της συλλογικής ελευθερίας μιας κοινωνίας. Συνδέω πλήθος στάσεων και συμπεριφορών αυστηρά τυπολογικά ενταγμένων «χωρίς αίματα» ή κατατρεγμούς. Τις συναρτώ με πολιτικές σκέψεις εξίσου τυπολογικά ενταγμένων χωρίς προεκτάσεις τύπου «Γουδί» ή «εξορίες» ή εξοστρακισμούς. Αφορούν μόνο πολιτικούς ελέγχους αναγκαίους και μη εξαιρετέους για την ελευθερία μια κοινωνίας. Αυτούς που ρητά και ξάστερα, για παράδειγμα, αναφέρω στο άρθρο του Φιλελεύθερου και σε άλλα κείμενα: Ότι δηλαδή ηγέτες που διέπραξαν τέτοιο ολίσθημα θα πρέπει είτε να καταψηφιστούν από τους πολίτες είτε, καλύτερα, οικειοθελώς να αποχωρήσουν οι ίδιοι από την πολιτική. Αυτό δεν έγραψα;!

Για πολλούς δεν είναι αποδεκτός οποιοσδήποτε υπαινιγμός –έμμεσος, άμεσος ή εξ αποστάσεως υπονοημένος– που θίγει την ελευθερία της έκφρασης μέσα στον Δήμο της πατρίδας μου. Εν τούτοις, πολλοί κάνουν δίκη προθέσεων και καταδικάζουν αυθαίρετα και αντιδεοντολογικά εκατοντάδες χιλιάδες πολίτες ως ανθέλληνες ή αντίστοιχα κάποιους ηγέτες, στην βάση μιας έωλης εκτίμησης στηριγμένης αποσπασματικά σε μερικά «έγγραφα» τα οποία ανάγουν σε κοσμοϊστορικές ερμηνείες τις απόψεις του ενός ή άλλου υπάλληλου.

            Καμιά σκέψη λοιπόν δεν μπορεί να γίνει αποδεκτή όταν βάλλει κατά της ελευθερίας της σκέψης ή της επιστημονικής κριτικής στην βάση «παρελθουσών νοοτροπιών» της δεκαετίας του 1960 και 1970 (ή στην Ελλάδα μετά τον εμφύλιο πόλεμο την εποχή της Μακρονήσου όταν επικράτησε η μια από τις δύο «καλές» πλευρές ή κατά την διάρκεια της δικτατορίας στην Ελλάδα που αντιστάθηκα με σθένος, πλήρωσα μεγάλο κόστος και συλλήφθηκα).

Μπορεί επίσης να αμφισβητήσει το κατά πόσο μπορώ να συνδέω βάσιμα τις πολιτικές στάσεις και συμπεριφορές με τις διάφορες βαθμίδες που οριοθετεί η τυπολογία. Ερωτώ: «Ήταν ή δεν ήταν το σχέδιο Αναν «εσχάτη προδοσία» με βάση την οικουμενικών προδιαγραφών και διαχρονικής εφαρμογής τυπολογία μου και πήραν ή δεν πήραν συγκεκριμένα πολιτικά πρόσωπα συγκεκριμένες πολιτικές στάσεις και ποιες είναι οι προγραμματικές τους θέσεις σήμερα;». Δεν κρίνουμε προθέσεις αλλά δεδηλώμένες αποφάσεις και αποτελέσματα.

Επιστημονικά και επιστημολογικά μιλώντας, αυτός είναι ο ρόλος της τυπολογίας: Πάνω στο εκκρεμές στάσεων και συμπεριφορών που πάει και έρχεται ο καθείς κρίνει τον εαυτό του και όλοι μαζί κρίνουν που βρίσκεται ο καθείς. Για τις στάσεις του Αλκιβιάδη ή του ενάρετου πολίτη ή του αντίποδά του, πέρασαν αιώνες αλλά ακόμη το συζητάμε! Τυπολογίες πρέπει να ξέρετε γράφω πολλές, οι πιο αυστηρές και σκληρές για το πεδίο όπου έλαχε να βρίσκομαι, της πολιτικής σκέψης διαχρονικά. Όχι μόνο επειδή είμαι Αριστοτελικός αλλά επειδή πιστεύω ότι είναι ο καλύτερος τρόπος επιστημολογικής ελαστικότητας στην πολιτικά πολιτισμένη περιγραφή σύνθετων καταστάσεων του ανθρώπου ως άτομο και ως συλλογικότητα. Για να το κάνω πιο σαφές: Για να συγκρατήσουμε τα θέσφατα και τα έσχατα ακέραια και άθικτα και για να εντάξουμε τις «ανθρώπινες» συμπεριφορές σε μια πιο «ανθρώπινη» διαδικασία πολιτικών ελέγχων και εξισορροπήσεων.

Θα σταθώ τώρα, ενδεικτικά και στο πλαίσιο του πνεύματος και του γράμματος του παρόντος όπως το προδιάγραψα για να αναφερθώ σε κάποια ζητήματα της περιόδου Αύγουστος 1964 – Δεκέμβριος 1964 Κάποιες πρώτες εκτιμήσεις που θα εξεταστούν ξανά. Ότι ακολουθεί λοιπόν είναι προγραμματικές «εκτιμήσεις». Βέβαια, εκτιμώ ότι βρίσκονται σε πολύ καλή κατεύθυνση (κάτι είναι και αυτό από το να κινείσαι προς την αντίθετη κατεύθυνση).

Στη δε περίπτωση του σχεδίου Άτσεσον είχαμε μεταξύ άλλων ασταθή εσωτερικά μέτωπα στην δική μας πλευρά, στρατηγική ρευστότητα, ένα έξυπνα κινούμενο αντίπαλο στην Άγκυρα και ένα πρωθυπουργό του οποίου οι κινήσεις ήταν κλασικά σπασμωδικές και ανεύθυνες και η αποστασία και η διδακτορία μετά δείχνει το πόσο ανορθολογικός ήταν όταν διαχειριζόταν την μετά-εμφυλιακή Ελλάδα. Τα πράγματα είναι ακόμη χειρότερα γιατί είχαμε όπως θα εξηγήσω πιο κάτω ένα ανεύθυνο πραξικοπηματία πρωθυπουργό στην Αθήνα που συνωμοτούσε με ξένους, που σχεδίαζε κατά μιας εκλεγμένης ελληνικής κυβέρνησης και που θα έδινε ελληνική γη αφήνοντας ταυτόχρονα την Τουρκία για πρώτη φορά να καβαλικέψει την Μεγαλόνησο επίσημα και συντεταγμένα με βάση.           

Για όποιον στοιχειωδώς το αλφαβητάριο της χάραξης, σχεδιασμού και εφαρμογής στρατηγικής των μεγάλων δυνάμεων (για τις ΗΠΑ είναι τα περίφημα «contingency plans») εκτιμά ότι Ελλάδα και Κύπρος θα έμπαιναν στο τραπέζι του Προκρούστη των στρατηγικών παιγνίων από το οποίο αν και διπλωματικά άσχετος και απαίδευτος «αυτός ο καλόγερος» (ο Μακάριος) μας έσωσε συμπτωματικά (Από πείσμα; Από ένστικτο; Οι αποφάσεις και η αιτιολόγησή τους διερευνώνται).

Σταδιακά βέβαια διαπιστώνω μας έσωσαν (τότε, τώρα μάλλον με τίποτα) και άλλα γεγονότα όπως ο «πατριωτισμός των τούρκων». Επίσης διατρέχοντας κάποια κείμενα, διακρίνω μια αγωνία των Αμερικανών πως μια ταυτόχρονη στρατιωτική εμπλοκή Ελλάδας και Τουρκίας συνδυασμένη με πραξικοπήματα και εμφύλια ενδο-ελληνική σύρραξη δεν θα μπορούσε να ελεγχθεί κατιτί που υπό τις τότε συνθήκες για τους αμερικανούς ήταν εκτός συζητήσεως.

Για να καταλάβουμε τι συμβαίνει όταν το χτένι φτάνει στον κόμπο, όμως, χρειάζεται να έχουμε το μάτι στο «στρατηγικό» που κατά τα άλλα σε γενικές γραμμές γνωρίζουμε πιο ήταν όπως και πως ιεραρχούν τις ενέργειές τους: Geneva, August 22, 1964, 6 p.m.: From Acheson. «USG would deeply regret any development which might lead either ally to believe that its interests had not been sufficiently safeguarded but it must be guided by the interest and purposes of the Alliance as a whole». Αυτό δεν είναι κάτι που μαθαίνουμε από το «έγγραφο». Το λένε και άλλα «έγγραφα». Όποιος γνωρίζει στοιχειωδώς την τότε συγκυρία γνωρίζει τις στρατηγικές προτεραιότητες των ΗΠΑ και τον τρόπου που το Λονδίνο καιροφυλακτούσε. Μια μικρή επιβεβαίωση είναι και δεν θα αρκούσε, ιδιαίτερα εάν αντίβαινε στο διϋποκειμενικά γνωστό για τις στρατηγικές ιεραρχίες.

Αν πχ όπως διαβάζουμε σε όσα έχουμε μπροστά μας μπαίναμε στις συμπληγάδες ασαφών και θολών πραξικοπημάτων, ελεγχόμενων εισβολών, κτλ, το συμφέρον της Ατλαντικής Συμμαχίας στο σύνολό της ήταν η διαφύλαξη της Τουρκίας ως μείζονος γεωπολιτικής σημασίας. Αυτή είναι μια εκτίμηση με μεγάλες πιθανότητες να είναι σωστή και σε αναφορά με άλλες φάσεις της περιόδου αυτής. Τώρα, να δούμε και καμιά Σειρήνα να φωνάζει … αντικομουνιστικά, κάτι που επίσης αποτελεί μικρή επιβεβαίωση γνωστών γεγονότων.

Σε ένα τηλεγράφημα από τις ΗΠΑ προς τον Πρέσβη στην Αθήνα λένε να φωνάξουν το Γρίβα και αφού ανεμίζει καμπόσες αντικομουνιστικές σημαίες καταλήγει: «What must be gotten across to General Grivas is that what the American proposal offers is an opportunity for him to fulfill his Dighenis role and thus reclaim Cyprus for Hellenism and save it from Communism to which Makarios is leading it. He would also secure for the people of Cyprus the chance to make their Island blossom like a rose». Τριανταφυλλένια ζωή λοιπόν μετά από το εγχείρημα πραξικοπήματος που τότε ακόμη προσπαθούσαν να πείσουν τον Γρίβα, κάτι που μετά (δεκαετία του 1970) πέτυχε. Οι Τούρκοι, βέβαια, με πολύ αυτοπεποίθηση τον χαβά τους. Μιλούσαν, διαρκώς απέρριπταν, τελικά απέρριψαν τελεσίδικα αλλά … συνέχισαν να συνομιλούν για μήνες. Που παραπέμπει αυτό; Μα λογικά στην αναμονή ακόμη πιο ευνοϊκής στιγμής όταν αφού θα είχαν πειστεί αμετάκλητα οι Παπανδρέου και Γρίβας θα άρχιζε ο πραξικοπηματικός εμφύλιος πόλεμος σε Ελλάδα και Κύπρο. Λογικά όλα αυτά και δείχνουν πόσο υψηλού ρίσκου είναι κάθε εκτίμηση για μεμονωμένα γεγονότα. Μέσα στη ναρκοθετημένη διαδρομή των επόμενων ημερών κάποιες «νάρκες» θα ανατινάζονταν «τυχαία» και η στρατηγικά και διπλωματικά συντεταγμένη Άγκυρα θα άδραχνε την ευκαιρία να επιτύχει το μείζον ή το όλον που παρ’ ολίγο να επιτύχει το 1974 με το σχέδιο Αναν: Τον ολικό έλεγχο της Κύπρου. Εκτιμήσεις κάνουμε ή καλύτερα αποτίμηση των μεγάλων στρατηγικών στόχων των τότε δυνάμεων και της Τουρκίας όπως εξάλλου επιβεβαιώθηκαν στην συνέχεια.

Πάντοτε στο πλαίσιο εύλογων προκαταρτικών εκτιμήσεων χωρίς άλματα και στην βάση πάγιων γνώσεων για την αμερικανική στρατηγική, μπροστά τους στο Πεντάγωνο και ειδικά στο Συμβούλιο Εθνικής Ασφαλείας (ΣΕΑ) πρέπει να είχαν καμιά εκατοστή «contingency plans» όπου κάθε πρωτοετής φοιτητής ξέρει ότι δεν ξέρουν «φίλους» και «εχθρούς» αλλά εναλλασσόμενα και μετακινούμενα πιόνια στην σκακιέρα την τύχη των οποίων συνδέουν με τους σκοπούς τους. Στην βάση πάγιων χαρακτηριστικών της αμερικανικής στρατηγικής οι σκοποί ιεραρχικά είναι οι εξής:

Α) Μακροπρόθεσμοι σκοποί (ευνοϊκή κατανομή ισχύος πλανητικά, περιφερειακά και τοπικά βαθειά μέσα το μέλλον πχ σε πενήντα χρόνια στην βάση δεικτών ισχύος και εκτιμήσεων για το ποιος είναι αναλώσιμος πχ Ελλάδα, Κύπρος, Λιβύη, Ιράκ, Συρία και ποιος ανθεκτικός και αξιόπιστος συνομιλητής για «συναλλαγές», πχ Ισραήλ, Τουρκία).

Β) Μεσοπρόθεσμοι σκοποί που εξυπηρετούν αντίστοιχα, ανάλογα και ρευστά τους στρατηγικούς μακροπρόθεσμους σκοπούς.

Γ) Βραχυχρόνιους-τακτικούς σκοπούς που αλλάζουν ανά πάσα στιγμή αφήνοντας στα κρύα του λουτρού τους αφελείς και όσους ανεπίγνωστα ή από απελπισία ή απόγνωση, όπως υπαινίχθηκε σαρκαστικά ο Μπωλλ για τον Παπανδρέου σε ένα briefing του Συμβουλίου Εθνικής Ασφαλείας [στο Παπαχελάς όπου και πολλά άλλα «έγγραφα» και πληροφορίες]. 

Ένας μακροχρόνιος σκοπός μιας μεγάλης δύναμης είναι να έχει υπό έλεγχο ή κατάσταση επικυριαρχίας όσες περισσότερες μικρότερες χώρες. Ο έλεγχος διευκολύνεται από κατακερματισμό και διασπορά της χώρας-στόχου και της κοινωνίας της. «Κατά προτίμηση» ο έλεγχος πρέπει να είναι πλήρης και ανελέητος (εάν βέβαια είναι εφικτό γιατί κάποια σφριγηλά και οργανωμένα κράτη κατά καιρούς στο ταξίδι-Οδύσσεια αντιστέκονται αποτελεσματικά και συναλλάσσονται ισόρροπα – δεν μπορούν να το κάνουν όταν ανά πάσα στιγμή έχουν ετοιμοπόλεμους πραξικοπηματίες έτοιμους να ενεργήσουν κατά του δικού τους κράτους που εδώ το εκπληκτικό είναι ότι εμείς είχαμε και τον … πρωθυπουργό έτοιμο να διαπράξει ένα τέτοιο έγκλημα κατά ενός ελληνικά κυριαρχούμενου κράτους, της ΚΔ).

Αναρίθμητα δε είναι τα παραδείγματα όσων από φόβο ή λάθος εκτίμηση σύρθηκαν στην θηριώδη φωλιά μιας μεγάλης δύναμης και μάλιστα χωρίς όρους για να καταστούν στην συνέχεια βορά των θηρίων. Από τη στιγμή που θα πάρουν την «βάση» τους στην συνέχεια μόνο υποτέλεια υπάρχει και με το παραμικρό λάκτισμα τρως χιλιάδες κλωτσιές.

Η σύμπραξη μιας μικρότερης χώρας με μια μεγαλύτερη χώρα έχει τύχει μεγάλης επεξεργασίας στην στρατηγική ανάλυση στο εξωτερικό και εγώ στην Ελλάδα με νεότερους διεθνολόγους έχω οργανώσει και αποδώσει διδακτορικά (για την στρατηγική του Βενιζέλου το 1922). Και εγώ έχω γράψει άρθρα στο εξωτερικό (για την σχετική στρατηγική της Τουρκίας, του Ισραήλ και άλλων μικρότερων κρατών το 1990-91).

Πολλά επεισόδια της Ελληνικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής όπως το σχέδιο Άτσεσον προσφέρονται ως σημαντικές περιπτώσεις όχι επειδή είναι «χαμένες ευκαιρίες» αλλά για να δείξουν ότι οι ιθύνοντες είχαν στρατηγική γνώση και σκέψη επιπέδου νηπίου για το πώς ένα λιγότερο ισχυρό κράτος διαπραγματεύεται. Είναι μια ανελέητη «πελατειακή αναμέτρηση» στην πλάστιγγα κόστους-οφέλους και όχι παρακάλια του «ξεμωραμένου γέρου» (έτσι χαρακτήριζαν οι Αμερικανοί τον Παπανδρέου, τόση υπόληψη είχαν για αυτόν και έτσι διαπραγματευτή τον έβλεπαν). Ή επιτυγχάνεις τα μέγιστα δυνατά και επιβιώνεις (όπως συμβαίνει με πολλά μικρά κράτη) ή γίνεσαι λικνίζεσαι αδύναμα, παρακαλείς, απεγνωσμένα υπόσχεσαι πραξικοπήματα κατά ελλήνων, δέχεσαι να εισέλθεις σε ναρκοπέδια ασταθών ενεργημάτων στην βάση «συμφωνιών» και … «συνεννοήσεων», γίνεσαι έτσι έρμαιο των χειρότερων για εσένα contingency plans και … καλόπιστα αυτοκτονείς.

Σε ένα από τα κορυφαία για την περίπτωσή μας κείμενο συναγωγής συμπερασμάτων από έγγραφα αναλυμένα «in context», του Douglas Brinkley Dean Acheson the cold war years 1953-1971 Yale University Press 1992, κεφ 7 «repairing cracks in Nato 1964-67» πχ σ. 203-236, βλέπουμε ότι οι αμερικανοί μιλούσαν για «πρωτόκολλα» όσον αφορά τις περιοχές που θα είναι τουρκικές βάσεις που θα ήθελαν να είναι υπό την υψηλή εποπτεία των αμερικανών διοικητών στην Ευρώπη.

Ολοφάνερη προσπάθεια να πατήσουν πόδι και μάλιστα κάπου αλλού διαφαίνεται ότι αυτό παραγκώνιζε και το Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο (δεν είναι η πρώτη φορά στις κατά τα άλλα αδελφικές και στενές σχέσεις των δύο αδελφών κρατών και το έχω αναλύσει πολύ και σε πολλά βιβλία – αυτό δεν αναιρούσε και δεν αναίρεσε μια στενή συνεργασία). Αυτές οι διπλωματικές μεθοδεύσεις είναι πολύ γνωστές και δημιουργούν ολισθηρό πολιτικοδιπλωματικοστρατιωτικό πεδίο πάνω στο ο οποίο ο λιγότερο ισχυρός στην συνέχεια γλιστρά διαρκώς ενώ ο ισχυρός τον παίζει επί μακρόν αν όχι για πάντα όπως η γάτα το ποντίκι (εδώ να μην ξεχνάμε ότι για πρώτη φορά θα πατούσε δυνατά στην Κύπρο μια άλλη άγρια γάτα, η Τουρκία).

Διαρκώς ανακύπτουν ή σχεδιάζονται καταστάσεις εκτάκτου ανάγκης, διαρκώς οι σκοποί της πλανητικής Υψηλής Στρατηγικής δικαιολογώντας τα πάντα (βλ. πιο πάνω Geneva, August 22, 1964, 6 p.m. 461: From Acheson. «… it must be guided by the interest and purposes of the Alliance as a whole»), διαρκώς με αστάθμητο και απρόβλεπτο τρόπο (ή άλλοτε με « the interest and purposes of the Alliance as a whole» με σταθμισμένο και για τους σχεδιαστές στρατηγικής προβλεπτό τρόπο), διαρκώς στο εμπράγματο  πεδίο των εξελίξεων ο κάθε αστάθμητος και απρόβλεπτος «άνθρωπος» ως άτομο, ως κράτος ή ως ομάδα αλλάζει τα δεδομένα και προκαλεί επαναθεώρηση και επανασχεδιασμό των βραχυχρόνιων ενεργημάτων, διαρκώς γίνονται διαπραγματεύσεις με όλους (εκτός από τους αναλώσιμους οι οποίοι γονατιστοί παρακαλούν να κάνουν πραξικοπήματα κατά του εαυτού τους και τελικά ούτε αυτό μπορούν να κάνουν, οπότε γίνονται τελείως περίγελως και τελείως αναλώσιμοι),  και τα λοιπά και τα λοιπά.  

Συναφώς, στο τέλος της παραγράφου δέστε επακριβώς την καίριας ερμηνευτικής σημασίας αντίληψη των Αμερικανών για τους έλληνες διαπραγματευτές (και ιδιαίτερα για τον έλληνα «πρωθυπουργεύοντα»), για τις ικανότητές τους και για το πόσο τους λάμβαναν υπόψη ως παίχτες. Δες τε τι θεωρούσαν τον έλληνα διαπραγματευτή Γεώργιο Παπανδρέου που θα έπαιζε την ζωή της Ελλάδας και της Κύπρου κορώνα-γράμματα όταν «απελπισμένος-απεγνωσμένος» από την εσωτερική κατάσταση στην Ελλάδα και την χαώδη κατάσταση στην Κύπρο όπου ο Μακάριος έπαιζε με την φωτιά φλερτάροντας με τους σοβιετικούς [για το πώς φτάσαμε σε τέτοιες ανόητες πράξεις είναι ένα άλλο μεγάλο κεφάλαιο όχι που δείχνει οτιδήποτε «ανθελληνικό του Μακαρίου» αλλά προδίδει την χαώδη κατάσταση στο δικό μας ελλαδοκυπριακό στρατόπεδο και που δείχνει επακριβώς ότι δεν είχαμε έλεγχο της κατάστασης, καθως επίσης και ότι πριν τον έχουμε με τον ένα ή άλλο τρόπο, κυρίως με συνεννόηση μεταξύ των Ελλήνων, δεν έπρεπε να εισερχόμαστε σε ναρκοπέδια που και τα ίδια τα ναρκοπέδια καθόταν πάνω σε κινούμενη διεθνή άμμο].

Δέστε, την ίδια στιγμή όταν Παπανδρέου εγκληματικά σκεπτόμενος πραξικοπηματικά (ο Γρίβας από ότι ξέρω αρχικά ήταν επιφυλακτικός, τελικά όμως φάνηκε να κλίνει προς σύμπραξη η οποία ευτυχώς τότε δεν επιβεβαιώθηκε γιατί τα πράγματα στην δική μας πλευρά ήταν τελείως εκτός ελέγχου και οι συνέπειες θα πολύ χειρότερα από το 1974) πόσο τον υπολόγιζαν οι Αμερικανοί. Αμερικανοί οι οποίοι ολοφάνερα και από πολλές πηγές βλέπουμε –δεν χρειαζόταν πηγές να το ξέρουμε, αυτό κάνουν ανά πάσα στιγμή και για κάθε ζήτημα, απλά κάποιες πηγές φτάνουν για να καταδείξουν την ένταση και πυκνότητα– ενάλλασσαν τα contingency plans το ένα μετά το άλλο στο τραπέζι (πώς να το κάνουμε: ή ξέρεις τι σημαίνει αυτό στην εφαρμογή στρατηγικών σχεδίων μιας μεγάλης δύναμης και σκέφτεσαι ορθολογιστικά ή διαβάζεις αποσπασματικά έγγραφα και μάλιστα όπως θέλεις εσύ να ήταν τα πράγματα οπότε και αναγκαστικά κινείσαι μέσα σε μια σαπουνόφουσκα ερμηνειών και εκτιμήσεων άκρως επικίνδυνη για την επιβίωσή σου). Στον Brinkley, λοιπόν:  Dga 2lucb dec 7 1964. «our weakness was Papandreou weakness. A garrulous senile, windbag without power of decision or resolution», το ίδιο εδάφιο στον Παπαχελάς μεταφρασμένο: «η αδυναμία του Παπανδρέου ενός φλύαρου ξεμωραμένου κουφού ρήτορα που δεν έχει την δύναμη να αποφασίσει ή να λύσει οτιδήποτε. Φρόντισε, την πιο κρίσιμη στιγμή, να διαρρεύσουν τα σχέδιά μας στον Μακάριο».

Δηλαδή ο πρωθυπουργός ο  οποίος καθόταν πάνω σε 5-6 εκκολαπτόμενα πραξικοπήματα σε μια «χώρα της Φρειδερίκης» της οποίας δεν είχε τον παραμικρό έλεγχο [ίσως το μόνο «έρεισμα» ήταν αρνητικό, δηλαδή τα διαγγέλματα (αντί ψύχραιμων και νηφάλιων ενεργειών που θα ένωναν αντί να οδηγήσουν σε αποστασίες) στα μπαλκόνια που ξεσήκωναν και διαιρούσαν ακόμη περισσότερο μια διαιρεμένη χώρα. Ή μήπως νομίζετε ότι οι αμερικανοί τυχαία τον θεωρούσαν δημαγωγό και ξεφουσκωμένο: Ανά πάσα στιγμή και τώρα που μιλάμε ακόμη και τα ηλεκτρονικά μας μηνύματα ή και τα λογοτεχνήματα κάνουν σταθμίσεις και βάσιμες εκτιμήσεις της κατάστασής μας]  υποσχόταν και αυτός … πραξικόπημα σε ξένους (που τελικά φοβήθηκε να εκτελέσει και έντρομος διέρρευσε «τα σχέδιά τους» με αποτέλεσμα οι Αμερικανοί να τον υποτιμήσουν τελείως γιατί ούτε όργανό τους δεν μπορούσε να γίνει), υποσχόταν ελληνική γη για να ελέγχουν οι τούρκοι τις … προσβάσεις:

Σε όλη τη διαδικασία έπαιζε και προσφορά για Καστελλόριζο «PΜ was prepared to let Turkey have island of Kastellorizon as military base to protect its approaches.»(From Acheson to State, July 21 1964) (που οι Τούρκοι δεν αποδέχονται! γιατί λογικά θέλουν περισσότερα ή περιμένουν να τα αρπάξουν αν εμείς πατούσαμε την πεπονόφλουδα). Ενδεικτικά: Summary Notes of the 542nd Μeetting of the National Security Council [Συμβούλιο Εθνικής Ασφαλείας], Washington September 1 1964. Global Briefing Cyprus Under Secretary Ball: With respect to Cyprus, the Geneva phase of the negotiations is over. Two months have been spent narrowing the gap between Greeks and Turks defining their differences. There are two reasons for the failure of the Acheson talks at Geneva [Δύο (κύριοι) λόγοι της αποτυχίας στην Γενεύη].

1. The weakness of the Greek Government [Η αδυναμία της Ελληνικής Κυβέρνησης να προχωρήσει] which was unwilling to move in and take over in Cyprus, and

2. The Turks’ insistence on having a sovereign base on the island, which in effect, meant partition. [«η εμμονή των Τούρκων για κυρίαρχη βάση που, κατά βάση, σήμαινε διχοτόμηση»].

Αμήν!

Δεν ήμασταν γεμάτοι ανθέλληνες. Γεμάτοι ερασιτέχνες έλληνες «ηγέτες» ήμασταν, όπως και σήμερα. Τότε και τώρα, μας παίζουν όπως η γάτα το ποντίκι και εμείς όταν εμείς αμέριμνα ονειρευόμαστε πρώτα τον παράδεισο που κάθετε πάνω σε ένα βουνό ψευδαισθήσεων και ευσεβών πόθων και δεύτερον, όταν καταντούμε τελείως πνευματικά υποχείριά τους εάν ακόμη και άνθρωποι του υψηλότερου φρονήματος καταλήξουν να εκλογικεύουν αντί την αξίωση ελευθερίας μια μακάρια βιολογική επιβίωση.

Ξανά: Στην διαχείριση της Υψηλής Στρατηγικής όπου συμπλέκονται μακροπρόθεσμοι σκοποί, βέλτιστα επιδιωκόμενοι μεσοπρόθεσμοι σκοποί και ρευστή βραχυχρόνια διαχείριση κρίσεων –μια μεγάλη δύναμη διαχείριση κρίσεων κάνει ασταμάτητα όπου εκατοντάδες χιλιάδες ιεραρχημένοι λειτουργοί δουλεύουν σαν μέλισσες–, εάν μια κοινωνία-στόχος (και όλοι είναι στόχοι εχθροί και φίλοι, (διαρκώς εναλλασσόμενοι στην ανελέητη και ασταμάτητη προσπάθεια ευνοϊκής διαχείρισης της κατανομής ισχύος με μύριες αδιαφανείς μεθοδεύσεις, βλ. Mearsheimer σε άλλο σημείο, βλ. πιο φανερά όταν ΗΠΑ επί Ρήγκαν «βοηθούσαν» τόσο το Ιράκ όσο και το Ιράν του Χομέινι με ισραηλινή μάλιστα σύμπραξη ή την παρούσα στιγμή πως εναλλάσσονται φιλίες και έχθρες με την Αλκάιντα και καμιά εκατοστή άλλους παίχτες συμπεριλαμβανομένων κρατών και των κούρδων οι οποίοι τις τελευταίες εβδομάδες βλέπουμε να κάνουν κάποιες «περίεργες» διαπραγματεύσεις όπου και η … Τουρκία εμπλέκεται, και τα λοιπά και τα λοιπά! Που δεν τα βλέπεις όταν βλέπεις το πόδι σου αντί δέκα τουλάχιστον μέτρα πιο πέρα όπου στέκονται τα αδέλφια σου ως επίγειες υποστάσεις πνεύματος και ύλης, όχι εχθροί επειδή την … δεκαετία του 1970 «παίξαμε μερικές μπουνιές»). 

Αν η οποιαδήποτε εμπλεκόμενη κοινωνία είναι και διαιρεμένη οι σκοποί τους διευκολύνονται. Δέστε για παράδειγμα το Ιράκ, την Συρία, τον Λίβανο, την Λιβύη. Πριν μερικά χρόνια «διέρρευσαν» και contingency plans για «τρεις Τουρκίες». Δεν εφαρμόστηκε επειδή η Τουρκία μπορούσε να κρατήσει το κράτος και το κοινωνικοπολιτικό σύστημα ενωμένο. Ίσως τώρα να μην μπορέσει (η Τουρκία σήμερα) εάν εισέλθει σε διελκυστίνδα εμπλοκών που κάποια στιγμή δεν θα ελέγχει και η υπερισχύουσα μεγάλη δύναμη θα εμφανίσει ως αναγκαιότητα και τετελεσμένο. Πχ σε σχέση με την κουρδική ανεξαρτησία και την αναδιάταξη συνόρων και συμφερόντων (Η διαφορά μας με την Τουρκία είναι ότι αυτοί αν και διατρέχουν πολύ μεγαλύτερους κινδύνους από την Ελλάδα ίσως να έχουν επίγνωση του πως παίζονται τα στρατηγικά παιχνίδια, το διαπίστωσα και εγώ σε μελέτη που προανέφερα για την κρίση αρχές του 1990).

Θα μπορούσαμε να επεκταθούμε πολύ περισσότερο αλλά φοβάμαι ότι θα προκαλέσω αναιτιολόγητο θυμό αντί περισυλλογή, μετριοφροσύνη, περισσότερη μελέτη της διεθνούς πολιτικής και επιστημολογικών ζητημάτων. Αυτά τα λίγα επιπέδου για εμένα αλφαβηταρίου (τα διδάσκω στους δευτεροετείς του πανεπιστημίου) τα γράφω για να καταλάβουμε ότι τα πράγματα όταν συγκρούονται ή όταν κάνουν έρωτα οι ελέφαντες δεν είναι τόσο απλά για το γρασίδι. Ούτε και ισχύει αυτό που βλέπουμε, ή αυτό που νομίζουμε ότι βλέπουμε ή πολύ χειρότερο αυτό που θέλουμε μετά από μισό αιώνα. Δεν αφήνεις τον εαυτό σου να εισέλθει σε ναρκοπέδιο διαχείρισης αβεβαιοτήτων στο στρατηγικό πεδίο όταν μύριοι παράγοντες όχι μόνο είναι αστάθμητοι αλλά δεν τους ελέγχεις όλους, η ελέγχεις ελάχιστους η και καθόλου.

Μια ταπεινή προς το παρόν προκαταρτική εκτίμηση με αυτό το σκεπτικό είναι ότι δεν θα κατακρεουργούσαν και κατακερμάτιζαν μόνο την Κύπρο αλλά και την λικνιζόμενη και κοινωνικοπολιτικά βαθύτατα διαιρεμένη Ελλάδα (εκτιμώ προς το παρόν, και βλέπουμε όταν βρούμε νέα στοιχεία και τα συνδυάσουμε με πιο συγκεκριμένα contingency plans για τους μακροχρόνιους στρατηγικούς σκοπούς). Με δεδομένη την σημασία της Τουρκίας τότε, η Ελλάδα θα μπορούσε να είχε υποστεί πλήγματα μπροστά στα οποία το 1967 και το 1974 είναι ανώδυνο χαστούκι. Θα προσπαθήσω να τεκμηριώσω αυτή την εκτίμηση –πάντοτε στο πλαίσιο μιας επιστημολογικά και μεθοδολογικά βάσιμης προσέγγισης και με την προαναφερθείσα επιφύλαξη ότι υποβόσκουν πολλά ερωτήματα και ότι η κάθε τέτοια προσπάθεια αν είναι εύλογα σωστή προσφέρεται για μαθήματα όχι για επανάληψη των παθημάτων, πχ την εξαφάνισή μας μέσα στο κενό αέρα ενός σχεδίου Αναν–   σε εύθετο χρόνο και Θεού επιτρέποντος.

Την στιγμή που γράφω αυτές τις γραμμές και καθημερινά τις τελευταίες μέρες ακούω για εκατοντάδες «έγγραφα», σκοπούς κτλ. Χρειάζεται περισσότερη έρευνα. Ιδιαίτερα στο τρίτο επίπεδο, το στρατηγικό. Στοιχεία ήδη βρίσκω αρκετά σε διάφορα βιβλία ή μου αναφέρουν με μηνύματα φίλοι και αναγνώστες που δεν γνωρίζω πολύ καλά. Κάποια στιγμή θα διαχειριστώ λεπτομερέστερα ότι μαζέψω.

Τα έγγραφα βέβαια δεν αποκαλύπτουν την κίνηση της ιστορίας παρά μόνο φωτίζουν στιγμιαία γεγονότα. Μόνο αν τα εντάξεις σε μια ευρύτερη οπτική έχουν αξία τα οποιαδήποτε ευρήματα. Και πάλιν, βέβαια, τα ερωτήματα μένουν γιατί υπάρχουν άπειρα πράγματα που δεν γνωρίζουμε και ίσως ποτέ δεν θα μάθουμε. Αυτό θα πει κανείς κάθε σοβαρός ιστορικός και δεν γνωρίζω κανένα σοβαρό που λέει το αντίθετο.

Γι’ αυτό για τις ανάγκες της παρούσης «ανάλυσης» είναι σημαντικό να πούμε ότι είναι σαφές πως παραλογίζεται όποιος ισχυριστεί ότι είναι προφήτης του παρελθόντος. Για μια δε σύνδεση του σχεδίου Άτσεσον με το σχέδιο Αναν είναι αστείο ακόμη και να ειπωθεί. Εδώ δεν μιλάμε για «άνοιγμα της πόρτας του Φρενοκομείου» (ακόμη μια επίδειξη σπασμωδικότητας και στρατηγικής ανευθυνότητας του Παπανδρέου που στην Αθήνα ασκούσε ελάχιστη ή καθόλου πραγματική εξουσία). Το σχέδιο Αναν ήταν η αποκορύφωση μιας μακράς πορείας όπου καταγράφηκε ρητά και ξεκάθαρα το στρατηγικό ερώτημα: «Να πείτε ένα ΝΑΙ και να γίνεται για πάντα είλωτες των αγγλοτούρκων» ή «να πείτε ένα ΟΧΙ και θα πέσουν τόνοι τούβλα στο κεφάλι σας (Powell)». Δεν έπεσαν βέβαια τα τούβλα γιατί στην συνέχεια Παπαδόπουλος και Χριστόφιας (δύο πονηροί έλληνες πολιτικοί) με τακτικούς ελιγμούς κέρδισαν χρόνο.

Εάν προσπαθήσουμε να φωτίσουμε περισσότερο τον Αύγουστο του 1964 δύο εκτιμήσεις θα μπορούσαν να είναι χρήσιμες ως υπόθεση εργασίας προς διερεύνηση και υπό το πρίσμα πολλών ερωτημάτων και επιφυλάξεων (χωρίς τα οποία είσαι απλουστευτικά γραμμικός, εκτός θέματος και διολισθαίνεις σε προφητείες του παρελθόντος).

Αφενός τα πεδία ρευστότητας και αστάθειας στους τομείς της στρατηγικής και της ισχύος και αφετέρου η πολύ πιο ασταθής εκτίμηση για το ρίσκο που θα διατρέχαμε αν εισερχόμαστε απροετοίμαστοι και διχασμένοι μέσα στις συμπληγάδες μιας στρατηγικής αντιπαράθεσης πολλών παιχτών.

Αρχίζουμε τονίζοντας ένα διασταυρωμένο «εύρημα» που ενέχει κομβική σημασία για την εκτίμηση του ρίσκου. Ποτέ δεν συνωμοτείς όπως έκανε ο Παπανδρέου και ποτέ δεν κάνεις πραξικόπημα κατά ομοεθνών χέρι-χέρι με άσπονδους φίλους και εχθρούς και στο όνομα τόσο ελαστικών οικουμενικών σκοπών η εκπλήρωση των οποίων θα μπορούσε να αιτιολογηθεί πολύ ελαστικά ακόμη και με τον θάνατό σου Πχ εάν το 1964 η Τουρκία κλιμάκωνε αυθαίρετα όπως συχνά κάνει παραβλέποντας «συμφωνίες» ή συμφωνίες και εάν το χάος που θα δημιουργούταν έθετε στην πλάστιγγα τα στρατηγικά της συμφέροντα, την θέληση της Τουρκίας και τον θάνατο της Κύπρου ή και της Ελλάδας. Θα μπορούσα να αναφέρω πάμπολλα παραδείγματα άλλων περιπτώσεων μετά το 1945 αλλά δεν γράφω βιβλίο προς δημοσίευση.    

Ενώ θεωρείται βεβαία η αλληλεπενέργεια και δυναμική και αστάθμητη (για τους αδύναμους) αλληλεπίδραση πολλών ενδογενών και συστημικών μεταβλητών, μπορούμε να αναφερθούμε σε γενικές γραμμές στην κατάσταση της Ελλάδας, της Κύπρου, της Τουρκίας, την στρατηγική τους η την απουσία στρατηγικής, τα σχέδια των εμπλεκομένων δυνάμεων, κάποια συγκεκριμένα ενεργήματά τους και  το πώς αυτό εντάσσεται στο ευρύτερο στρατηγικό περιβάλλον. Όχι για να προβλέψουμε πως άλλαζε ο ρους της ιστορίας αλλά για να εκφράσουμε εκτιμήσεις, για παράδειγμα, μεταξύ πολλών άλλων, για την εξέλιξη της σχέσης ισχυρού και ανίσχυρου, προσεκτικού και απρόσεκτου, οργανωμένου και ανοργάνωτου, διχασμένης και συνεκτικής κοινωνίας και ασυνάρτητου ή αντίστροφα συγκροτημένου ηγέτη.

Το σχέδιο Άτσεσον δεν έγινε δεκτό και η ζωή συνεχίστηκε. Ενώ εκ των υστέρων δεν μπορείς να εκτιμήσεις την αλληλεπίδραση των μεταβλητών μπορείς εν τούτοις να εκτιμήσεις τον βαθμό κινδύνου στην βάση αυτών ή παρόμοιων κριτηρίων.

Ένα από τα αναρίθμητα στοιχεία που συνεκτιμώνται χωρίς να υπερεκτιμώνται είναι το Acheson, Geneva, August 23 secret F768803-1592. Προστίθεται στην σωρό ακατέργαστων ακόμη κειμένων που σωρεύονται και βιβλίων που περιέχουν πολλές πληροφορίες και αρχεία και τα οποία προς το παρόν ξεφυλλίζω άναρχα πλην εκλεκτικά.      

Για τις ανάγκες του παρόντος αξίζει να ειπωθεί ότι πληροφορίες όπως αυτές δείχνουν ότι αυτά που μας συνέβηκαν και αυτά που θα μας συμβούν δεν είναι τυχαία. Εκτιμήσεις κάνω ξανά. Δεν προδικάζω «χαμένες ευκαιρίες» κοσμοϊστορικών γεγονότων που υπό το πρίσμα της μιας ή άλλης οπτικής θα λάμβαναν χώρα. Σιγά-σιγά όμως σταθεροποιούνται κάποιες βάσιμες εκτιμήσεις: Μάλλον δεν είναι τυχαίο ότι πολλοί, άλλοι κακοί, άλλοι καλοί, άλλοι ανάποδοι και άλλοι υπόγειοι πράκτορες ξένων στην Ελλάδα και στην Κύπρο έρεπαν στα πραξικοπήματα. Μάλλον πανταχόθεν πραξικοπηματίες είχαμε την περίοδο 1960-74! Αυτό ήταν ημέτερο πεδίο μέσα στο οποίο θα εισερχόμασταν σε διελκυστίνδα μεγαλεπήβολων πράξεων. Αν είναι έτσι φτηνά την γλιτώσαμε από χειρότερα.

Ποιο πάνω παρέθεσα εντός εισαγωγικών τι εκτιμούσαν οι αμερικανοί ότι είναι ο Γεώργιος Παπανδρέου. Ο κάθε λογικός –εδώ λογική θέλουμε και όχι υψιτενείς ιστορικές γνώσεις ή «έγγραφα» ή συναισθηματικές εξάρσεις, «ξελαρυγγισμούς υποταγής» και διάθεση εισόδου στην φωλιά του λύκου (όχι του δικού μας)– μπορεί να κρίνει εύκολα κατά πόσο αυτός ο πανταχόθεν βαλλόμενος και ο ίδιος μεθυσμένα λικνιζόμενος πρωθυπουργός ήταν το καταλληλότερο πρόσωπο υπό τις καταλληλότερες συνθήκες να σύρει την Κύπρο και την Ελλάδα στο θηριώδες τραπέζι του Προκρούστη των στρατηγικών παιγνίων και της αποδεδειγμένα θηριώδους και απείρως την εποχή εκείνη πιο γεωπολιτικά σημαντικής Τουρκίας.  

Ο «Γέρος της Δημοκρατίας» πραξικοπηματίας και αυτός!!,πρέπει να το πούμε και το ξαναπούμε να το εμπεδώσουμε γιατί το βρήκα σε πολλά «έγγραφα» και τέτοιες πληροφορίες είναι από τις πολυτιμότερες που στην συνέχεια εντάσσεις in context για να σκεφτείς νηφάλια και ορθολογιστικά. Θαυμάστε τον Παπανδρέου στο «έγγραφο» αυτό με τι ευκολία δηλώνει έτοιμος να κάνει πραξικοπήματα κατά ενός ελληνικού κράτους που με σύνεση, νηφαλιότητα και ψυχραιμία θα μπορούσε να τραβήξει άλλο δρόμο και σε κατάλληλο χρόνο να επιτύχει τους ιστορικούς σκοπούς της πλειονότητας των πολιτών προστατεύοντας ταυτόχρονα τους υπόλοιπους (πριν τους εποίκους οι περισσότεροι ήταν εκτουρκισθέντες Έλληνες). Ένας «ξεμωραμένος» Πρωθυπουργός (πάντα κατά τους αμερικανούς) δεδηλωμένα σε αυτούς πραξικοπηματίας και από κάτω πολλές υπόγειες ομάδες. Να θυμίσουμε ξανά μερικές: Φρειδερίκη, βασιλόπουλα, αποστάτες, στρατηγοί, υποστράτηγοι, συνταγματάρχες και ίσως πολλοί άλλοι. Και η Ασπίδα, τι ήταν; Όλοι λίγο πολύ με κάποιον συνωμοτούσαν. Άλλοι για το γούστο τους, άλλοι υπό την επήρεια ξένων και άλλοι χέρι-χέρι με ξένους άσπονδους φίλους. Λαμπρά! Στα άρματα στα άρματα: Όλοι έτοιμοι για αγώνες (όλοι εναντίον αλλήλων στο δικό μας πεδίο εν μέσω «ανακηρύξεων» ένωσης).

Στον περιβάλλοντα «κοινωνικοπολιτικό χώρο» της Ελλάδας πολλοί οι αγριεμένοι, όλοι και αυτοί εχθρικά διακείμενοι εχθρικά όλοι εναντίον όλων. Διαδηλώσεις, δημαγωγίες στα μπαλκόνια, άνοδος των κομμουνιστών με άλλη κομματική μεταμφίεση (δεν αξιολογώ αλλά το αναφέρω σε σχέση με τα στρατηγικά παίγνια και την μυωπία του Παπανδρέου να λέει και να καρφώνει και να ξανακαρφώνει στους αμερικανούς –το βλέπουμε στα έγγραφα να το κάνει, αυτός και οι πρέσβεις του)– τον αντι–κομμουνιστικό οίστρο των γερακιών-στρατηγιστών του Πενταγώνου για να φτιάξουν καμιά δεκαριά ακόμη contingency plans για το πώς θα μας πετσόκοβαν όταν θα διολισθάναμε μέσα στο Φρενοκομείο (αυτά είναι πάγιες στάσεις χάραξης και εφαρμογής των ΗΠΑ όχι εκτιμήσεις ή προβλέψεις εξέλιξης του παρελθόντος).

Οι περισσότεροι εξαγριωμένοι στον ελληνικό κοινωνικοπολιτικό χώρο, εξάλλου, μόλις έφυγαν από την Μακρόνησο και ήταν … «ημιαναγνωρισμένοι» (μέχρι να ξαναμπούν στην φυλακή), γνωστοί .. «ανθέλληνες» όπως ο Ρίτσος και ο Μίκης Θεοδωράκης, που ήθελαν να εισέλθουν στο πολιτικό σκηνικό με τον σωστό βηματισμό.

Οι «δεξιοί» επίσης που κατείχαν την εξουσία και τον στρατό και σκότωναν τους Λαμπράκηδες (αυτός ο «Ανθέλληνας» ο οποίος υπενθυμίζω κομμουνιστές μεν, για να παραφράσω τον Γρίβα, πλην Έλληνας: Ο Λαμπράκης κρατούσε πανό που έγραφε εθνική ανεξαρτησία όταν τον σκότωσαν οι πιστολέρο του υποκόσμου δεν ξέρω ποιανού ηθικού αυτουργού). Όποιος βρέθηκε τότε στην Αθήνα ακόμη και σε νεαρή ηλικία έζησε από πρώτο χέρι «δεξιούς» τραμπουκισκούς απείρου κάλλους, τους «αριστερούς» να τρίζουν τα δόντια όντας σε απόλυτη καταπίεση, την αστυνομία να συμπεριφέρεται με όρους σημερινής Σομαλίας, τους υπαλλήλους του κράτους να λειτουργούν με όρους Ουγκάντας, τους στρατιωτικούς διχασμένους σε βασιλόφρονες, αντί-βασιλόφρονες, δημοκρατικούς, φασίστες με κόκκινα μάτια και πατακούς κάθε είδους (μιλώ για αυτά που έβλεπαν ξεκάθαρα οι πάντες καθότι την διϋποκειμενική ιστορία κανείς δεν μπορεί να την παρακάμψει).

Στην δε Κύπρο ακόμη χειρότερα. Στο προσκήνιο συγκρούονταν τα μέλη του παρακράτους (ή καλύτερα πολλά παρακράτη συγκρούονταν μεταξύ τους και ο Μακάριος ενίοτε και με τον Γρίβα μαζί προσπαθούσαν να τους συγκρατήσουν ή τουλάχιστον να τους διαχειριστούν), οι αυτονομηθέντες «παλληκαράδες» του 1955 εκ των οποίων μερικοί (όχι όλοι και όχι οι περισσότεροι) έγιναν τραμπούκοι του χείριστου είδους και άλλοι που όντας πραγματικά γνήσιοι ήρωες του εθνικοαπελευθερωτικού αγώνα έμειναν στο περιθώριο μη επιζητώντας αξιώματα και εξουσία. Αυτή ήταν η Ελλάδακαι αυτή ήταν η Κύπρος. Αμφότερα λοιπόν τα κράτη θα έμπαιναν σε πολλαπλά ναρκοπέδια εν μέσω πραξικοπημάτων, εισβολών και ρευστών στρατηγικών παρεμβολών κάθε είδους.

Εδώ κολλάει για όλους ανεξαιρέτως (τους «από πάνω», τους «από κάτω» και τους φυλακισμένους), η προαναφερθείσα τυπολογία μου για την «εσχάτη προδοσία» και οι ιδέες που κατά καιρό καταθέτω σε αυτό το (επιστημονικό) πλαίσιο για την πολιτική συγκρότηση των κρατών. Μπορεί κάλλιστα να προσφέρει «μη αιματηρές» πολιτικές διεξόδους για την αντιμετώπιση του μεγάλου αυτού φάσματος ατοπημάτων Ελλήνων που κατά καιρούς αλληθώρισαν και συνεργάστηκαν με ξένους. Όποιος σφάλλει ή ολισθαίνει ή παρασύρεται κτλ, δεν του κολλάμε αμέσως το παρατσούκλι «ανθέλληνας», μάλιστα με αποκλειστικό κριτήριο υποκειμενικές δίκες προθέσεων.

Λογικά ο κάθε ένας από αυτούς που σχεδίαζε πραξικοπήματα και μπορούσε να χρησιμεύσει κάτι στους ξένους ήταν «συνομιλητής τους» (συμβαίνει και στις καλύτερες οικογένειες). [Να θυμίσω εδώ ότι μετά τον εμφύλιο πόλεμο μυστικές υπηρεσίες κτλ θεωρούσαν υπηρεσιακά ανώτερους την Ουάσινγκτον όχι στην Αθήνα – αν είχαν κερδίσει οι άλλοι θα ανέφεραν στην Μόσχα]. Από «εσωτερικούς εχθρούς» δηλαδή, γεμάτες η Ελλάδα και η Κύπρος.

Ολόρθος ο Περικλής εκεί απέναντι στον Παρθενώνα απεγνωσμένα κήρυττε «Θουκυδίδου Α144: «Περισσότερο φοβούμαι τα ιδικά μας σφάλματα παρά τα σχέδια των εχθρών μας» (Ελ. Βενιζέλος)». Οδυσσέα, σύνελθε, φύγε από τις Σειρήνες, φύγε από τα σπήλαια με τους Κύκλωπες, μην βρίζεις τα Θεία, δηλαδή τα ιερά και τα θέσφατα και τις ουσίες και νοήματα των Ελλήνων. Σε περιμένει μια Πηνελόπη η οποία δεν θέλει ούτε να εκπορνευτεί ούτε να αλλαξοπιστήσει για να επιβιώσει βιολογικά. Ποιος να τον ακούσει όμως τον Περικλή σε ένα δεξιοαριστερά πολωμένο χώρο (όχι χώρα-Πολιτεία: χώρο γεμάτο Έλληνες αλλά σκόρπιους όπως και σήμερα, μερικοί απελπισμένοι ή δειλοί ή δημαγωγοί που κρέμονταν πάνω στο κυμαινόμενο εκκρεμές της προαναφερθείσας τυπολογίας μου). Λίγο πιο κάτω δε ο Διογένης με το λυχνάρι έψαχνε για κανένα πολιτικά και στρατηγικά σκεπτόμενο άνθρωπο. Και μας προειδοποιούσε ο Διογένης: «Παιδιά δεν έχει ούτε ένα σκεπτόμενο άνθρωπο, και να είχε είναι πολύ μπλεγμένος».

Ένα τέτοιο περιβάλλον δεν επιτρέπει ενεργήματα μεγάλης εμβέλειας. Κάθε θέση περί του αντιθέτου είναι πολιτικά λάθος και θανάσιμα επικίνδυνη. Λογικό είναι αυτό το συμπέρασμα πέρα για πέρα στην βάση απλής λογικής και διϋποκειμενικής γνώσης. Φανταστείτε τι θα γίνει όταν θεμελιωθεί πως η κατάσταση αυτή και το πρόβλημα ήταν ακόμη πιο βαθύ και αγεφύρωτο.

Για την Κύπρο δεν χρειάζεται να πω πολλά γιατί η αναφορά πιο κάτω σε ορισμένες μόνο πτυχές του κλίματος της δεκαετίας του 1960 και 1970 που σε χονδρικές γραμμές είναι και διυποκειμενικά κοινός τόπος περιγράφουν μια ακόμη ημέτερη άλλη εξόχως θαυμαστή ζούγκλα, την ίδια στιγμή που οι Τούρκοι απειλούσαν, συνωμοτούσαν με τους άγγλους και αμερικανούς εν αγνοί μας κα σίγούρα είχαν τα δικά τους σχέδια, όπως εξάλλου καταμαρτυρήθηκε περίτρανα αργότερα:

Μακάριος που άγεται και φέρεται από τους άγγλους να αλλάξει το Σύνταγμα (χρήζει μεγάλης έρευνας για να θεμελιωθούν τα αίτια). Γρίβας που θέλει ένωση και δικαίως (πλην άλλο το θέλει και άλλο το μπορώ, άσε που δεν ξέρουμε με ποιους, λίγα χρόνια μετά, συνομιλούσε αυτός λεβεντόγερος του 1955-59). Πρωτοπαλίκαρα του αγώνα που άρχισαν όπως οι Ουρακοτάγκοι στην ζούγκλα να παλεύουν με πιστόλια για να οριοθετήσουν το δικό τους ζωτικό πεδίο στον εκκολαπτόμενο υπόκοσμο (πολλοί αγωνιστές της ΕΟΚΑ, όπως ήδη υπαινιχθήκαμε, δεν ζήτησαν τίποτα και δεν αναμείχθηκαν με αυτά –ξέρω πολλούς, ταπεινοί εργάτες μετά, όσοι ζουν μέχρι σήμερα ή δεν είναι συνταξιούχοι–, ενώ όσοι αναμείχθηκαν δεν κινούνταν ομοιόμορφα και στο ίδιο επίπεδο).

Εκκόλαψη πιστολέρο, εντός, εκτός και περιφερόμενους στο κράτος, στο παρακράτος και στον υπόκοσμο (πολλοί μάλιστα νεαρά παιδιά που δεν άκουαν από συμβουλές και που εύκολα τραβούσαν την σκανδάλη). Μακάριος που «φώναζε την Ρωσία» [Αλήθεια τι διάολο σχέσεις είχαμε η Ελλάδα και η Κύπρος για να κάνει μια τόσο αυτοκτονική κίνηση ο Μακάριος; Πως προσπάθησε να τον συμβουλεύσει η Αθήνα; Πόσο συνεργαζόντουσαν ή αλληλουπονομευόντουσαν και πως μετράει αυτό στην προσπάθειά μας να εκτιμήσουμε το περιβάλλον της περιόδου 1960-67; Τι διάολο «εθνικό κέντρο» ήταν η Αθήνα όταν δεν είχε την παραμικρή επιρροή σε μια τέτοια απόφαση; Ή μήπως είχε συναινέσει και μετά έσπευσε να καρφώνει τον Μακάριο και τους Κύπριους (πολλοί οι «κομμουνιστές» εκεί, όπως και στην Ελλάδα, πώς να το κάνουμε, να τους σφάξουμε;, ήταν σε κάθε περίπτωση υπεύθυνο Έλληνες «ηγέτες» να θρέφουν τον αντι-κομμουνιστκό οίστρο των Αμερικανών στρέφοντάς τους εναντίον μας όπως είπαμε;]

Από όλο αυτό τον όχλο πολλοί περνούσαν από σχολεία επιμόρφωσης Ιθαγενών από ψιλοκουρεμένους αμερικανούς πράκτορες που στα χωριά όλοι τους έβλεπαν να καταφθάνουν μαζί με τον Γεωργκάτζη (άλλο μεγάλο ζήτημα προς διερεύνηση και στοιχειοθέτηση του δικούς ρευστού πολιτικού πεδίου). Κομμουνιστές που με σφιγμένα τα δόντια καιροφυλακτούσαν αν μπορούσαν να κάνουν και αυτοί τα ίδια (και υποθέτω οι καθοδηγητές τους συμβούλευαν να περιμένουν μέχρι να έλθει η Μόσχα ή να βγει ο φίλος σοσιαλιστής Ινονού. Οι περισσότεροι πολίτες να πιστεύουν ότι εύκολα μπορεί να γίνει η ένωση (και το ΑΚΕΛ επίσημα) ενώ πριν 2-3 μόλις χρόνια όλη η θαυμαστή πολιτική ηγεσία της Ελλάδας και της Κύπρου (πλην 2-3 εξαιρέσεων) υπέγραψαν την επάρατη Ζυρίχη.

Τώρα, λίγο πιο πέρα σε γωνιές της Κύπρου είχαμε πολλούς αγωνιστές οι οποίοι δικαίως έτριζαν τα δόντια γιατί υπενθυμίζω οι Άγγλοι φρόντισαν οι βασανιστές-επικουρικοί αστυνομικοί να είναι τουρκοκύπριοι. Οι πανούργοι άγγλοι πράκτορες που κινούνταν σε όλα τα επίπεδα μόνο ο Θεός μπορεί να ξέρει για τι πράγμα συνωμοτούσαν. Εδώ και εκεί τέλος αλλά όχι το τελευταίο, όπως πάντα είχαμε και τους ευέλικτους, τους εκ φύσεώς τους δειλούς και τις ασθενείς ψυχές, τους εύκολα προσαρμοζόμενους σε κάθε περίσταση (εδώ πάλι κολλάει Καβάφης), τα παλληκάρια της φακής που μόνο με όπλα στο χέρι εναντίον ελλήνων είχαν δύναμη ενώ μπροστά στους ξένους ινστρούκτουρές τους εκλογίκευαν και εκλογικεύουν τις ηδονές του τομαριού τους. «Ανθρώπινα όλα αυτά», μας λέει ο Κονδύλης. Πολύ επικίνδυνα όμως όταν καμιά δεκαριά τουλάχιστον υπόγειοι «ηγέτες» στην Ελλάδα και στην Κύπρο ήταν έτοιμοι για γενίκευση των πραξικοπημάτων. Αυτό προειδοποιητικά αν έχουμε κουκούτσι λογική μας εξαποστέλλει ξανά κατευθείαν στον Θουκυδίδη και στα «κερκυραίικα».

Ξανά λοιπόν: Ένα τέτοιο περιβάλλον δεν επιτρέπει ενεργήματα μεγάλης εμβέλειας κάθε θέση περί του αντιθέτου είναι πολιτικά λάθος και επικίνδυνη.   

Ένα σίγουρα ασφαλές συμπέρασμα είναι ότι ο –υπό τις περιστάσεις της τότε αξιοθρήνητης πολιτικής συγκυρίας– αμίμητος Παπανδρέου παρ’ ολίγο να σύρει Κύπρο και την Ελλάδα στο σφαγείο με το να αρχίσει πρώτος τα πραξικοπήματα. Δεν είναι πρόθεση ή υπόθεση. Είναι καταγεγραμμένη υπόσχεση στους ξένους που μετά φοβούμενος τις συνέπειες αλλά και λόγω αντιδράσεων δεν εκτέλεσε εισπράττοντας τους μύδρους των αμερικανών. Εγκληματική πράξη στην οποία ολοφάνερα τον έσερναν οι αμερικανοί οι οποίοι την ίδια εποχή τον χλεύαζαν και τον θεωρούσαν ανίκανο.

Μόνο και μόνο αυτά που έλεγαν για τον Παπανδρέου (βλ. πιο πάνω) οι Αμερικανοί δείχνουν ότι οι κινήσεις του ήταν ακραία επικίνδυνες όχι μόνο για την Κύπρο αλλά και για την Ελλάδα. Μόλις τρία χρόνια μετά την Ζυρίχη κινούμασταν πάνω σε κινούμενη άμμο ανεπίγνωστα ή λόγω πολιτικής ανευθυνότητας. Ιδιαίτερα αν λάβει κανείς ότι εκεί που η Τουρκία βρισκόταν μετά την Ζυρίχη –η οποία  πολιτικά μιλώντας μερικώς μόνο είχε αναιρέσει την Λοζάνη και στρατιωτικά μιλώντας δεν είχει ισχυρό στρατιωτικό έρεισμα πάνω στο νησί–  οι συζητήσεις για να επιτρέψουν κάτι τέτοιο ήταν άμυαλες και αλόγιστες, γεγονός που δείχνουν πως δεν γνωρίζαμε πως σκέφτονται και πως λειτουργούν οι μεγάλες δυνάμεις οι οποίες βλέπουν κάθε ένδειξη υποχωρητικότητας επί ζητημάτων υψηλής αρχής ως ένδειξη ότι είμαστε αναλώσιμοι για ένα άλλο χειρότερο εναλλακτικό σενάριο δράσης (contingency plan) από τα πολλά που έχουν, όπως ξανά και ξανά τονίσαμε για να εμπεδωθεί, στο τραπέζι κάθε στιγμή. Διατρέχοντας στοιχειωδώς και προκαταρτικά κάποια κείμενα (και τις «απόψεις!» του Ράσκ) γίνεται περισσότερο από σαφές

α) ότι οι Τούρκοι διαρκώς και κάποια στιγμή τελεσιδίκως απόρριψαν το περίφημο σχέδιο Άτσεσον.

β) ότι το πώς θα είναι οι «ρυθμίσεις» ποτέ δεν σταθεροποιήθηκε και όταν ήταν ανοιχτά και ρευστά,

γ) ότι θα άρχιζε κάτι που θα μετρούσε η ισχύς, [η δε μη τήρηση των «συμφωνηθέντων» (ποιων αλήθεια και τι είδους συμφωνία!) για «τυχαίους» λόγους θα σήμαινε ότι εύκολα θα επιβάλλονταν τα τετελεσμένα του πιο ισχυρού],

δ) οι αμερικανοί δεν ήταν πρόθυμοι να συγκρατήσουν τους τούρκους και πολύ περισσότερο απέκλειαν να συγκρουστούν μαζί τους (το είδαμε ξανά και ξανά σε λίγα μόνο κείμενα των αμερικανών που έχουμε)

ε) όπως αναφέραμε και πιο πάνω οι ίδιοι οι αμερικανοί χαρακτήρισαν τις διαθέσεις του έλληνα πρωθυπουργού Παπανδρέου να κηρύξει την ένωση ήταν «σπασμωδική» ενώ οι Άγγλοι έλεγαν ότι έμαθαν πως την πήρε αυτή την απόφαση εν βρασμώ. Απόφαση ανορθολογική, χωρίς κεντρικό σχεδιασμό, με πολλές ασάφειες και ανοικτά παράθυρα για το τι ακολουθεί και που θα καταλήξουμε. Άλλοι μιλούσαν για βάση πριν, άλλοι μετά, άλλοι για κυριαρχία, άλλοι για σιωπηρές συμφωνίες, άλλοι για ξεκαθάρισμα του «καλόγερού» και βλέπουμε, άλλοι για την ακατανόητη ετοιμότητα παραχώρησης ελληνικής γης. Διαβάζουμε πχ: «PΜ was prepared to let Turkey have island of Kastellorizon as military base to protect its approaches.» Από τι «approaches» και γιατί;

Ας κάνουμε μερικά εναλλακτικά σενάρια με όρους αμερικανικής στρατηγικής. Τι να προστατέψει; Τους τουρκοκύπριους; Αυτό δεν είναι που ειπώθηκε το 1974 ενώ κάποια «έγγραφα» μας λένε κάποια άλλα ότι έλεγαν δυτικές πρωτεύουσες ενώ φαίνεται αυτά ήταν σαπουνόφουσκες και κάποιος άλλος σχεδιασμός εφαρμοζόταν εναλλακτικά και ανά πάσα στιγμή;

Άσε που στην επιστολή του Άτσενσον που προανάφερα γίνονται θολές αναφορές για «συντονισμούς» άγγλων, εθνοφρουράς, τούρκων; ΟΗΕ και αμερικανών στο πεδίο των επιχειρήσεων των πιθανών εξελίξεων που εμπλέκουν αυτό τον μεγάλο ήρωα της Ελευθερίας το Γρίβα. Θα ήταν ο ιδανικός διασυρμός του. Εκεί που με τον εθνικοαπελευθερωτικό αγώνα και εξιλεώθηκε από την προϊστορία του Χίτη (σύμφωνα βέβαια με κάποια άποψη γιατί υπάρχουν και διαφορετικές για τους Χίτες) θα έμπαινε ξανά και για πάντα ως ο μεγάλος πρωτοστάτης μέσα στο θαυμαστό ιστορικό πάνθεο των ελληνικών εμφυλίων.

            Τίποτε δεν σταθεροποιήθηκε. Καμιά ευκαιρία δεν υπήρξε ενώ πολλοί κίνδυνοι παραμόνευαν. Εμείς μόνο συρόμασταν από το ένα contingency plan στο άλλο. Παρά το ότι αυτό το συμπέρασμα είναι προκαταρτικό, είναι εν τούτοις ξεκάθαρο και με πολλές ομοιότητες με τα συμβάντα του 1974

            Η Αθήνα ζητούσε δέσμευση των αμερικανών να ελέγξουν τους Τούρκους (για «ελεγχόμενη» εισβολή, όχι τίποτα άλλο). Οι αμερικάνοι τους έλεγαν «κάντε πρώτα εσείς το πραξικόπημα και θα ελεγχθεί η κατάσταση» ενώ την ίδια στιγμή εξανίσταντο και τόνιζαν «όχι βέβαια και να παρεμβάλουμε τις δυνάμεις μας και να πολεμήσουμε τους τούρκους»). Δεσμευτείτε για την μια ή άλλη βάση και βλέπουμε πως θα είναι και ποιας έκτασης θα είναι («θα έλθει επί τόπου ο αμερικανός διοικητής στην Ευρώπη να … ορίσει τα σύνορα» και κάπου αλλού διαβάζουμε «αυτό θα ήταν ντε φάκτο διχοτόμηση», εγώ υπογραμμίζω την εκτίμηση: σε πρώτη φάση!). Αυτά όλα, υπογραμμίζω, είναι ήδη διασταυρωμένα.

Το κατά πόσο οι τούρκοι θα δράσουν «μονομερώς και βλέπουμε» ή «συνεννοημένα» και «ελεγχόμενα» και «βλέπουμε» ήταν σενάρια που συζητούσαν όλοι, κτλ, πλην οι Τούρκοι πάντα ήξεραν τι ήθελαν απόρριπταν ότι δεν τους αρκούσε και ήταν πανέτοιμοι να πιουν ελληνικό αίμα ξανά μέχρι και στην Ελληνική ενδοχώρα.

Η Αθήνα εν τέλει: Δεν αποφάσισε αυτό που ήθελαν οι αμερικάνοι. Το οποίο έτσι και αλλιώς οι Τούρκοι δεν αποδέχονται. Διότι αποδέχονται μόνο κυριαρχία και το οποίο (αυτό που ήθελαν οι αμερικανοί) η Αθήνα αν είχε σχέδιο, εάν δηλαδή ήλεγχε τις δυνάμεις της (δηλαδή το σύνολο των κριτηρίων και παραγόντων της ελληνικής στρατηγικής κα του ελληνικού πολιτικού συστήματος) θα το έκανε ότι και να έλεγαν κάποιοι κύπριοι ή ο Μακάριος.

Εκτιμήσεις υψηλού ρίσκου μπορούν να γίνουν μετά από πολλά χρόνια όταν ολοκληρωθεί η συνολική περίοδος 1945-1974. Ακόμη κα προκαταρτικά, εν τούτοις, ακόμη και εάν κανείς έχει στοιχειώδη γνώση των στρατηγικών παιγνίων βεβαιώνεται ότι σε σφαγείο θα μπαίναμε και μετά πετσοκομμένοι και μισο-ζωντανοί στο κρεοπωλείο της στρατηγικής γειτονιάς για να εξυπηρετηθεί το «alliance» και οι οικουμενικοί σκοποί που όπως είδαμε ακόμη και ένας αντιπρόσωπος Άτσεσον κάτι ήξερε και τα έθετε ψηλά στις στρατηγικές ιεραρχήσεις, εάν ξεσπούσε μια διένεξη.

Έτσι, πάντα χωρίς να το παίζουμε «προφήτες του παρελθόντος» αλλά με λίγη γνώση της στρατηγικής διαπάλης και της χάραξης και εφαρμογής στρατηγικής των ηγεμονικών ελεφάντων, μπορούμε εύλογα να διατυπώσουμε μια εκτίμηση ρίσκου: Τα πολλά contingency plans θα εναλλάσσονταν και θα προσαρμόζονταν στην εξέλιξη των σχέσεων ισχύος σε μια αναπόδραστα (με βάση και τα έγγραφα) είσοδό μας σε πραξικοπήματα, εμφύλιες συγκρούσεις, κοινωνική αναταραχή, κατάληψη της εξουσίας από υπόγειους περιφερόμενους πραξικοπηματίες που θα περιόριζαν αυτόν τον –όπως χλεύαζαν τον «άνθρωπό τους» οι αμερικανοί στις πιο επίσημες συσκέψεις του Συμβουλίου Εθνικής Ασφαλείας– «φλύαρο ξεμωραμένο κουφό ρήτορα που δεν έχει την δύναμη να αποφασίσει ή να λύσει οτιδήποτε και διαρρέει στον καλόγερο τις συζητήσεις μας»

Ο ηγέτης μας, άμα δεν ήταν χρήσιμος αρκετά να τους κάνει τις δουλειές τους, ήταν αναλώσιμος όπως και εμείς σήμερα από τους άσπονδους σωτήρες μας οι οποίοι ακόμη και αν υποστείλουμε την σημαία δεν σεβαστούν ούτε την επίγεια βιολογική μας υπόσταση, ούτε τις γυναίκες μας ούτε την τιμή μας.

Υπογραμμίζω ή συνοψίζω μερικές ακόμη συναφείς «εκτιμήσεις»: Κινούμασταν σαν ακυβέρνητο καράβι στο πλαίσιο ασταθών «απόψεων» του ενός και του άλλου για το τι θα έκαναν οι τούρκοι, με τους αμερικανούς και τους βρετανούς να δηλώνουν ότι δεν μπορούν να σταματήσουν τους τούρκους ή να συγκρουστούν μαζί τους, κτλ, πράγματα που κάθε λογικός αντιλαμβάνεται ότι θα οδηγούσαν Κύπρο και Ελλάδα σε δίνη εμφυλίων και πραξικοπημάτων εν μέσω πολέμου, με 5-6 ομάδες πρακτόρων αξιωματικών στην Ελλάδα που παραμόνευαν να κάνουν αυτά που έκαναν στον Έβρο και στην Κύπρο το 1974.

Εκτροχιασμοί με σχοινοβασίες για το πώς, πότε και με ποιες υπόγειες συνεννοήσεις θα έρχονταν οι Τούρκοι στην Κύπρο, πως, που και πόσο μεγάλη θα ήταν η τουρκική βάση (που θα ισοδυναμούσε με διχοτόμηση έλεγαν κάποιοι), κατιτί το οποίο εν τούτοις οι τούρκοι απόρριπταν όπως μονίμως κάνουν ζητώντας περισσότερα (τόσες πολλές απορρίψεις εκπλήττουν για την αυτοπεποίθησή τους).

Επίσης υποθέσεις για την στάση των Τούρκων αν εμείς προχωρήσουμε στην όπως είπαμε κατά τους αμερικανούς «σπασμωδική προκήρυξη» ενώσεως, υποθέσεις για κάποιες «συμφωνίες;», «συνεννοήσεις;» με τους Τούρκους, κτλ, οι οποίοι ξέρουμε πόσο τις τηρούν και τι θα έκαναν αν μεθοδευμένα όπως ενήργησαν σε άλλες περιπτώσεις όταν κλιμάκωναν την σύγκρουση. Μήπως θέλετε να θυμηθούμε το 1974 και την ελεγχόμενη απόβαση που θα ήταν προγεφύρωμα, που εξελίχθηκε σε ευρύτερη περιοχή για να φτάσει εκεί που ήταν κάποιο άλλο contingency plan όπως ξέρουμε πολύ καλά και διασταυρωμένα για την διαρκή μετεξέλιξη της αμερικανικής στρατηγικής όπως εξελισσόταν η κρίση.

Ο πόλεμος δεν είναι αστεία υπόθεση. Είναι ζωή ή θάνατος. Εάν είσαι αμυνόμενος και μάλιστα ο αδύναμος πρωτίστως τον αποτρέπεις και ποτέ δεν τον αρχίζεις πρώτος κινούμενος σε ολισθηρά πολιτικοστρατιωτικά-διπλωματικά πεδία.

Αν θες να διεκδικήσεις κάτι το μεθοδεύεις με σιδερένια σχέδια, σιδερένια στρατηγική και σιδερένια συσπείρωση γύρω από έσχατα και θέσφατα όλων των εμπλεκομένων ημετέρων. Όχι πραξικοπήματα εναντίον στο εσωτερικό μας και ταυτόχρονα διολίσθηση σε ασταθείς διαδικασίες την στιγμή που εκατέρωθεν στην Ελλάδα και στην Κύπρο η άμμος κάτω από τα πόδια μας κινούνταν άγρια. Ξανά: «Θουκυδίδου Α144: «Περισσότερο φοβούμαι τα ιδικά μας σφάλματα παρά τα σχέδια των εχθρών μας

Τώρα, μερικά μόνο λόγια για τις «απόψεις» Ράσκ. Υπό το πρίσμα των πιο πάνω και συνεκτιμώντας τα υπόλοιπα που ξέρουμε, την στρατηγική κατάσταση της εποχής εκείνης, τον τρόπο λήψης στρατηγικών αποφάσεων και κυρίως εφαρμογής στρατηγικής η ανάγνωση των «απόψεων» Ράσκ δεν μας λέει κάτι άλλο ή κάτι σημαντικό από αυτά που διαβάζουμε και σε όποιο αρχειακό υλικό βλέπουμε.

Δείχνει, ακόμη, ότι όπως συνήθως κάνει ένας αμερικανός υπέξ –όπβε ήδη αναφέρθηκε πολλοί υπέξ στο παρελθόν παραγκωνίστηκαν τελείως και μερικοί άλλοι αποχώρησαν– προσπαθεί να είναι στην εικόνα αυτών που κάνει το Πεντάγωνο υπό την υψηλή εποπτεία του εκάστοτε προέδρου και που χαράσσει και εφαρμόζει το Συμβούλιο Εθνικής Ασφαλείας (ΣΕΑ).

Το ΣΕΑ έχει πάντα τον αποφασιστικό έλεγχο και εποπτεία ανά πάσα στιγμή. Βασικά, εξαιρουμένου του Προέδρου που είναι ανά πάσα στιγμή ενήμερος (ενήμερος και για κάποιες «πιο απόκρυφες πτυχές» όπως συχνά ισχύει) κανείς άλλος πλην του ΣΕΑ δεν έχει πλήρη και ανά πάσα στιγμή εποπτεία για το συμβαίνει, τι αναμένεται να επέλθει, τι θέλουν να κάνουν ακριβώς και πως θα το κάνουν στην κατάλληλη στιγμή. Μεριμνούν βέβαια ο Υπέξ, άλλοι επίσημοι κα διπλωμάτες να είναι ευθυγραμμισμένοι με την εθνική στρατηγική και να ξέρουν αρκετά για να μην κάνουν μεγάλες γκάφες (αυτό συχνά συμβαίνει). Στον Υπέξ ασφαλώς κοινοποιούνται πολλά έγγραφα (το βλέπουμε στις κοινοποιήσεις πολλών εγγράφων που είναι δημοσιεύσιμα) αλλά όχι κατ’ ανάγκη μερικά άλλα, ειδικά αυτά που σχεδιάζονται και εφαρμόζονται σε κάποια βαθειά υπόγεια του Πενταγώνου.

Αλίμονο σε όποιον στηριχθεί μόνο σε συνομιλίες με τον Υπέξ ή σε εκτιμήσεις στην βάση κάποιων εγγράφων του και μάλιστα μετά από μισό αιώνα. Εδώ ολοφάνερα ο Ράσκ συνοψίζει μερικά πράγματα αλλά είναι φανερό ότι αν και έχει μια γενική γνώση των προσανατολισμών δεν έχει την πλήρη εικόνα. Τελεσίδικα αυτές οι απόψεις σε αυτό το έγγραφο δεν είναι η αποκάλυψη του αιώνα για κάποια μεγάλη κοσμοϊστορική χαμένη ευκαιρία. Εντάσσεται πλήρως στην λογική που σκιαγραφήσαμε πιο πάνω, μια δηλαδή πολύ επικίνδυνη κατάσταση για εμάς σε όλο το φάσμα που για διάφορους λόγους –και κυρίως όπως οι φόβοι του αμήχανου Παπανδρέου– δεν οδηγηθήκαμε στο αποτρόπαιο πραξικόπημα, στην σφαγή κα ι στο κρεοπωλείο διανομής σφαγμένων απρόσεκτων.

Κάθε μελετητής της αμερικανικής διπλωματίας συνεκτιμά τα έγγραφα που κατά καιρούς αποδεσμεύονται με όλα τα άλλα γεγονότα, πληροφορίες, δηλώσεις και αντιδηλώσεις, ενεργήματα και πράξεις που σχεδιάστηκαν αλλά δεν εκτελέστηκαν (και που είναι τώρα άγνωστες ενώ ίσως ποτέ δεν τις μάθουμε). Ενώ εδώ κάνουμε εκτιμήσεις σχεδόν άναρχα αλλά στο πλαίσιο λογικών και αλληλένδετων σκέψεων που αφορούν τα επίπεδα δράσης στα οποία αναφερόμαστε, ο ηγέτης όταν αποφασίζει στρατηγικά ενεργήματα φέρει μεγάλη ευθύνη:

Εκτίμηση κινδύνου κάνει εκείνη την στιγμή και με βάση της γνώσης που έχει πρωτίστως του ημέτερου εαυτού, μετά του εχθρού και στην συνέχεια όλων των άλλων (Σουν Τζου). Αυτή την εκτίμηση κινδύνου εκείνης της στιγμή που μπορεί να οδηγήσει στο σφαγείο ή στον θρίαμβο κανείς δεν μπορεί να την εκτιμήσει ακριβώς εκ των υστέρων. Όπως επανειλημμένα υπογράμμισα, εκ των υστέρων φωτίζουμε ότι μπορούμε, σκεπτόμαστε το ευρύτερο στρατηγικό περιβάλλον και κυρίως όπως κάναμε πιο πάνω διατυπώνουμε εκτιμήσεις για το τι ίσχυε στο δικό μας πεδίο. 

Τώρα, τι να πω, τον κοινό τόπο. Ότι δηλαδή ο ρόλος του εκάστοτε αμερικανού υπέξ ήταν πάντοτε, συγκριτικά με το επιτελείο του προέδρου, βοηθητικός. Διαβιβάζει μηνύματα, λέει απόψεις, μεταφέρει απόψεις τρίτων που συναντά και υπηρετεί την στρατηγική που χαράσσει το Πεντάγωνο και το Συμβούλιο Εθνικής Ασφαλείας υπό τον Πρόεδρο. Αν και πολλά μπορούν να γραφτούν για αυτά που λέει in context στο έγγραφο που μου στάλθηκε και συναρτημένα με την ροή των γεγονότων, θα συμβούλευα ένα οποιοδήποτε πολιτικό μας όταν συνομιλεί με –ρητορικά μιλώντας, για να το τονίσουμε– «διακοσμητικούς» πολιτικούς ηγέτες ξένων κρατών, να τους αξιολογεί αναλόγως και κατά περίπτωση.

Στις ΗΠΑ, να μιλά πρωτίστως με τον Πρόεδρο, τα μέλη του Συμβουλίου Εθνικής Ασφαλείας του προέδρου και άλλους πολλούς που χαράσσουν, σχεδιάζουν και εφαρμόζουν τα contingency plans (υπάρχουν άπειρες περιπτωσιολογικές μελέτες, μερικές έκανα και εγώ, δες τες παράδειγμα το τετράγωνο Τουρκία, Συρία, Ιράκ, Ισραήλ (και άλλοι) τον τελευταίο μόνο μήνα. Ο Υπέξ το πολύ να του μεταφέρει κάποιο μήνυμα στο Πεντάγωνο, έτσι για να μην ταξιδεύει ο ίδιος ή για να γίνει πιο επίσημο.

Ο Υπέξ δεν αποφασίζει στις ΗΠΑ: Πόσες φορές άλλαξαν εχθροί και φίλοι, πόσες φορές ευκολόπιστοι βρέθηκαν στα κρύα του λουτρού, πόσες φορές επί χάρτου και στο πεδίο της μάχης άλλαξαν σχέδια, κατακρεουργήθηκαν κράτη, αναδείχθηκαν χθεσινοί εχθροί σε πρωταγωνιστές κτλ κτλ., επειδή δεν ήξεραν τις ιεραρχίας της λήψης αποφάσεων στις ΗΠΑ και άλλων κρατών!  

Είναι φανερό από πολλά κείμενα, επίσης, ότι ο Ράσκ δεν είχε την πλήρη εικόνα. Πώς να γίνει έτσι είναι τα πράγματα και είτε το ξέρουμε είτε όχι και το ξανατονίζουμε: Στο Συμβούλιο Εθνικής Ασφαλείας έχουν όχι μόνο την πλήρη εικόνα διαρκώς αλλά και το πώς αλλάζει και το πώς αλλάζουν τα συμφέροντά τους όταν μύριοι άλλοι παράγοντες εξελίσσονται μέσα την δυναμική δίνη της διεθνούς και περιφερειακής πολιτικής. Όσο καλύτερο παρακολούθημα του ΣΕΑ είναι ο αμερικανός Υπέξ τόσο καλύτερος Υπέξ είναι και το αντίστροφο. Κατά καιρούς σε μερικούς δεν αρέσει και παραγκωνίζονται ή και φεύγουν. Παίζει ρόλο και η προσωπικότητα και πόσο «καπάτσος» είναι. Είναι ένας ο Ράσκ, άλλος Powell και πολύ διαφορετικός ο Κίζιγκερ ο οποίος πριν γίνει υπέξ διετέλεσε ο ΣΕΑ του Προέδρου. Αυτά δεν ξενίζουν κανένα παρατηρητή ή αναλυτή της αμερικανικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής. Συντομεύοντας λοιπόν υπογραμμίζω τα εξής:

α) Την εθνική στρατηγική των ΗΠΑ την χαράσσει η «γραφειοκρατία» του Πενταγώνου υπό την υψηλή εποπτεία του Συμβουλίου Εθνικής Ασφαλείας στο οποίο και καταλήγουν αναρίθμητα εναλλακτικά σενάρια δράσης τα οποία μάλιστα υπάρχει μέριμνα να αλλάζουν όπως ανά πάσα στιγμή αλλάζουν τα γεγονότα. Σε περιόδους κρίσεων υπάρχουν πολλές επί τόπου μονάδες παρατήρησης, ανάλυσης και μετάδοσης πληροφοριών και εκτιμήσεων στα κεντρικά για να αναδιαμορφώνονται τα εναλλακτικά σενάρια ανάλογα με τις παραστάσεις που δίνουν οι τρίτοι ή το πώς αλλάζουν τα δεδομένα στο έδαφος. Όταν εμείς είχαμε μια λανθασμένη εικόνα βεβαιοτήτων απόρροια της άγνοιάς μας, ένα πιθανό σενάριο το 1964 θα ήταν: Βάλτε ως σκοπό τον πιο αποτελεσματικό έλεγχο της Κύπρου χωρίς μελλοντικές παρενοχλήσεις (να μείνουν μόνο ιθαγενείς που θα υπακούουν τυφλά – μήπως σε αυτό το μέλλον θα επιστρέψουμε μετά τον Φεβρουάριο 2013;

Να μείνουν μόνο όσοι τους αρκούν οι βιολογικές ηδονές, κα βλέπουμε με αυτούς σε ένα άλλο σενάριο σε άλλες περιπτώσεις – βλέπουμε τι γίνεται και με την Τουρκία μετά από λίγα χρόνια ή και με άλλες χώρες τις περιοχές που θα παρελάσουν από το σφαγείο μας). Θα έλεγαν σίγουρα, ακόμη: Όπως και να έχουν τα πράγματα, ανασύρατε το contingency plan που ικανοποιεί την Τουρκία που ήταν σημαντική στρατηγικά. Λογικό ακούεται αυτό και επαναλαμβάνουμε ότι είναι λογικοί συνειρμοί από άλλες περιπτώσεις διαχείρισης κρίσεων των υπηρεσιών των ΗΠΑ. Την δε αναλώσιμη Ελλάδα με τους πολλούς κομμουνιστές και τον «ξεμωραμένο, δημαγωγό και ανίκανο πρωθυπουργό» –έτσι εικόνα δίναμε από τα πιο πάνω– θα τη διαχειριστούμε με τον πρέποντα τρόπο. [Εδώ θα τολμούσα να κάνω την εκτίμηση ότι περισσότερο υπολόγιζαν τον Μακάριο οι Αμερικανοί και λιγότερο τον Παπανδρέου – το λάθος του Μακαρίου ίσως ήταν ότι δεν φρόντισε [αν μπορούσε, αν ήξερε να τις κάνει και αν δεν θα έμπαινε σε εμφύλιες λογικές του Παπανδρέου] να κάνει ο ίδιος τις διαπραγματεύσεις με τους Αμερικανούς για να ξεφύγει και από τους Ρώσους. Ο Μακάριος για να ενώσει στρατηγικά και ελληνικά νήματα, όμως, απαιτείτο πρώτον, να έχει καμιά εικοσαριά ενημερωμένους συμβούλους-στρατηγιστές (ούτε ο Θεός δεν θα τους εύρισκε), δεύτερον, να εξασφαλίσει την συμφωνία του Γρίβα (εγκάρδια φιλαράκια αυτοί οι δύο, μόνο οι οπαδοί τους σκοτώθηκαν από υπερβάλλοντα ζήλο και συνεχίζουν μέχρι σήμερα να καυγαδίζουν σαν νήπια τριών ετών) και τρίτον, να ενώσει τα ελληνικά νήματα αντικαθιστώντας το εθνικό κέντρο ως αντιπρόσωπος στις στρατηγικές διαπραγματεύσεις. Όλα αυτά έπρεπε να γίνουν και μυστικά, δηλαδή, βράσε όρυζα.

Συμπέρασμα: Το λιγότερο ριψοκίνδυνο θα ήταν να περάσουμε τον Ρουβικώνα με τις λιγότερους δυνατές ζημιές. Αυτό έγινε ούτως ή άλλως αλλά σε 5 χρόνια και με χούντα στην Ελλάδα ξανά από την αρχή: Ο ευκολόπιστος λεβεντόγερος του εθνικοαπελευθερωτικού αγώνα, τα παλληκάρια της φακής που άρπαξαν πάλι όπλα, το φοβισμένο ΑΚΕΛ, ο έντρομος Μακάριος που παρακαλούσε να σταματήσει αυτή η τρέλα, ο φυσικός(;) θάνατος του Γρίβα, κάποιες επιστολές προς Γκιζίκη, ο ανδρείος Πρωθυπουργός της Ελλάδας που μετά κρύφτηκε στο Παγκράτι, τα χουντικά παλληκάρια εκ των οποίων μερικοί αποδείχθηκαν «έσχατοι προδότες», κάποιος λικνιζόμενος Ιωαννίδης και σταθμάρχες της ΣΙΑ που δεν ήλεγχε ο Πρέσβης (ελάτε τώρα, δεν το ήξερε! Φανταστείτε κάποιος που δεν ξέρει τι έγινε να βρει κανένα έγγραφο αλληλογραφίας του Πρέσβη και του αμερικανού Υπέξ και να μας το κουνάει – οπότε θα τον εξαποστείλω να διαβάσει μερικές χιλιάδες κείμενα για το τι κάνουν οι μεγάλες δυνάμεις]  

β) Το θανάσιμο δικό μας λάθος ήταν ο Παπανδρέου να λέει στους άσπονδους συμμάχους ότι θα κάνει πραξικόπημα [με ποιο ηθικό ή εθνικό δικαίωμα άραγε θα έκανε αυτή την ανεύθυνη εγκληματική πράξη κατά ελλήνων – και πως θα ήλεγχε την κατάσταση όταν στην Κύπρο και στην Ελλάδα «τα πάντα αναπόδραστα θα έρεαν»]. Τους έλεγε επίσης ότι φοβάται πως η ΕΣΣΔ θα … ελέγξει την Κύπρο. [την Κύπρο όπου υπήρχαν βάσεις και τρεις στρατοί του ΝΑΤΟ μάλιστα περίπου την ίδια εποχή της κρίσης της Κούβας – συν βέβαια το πάγιο στρατηγικό setting μη καθόδου της στα θερμά νερά. Θυμίζω ότι όταν φλέρταρε να κατέβει αποφασιστικά νότια στην Συρία η ΕΣΣΔ είχαμε πυρηνική απειλή από ΗΠΑ και στο Αφγανιστάν το δόγμα Κάρτερ που την καθήλωσε μέχρι θανάτου λίγα χρόνια μετά – Σίγουρα γι’ αυτό οι αμερικανοί τον κορόιδευαν λέγοντας ότι είναι ξεμωραμένος. Σίγουρα σκέφτηκαν ότι είναι άσχετος ή τους περνούσε και αυτούς για ηλίθιους – Μιλώ για τους στρατηγιστές στο Πεντάγωνο όχι για τους εκεί και εδώ «προσκόπους», πρέσβεις, διπλωμάτες ή τον περιφερόμενο αμερικανό Υπέξ που δεν έχει την βαθιά γνώση των κινήσεων και δυνατοτήτων που έχουν στο Πεντάγωνο.  Εκεί ήξεραν ότι πρώτον, εύκολα θα σταματούσαν τον Μακάριο αν έκανε τέτοια τρέλα να προσφέρει βάσεις στους σοβιετικούς οπότε οι επί τόπου στρατοί τους θα αναλάμβαναν και δεύτερον, ήξεραν τα όρια μέσα στα οποία κινούταν η ΕΣΣΔ, ιδιαίτερα την πολύ τεταμένη, μέχρι τήξεως, κατάσταση λόγω πυραύλων Πολάρις]

γ) Τελειώνω εδώ με τον Ρασκ για να υπογραμμίσω ότι ποτέ και σε καμιά περίπτωση και ανά πάσα στιγμή δεν πρέπει να εκλαμβάνεται ο λόγος μιας μεγάλης δύναμης ως δεδομένος ή θεωρούμε βεβαιότητα ακόμη και αυτό που ακούμε με τα ίδια τα αυτιά. Τις στιγμιαίες «απόψεις» του Ράσκ (η προσεκτική ανάγνωση του αγγλικού κειμένου δείχνει πολύ θολές «απόψεις») θα πρέπει κανείς να τις δει in context. Μόνο κάποιος που είναι πολύ φαντασιόπληκτος θα μπορούσε να πει ότι κοντέψαμε έστω κα εξ αποστάσεων στην Ένωση το 1964. Σε ένα σφαγείο κοντέψαμε σίγουρα. Τα πάντα ρεί στο οπλοστάσιο μιας μεγάλης δύναμης η οποία δεν αρχίζει ή τελειώνει ένα πόλεμο αλλά βρίσκεται  σε διαρκή πόλεμο πολλών επιπέδων και ειδών και σε πολλά πλανητικά σημεία.

Για όποιον θέλει να συζητά σοβαρά καλά θα κάνει να μελετήσει αξιόπιστα κείμενα όπως του Mearheimer Η τραγωδία της στρατηγικής των μεγάλων δυνάμεων στο οποίο παρέπεμψα και σε άλλο μήνυμα. Μεταξύ άλλων, ανά πάσα στιγμή τα επιτελεία χάραξης και εφαρμογής στρατηγικής μιας μεγάλης δύναμης επιδιώκουν την εξυπηρέτηση των παγκόσμιων συμφερόντων τους με έλεγχο της κατανομής ισχύος και υπερπόντιες εξισορροπήσεις των άλλων μεγάλων δυνάμεων. Στο μικροεπίπεδό μας όποιος γλυτώσει και γλυτώνουν πολλοί που δένουν κοινωνικοπολιτικά το κράτος τους, δεν διαιρούνται γύρω από ανόητα δεξιοαριστερά δόγματα, δεν κάνουν άλματα στο κενό, δεν είναι ευκολόπιστα, είναι πανέτοιμα να επιβάλουν υψηλό κόστος σε όλους και τα λοιπά, οπότε μπορούν να διαπραγματευτούν με τις μεγάλες δυνάμεις με αξιόπιστο τρόπο. Αυτά και άλλα ίσχυαν το 1964 στην Κύπρο και Ελλάδα ή ο Παπανδρέου που ήθελε «να ανοίξει του Φρενοκομείου» έψαχνε απεγνωσμένος από την άθλια κατάσταση της Ελλάδας λειτουργούσε σπασμωδικά, ανεύθυνα και πολιτικά εγκληματικά!  

Οι μεγάλες δυνάμεις για να επιτύχουν τους στρατηγικούς σκοπούς της Υψηλής Στρατηγικής τους παλεύουν ως ελέφαντες μέσα σε υαλοπωλείο για να επιτυγχάνουν μεσοπρόθεσμες και μακροπρόθεσμες προϋποθέσεις που εξυπηρετούν αυτή την ασταμάτητη και ανελέητη πάλη στο πλαίσιο της οποίας όποιος σκεφτεί ότι βλέπουν φίλους ή εχθρούς αυτοκτονεί προγραμματικά. Βλέπουν μόνο κράτη ή ομάδες (πχ την Αλ Κάιντα πανταχόθεν, ιδ. Λιβύη και Συρία) που μπορούν να εναλλάσσουν ως «φίλους» ή «εχθρούς» ανάλογα με το πώς εξελίσσεται η στρατηγική τους, η στρατηγική των άλλων κρατών και η στρατηγική των ίδιων των λιγότερο ισχυρών κρατών στις περιφέρειες. Υπό αυτό το πρίσμα τα σενάρια και τα έγγραφα πάνε και έρχονται με κεντρικά επιτελεία που ξέρουν τα πάντα για όποιους ενδιαφέρει την στρατηγική τους (ακόμη και πως … περπατάει στον δρόμο όποιος τους ενδιαφέρει).

Κύρια εισροή εκτιμήσεων είναι το πώς εκτιμούν τις δυνατότητες των τρίτων κρατών, ιδιαίτερα των λιγότερο ισχυρών «πιονιών» της στρατηγικής τους σκακιέρας. Δεν μιλάμε για συνομωσίες αλλά στρατηγικά σχέδια που συνεκτιμούν πλήθος στοιχείων. Η εφαρμογή της στρατηγική εκτυλίσσεται με τέτοιο τρόπο που προβλέπει την αποδυνάμωση «εχθρών» και «φίλων» με τρόπο που θα τους σέρνουν στο επεμβατικό χειρουργικό τραπέζι (ή καλύτερα στο τραπέζι του στρατηγικού τους Προκρούστη) όσο χρειαστεί ακόμη και επί δεκαετίες ή και για πάντα.

Μέτρο διαρκούς στάθμισης και εκτίμησης ασφαλώς είναι, μεταξύ άλλων, η ισχύς του τρίτου κράτους, η κοινωνική συνοχή, η κοινωνική ευρωστία, η συσπείρωση της πολιτικής ηγεσίας γύρω από έσχατες λογικές, η σχέση στρατιωτικής και πολιτικής ηγεσίας, η στρατιωτική οργάνωση και οι ιδιότητες των συντελεστών ισχύος, ο βαθμός ξένης εξάρτησης, ο βαθμός ξένης εξάρτησης των διανοουμένων και μέσων επικοινωνίας που διαμορφώνουν γνώμη, ο βαθμός διάβρωσης από ξένες υπηρεσίες πολιτών, πολιτικών, δημοσιογράφων κα διανοουμένων, η ικανότητα να αμυνθείς προκαλώντας μεγάλο κόστος στον οποιοδήποτε εισβολέα (ακόμη και στην ίδια την μεγάλη δύναμη), η διείσδυση άλλων μεγάλων δυνάμεων στον δικό τους χώρο επιρροής (και ασφαλώς ξέρουν με ακρίβεια και δεν χρειάζονται καρφώματα του κατ’ αυτούς «φλύαρο ξεμωραμένο κουφό ρήτορα που δεν έχει την δύναμη να αποφασίσει ή να λύσει οτιδήποτε» Παπανδρέου αν η ΕΣΣΔ μπορούσε να θέσει την Κύπρο υπό τον έλεγχό τους), την οικονομική σημασία τους στο πεδίο των πλουτοπαραγωγικών πόρων, την ικανότητά τους να ελέγχουν τους πλουτοπαραγωγικούς τους πόρους (οπότε και ετοιμάζουν άλλους να το κάνουν όπως πχ τώρα εναλλάσσονται σχέδια στο Βόρειο Ιράκ σε σχέση με την Τουρκία, την Συρία και το Κουρδικό), και τα λοιπά.

Ανάλογα με τέτοιου είδους και πολλά άλλα κριτήρια και παράγοντες μπορεί εμείς αγέρωχοι να νομίζουμε συνομιλούν μαζί μας για Α και αυτοί να έχουν στο μυαλό Ω που μπορεί να σημαίνει και τον θάνατό μας σε 1, 5, 10 ή 30 χρόνια. Τα εναλλακτικά σενάρια στρατηγικής επαναλαμβάνω είναι σε διαρκή κίνηση προσαρμόζοντας τα συμφέροντά τους όπως και αυτά αλλάζουν πάνω στην κινούμενη άμμο της διεθνούς πολιτικής όπου τα κριτήρια που αυτοί ξέρουν και εμείς δεν ξέρουμε και οι δυνητικοί συνδυασμοί μεταξύ τους είναι άπειρα.

Όσα ξέρουμε μέχρι στιγμής συνηγορούν με την εκτίμηση πως με δεδομένη την κατάσταση στα διάφορα πεδία και κυρίως στο δικό μας, με το σχέδιο Άτσεσον θα οδηγούμασταν στο σφαγείο και στην συνέχεια στο κρεοπωλείο. Τώρα, τα περί ανθελλήνων ή τι έκρυβε μέσα στην ψυχή του ο ένας ή άλλος ηγέτης, μάλιστα και σε αναφορά σε πρόσωπα που φέρουν εθναρχικό σχήμα, όχι μόνο δεν τα θεωρώ σοβαρά αλλά εξ αντικειμένου είναι τερατώδη και τροφή εμφύλιων συνδρόμων.

Τα πιο πάνω και πολλά άλλα που θα μπορούσαν να ειπωθούν δεν σημαίνουν ότι ένα λιγότερο ισχυρό κράτος είναι καταδικασμένο σε θάνατο. Το αντίθετο λέμε. Σε προγενέστερο σημείωμα αλλά και σε πιο «επίσημες» δημοσιεύσεις αναλύονται οι σχέσεις ισχυρών και λιγότερο ισχυρών κρατών. Τα περιθώρια του λιγότερο ισχυρού κράτους είναι αν πληρούνται συγκεκριμένα κριτήρια που το 1960-67 δεν πληρούνταν. Τονίζουμε ή συμπληρώνουμε τα προαναφερθέντα:

α) Να είναι ισχυρό και να μπορεί επιβάλει υψηλό κόστος κατά όσων απειλούν τα συμφέροντά του καθιστώντας έτσι το κράτος και την κοινωνία μη αναλώσιμα.

β) Ποτέ να μην συναινεί σε θανατηφόρες προτάσεις που το αφορούν (αυτό το δικαίωμα του το αναγνωρίζουν όλοι, τουλάχιστον προσωρινά).

γ) Να είναι δυνατό, εύρωστο και σίγουρο για τον εαυτό του, να διαπραγματεύεται εφ’ όλης της ύλης με σοβαρότητα και αξιοπιστία (όχι να καταντούμε να θεωρούν οι άλλοι των πρωθυπουργό μας «φλύαρο ξεμωραμένο κουφό ρήτορα που δεν έχει την δύναμη να αποφασίσει ή να λύσει οτιδήποτε» ή μελλοντικά στην Κύπρο να έχουν απέναντί τους προέδρους που θα είναι έτοιμοι να συζητήσουν την κατάργηση του κράτους)

Αποτελεί κακόγουστο αστείο ακόμη και να υπονοηθεί ότι η κατάσταση στην Ελλάδα και στην Κύπρο την δεκαετία του 1960 έδειχνε κατιτί που θα οδηγούσε στο συμπέρασμα ότι οι αγγλοαμερικανοί δεν μας θεωρούσαν αναλώσιμους και πανέτοιμα πρόβατα στο στρατηγικό τους θυσιαστήριο. Κανένα έγγραφο δεν χρειάζεται για να το ξέρουμε και μόνο μερικές φράσεις αν διαβάσει κανείς από δηλώσεις 5 ή 10 ελλήνων «ηγετών» στην Ελλάδα και στην Κύπρο θα οδηγούσε στο αναντίλεκτο συμπέρασμα ότι αναπόδραστα θα μας θεωρούσαν πρόβατα πανέτοιμα για σφαγή.

Αν πριν την δικτατορία στην Ελλάδα συρόμασταν στο τραπέζι του Προκρούστη της στρατηγικής τους ιδιαίτερα υπό τις τότε συνθήκες, θα σήμαινε μεθοδευμένο από την πλευρά τους άνοιγμα ασκών πολλών ανέμων που θα μας έβαζαν ήδη από τότε σε μια απελπιστική και εξοντωτική διαδικασία μέχρι πλήρους και τελεσίδικου ελέγχου μας ή αν χρειαζόταν και πλήρους εξόντωσης. Κύριος στρατηγικός εταίρος τότε ήταν η Τουρκία και αυτό μετρούσε πολύ για το πώς θα εξελίσσονταν τα πράγματα και οι ρευστές κουβέντες δήθεν συνεννοήσεις που έκανε με τους αμερικανούς ο λικνιζόμενος Παπανδρέου. Ακολούθησαν άλλες πρακτικές που συνεχίζονται μέχρι σήμερα, όπως η ΕΟΚΑ Β, το πραξικόπημα, η διζωνική παράκρουση, το σχέδιο Αναν και τα επερχόμενα σχέδια Αναν μετά τις προεδρικές εκλογές στην Κύπρο τον Φεβρουάριο 2013.

Εάν δε δούμε 7-8 χρόνια μετά, εν μέσω δικτατορίας πως λειτούργησαν οι ημέτεροι πιστολέρο εκατέρωθεν δείχνει το πόσο λίγο ασήμαντους και ανίκανους αν όχι τυφλούς ανθρώπους είχαν οι αγγλοαμερικανοί και οι τούρκοι ως συνομιλητές τους. Νομίζουμε πως δεν το ήξεραν;! Μα γιατί άλλωστε στην παρατεταμένη περίοδο μέχρι το 2004 μας έπαιζαν όπως η γάτα το ποντίκι και γιατί επίσης το 2003-04 μας θεώρησαν γαϊδούρια και μας σέρβιραν το δηλητηριώδες σανό του σχεδίου Αναν. Πως άλλωστε μας βλέπουν σήμερα όταν βλέπουν πολλούς στην Κύπρο να μην ανακαλούν ολικά το θανατηφόρο σχέδιο Αναν;

Οι άλλοι «έξω» βέβαια έμαθαν κάτι από το ΟΧΙ των κυπρίων του 2004. Ότι δηλαδή «δεν ξέρεις τι γίνεται και πως μπορούν να αντιδράσουν αυτοί οι τρελοί απόγονοι του Λεωνίδα και του Παλληκαρίδη». «Δώσε τους λοιπόν μπόλικα σακιά δηλητηριώδη σανό μέχρι τον Φεβρουάριο 2013 γιατί αυτή την φορά θα τους αρπάξουμε τελεσιδίκως», θα λένε σίγουρα. Που θα πάνε, άσε τους να συζητούν για το … 1964 για να δικαιολογήσουν τις υποχωρήσεις του 2013 και εμείς πανέτοιμοι θα τους ρίξουμε στο τραπέζι του στρατηγικού μας Προκρούστη.

4. (7.7.2013) Απάντηση σε σχόλια για το κουράγιο της … Πηνελόπης: Αντίσταση στα θανατηφόρα εμφυλιακά σύνδρομα και στα σύνδρομα ενοχής

 Η ιστορία της Κύπρου όταν γραφτεί σωστά, θα καταδείξει ότι όσον αφορά το εσωτερικό μέτωπο, διακρίνονται κάποιοι σταθμοί οι οποίοι λίγο πολύ συνδέονται γραμμικά. Η ιστορία θα γραφτεί ή πρέπει να γραφτεί για να αναιρεθούν, αν μη τι άλλο, οι απλουστεύσεις όσων Ανανιστών κάθε εποχής, οι οποίοι την στιγμή που η Κύπρος και η Ελλάδα βρίσκονται στην άκρη του γκρεμού, ανερυθρίαστα με λόγια και με πράξεις και συνειδητά ή ανεπίγνωστα, δημιουργούν «κατάλληλη» ατμόσφαιρα για επαναφορά ενός νέου ακόμη χειρότερου φασιστικού, ανελεύθερου και γενοκτονικού σχεδίου Αναν.

«Κάποιος» πριν μερικούς μήνες έγραψε: [δεν βλέπουν] «… οι κήρυκες της απόλυτης ορθότητας του ΟΧΙ [του Σχεδίου Αναν] είναι ότι η τουρκική κατάκτηση μεγάλου μέρους της Κύπρου θέτει (έθεσε κι έθετε από τότε) τέρμα στους εθνικούς ενωτικούς αγώνες της Κύπρου για τα επόμενα 100 χρόνια, κι αν αυτό ήταν σοκ σε πολλαπλά πεδία (εθνικό, ψυχολογικό, ιστορικό κ.λπ.), κανένας δεν δικαιολογείται να λέει «εγώ θέλω να αγνοώ το τάδε πεδίο διότι όταν το σκέφτομαι με αρρωσταίνει». … να συνειδητοποιούσαμε ότι τερματίστηκαν άδοξα, συντριπτικά  και τελειωτικά πια οι εθνικοί μας αγώνες, οπότε ας βάλουμε προσωρινά πίσω στα μπαούλα τα σύμβολα και τα οράματα κι ας δούμε τι μπορούμε να περισώσουμε ως απλοί  «πολίτες» μιας ιδιότυπης «Δημοκρατίας», που για την ώρα σκέφτονται μόνο τη βιολογική τους επιβίωση εν ειρήνη. Τεράστιας ευθύνης απόφαση. Μεγάλου κινδύνου απόφαση, αληθινά ζωής ή θανάτου απόφαση, με τον θάνατο να έχει τις συντριπτικά περισσότερες πιθανότητες ..».

Το ποιος έγραψε αυτή την βαθύτατων προεκτάσεων «ιστορική» φράση δεν έχει και πολύ μεγάλη σημασία. Σημασία έχει ότι υποδηλώνει μια αντίληψη που υποβόσκει στα θεμέλια πολλών δραστών της συμφοράς των Ελλήνων από το 1945 μέχρι σήμερα. Σήμερα, στο μεταίχμιο, όταν αμφότερα τα κράτη τα κυβερνούν τρόικες και όταν στήνονται νέες κλίνες Προκρούστη στρατηγικών παιγνίων, δεν υπάρχουν πολλά περιθώρια πολιτικού και πνευματικού ανορθολογισμού.

Άμα βάλουμε τις σημαίες μας στα μπαούλα η Πηνελόπη δεν θα συναντήσει τον Οδυσσέα. Είτε θα την βιάσουν είτε απεγνωσμένη θα εκπορνευτεί. Δυστυχώς η επιπολαιότητά μας και η ενθάρρυνση των εμφυλιακών συνδρόμων προς τα εκεί οδηγεί την Κύπρο (πολύ πιθανό και την Ελλάδα). Είναι θλιβερό, πάντως, το γεγονός ότι ακόμη και καλοπροαίρετοι συμπατριώτες μας δεν βλέπουν αυτή την εξόφθαλμη αλήθεια.

Οι αντί-κομμουνιστές τραμπούκοι της περιόδου αμέσως μετά την ανεξαρτησία περιόδου (1960-67) γαλουχήθηκαν όχι για να δράσουν υπέρ των σκοπών της ανεξαρτησίας και ελευθερίας των κυπρίων. Πολλοί μπορεί αυτό να νόμιζαν αλλά η αλήθεια είναι άλλη. Κατά την διάρκεια αυτής της περιόδου πολλοί κύπριοι  προσχώρησαν στην προπαγάνδα της μιας πλευράς των αντιπάλων του Ψυχρού Πολέμου (οι αντίθετοί τους, βέβαια, στην προπαγάνδα της άλλης πλευράς). Όσοι ζούσαν τότε και ζουν και σήμερα θυμούνται τις μαύρες λιμουζίνες γεμάτες ψιλοκουρεμένους αμερικανούς να καταφθάνουν ακόμη και στο τελευταίο χωριό και να γαλουχούν τα «παλληκάρια» με αλλότρια δόγματα. Τα δογμάτιζαν με ζητήματα άσχετα με την επιβίωση των Ελλήνων και τα ετοίμαζαν, όπως τελικά αποδείχθηκε, για κάθε μελλοντική «χρήση». Οι συνέπειες είναι πασίγνωστες, φρικτές και πολλές ανεπίστροφες. Έστησαν στρατούς αναρίθμητων οι οποίοι συνειδητά ή ανεπίγνωστα μέχρι και σήμερα πανέτοιμα και ετοιμοπόλεμα υπηρετούν το ένα ή άλλο στρατηγικό σχέδιο. Το ίδιο αποκρουστικό σκηνικό πολλών άλλων ιθαγενών πολλών άλλων κρατών της μετά-αποικιακής εποχής που σήμερα βλέπουμε που καταλήγουν. Διευκρινίζεται ότι δεν μιλάμε για καμιά συνομωσία. Μιλάμε για πασίγνωστα σε κάθε καλό διεθνολόγο στρατηγικά σχέδια της ανελέητης σύγκρουσης μεταξύ των ηγεμονικών δυνάμεων. Δεν βλέπουν φίλους και εχθρούς. Βλέπουν μόνο πιόνια των εκατέρωθεν στρατηγικών παιγνίων. Μικρότερα κράτη όπως τα δικά μας αντί να διαφυλάξουν την συνοχή τους, αντί να συσπειρωθούν γύρω από έσχατες λογικές ελευθερίας και ανεξαρτησίας και αντί να αποφεύγουν τις συμπληγάδες, συχνά σέρνονται και συνθλίβονται.

Στην Αθήνα περίπου την ίδια περίοδο (αρχές της δεκαετίας του 1960) το σκηνικό της αδυναμίας, της εμφύλιας διαίρεσης και της εξάρτησης ήταν κάτι περισσότερο από πασίδηλο. Δημαγωγοί, πράκτορες, εθνοσωτήρες, βασιλιάδες και βασιλόπουλα και εξεγερμένοι κομμουνιστές της μετά-εμφυλιακής εποχής κατά των «νικητών» του εμφυλίου πολέμου των οποίων ο κίβδηλος πατριωτισμός αποκαλύφθηκε από την θέρμη με την οποία υποστήριξαν την ξενόβαλτη χούντα. Ούτως ή άλλως, κατ’ ουσία, ελληνικό κράτος δεν υπήρχε. Οι υπηρεσίες, ο στρατός και η αστυνομία ελέγχονταν εξωτερικά και οι δημαγωγοί –με κορυφαίο των «Γέρο»– επιδιδόταν σε ρεσιτάλ πολιτικής ανευθυνότητας.

«Γέρος»: Καθισμένος πάνω σε 5-6 εκκολαπτόμενα ενδό-Ελλαδικά πραξικοπήματα, πέραν πολλών άλλων απίστευτων ερασιτεχνικών κινήσεων υπόσχονταν στους ξένους πραξικόπημα κατά της εκλεγμένης ηγεσίας στην Κύπρο. Βέβαια οι γεμάτοι εμφυλιακά σύνδρομα συγκαιρινοί ιστορικοί εισαγγελείς, ούτε που τους ενδιαφέρει η εγκληματική πρόθεση του «Γέρου» να κάνει πραξικόπημα. Τέσσερεις δεκαετίες μετά το αντί-μακαριακό μένος και τα εμφύλια σύνδρομα ενώνονται για να εθελοτυφλούν μπροστά σε τέτοιες εγκληματικές προθέσεις και υποσχέσεις. Η πολιτική ανευθυνότητα του «Γέρου» ήταν μνημειώδης. Εάν κάτι πολύ σημαντικό αποκαλύπτουν τα αμερικανικά και βρετανικά έγγραφα που έρχονται στο φως της δημοσιότητας, είναι ακριβώς τέτοιες πτυχές, καθότι οι άλλες που αφορούν την στρατηγική αντιπαράθεση και τις ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις είναι λίγο πολύ γνωστές. Στην διελκυστίνδα των αμερικανικών σχεδίων της περιόδου 1964-65 (συχνά ακούνε και στο όνομα «σχέδια Άτσεσον) και ενώ οι Τούρκοι ως συνήθως ποτέ δεν δέχθηκαν οτιδήποτε παρά μόνο συνομιλούσαν ανεβάζοντας διαρκώς τον πήχη των αξιώσεων, η Άγκυρα ολοφάνερα ανέμενε να διαπράξουμε το μοιραίο λάθος (που τελικά αποφεύχθηκε λόγω ελιγμών του Μακαρίου αλλά που δυστυχώς δεν αποφύγαμε το 1974).

Αν κάτι σημαντικό, επιπλέον, μπορεί να συναχθεί από τα αμερικανικά και βρετανικά έγγραφα για να φωτίσει σημαντικές σκοτεινές πτυχές των σχεδίων Άτσεσον, είναι ότι οι αμερικανοί στο πιο υψηλό επίπεδο της χάραξης και εφαρμογής στρατηγικής έλεγαν ότι εάν άρχιζε στην Κύπρο κατιτί δεν υπήρχε περίπτωση να μην ευνοηθεί η Τουρκία (αυτά είναι τα ουσιώδη της ανάγνωσης των αρχείων και όχι η επιλεκτική ανάγνωση ασήμαντων πτυχών που δικαιολογούν πραξικοπήματα, σύνδρομα ενοχών και σημερινή υποστήριξη του ενός ή άλλου επερχόμενου σχεδίου Αναν). 

Εάν σταθούμε στον «Γέρο», με ανευθυνότητα ακραίων διαστάσεων την ίδια στιγμή που υποσχόταν πραξικόπημα στην Κύπρο συναινούσε στην για πρώτη φορά έλευση της Τουρκίας στην Καρπασία και στην παραχώρηση του Καστελορίζου (για λόγους ελέγχου των προσβάσεων!!). Κυρίως, όμως, συνομιλούσε με ξένους για προέλαση των Τούρκων με θολούς και αδιευκρίνιστους όρους και σε θολά προσδιορισμένες περιοχές. Η σταθεροποίηση των ορίων θα συντελούνταν δυναμικά και αφού η Κύπρος θα είχε μπει ανυπεράσπιστη στην  κλίνη του Προκρούστη των στρατηγικών παιγνίων του Ψυχρού Πολέμου. Καθ’ όλη την διάρκεια των «συνομιλιών» η αντιμετώπιση «τυχόν συγκρούσεων» που θα άρχιζαν μεταξύ «θερμόαιμων ελλήνων» αποτελούσε πάντοτε ένα ρευστό ζήτημα. Η έκβαση των συγκρούσεων όπως είναι λογικό και όπως συμβαίνει με κάθε διεθνή σύγκρουση συναρτάται με την πολιτικοστρατιωτική οργάνωση των εμπλεκομένων, τα εναλλακτικά σενάρια εκπλήρωσης των σκοπών, την ισχύ των δρώντων, τις πραγματικές δυνατότητες των εμπλεκομένων και κυρίως από τα συμπλεκόμενα στρατηγικά συμφέροντα του Ψυχρού Πολέμου  (ποιος θα τις άρχιζε, ποιος θα τις ήλεγχε, ποιος θα τις ποδογετούσε τις δικές μας εμφύλιες συγκρούσεις, ποιοι θα επωφελούνταν, που θα κατέληγε κτλ – όλα αυτά μας τα εξηγεί ο αρχηγός του Αμερικανικού επιτελείου ο οποίος έκανε σαφές ότι η Τουρκία ήταν υπέρτατος σύμμαχος και τα συμφέροντά της και οι επιλογές της μη αμφισβητήσιμες). Την ίδια στιγμή, βέβαια και εν μέσω κρίσεως, τίποτα δες εγγυόταν ότι στην Αθήνα δεν θα γινόταν ένα από τα πολλά ετοιμαζόμενα πραξικοπήματα (ένα από αυτά έγινε λίγα χρόνια μετά το 1967). Ο «Γέρος» καθισμένος πάνω σε κινούμενες κοινωνικοπολιτικές πλάκες και εν μέσω σχεδίων πραξικοπημάτων δημαγωγούσε ακατάσχετα. Αγόταν και φερόταν. Ολοφάνερα, κατάφερε να φέρει την Κύπρο στο χείλος της αβύσσου. Ακόμη και οι αμερικανοί έφριξαν με την ανευθυνότητά του και το έλεγαν στις συναντήσεις τους και στις επιστολές τους (κύριο μέλημα των αμερικανών βέβαια, ήταν να εκδιωχθεί ή και δολοφονηθεί ο Μακάριος για να προχωρήσουν τα σχέδιά τους, και την (τελική) δειλία του Παπανδρέου στηλίτευαν επειδή φοβήθηκε και δεν τήρησε τις υποσχέσεις του).

Τουτέστιν, εάν χρειάζεται να κάνουμε υποθέσεις το 1964-5 προδιαγραφόταν α) εμφύλιες συγκρούσεις στην Κύπρο, β) προέλαση των Τούρκων στην οποία οι Αμερικανοί δήλωναν προγραμματικά αμέτοχοι (δηλαδή, δεν θα τους εμπόδιζαν, όπως δήλωναν απερίφραστα, στην εκπλήρωση των σκοπών τους!!!), γ) πραξικοπήματα στην Ελλάδα και δ) η Ελλάδα και την Κύπρο αδύναμες και διαιρεμένες να κατακομματιάζονται πάνω στο τραπέζι της προαναφερθείσης κλίνης του Προκρούστη των στρατηγικών παιγνίων.

Οι ερασιστεχνισμοί της Αθήνας, το Λονδίνο που καιροφυλαχτούσε και ποτέ δεν έδειξε πλήρως τα χαρτιά του, οι στρατηγικές ισορροπίες της εποχής εκείνης στο επίπεδο ΗΠΑ-ΕΣΣΔ, οι λεπτές ισορροπίες στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο, η σημασία της Τουρκίας για αυτές, οι ΗΠΑ που λειτουργούσαν ως ελέφαντες εν υαλοπωλείο και οι σχεδόν σίγουρες (και σίγουρα υποκινημένες από οποιονδήποτε θα είχε συμφέρον) συγκρούσεις στην Κύπρο θα είχαν ένα αναπόδραστο υπό τις περιστάσεις αποτέλεσμα: Η Κύπρος και η Ελλάδα θα έμπαιναν στο τραπέζι των στρατηγικών παιγνίων υπό τις δυσμενέστερες γι’ αυτή συνθήκες (χειρότερες συνθήκες συγκρινόμενες ακόμη και με αυτές του 1974 και του 2004 ή τις σημερινές).

Προφήτης του παρελθόντος κανείς δεν μπορεί να γίνει. Το ότι μερικοί προσυπογράφουν ιστορικές ανεκδοτολογίες και γραμμικές ιστορικές ασυναρτησίες είναι δηλωτικό της πνευματικής και πολιτικής παρακμής των Ελλήνων. Εν τέλει, όμως, πρέπει να τονιστεί ότι είναι πολιτικά άκρως επικίνδυνο να γίνονται ανεκδοτολογικού χαρακτήρα εξιστορήσεις για τόσο σοβαρά πράγματα. Ακόμη πιο επικίνδυνο είναι για τους Έλληνες ότι με τόσο αλματώδη τρόπο συνδέονται τα τότε γεγονότα με την σημερινή κατάσταση για να προδιαγράψουν την οριστική καταστροφή. Την οριστική και αμετάκλητη, δηλαδή, ένταξη του Ελληνισμού της Κύπρου στον χώρο επιρροής των εχθρών. Βρικολακιάζει ο χειρότερος εαυτό μας της περιόδου 1960-1974 και ακυρώνεται έτσι κάθε αξίωση πολιτικού και στρατηγικού ορθολογισμού. Θα επικρατήσουν οι ίδιοι άκρως επικίνδυνοι παραλογισμοί και πολύ χειρότεροι.

Αυτοί δηλαδή –οι παραλογισμοί– οι οποίοι από το 1960 μέχρι το 1967 μετέτρεψαν την Κύπρο πεδίο συγκρουόμενων τραμπούκων του υποκόσμου και αυτοί που προκάλεσαν συνοδοιπορία πολλών με την Χούντα, την Ουάσινγκτον και την Μόσχα (οι συγκλίνουσες περί το σχέδιο Αναν συμπεριφορές σε ένα ευρύ ιδεολογικό φάσμα δεν είναι τυχαίες – το ζήτημα δεν είναι η μια ή άλλη ιδεολογία γιατί όλες οι ιδεολογίες του Ψυχρού Πολέμου ήταν και συνεχίζουν να είναι ξενόδουλες και εξυπηρετικές ξένων στρατηγικών σχεδίων – το ότι συγκλίνουν στα ουσιώδη δεν είναι τυχαίο).

Είναι οι ίδιοι παραλογισμοί όσων ξεσηκώθηκαν να κάνουν … την ένωση από το 1970 μέχρι το 1974. Αναμενόμενα οδήγησαν σε πλήρη σύμπραξη πολλών «παλληκαριών της φακής» με το πραξικόπημα. Όσων (παραλογισμών) στην συνέχεια έκαναν πολλούς να γονατίσουν μπροστά στους εχθρούς, όσων έκαναν πολλούς να αναπτύξουν σύνδρομα υποτέλειας και ετοιμότητα να υποδουλωθούν ακόμη και … για εκατό χρόνια, να βάλουν τις σημαίες στα μπαούλα και να δεχθούν την ιδέα ένταξης της Κύπρου στο νέο-Οθωμανικό σφαγείο. Όσων γεμάτοι σύνδρομα και ενοχές για το αμαρτωλό πολιτικό παρελθόν τους ψάχνουν για δικαίωση παραδίδοντάς μας χειροπόδαρα δεμένους ως δήθεν «πολίτες» μιας δήθεν «ιδιότυπης «Δημοκρατίας», που για την ώρα, δήθεν, θα πρέπει να σκέφτονται μόνο τη βιολογική τους επιβίωση.

Πρέπει να τονιστεί ότι είναι αξιοπερίεργο το γεγονός ότι τόσοι πολλοί καλοπροαίρετοι –και συχνά πολύ μορφωμένοι και επί άλλων σημαντικών περιόδων ιστορικά καταρτισμένοι– δεν μπορούν να διαβάσουν το ιστορικό Α,Β,Γ ή να διακρίνουν το ιστορικό μαύρο από το ιστορικό άσπρο. Γιατί παρασύρονται από ανεκδοτολογίες και από αυθαίρετες αλματώδεις ασυναρτησίες! Στον Μακάριο, για παράδειγμα, μπορούν να καταλογιστούν πάρα, πάρα, πάρα πολλά!!. Κυρίως ότι δεν φρόντισε να θωρακίσει και περιφρουρήσει πλήρως!! και ασυμβίβαστα!! το κυπριακό κράτος κατά των ξενόβαλτων, ξενόδουλων, ξενοκρατούμενων και άκρως ανεύθυνων εξουσιαστών των Αθηνών. Πιστώνεται όμως, ο Μακάριος, με το γεγονός ότι το 1963-64 εν μέσω εξόφθαλμα ακραία και εγκληματικά ανεύθυνων κινήσεων της Αθήνας και περνώντας μέσα από πολλές συμπληγάδες μιας επικίνδυνης ιστορικής ψυχροπολεμικής στιγμής, κατόρθωσε να διασώσει, έστω και προσωρινά, την Κύπρο. Είναι αποκρουστικό να δεχόμαστε να αντιστρέφουμε τόσο ωμά και αυθαίρετα αυτή την πασίδηλη και διυποκειμενικά γνωστή αλήθεια. Το να κατηγορείται ο Μακάριος για κάποιου είδους ανθελληνισμό, λόγω αυτού του γεγονότος, εξάλλου, αποτελεί ύβρη κατά της λογικής και κατά της ιστορίας. Η ύβρις ως γνωστό, ποτέ δεν είναι χωρίς συνέπειες για όσους την εκτόξευαν.

Βέβαια, το 1964-65 ο Μακάριος διέσωσε την Κύπρο μόνο προσωρινά. Τα ίδια μυαλά και οι ίδιοι περίπου δράστες επανήλθαν και επανέρχονται. Με μια διαφορά: Ότι σήμερα η κυριαρχία των ίδιων εξαρτημένων, ξενόδουλων και εμφυλιακών νοοτροπιών θα σήμαινε ότι Ελλάδα και Κύπρος θα δεχθούν την χαριστική  βολή. Συνομιλώντας σήμερα το πρωί με συνάδελφο μου είπε ότι ίσως και να μας αξίζει. Διαφωνώ!! Όσο και να διαφωνεί κάποιος, όμως, μπροστά στο τζουνάμι ανορθολογισμού οι επιλογές λιγοστεύουν και το μοιραίο επέρχεται. Οι λίγοι θα βάλουν την σημαία στο μπαούλο και ως συνήθως συμβαίνει ιστορικά θα συμβιβαστούν για να υπηρετήσουν τον κατακτητή και οι λίγοι θα υποφέρουν.

Η Πηνελόπη όμως τι φταίει. Ενώ η Πηνελόπη υπομονετικά περίμενε τον πολυμήχανο Οδυσσέα, στις μέρες μας, στο όνομα αμφοτέρων, κάποιοι επικαλούνται την ιδιότητα του φορέα της ελληνικότητας (αχθοφόροι, κατά βάση) για να συνεισφέρουν στο σημερινό ρεκόρ πολιτικού ανορθολογισμού και διπλωματικής ασυναρτησίας. Γιατί το κάνουν; Γιατί τους αφήνουμε και κυρίως γιατί καλοπροαίρετοι άνθρωποι τόσο εύκολα παρασύρονται και τόσο εύκολα συνηγορούν;

Υπό τις περιστάσεις είναι αναγκαίο να γνωρίζουμε όλοι ότι ενώ τα ηλίθια επιχειρήματα στις καφενειακές διαμάχες είναι αήττητα, όταν επικρατήσουν στο πολιτικό πεδίο είναι θανατηφόρα.

Υστερόγραφο. Σε κάθε καλοπροαίρετο πατριώτη θα συνιστούσα προσοχή στις ανεκδοτολογίες πολεμικού και εμφυλιακού χαρακτήρα. Η αντιμετώπιση των σημερινών προκλήσεων περνάει όχι μέσα από δικαιολόγηση συνδρόμων αλλά με πολιτικό ορθολογισμό και κατανόηση της σημασίας της εξάρτησης, του ρόλου των εμφύλιων συνδρόμων και της κατανόησης του τρόπου που τα παρελθόντα φρικτά λάθη (συμπεριλαμβανομένων των συνομωσιών των εγκληματικά ανεύθυνων εξουσιαστών της Αθήνας κατά του Μακαρίου το 1964-65) μας οδήγησαν στο σημερινό τέλμα. Οι ουσίες, τα νοήματα, η ελευθερία και τα σύμβολα των Ελλήνων απαιτείται να εγερθούν και όχι να κρυφτούν στα ανανικά μπαούλα. Αυτό διευκολύνει την νέο-Οθωμανική λαίλαπα εκτός και εάν πολλοί πλέον την θέλουν. 

5. (20.1.2013)  Τα σχέδια Άτσεσον τον Αύγουστο και Σεπτέμβριο του 1964

Η συγγραφή του παρόντος σημειώματος αποφασίστηκε μετά από διαδικτυακές συζητήσεις που προκάλεσαν έναρξη μιας πιο συστηματικής προκαταρτικής εξέτασης της περιόδου 1960-74. Πυροδοτήθηκαν από αρθρογραφία μου υπέρ του ανεξάρτητου υποψηφίου στις προεδρικές εκλογές της Κύπρου, Γιώργου Λιλλήκα στις 20.12.2012. Για το σχέδιο Αναν δεν θα επεκταθούμε εδώ γιατί έχει αναλυθεί εκτενώς σε άλλες περιπτώσεις. Πάντοτε βεβαίως υπάρχει η «Έκθεση εμπειρογνωμόνων για το Κυπριακό» που γράφτηκε από μια διεθνή ομάδα ακαδημαϊκών στην οποία συμμετείχα. Ο ενδιαφερόμενος για μια σφαιρική και τεκμηριωμένη ανάλυση του τρόπου που το σχέδιο Αναν παραβίαζε την διεθνή και ευρωπαϊκή νομιμότητα, θα πρέπει να διαβάσει την έκθεση αυτή. 

Ξαφνικά, εκεί που γινόταν ανταλλαγή απόψεων για τις πολιτικές προϋποθέσεις των υποψηφίων και ιδιαίτερα την σχέση τους με το σχέδιο Αναν (παλαιό και επερχόμενο), οι συντρέχουσες πολιτικές εξελίξεις συνδέθηκαν με το σχέδιο Άτσεσον, τους δεξιούς και αριστερούς των δεκαετιών 1960 και 1970, την διαδρομή των ιδεολογικό-κομματικών συγκρούσεων σε Ελλάδα και Κύπρο έκτοτε, την σχέση ηρώων του αγώνα της ΕΟΚΑ όπως ο Αυξεντίου με αμετανόητους «ανανικούς» υποψηφίους και το μέλλον του ελληνισμού της Κύπρου ο οποίος, κατά μια άποψη, δεν του αξίζει ελευθερία όπως όλων των άλλων ή ότι θα την βρει μέσα στην σαπουνόφουσκα της «μεταεθνικής εποχής». Τέτοιες περίεργες ιδέες είχε γράψει το 2003 ο Στέλιος Ράμφος αλλά συχνά τις επαναλαμβάνουν και άλλοι. Ιδιαίτερα όσοι θέλουν με το να εισέλθουν σε ένα κενό πνευματικού αέρα να δικαιολογήσουν το σχέδιο Αναν παλαιό και επερχόμενο. Επιλέγουμε λοιπόν «ανανικούς πολιτικούς» επειδή αυτοί θα μας οδηγήσουν ειρηνικά και εξ ανάγκης στον αιώνιο υποβιβασμό μας στις κατώτερες πολιτικές ιεραρχίες (των υποδούλων και υποτελών, αν κανείς μπορεί να τις ονομάσει «πολιτικές»).    

Έτσι, στον ελληνικό πολιτικοστοχαστικό χώρο όπου η λέξη «αλαλούμ» και «χαβαλές» αποτυπώνει με τον ποιο γλαφυρό αλλά αληθινό τρόπο τις χαμηλές ποιοτικές βαθμίδες των συζητήσεων μέσα στην δημόσια σφαίρα, ούτε λίγο ούτε πολύ κάποιοι αναφέρονται στο σχέδιο Άτσεσον ως «χαμένη ευκαιρία» «ατόφιας ένωσης» της Κύπρου με την Ελλάδα το 1964. Το εκπληκτικό όμως δεν είναι αυτές οι προφητείες του παρελθόντος οι οποίες υποδηλώνουν πνευματική παρακμή και οι οποίες μπορεί να εκδηλωθούν και στις «καλύτερες (πολιτειακές) οικογένειες» όταν αυτές παρακμάσουν και υποδουλωθούν. Το εκπληκτικό είναι οι γραμμικές ιστορικές ερμηνείες που καταλήγουν με τέτοιο ασυνάρτητο τρόπο σε τόσο αλματώδη συμπεράσματα δεν υπόκεινται σε ελέγχους και εξισορροπήσεις. Μοιάζει σαν και το πολιτικοστοχαστικό περιβάλλον της Ελλάδας και της Κύπρου να είναι ανύπαρκτο ή παντελώς ροκανισμένο. Σίγουρα, εισήλθαμε πλέον σε ένα απελπιστικά ανιστόρητο και πολιτικά άκρως επικίνδυνο τέλμα αφελειών και ασυναρτησιών. Με ολίγη φαντασία, κανένα αποσπασματικό έγγραφο που ερμηνεύουμε κατά βούληση, με ολίγα άλματα συλλογισμών, με δίκη προθέσεων ιστορικών προσώπων ή και ολόκληρων πληθυσμών και με πολωτική δεξιοαριστερή προδιάθεση καταλήγουμε στο ιδεολόγημα των «χαμένων ευκαιριών» που μπορεί να δικαιολογήσει ακόμη και την σκλαβιά. Σίγουρα, πάντως, σε αποκλεισμό πολιτικών προσώπων που υπερασπίζονται την εθνική ανεξαρτησία και στην θεοποίηση πολιτικών προσώπων που προγραμματικά δηλώνουν ότι είναι έτοιμοι να συζητήσουν την κατάργηση του κράτους.

Μετά τις πρώτες και λίγο πολύ αμυντικές αντιδράσεις του υποφαινόμενου με κείμενα στο διαδίκτυο τα κυριότερα είναι αναρτημένα πιο κάτω (http://www.ifestosedu.gr/112CySympligades.htm) –υπάρχουν και άλλα κείμενα σε ιδιωτικές λίστες διαδικτυακής συζήτησης που για ευνόητους δεοντολογικούς λόγους δεν αναρτώ–, οι πληροφορίες άρχισαν να εισρέουν ορμητικά. Φίλοι από όλο τον κόσμο άρχισαν να μου αποστέλλουν φωτοτυπίες από βιβλία, τεράστια αρχεία τα οποία περιείχαν εκατοντάδες δημοσιοποιημένα έγγραφα της αμερικανικής και βρετανικής κυβέρνησης, εκθέσεις διπλωματικών αντιπροσώπων, συζητήσεις στο επιτελείο του αμερικανού προέδρου, συνδέσμους σε αποδεσμευμένο αρχειακό υλικό και πολλά άλλα που αριθμούν ήδη χιλιάδες σελίδες. Μερικά περιέχουν αξιολογήσιμες πληροφορίες, άλλα είναι κείμενα ρουτίνας που θα πρέπει να ειδωθούν σε συνάρτηση με άλλα σημαντικότερα και κάποια άλλα είναι «παλιοχάρτια», όπως λέμε όσοι μπροστά σε όγκους πηγών αγωνιζόμαστε να τα αξιολογήσουμε και ιεραρχήσουμε παραμερίζοντας τα περισσότερα ως άχρηστα ή αποπροσανατολιστικά.  

Κατ’ αρχάς και με δεδομένο ότι υπήρξαν ήδη τοποθετήσεις πριν δω πολλές από αυτές τις πληροφορίες, υπάρχει μια ανακούφιση καθότι ως «πολιτικός επιστήμονας» ο οποίος συχνά ανθρώπινα εξοργισμένος παρεμβαίνει για να πει τα αυτονόητα, διυποκειμενικά και πασίδηλα, φαίνεται να μην έχω πέσει έξω στις πρώτες μου εκτιμήσεις για την δεκαετία του 1960. Στην βάση στοιχειωδών γνώσεων –και κυρίως στο πεδίο της στρατηγικής ανάλυσης– οι πρώτες εκτιμήσεις που έγιναν και που βρίσκονται αναρτημένες κινούνται εντός λογικών και σωστών επιστημολογικών και επιστημονικών ορίων.

Κατά δεύτερον, μια γρήγορη η ανάγνωση μερικών κειμένων που κατέφθασαν βεβαιώνει την εκτίμηση ότι η περίοδος 1960-1964 ήταν ένα επεισόδιο της νεότερης ελληνικής ιστορίας το οποίο επειδή συνέβηκε σε μια κομβική στιγμή ενδέχεται ενταγμένο υπό ευρύτερο πρίσμα να είναι διδακτικό. Επαληθεύεται, επίσης, ότι το κυπριακό αποτελεί την σημαντικότερη αχίλλειο πτέρνα του νεοελληνικού κράτους στην μεταπολεμική και μεταψυχροπολεμική εποχή. Πιο σημαντικό, για ένα οποιοδήποτε πολιτικό επιστήμονα του διεθνούς συστήματος καθίσταται ακαριαία ολοφάνερο ότι στην στρατηγική των εμπλεκομένων με τις ελληνικές διεθνείς σχέσεις και ιδιαίτερα των μεγάλων δυνάμεων και της Τουρκίας υπάρχει μακροχρόνιος στρατηγικός σχεδιασμός γεωπολιτικής και γεωστρατηγικής υφής που αφορά ευθέως μια αλυσίδα από αλληλένδετα ζητήματα της νεότερης ελληνικής ιστορίας.

Ζητήματα που βλέπει κανείς να ξεδιπλώνονται μέσα από αρχειακό υλικό που ήδη κατέφθασε, άλλο που αναμένεται και πολύ περισσότερο που δεν έχει ακόμη αποδεσμευτεί αλλά ερευνητές έχουν ήδη πολλά στοιχεία. Ορίστε, μεταξύ άλλων, μερικά ζητήματα που φωτίζονται με αρχειακό υλικό που ήδη διαθέτουμε και με άλλες αξιόπιστες πληροφορίες που έχουμε ή αναμένουμε:

  • ·       Εμφύλιος πόλεμος, τριμερής Διάσκεψη και εθνικοαπελευθερωτικός αγώνας 1955-59.
  • ·       Κωνσταντινούπολη 1955 υπό το πρίσμα τουρκικών στρατηγικών σχεδιασμών.
  • ·       Ζυρίχη 1959-60 και ο τρόπος που επιβλήθηκε, οι δρώντες και οι αιτιολογήσεις τους.
  • ·       Αίτια για σχιζοφρενή πολιτικά και πολιτειακά χαρακτηριστικά του κυπριακού κράτους.
  • ·       Κυπριακές προτάσεις αλλαγής της Συντάγματος αμέσως μετά με αγγλική ενθάρρυνση.
  • ·       Έναρξη τουρκοκυπριακών αρνησικυριών και ανταρσία του 1963.
  • ·       Τουρκική επιθετικότητα και απελπισμένη αν όχι απονενοημένη κυπριακή προσέγγιση της ΕΣΣΔ
  • ·       Αλματώδης άνοδος της γεωπολιτικής σημασίας της Τουρκίας λόγω εξελίξεων στον Ψυχρό Πόλεμο.
  • ·       Στρατηγικός σχεδιασμός και επανασχεδιασμός των μεγάλων δυνάμεων και άλλων κρατών.
  • ·       Ταραχώδης ελληνική πολιτική ζωή από το 1960 μέχρι το 67 (οι αμερικανοί την χαρακτηρίζουν «δημαγωγική» με επιθετικούς προσδιορισμούς κατά του Γεωργίου Παπανδρέου).
  • ·       Σχέδιο Άτσεσον και όλα τα συμπαρομαρτούντα στρατηγικά παρασκήνια, εναλλακτικά σενάρια δράσης (contingency plans) και χαρακτηριστικές μεθοδεύσεις που προσδιορίζουν τις συμπεριφορές στο άναρχο διεθνές σύστημα.
  • ·       Συμπεριφορές και στάσεις που προσδιορίζουν τον ρόλο της ισχύος στην εξέλιξη των διακρατικών σχέσεων.
  • ·       Συμπεριφορές και στάσεις που προσδιορίζουν με μαθηματική ακρίβεια την έννοια «ηθική» στην διεθνή πολιτική.
  • ·       Συμπεριφορές και στάσεις που προσδιορίζουν τον τρόπο που τίθενται ζητήματα όπως η αυτοσυντήρηση και η επιβίωση.
  • ·       Οι επανειλημμένες υποσχέσεις του Γεωργίου Παπανδρέου (και ασφαλώς πολλών άλλων που είχαν εμπλακεί) να εκτελέσει πραξικόπημα στην Κύπρο κατά του εκλεγμένου Προέδρου.
  • ·       Εκκόλαψη και διαρκώς μετεξέλιξη των εναλλακτικών στρατηγικών σχεδίων αμερικανοτουρκικής νομής του κυπριακού χώρου.
  • ·       Η σημασία της ύπαρξης ισχυρών κομμουνιστικών ρευμάτων στην Ελλάδα και Κύπρο και χαρακτηριστικές ανεύθυνες στάσεις όπως του τότε πρωθυπουργού Γεωργίου Παπανδρέου ο οποίος εκτός από πραξικοπήματα δεν έχανε ευκαιρία να τροφοδοτεί τον αμερικανικό αντί-κομμουνιστικό οίστρο.
  • ·       Διαδηλώσεις στην Αθήνα και δημαγωγίες από τα μπαλκόνια που εκτιμούμενα λεπτομερέστερα προσδιορίζουν με ακρίβεια το επίπεδο της ελληνικής πολιτικής συνοχής ενόψει εμπλοκής σε στρατηγικά σχέδια που αφορούν ζητήματα ζωής και θανάτου.
  • ·       Αποστασίες στην Ελλάδα, Φρειδερίκη, Βασιλόπουλά, 4-5 τουλάχιστον υπό εκκόλαψη πραξικοπήματα στην Αθήνα και ολοφάνερες μέσα από τα αρχεία διασυνδέσεις των αμερικανικών υπηρεσιών με πολλούς.
  • ·       Κάθοδος της ελληνικής επαρχίας στην Κύπρο που ενώ υπό άλλες συνθήκες θα μπορούσε να αποτελέσει τρόπο επίλυσης του κυπριακού και σταθεροποίησης όλων των περιφερειακών σχέσεων διολίσθησε στο να είναι εργαλείο των αμερικανών για πραξικόπημα στην Κύπρο.
  • ·       Διευκόλυνση μιας εν δυνάμει και για πρώτη φορά τουρκικής στρατιωτικής εισβολής στην Κύπρο (την ίδια στιγμή που ο ίδιος ο Έλληνας πρωθυπουργός θολά, παραπονιάρικα και αδύναμα υπενθύμιζε την Συνθήκη της Λοζάνης.
  • ·       Διολίσθηση για παραχώρηση ελληνικής γης ως «αντάλλαγμα» για να εισέλθουμε μέσα σε ένα τέτοιο ασταθές ναρκοπέδιο.
  • ·       Υπόγειες δραστηριότητες του αεικίνητου Υπουργού Εθνικής Άμυνας Γαρουφαλιά τον οποίο οι αμερικανοί θεωρούσαν τον «ισχυρό άνδρα» με τον οποίο η CIA θα μπορούσε με την πρώτη ευκαιρία να συνεννοηθεί για να εκτελεστεί αδίστακτα (σε αντίθεση με τον «ανίκανο» Παπανδρέου, όπως τον χαρακτήριζαν οι αμερικανοί) ένα ελλαδικό πραξικόπημα κατά του Μακαρίου για να  για να διευκολυνθεί η «ελεγχόμενη» τουρκική εισβολή στην Κύπρο που θα μετάτρεπε το νησί σε αμερικανική βάση (συν βέβαια Βρετανική και τουρκική παρουσία οπότε το ερώτημα που θα ζούσαν οι αυτόχθονες κάτοικοι).
  • ·       Έλληνες πρέσβεις να εισηγούνται στους Αμερικανούς (αυτοί που διαπραγματευόντουσαν την «ατόφια ένωση») την κατάληψη της Καρπασίας από τους Τούρκους.
  • ·       Στρατηγικά σημαίνουσες συναλλαγές ΗΠΑ και Τουρκίας.
  • ·       Διαρκή τουρκική άρνηση και απόρριψη των πάντων από την Τουρκία με ολοφάνερο σκοπό να διευρύνει τις δυνατότητές της σε μια ευνοϊκή στιγμή για αυτή (που δεν άργησε να έλθει το 1974).
  • ·       Διαρκείς επαφές των Τούρκων με όλους συμπεριλαμβανομένης της Σοβιετικής Ένωσης.
  • ·       Δραστήρια Βρετανικά ενεργήματα στο παρασκήνιο των εξελίξεων.
  • ·       Το Αμερικανικό σκεπτικό στο πιο υψηλό επίπεδο που δείχνει ότι γνώριζαν ότι η Σοβιετική κάθοδος στην Κύπρο είναι απίθανη κατιτί που υποδηλώνει τον προσχηματικό χαρακτήρα πολλών δηλώσεων στο διπλωματικό πεδίο και τον δημόσιο λόγο.
  • ·       Ρητές και άρρητες διασυνδέσεις του παρακράτους πολλών ειδών και αποχρώσεων της Ελλάδας και της Κύπρου και όλων μαζί με ξένες δυνάμεις.
  • ·       Τον τρόπο που συνδεόταν το ασταθές κοινωνικοπολιτικό πεδίο στην Αθήνα με το εξίσου ασταθές πολιτικό πεδίο της Κύπρου.

Τα πιο πάνω είναι μερικά ζητήματα που εκτυλίσσονται μέσα από το αρχειακό υλικό που ήδη διαθέτουμε. Αυτά και πολλά άλλα μπορούν να συνεκτιμηθούν με τον σωστό τρόπο σε αναφορά με την στρατηγική δίνη της εποχής εκείνης όπως εξελίχθηκε την δεκαετία του 1960 στο πλαίσιο της αντιπαράθεσης του Ψυχρού Πολέμου. Αντιπαράθεση η οποία δημιουργούσε ένα πολύ ρευστό, ασταθές και δυναμικά κινούμενο ενδοκρατικό και διεθνές περιβάλλον. Υπό αυτό το πρίσμα οι παράγοντες που υπεισέρχονται σε κάθε ζήτημα διεθνούς πολιτικής όπως το επεισόδιο του σχεδίου Αναν είναι αναρίθμητοι και οι μεταξύ τους συνδυασμοί αμέτρητοι.

Γι’ αυτό και αποτελεί παρακμή η συναγωγή προφητειών του παρελθόντος για το πώς θα εξελίσσονταν τα πράγματα μιας και η ιστορία διδάσκει ότι όλα μαζί θα εισέλθουν μέσα στην δυναμική κινούμενη δίνη της διεθνούς πολιτικής όπου όπως μας πληροφορεί ο Υποδειγματικός –για την θεωρία διεθνών σχέσεων– Θουκυδίδης, η έκβαση κατά πάσα πιθανότητα θα είναι η εξής: «Δίκαιο (αυτού που το επιδιώκει) υπάρχει όταν υπάρχει ίση δύναμη για την επιβολή του και όταν αυτό δεν συμβαίνει ο ισχυρός κάνει ότι του επιτρέπει η δύναμή του και οι αδύναμοι υποχωρούν και προσαρμόζονται» ή σκοτώνονται και εξαφανίζονται (όπως έκαναν οι Αθηναίοι στους Μήλιους).

Ακόμη και αυτή η αξιωματική θέση, βέβαια, βρίσκεται υπό την αίρεση επαληθεύσεων και διαψεύσεων, λένε κάποιοι: Που ξέρεις, μπορεί να ήλθε η στιγμή όπου πλέον τα κράτη συμπεριφέρονται αλτρουιστικά και μεγαλόψυχα. Οπότε ξανά ο Θουκυδίδης μας προειδοποιεί: «λόγια που να στηρίζονται στο δίκαιο δεν λείπουν από κανένα, πιστεύουν όμως πως όσοι διατηρούν την ελευθερία τους το χρωστούν στη δύναμή τους … Η ελπίδα, παρηγοριά την ώρα του κινδύνου, όσους την έχουν από περίσσια δύναμη κι αν τους βλάψει δεν τους καταστρέφει  όσοι όμως, στηριγμένοι πάνω της, τα παίζουν όλα για όλα (γιατί απ’ τη φύση της είναι σπάταλη), μονάχα όταν αποτύχουν την γνωρίζουν, όταν πια, για κείνον που έκαμε τη γνωριμία της, δεν έχει απομείνει τίποτε για να το προφυλάξει απ’ αυτήν».

Ο λόγος για τον οποίο οι πολιτικοί επιστήμονες του διεθνούς συστήματος προχωρούν στην μελέτη των ιστορικών γεγονότων μπορεί να είναι ένας και μοναδικός: Η άντληση διδαγμάτων, η αναγνώριση των φυσιογνωμικών χαρακτηριστικών των δρώντων, η επαλήθευση ή διάψευση σταθερότερων κριτηρίων της διεθνούς πολιτικής, η ερμηνεία της διακρατικής δομής όπως προσδιορίζεται σήμερα και η συναγωγή αξιόπιστων πορισμάτων που αφορούν όλους ανεξάρτητα το τι μπορούν να κάνουν ή το πώς θα το κάνουν.

          Υπό το ίδιο πρίσμα, η συνωμοτική ερμηνεία της ιστορίας ή η απόδοση προθέσεων και οι αλματώδεις προφητείες του παρελθόντος οδηγούν σε έωλα πολιτικοστοχαστικά εγχειρήματα τα οποία άμα συνδυαστούν πνευματικούς εκτροχιασμούς προκαλούν αβάστακτα λανθασμένες αποφάσεις. Για παράδειγμα, είναι ένα πράγμα η συνωμοσιολογία ως δήθεν πολιτική ανάλυση της διεθνούς πολιτικής και άλλο η εξέταση της στρατηγικής των κρατών που εμπεριέχει τόσο φανερές όσο και μη διαφανείς ή μυστικές πτυχές. Το ίδιο ισχύει για την εξέταση πάγιων κριτηρίων στρατηγικών στάσεων, συμπεριφορών και ιεραρχήσεων και υπό το πρίσμα του γεγονότος ότι ένα κράτος είναι τόσο περισσότερο ανταγωνιστικό όσο περισσότερο μπορεί να συγκροτήσει σκοπούς και στρατηγικές επιλογές εκπλήρωσής τους. Έτσι, για παράδειγμα, εξετάζοντας συγκριτικά την Ελλάδα και την Τουρκία ή άλλα κράτη με αφορμή το επεισόδιο των σχεδίων Άτσεσον την δεκαετία του 1990 διερευνούμε ζητήματα όπως τα εξής που προσδιορίζουν το ρίσκο, τις πιθανότητες επιτυχίας και τα διδάγματα για το παρόν και το μέλλον:

  • ·       Ποια είναι η κοινωνικοπολιτική συνοχή.
  • ·       Ποια δέσμευση της κοινωνίας στα εθνικά συμφέροντα επιβίωσης ενός κράτους.
  • ·       Ποια είναι η ποιότητα του στρατηγικού προβληματισμού στο επίπεδο της πολιτικής και στρατιωτικής ηγεσίας και των επιστημονικών συζητήσεων.
  • ·       Ποια είναι η σχέση δυνατοτήτων-σκοπών που τίθενται όταν ένα κράτος χαράσσει –εάν χαράσσει– μακροχρόνιους, μεσοπρόθεσμους και βραχυχρόνιους σκοπούς και όταν σχεδιάζει-εφαρμόζει στρατηγικές εκπλήρωσής τους.
  • ·       Ποια είναι η ικανότητα των πολιτικών ηγετών να κατανοήσουν τον χαρακτήρα και τις λειτουργίες του διεθνούς συστήματος.
  • ·       Ποια είναι η ποιότητα της διπλωματίας.
  • ·       Ποιες είναι οι ποιοτικές βαθμίδες του επιστημονικού έργου που παράγεται σε εξειδικευμένους θεσμούς του κράτους ή στα πανεπιστήμια όσον αφορά την διεθνή πολιτική και την στρατηγική των άλλων κρατών.
  • ·       Ποια είναι η σύνδεση αυτού του επιστημονικού έργου (το οποίο όταν εκπορεύεται πανεπιστημιακά δεσμεύει γιγαντιαίους σπάνιους πόρους) με τα πολιτικά δρώμενα.
  • ·       Ποια η σχέση πολιτικής, στρατιωτικής και πνευματικής ηγεσίας.
  • ·       Ποια είναι η πολιτική συναίνεση μεταξύ των πολιτικών παρατάξεων μιας χώρας γύρω από το έσχατο και υπέρτατο εθνικό συμφέρον της επιβίωσης.
  • ·       Ποιος είναι ο βαθμός διάβρωσης της πολιτικής και πνευματικής ζωής (και των Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων) από ξένα συμφέροντα και από διεθνικούς δρώντες,
  • ·       και τα λοιπά.

 Πάντα υπό αυτό το πρίσμα, λοιπόν, και με δεδομένο ότι το μέχρι στιγμής (Ιανουάριος 2013) το υλικό που καταφθάνει αφορά κυρίως την δεκαετία του 1960, ενώ υπάρχει περισσότερο αν όχι άφθονο για όλες τις περιόδους μέχρι και σήμερα, κανείς μπορεί να επιχειρήσει μια λογική διασύνδεση της στρατηγικής και των σκοπών των εμπλεκομένων γεγονότων παρελθουσών εποχών για να αντλήσει διδάγματα για το σήμερα ή το αύριο. Για παράδειγμα πως στοιχειοθετείται μια αλληλουχία αλληλένδετων γεγονότων και πως αυτό σχετίζεται με την συγκαιρινή συγκυρία. Μεταξύ άλλων: 

  • ·       Η δικτατορία στην Ελλάδα.
  • ·       Το παρακράτος στην Ελλάδα και στην Κύπρο την δεκαετία του 1960.
  • ·       Η ΕΟΚΑ Β στην Κύπρο.
  • ·       Το πραξικόπημα του 1974 στην Κύπρο.
  • ·       Το πώς εξελίχθηκε η τουρκική εισβολή και ποιες οι ομοιότητες με στρατηγικές περιγραφές πχ του επεισοδίου των σχεδίων Άτσεσον ή και προγενέστερων περιπτώσεων.
  • ·       Πώς μεθοδεύτηκε διπλωματικά (και από τα ίδια μάλιστα πρόσωπα, πχ τον Μπώλλ) η διολίσθηση των ελλήνων σε διαπραγματεύσεις για δικοινοτική ομοσπονδία, στην συνέχεια σε διζωνική και λίγα χρόνια μετά στην αποκρυσταλλωμένη μορφή του σχεδίου Αναν που σήμαινε κατάλυση του κυπριακού κράτους, διασκορπισμό του πλούτου του και υποδούλωση της κοινωνίας του.
  • ·       Το ίδιο το σχέδιο Αναν ως μια καταγεγραμμένη αποτύπωση στρατηγικών σκοπών που βλέπουμε να επιχειρείται να εκπληρωθούν ήδη από τις δεκαετίες του 1950, του 1960 και 1970.
  • ·       Τον εξαρτημένο ή ανεξάρτητο ρόλο των διεθνών θεσμών και τα διδάγματα.
  • ·       Την εξέλιξη της Ελλάδας και της Κύπρου στην μεταψυχροπολεμική εποχή υπό το φως πιο μακροχρόνιων τάσεων και ιδιαίτερα της στρατηγικής των μεγάλων δυνάμεων στις υπερπόντιες εξισορροπήσεις και ανταγωνισμούς.   

6. Το «σχέδιο Άτσεσον» ως αφετηρία νέου κατήφορου που έφερε την χούντα και το 1974.      

Σκοπός. Σκοπός στις γραμμές που ακολουθούν δεν είναι να αναλυθεί το σχέδιο Άτσεσον καθότι δεν είναι παρά μόνο ένα επεισόδιο της ελληνικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής της περιόδου 1945-1974. Θα δούμε λοιπόν συνοπτικά το τι θα μπορούσε και τι θα έπρεπε, μεταξύ άλλων και στοιχειωδώς, να συνεκτιμήσει κανείς πριν σταθμίσει και αποφανθεί για το σχέδιο Άτσεσον. Ενδεικτικά και αλληλένδετα θα αναφερθώ σε πέντε ζητήματα. Πρώτον, την πολιτική δομή στην Ελλάδα και στην Κύπρο η οποία αν και διϋποκειμενικά γνωστή και αληθής είναι υπό την αίρεση βαθύτερων διερευνήσεων. Δεύτερον, τις στρατηγικές ή την ανυπαρξία στρατηγικών των εμπλεκομένων. Τρίτον, στοιχειώδεις αναφορές της στρατηγικής συγκυρίας της περιόδου 1955-1967 που αναβάθμισαν αλματωδώς την γεωπολιτική σημασία της Τουρκίας στην ιεραρχία των αμερικανικών μεθοδεύσεων. Τέταρτον, στις στρατηγικές των μεγάλων εμπλεκομένων δυνάμεων και κυρίως στα τυπολογικά χαρακτηριστικά στην χάραξη, σχεδιασμό και εφαρμογή της αμερικανικής υψηλής στρατηγικής, καθώς επίσης και σε παγιωμένες ιεραρχίες σκοπών και μεθοδεύσεων. Πέμπτον, εκλεκτικές παραθέσεις μερικών μόνο ενδεικτικών αποσπασμάτων οι οποίες από μόνες τους ανατρέπουν πλήρως τις γραμμικές ερμηνείες και τις προφητείες του παρελθόντος. Διαδοχικά, ο οξυδερκής αναγνώστης θα παρατηρήσει ολοφάνερα το γεγονός ότι η τύχη της Κύπρου και της Ελλάδας παίχτηκε στην κόψη του ξυραφιού και ότι σχεδόν συμπτωματικά διασώθηκαν προσωρινά εκ συμπτώσεως ή συγκυριών που θα φωτιστούν και αυτές δοκιμαστικά. Επαναλαμβάνω ότι ανεξαρτήτως της ευκολίας με την οποία κανείς καταλήγει σε εύλογες εκτιμήσεις για τα γεγονότα και την σημασία τους, α) προφητείες του παρελθόντος δεν μπορούν να γίνουν, β) βαθύτερη γνώση θα απαιτήσει μια συγκροτημένη έρευνα, αξιολόγηση των διαφόρων επιπέδων ανάλυσης και κυρίως συνάρτησής τους με μετέπειτα γεγονότα που καταμαρτυρούν την αλληλουχία στρατηγικών σκοπών και μεθοδεύσεων.              

Σκιαγράφηση της συγκυρίας. Αρχές της δεκαετίας του 1960 διαφαίνεται τόσο ο εύθραυστος χαρακτήρας των διευθετήσεων της Ζυρίχης όσο και οι τουρκικές μεθοδεύσεις να λησμονήσει τελείως την Συνθήκη της Λοζάνης και να κτίσει πάνω στις «εγγυητικά δικαιώματα» (κατά πολλούς αντίθετα στο διεθνές δίκαιο). Στο πεδίο της ελλαδικής πολιτικής το λιγότερο που θα μπορούσε να πει κανείς είναι ότι όλοι εισήλθαν σε μια αστάθμητη δίνη κάτω από την οποία εκκολάπτονταν πολλά σχέδια πραξικοπημάτων από πολλούς σχεδόν πάντοτε συνδεδεμένων με στρατηγικές ξένων κρατών και τις μυστικές τους υπηρεσίες. Στο στρατηγικό πεδίο, έχουμε την κορύφωση της έντασης του Ψυχρού Πολέμου. Μετά την κρίση της Κούβας οι ΗΠΑ στην βάση πάγιων γεωπολιτικών κριτηρίων και σε αναφορά με το δόγμα της ανάσχεσης στην περίμετρο της Ευρασίας πίεζε την Σοβιετική Ένωση να συγκρατηθεί στην γεωπολιτική ενδοχώρα ενώ η τελευταία χωρίς να φθάνει στα άκρα πίεζε αντίστροφα. Η ζώνη που κάλυπτε το CENTO βρισκόταν στον πυρήνα αυτής της στρατηγικής και η Τουρκία αναβαθμίστηκε στις ιεραρχίες των Δυτικών στρατηγικών ως υψίστης σημασίας κράτος. Στο πεδίο της ισχύος και των συμμαχιών η πλάστιγγα έγερνε υπέρ της Τουρκίας και εις βάρος της Ελλάδας. Με δεδομένη την ιστορική συγκυρία και στα δύο επίπεδα ανάλυσης (κράτη και στρατηγικό) η μόνη στρατηγική συμβουλή που θα μπορούσε να δώσει κανείς είναι η Ελλάδα και η Κύπρος ευφυώς να αποφύγουν να εισέλθουν στις συμπληγάδες του ηγεμονικού ανταγωνισμού γιατί θα βρίσκονταν σε άκρως μειονεκτική θέση. Επίσης, ότι στην βάση πάγιων στάσεων και συμπεριφορών το ηγεμονικό κράτος όταν δύο περιφερειακά κράτη συγκρούονται επιλέγει ενεργήματα που οδηγούν σε κατανομή ισχύος που ωφελούν τον γι’ αυτό το ηγεμονικό κράτος γεωπολιτικά σημαντικότερο σύμμαχο. Εξίσου χρήσιμη συμβουλή είναι να μην εμπιστεύεται κανείς οποιονδήποτε και να συνομιλεί –πάντοτε με επιφύλαξη και αξιόπιστα– με τους ιεραρχικά σημαντικότερους συντελεστές του συστήματος λήψης αποφάσεων (στις ΗΠΑ με συντελεστές του Συμβουλίου Εθνικής Ασφαλείας και κατ’ ευθείαν με τον Πρόεδρο, ο ρόλος του Υπουργού Εξωτερικών εξαρτάται από το πρόσωπο και είναι κατά κύριο λόγο βοηθητικός και ενίοτε δεύτερης ή και τρίτης τάξης). Την περίοδο 1960-63 η Τουρκία διαρκώς απειλούσε την Κύπρο,  συνωμοτούσε ακατάπαυστα και στην Ελληνική πλευρά αντί συντεταγμένης συνεννόησης πάρθηκαν αποφάσεις χωρίς να υπάρχει το αναγκαίο υπόστρωμα πολιτικής συνοχής, στρατηγικής οργάνωσης και εφαρμογής στρατηγικής σε όλα τα πιθανά επίπεδα. Έτσι, η αποστολή της Ελληνικής Μεραρχίας στην Κύπρο (λογική κατά τα άλλα απόφαση και στο κλίμα της εποχής και των αντιπαλοτήτων γύρω από την Κύπρο)  αντί μέσο διεξόδου κατάντησε όπως θα δούμε να είναι πιόνι έξωθεν υποκινούμενων σχεδίων ενδό-ελληνικού πραξικοπήματος και διολίσθησης στο κενό ή καλύτερα στα χέρια των αντίπαλων κρατών. Τέλος αλλά όχι το τελευταίο που θα μπορούσε να αναφερθεί για την τότε συγκυρία, ενώ οι παίχτες απέναντι στην Ελλάδα και στην Κύπρο λειτουργούσαν με σιδερένια συνοχή, οργάνωση και πειθαρχία η εικόνα στα δύο ελληνικά κράτη υποδήλωνε διάλυση, ασυνεννοησία, διλήμματα ασφαλείας!, αντιπάθειες, αποδιοργάνωση, παντελή άγνοια των στρατηγικών σκοπών και ιεραρχιών, διάβρωση από ξένες υπηρεσίες, καταστάσεις παρακράτους που και αυτές βρίσκονταν υπό ξένη επήρεια και αποδυναμωτική σπασμωδικότητα και νευρικότητα.     

7. Προσωρινά συμπεράσματα και στοιχειώδεις αναφορές σε διαθέσιμο αρχειακό υλικό – τα σημεία που ακολουθούν θα συμπληρωθούν, τεκμηριωθούν.

Η ανάγνωση του αρχειακού υλικού που έχουμε μέχρι στιγμής στην διάθεσή μας καθιστά σαφές ότι το σχέδιο Άτσεσον αποτελούσε μια αμερικανική στρατηγική ελέγχου της Κύπρου με σκοπούς η ιεραρχία των οποίων αναμενόμενα θα άλλαζε (και έτσι έγινε) ανάλογα με την ισχύ, την στρατηγική και τους ελιγμούς των εμπλεκομένων. Μια τέτοια στρατηγική εμπλοκή για τις ΗΠΑ σήμαινε ότι ιεραρχικά σήμαινε (πολλές αποχρώσεις είναι βεβαίως νοητές αλλά λογικά μόνο εντός αυτών οριοθετήσεων)

α) Να καταστεί η Κύπρος ορμητήριο των ΗΠΑ και του ΝΑΤΟ στην αντιπαράθεση Ανατολής-Δύσης (και ασφαλώς να μην περιπέσει η Κύπρος στην Σοβιετική Σφαίρα, κατιτί που όπως και θα ειπωθεί από τον Μπωλλ στον Πρόεδρο στην κρίσιμη σύσκεψη της 8ης Σεπτεμβρίου δεν ήταν κάτι το αναμενόμενο).

β) Προσπάθεια μεν να εκπληρωθεί αυτός ο στόχος χωρίς όμως κατά προτίμηση να συγκρουστούν Ελλάδα και Τουρκία (αυτό ακαριαία και άκαμπτα οριοθετούσε το εγχείρημα και τα εναλλακτικά σχέδια των ΗΠΑ εκτός και αν κανείς έχει ένδειξη ότι η Τουρκία θα δεχόταν οτιδήποτε άλλο εκτός από μια εδραία και μόνιμη παρουσία στην Κύπρο ως αφετηρία του επόμενου βήματος στο πλαίσιο της ελληνοτουρκικής αντιπαράθεσης που ποτέ δεν σταμάτησε – και που αποτελούσε συστημικού χαρακτήρα διένεξη, όπως τα γεγονότα καταμαρτυρούν διαχρονικά).

γ) Εάν η Τουρκία δεν συναινέσει σε μια περιορισμένη (σύμφωνα με τα αμερικανικά κριτήρια) κατάκτηση στρατιωτικού προγεφυρώματος στην Κύπρο (κατά την εκτίμησή μου ενοίκιο ή μόνιμη είναι δευτερεύον εκτός και αν τερματιζόταν για πάντα η ελληνοτουρκική αντιπαράθεση κατιτί που όπως γνωρίζουμε δεν ισχύει) τότε εξώθηση σε «ελεγχόμενη κρίση που θα έφερνε την Τουρκία σε διαπραγματευτική ισχυρή θέση» (βλ. στα έγγραφα πιο κάτω) και επιβολή των προδιαγεγραμμένων σκοπών.

δ) Οι Αμερικανοί με συγκλονιστικό για την Ελλάδα τρόπο –αλλά και καθοριστικό για την έκβαση της κρίσης αν άρχιζε κατιτί με σπασμωδικές ανακηρύξεις εν μέσω ελληνικού εμφυλίου– θεωρούσαν δύο πράγματα δεδομένα: Αφενός ο Έλληνας πρωθυπουργός ήταν αναλώσιμο υποχείριό τους απαξιώνοντάς τον διαρκώς ως δημαγωγό, ανίκανο κτλ. Αφετέρου, ότι ανά πάσα στιγμή ήλεγχαν πλήρως το ελλαδικό πολιτικοστρατιωτικό πεδίο με προεξάρχοντα βέβαια «άνθρωπό τους» τον Υπουργό Άμυνας Γαρουφαλιά. Είναι εξίσου συγκλονιστική, επιπλέον, προσδοκία των ΗΠΑ και ο θυμός τους αργότερα όταν δεν εκπληρώθηκε, ότι έλληνες θα εκτελούσαν ενδό-ελληνικά στρατιωτικά πραξικοπήματα τα οποία αυτοί στην συνέχεια θα ενέτασσαν στα γνωστά εναλλακτικά σενάρια δράσης (contingency plans μερικά από τα οποία αναδύονται εδώ και εκεί μέσα από όσες πληροφορίες διέτρεξα μέχρι στιγμής.

ε) Οι Τούρκοι απέρριπταν πάντοτε όλες τις προτάσεις και τελεσιδίκως με την αποστολή της επιστολής Ερκίν ενώ είχε δίαυλους επικοινωνίας με την Σοβιετική Ένωση για το θέμα της «ομοσπονδίας» (που ευνοούσε την περαιτέρω ενδό-Νατοϊκή διχόνοια που κατά βάση ήθελε η ΕΣΣΔ). Ο πασίδηλος σκοπός της Άγκυρας ήταν να συρθούν όλοι στο πεδίο στρατιωτικών παιγνίων όπου η γεωπολιτική της σημασία θα μετρούσε εξαιρετικά. Τρόπος να γίνει διαφορετικά ότι εκδουλεύσεις και να προσέφεραν οι ελλαδίτες συνομιλητές τους δεν υπήρχε γιατί η Τουρκία χαρακτηριστικά είπε αν ανακηρυχθεί η ένωση θα εισβάλει «ακόμη και εάν όλος ο κόσμος θα στραφεί εναντίον της». Εξαιρετικά σημαντικό και συναφές, πολλά κείμενα που έχουμε ήδη στην διάθεσή μας οι αμερικανοί καθιστούν ξανά και ξανά σαφές (μεταξύ τους και σε συνομιλίες με Έλληνες) αφενός ότι ποτέ δεν θα πολεμήσουν τον τουρκικό στρατό και αφετέρου ότι ποτέ δεν θα παρεμβληθούν μεταξύ τουρκικού στρατού και Κύπρου.

στ) Το πώς θα εξελίσσονταν τα εναλλακτικά σενάρια δράσης κανείς δεν μπορεί να ξέρει γιατί έχουν όπως θα εξηγήσουμε πιο κάτω την δική τους δυναμική πάντοτε αρνητική για τον λιγότερο ισχυρό.                

Μια πρώτη εκτίμηση είναι ότι το πραξικόπημα που σχεδίαζε, υποσχέθηκε και τελικά δεν έκανε συνωμοτώντας με ξένες δυνάμεις θα έβαζε Ελλάδα και Κύπρο σε ναρκοπέδιο τελικού θανάτου. Για τι επιτυχία να μιλάμε όταν θα διατρέχαμε ένα κίνδυνο ενδο-ελληνικού εμφυλίου και ταυτόχρονης πολυμέτωπης στρατιωτικής σύγκρουσης. Το μόνο που δεν μπόρεσα να δω ήταν κατά πόσο είχε εμπλακεί και η σοβιετική ένωση, με την οποία η Άγκυρα βρισκόταν σε επικοινωνία.  Ότι διάβασα μέχρι στιγμής επιβεβαιώνουν αυτές τις πρώτες εκτιμήσεις και επιφυλάσσομαι.

8. Η στρατηγική συγκυρία της δεκαετίας του 1960 και τα σχέδια Άτσεσον: Συμπληγάδες πραξικοπημάτων που θα οδηγούσαν … στο σφαγείο των στρατηγικών παιγνίων (Ι)

Έχει ήδη εδραιωθεί η εκτίμηση ότι πολλά δεινά έκτοτε σχετίζονται με συγκεκριμένα γεγονότα που αξίζουν να φωτιστούν περισσότερο. Συγκεκριμένα, εκτός από την δικτατορία στην Ελλάδα και το πραξικόπημα στην Κύπρο το 1974, σχετίζονται με διολίσθηση της Κύπρου στο σχέδιο Αναν και ανάλογα με τις εξελίξεις στις προεδρικές εκλογές του 2013 τα πιθανά επερχόμενα «νέα σχέδια Αναν». Όπως ήδη αναφέρθηκε, σκοπός εδώ δεν είναι προφητείες του παρελθόντος αλλά η συναγωγή επιστημονικά αξιόπιστων και διδακτικών πορισμάτων για την αλυσίδα στρατηγικών στάσεων της δεκαετίας του 1950, τον ξενοκρατούμενο υπόκοσμο στην Ελλάδα και στην Κύπρο την δεκαετία του 1960 που παρ’ ολίγο να οδηγήσουν στο σφαγείο του σχεδίου Άτσεσον και τον ανεκδιήγητο πραξικοπηματία Παπανδρέου που οι αμερικανοί έβριζαν διαρκώς επειδή δεν τους έκανε τις βρομοδουλειές τους.

Για το θέμα αυτό θα επανέλθουμε με εκτενέστερες αναλύσεις. Εδώ, τονίζεται, παρατίθενται μερικά στοιχεία καθότι παράλληλα στο Αντίβαρο δημοσιεύτηκαν άρθρα που επιχειρούν να αντικρούσουν την διζωνικής παράκρουσης ανάλυσή μου που δημοσιεύτηκε πριν λίγες εβδομάδες (στο Αντίβαρο αλλά και ευρύτερα στο διαδίκτυο).

 Αρχίζουμε με πια παράθεση για το πώς έβλεπαν οι Αμερικανοί τον Παπανδρέου ο οποίος, την στιγμή που κάτι από τα πόδια του εκκολάπτονταν πολλά πραξικοπήματα, ο ίδιος υποσχόταν ένα άλλο πραξικόπημα στην Κύπρο, υπόσχεση πάνω στην οποία εδραζόταν η διαπραγμάτευση για την … ένωση: «Our weakness was Papandreou weakness. A garrulous senile, windbag without power of decision or resolution» και μεταφρασμένο σε ελληνικά βιβλία, «η αδυναμία του Παπανδρέου ενός φλύαρου ξεμωραμένου κουφού ρήτορα που δεν έχει την δύναμη να αποφασίσει ή να λύσει οτιδήποτε». Φρόντισε, την πιο κρίσιμη στιγμή, να διαρρεύσουν τα σχέδιά μας στον Μακάριο» – Dga 2lucb dec 7 1964].

 Μόνο από αυτό γίνεται φανερό ότι ο Παπανδρέου δεν ήταν ικανός να κάνει μια τέτοια στρατηγική κίνηση και ότι ήταν αναξιόπιστος στους συνομιλητές του. Τα «σχέδιά τους» –για τα οποία θα επανέλθουμε λεπτομερέστερα σε μεταγενέστερα σημειώματα–  ήταν ότι μετά από πραξικόπημα στην Κύπρο το 1964 που θα εκτελούσε ο Παπανδρέου και το οποίο όπως είναι λογικό θα οδηγούσε πιθανότατα σε εμφύλιο στην Ελλάδα και στην Κύπρο, θα άρχιζε μια κρίση στην οποία πολλοί θα εμπλέκονταν χωρίς να μπορεί να προβλεφτεί που θα οδηγούσε.

 Εντάσσοντας τις πληροφορίες που διαρκώς συλλέγονται με τις στρατηγικές των κρατών θα οδηγηθούμε διαμέσου των δεκαετιών που ακολούθησαν στο σχέδιο Αναν και στα γεγονότα που επίκεινται μετά τις προεδρικές του Φεβρουαρίου (ιδιαίτερα εάν οι κύπριοι δεν αποφασίσουν να αλλάξουν προσανατολισμό και στρατηγική με το να εκλέξουν τον ανεξάρτητο υποψήφιο).

Στην διεθνή πολιτική δεν υπάρχουν συνωμοσίες αλλά στρατηγικά σχέδια και δική μας άγνοια του διεθνούς περιβάλλοντος και της στρατηγικής των δυνάμεων και των αντιπάλων μας. Εδώ, παραθέτω ενδεικτικά μόνο αποσπάσματα από ένα από τα πολλά και σημαντικά και τεκμηριωμένα βιβλία (συνημμένο και οι σελίδες του αγγλικού όπου εμφαίνονται και οι πηγές) όπου γίνονται αμέσως κατανοητές οι μεθοδεύσεις που συνόδευαν το σχέδιο Άτσεσον. Μερικά από τα εναλλακτικά σενάρια δράσης και οι ιεραρχίες των αμερικανών υπό το πρίσμα του στρατηγικού περιβάλλοντος της εποχής.

Η λογική των πραξικοπημάτων ζει, ακόμη, ενσαρκωμένη με ποικίλους και μεταμφιεσμένους τρόπους: Η διζωνική παράκρουση ή καλύτερα η «διζωνική εκτέλεση» πιθανότατα επέρχεται από Φεβρουάριο και μετά. Αν δεν περάσει χωρίς δημοψήφισμα όπως πολλοί εκτιμούν θα την καταψηφίσουμε αρχίζοντας ξανά ένα Γολγοθά πολιτικού κόστους. Ας προσέχαμε και ας προσέξουμε.

Θαυμάστε λοιπόν τους Νικολαρίζηδες, τους Γαρουφαλιάδες και τους αιωρούμενους Παπανδρέου που χειρίζονταν την τύχη μας διαμέσου της … CIA και ενίοτε (όπως ο διαπραγματευτής της Ελλάδας Νικολαρίζης έχοντας στο μυαλό τι πρέπει!! να κάνει η Τουρκία):

 Από το Claude Nicolet, TheUnited States Policy towards Cyprus (Zurich)

(στηρίζεται σε αρχειακό υλικό) Σελ. 284 κ.ε. αποσπάσματα σε ελεύθερη μετάφραση και verbatim. Περίληψη και μικρά δικά μου επεξηγηματικά σχόλια.

 Προσδιοριστικό είναι αυτό που ξεκακθάρισαν οι αμερικανοί και που εμφαίνεται σε πολλά άλλα έγγραφα: «Οι αμερικανοί ποτέ δεν θα παρεμβληθούν ή θα πολεμήσουν τις τουρκικές δυνάμεις». [Δηλαδή, την στιγμή που εμείς υποσχόμασταν να εισέλθουμε σε ναρκοπέδια εμφύλιων πραξικοπημάτων και που οι τούρκοι προειδοποιούσαν ότι θα εισέβαλλαν στην Κύπρο «ακόμη και εάν όλος ο άλλος κόσμος στρεφόταν εναντίον τους» οι Αμερικανοί α) προειδοποιούσαν ρητά ότι α) ποτέ δυνάμεις τους δεν θα συγκρουστούν με τις τουρκικές Ένοπλες Δυνάμεις και β) δεν θα παρεμβληθούν καν στο νησί.]

 [Στάση του Λονδίνου που και αυτό παραμόνευε να διασφαλίσει τα συμφέροντά του και τις βάσεις του:] «Η επιχείρηση των αμερικανών να διεισδύσουν στην Κύπρο με το σχέδιο Άτσεσον αντιμετωπίζεται με καχυποψία από το Λονδίνο και πυροδότησε διάβημα. Οι Carrington και Caccia προειδοποίησαν ότι η Βρετανική κυβέρνηση θα μπορούσε ακόμη και να διαφοροποιηθεί δημόσια. Το Foreign Office ειδοποίησε την Ουάσινγκτον ότι δεν θα συμπλεύσει με τον σχεδιασμό».

Η πρεσβεία της Βρετανίας ειδοποιεί το κέντρο ότι σε συνομιλία με τον υφυπουργό εξωτερικών άφησε να γίνει σαφές ότι «οι αμερικανοί δεν θα χρησιμοποιήσουν τον έκτο στόλο για να σταματήσουν την Τουρκία από το να εισβάλει στην Κύπρο και ότι οποιαδήποτε σχέδια των Ελλήνων για ένωση πριν υπάρξει συμφωνία (με την Τουρκία) δεν θα έχει την αμερικανική συμμετοχή ή υποστήριξη».  

Στις 24 Αυγούστου Ο Μπωλλ στέλνει μήνυμα στην πρεσβεία στην Τουρκία όπου λέει ότι χαλαρώνουν την πίεση καθότι βρίσκονται προ μεγάλων αποφάσεων και δραστική αλλαγή των προτεραιοτήτων. Συγκεκριμένα, οι ΗΠΑ εκτιμούσαν ότι «ο Παπανδρέου είναι ανίκανος να τηρήσει τις υποσχέσεις του για πραξικόπημα». Ξαφνικά (συνεχίζει η συγγραφέας), οι ΗΠΑ για ένα αριθμό λόγων προς τα τέλη Αυγούστου συνωμοτούσαν με την Τουρκία. [όπως και με τα υπόλοιπα, όλα είναι τεκμηριωμένα σε πληροφορίες εγγράφων των συναντήσεων και της αλληλογραφίας της συγγραφέως] 

«Πρέπει να καταλάβουν την Καρπασία»

 «Στις 25 Αυγούστου, ο πρέσβης Νικολαρίζης είπε στον Άτσεσον ότι «οι Τούρκοι πρέπει να καταλάβουν την Καρπασία μετά την ανακήρυξη της Ένωσης ούτως ώστε να μπορέσουν να διαπραγματευτούν από θέση ισχύος. Εξέφρασε αμφιβολίες κατά πόσο θα υπάρξει αντίσταση από ελληνικές δυνάμεις» (μήνυμα της Πρεσβείας ΗΠΑ στην Γενεύη).     

 «Την ίδια περίοδο ο στρατηγός Πόρτερ αντιπρόσωπος στο CENTO επισκέφτηκε την Κύπρο και πείστηκε από τον στρατηγό Συννάι ότι η Τουρκία ήθελε μια κυρίαρχη βάση, ότι η προσφορά για το Έλ Γκρέκο ήταν προσβλητική πρόταση και ότι αν η Ελλάδα προχωρούσε σε ανακήρυξη της ένωσης ο τουρκικός στρατός θα κινηθεί αμέσως, ακόμη και εάν θα πρέπει να το κάνουμε πηγαίνοντας κόντρα σε όλο τον κόσμο. Η τουρκική τιμή δεν απαιτεί τίποτα λιγότερο». (οι τούρκοι τις ίδιες μέρες οργάνωσαν καταστροφή του αμερικανικού περιπτέρου στην έκθεση της Σμύρνης).

[Προηγήθηκε επιστολή του Ερκίν που απέρριπτε τα προγενέστερα σχέδια Αναν, οπότε η παραφιλολογία ότι επειδή δεν το δεχθήκαμε χάσαμε την ένωση δεν ισχύει: Feridun Cemal Erkin, Turkish  Foreign Minister,  to Dean Acheson , President  Johnson’s Special Envoy to Geneva, Quote: » the latest proposal that you put forward on behalf of the United States government for a solution of the Cyprus problem have been found totally unacceptable by the Turkish government… I have stated to you unequivocally our position in our talk yesterday. I would like now to confirm most emphatically that your latest proposals based on the precarious foundation of a lease arrangement are unacceptable to the Turkish government and that our last decision in this respect is irrevocable.» Letter of 28 August 1964». (Η Τουρκία, έτσι λειτουργώντας έσπρωχνε την Ελλάδα, σε συνεννόηση με τις ΗΠΑ στο τραπέζι των στρατηγικών παιγνίων). 

 [Πρέπει να κατανοηθεί ότι εάν άρχιζε μια κρίση και ένα στρατηγικό παίγνιο επί του εδάφους όπως πάντα συμβαίνει υπάρχει μια προσδιοριστική ιεραρχία συμφερόντων που προσδιορίζει και τις προτεραιότητες των αποφάσεων. Εδώ καθίσταται κρυστάλλινα σαφές τι σχεδίαζε το Συμβούλιο Εθνικής Ασφαλείας (ΣΕΑ) και τι έθετε ως ιεραρχία]

 Σελ. 285 «Στις 5 Σεπτεμβρίου ο Αρχηγός του Γενικού Επιτελείου «Η Τουρκία είναι πολύ πιο σημαντική για τα εθνικά συμφέροντα ασφαλείας των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών σε σύγκριση με την Ελλάδα» Γι’ αυτό, «θα πρέπει να δοθεί μεγαλύτερη προσοχή στα συμφέροντα εθνικής ασφαλείας των ΗΠΑ που σχετίζονται με την Τουρκία όσον αφορά μια σύντομη διευθέτηση όσον αφορά το κυπριακό ζήτημα. Είναι σημαντικό να κρατήσουμε μια ισχυρή Τουρκία φιλική προς τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες ακόμη και εάν σε τελευταία ανάλυση θα διακινδυνεύουμε να αποξενώσουμε και προκαλέσουμε υποχώρηση των ελλήνων συμμάχων».

 [Η αλληλουχία των σχεδίων Άτσεσον είναι ολοφάνερο ότι με κλασικό τρόπο εντάσσεται στην μια ιεραρχία στρατηγικών προτεραιοτήτων όπου εκτιμάται κατά περίπτωση, κατά φάση και κατά στιγμή το πώς εξελίσσονται τα πράγματα σύμφωνα με τους κεντρικούς στρατηγικούς σκοπούς. Επίσης, την ισχύ των εμπλεκομένων, την συνοχή των αποφάσεών τους, την πολιτική τους συνοχή, την αποφασιστικότητά τους και τις επενέργειες θέσεων ή ενεργειών τρίτων, εδώ πχ της τότε Σοβιετικής Ένωσης]

Σχέδιο Άτσεσον 4 ως συνέχεια της σθεναρής τουρκικής στάσεις και των προειδοποιήσεων της  Άγκυρας και του «ανίκανου Παπανδρέου να κάνει τα πραξικοπήματα που υποσχόταν». Προσέξτε με τι άνεση οι Αμερικανοί ήλεγχαν το ελληνικό πολιτικό πεδίο, τι έλεγαν οι έλληνες διαπραγματευτές και το πώς (ασφαλώς όπως πάντα πίσω βρισκόταν το ΣΕΑ) οργάνωναν την εξαπάτηση των εμπλεκομένων] 

 «Σχετικά με αυτό το σκεπτικό εξετάζεται το πώς προέκυψε το σχέδιο Άτσεσον 4. Σίγουρο είναι όμως ότι αυτό το σκεπτικό επηρέασε την σθεναρή υποστήριξή του στην συνάντηση με τον Πρόεδρο στις 8 Σεπτεμβρίου. Το σχέδιο Άτσεσον 4 στάλθηκε στις 26 Αυγούστου στον Μπώλλ. Ο Άτσεσον υποστηρίζει ότι «τίποτα που θα μπορούσε να πάθει η Κύπρος δεν είναι αβάστακτο. Μόνο πόλεμος ή μόνιμη αποξένωση της Ελλάδας ή της Τουρκίας από την Δύση είναι καταστροφικό. Τρία μαθήματα που πρέπει να λάβουν υπόψη οι ΗΠΑ.

          Πρώτον, υπό τις παρούσες συνθήκες μια συμφωνία μεταξύ Ελλάδας και Τουρκίας είναι αδύνατη.

          Δεύτερον, ο Παπανδρέου είναι φλύαρος, πανούργος αλλά ηλίθιος, κατά συνέπεια διπλοπρόσωπος και αναξιόπιστος.

          Τρίτον, πολύ πιθανό ο Ινονού δεν μπορεί πλέον να συγκρατήσει τον στρατό σε περίπτωση κακομεταχείρισης των τουρκοκυπρίων.

[ΣΗΜΕΙΩΣΗ. Βλ. πιο κάτω όταν ο Μπούντι ερωτάει πως θα τηρηθούν τα προσχήματα για να ακούσει την μεθόδευση για την τουρκική εισβολή: «σχεδόν οτιδήποτε θα μπορούσε να εξυπηρετήσει αυτό το σκοπό»] [Ο καθείς που διαβάζει αυτό το σχέδιο βλέπει το βάθος του κινδύνου που διέτρεξαν η Ελλάδα και η Κύπρος. Κατανοεί επίσης τις ιεραρχίας της γεωπολιτικά πανίσχυρης τότε Τουρκίας και το γεγονός ότι εν μέσω πραξικοπημάτων και πιθανώς εμφυλίου εάν συρόμασταν στα στρατηγικά παίγνια θα αποτελούσε μια μοιραία εξέλιξη για την Ελλάδα και την Κύπρο]

 [Η συγγραφέας συνεχίζει].

 Ως πρώτο βήμα ο ελληνικός στρατός στην Κύπρο και η εθνική φρουρά θα πρέπει να περιέλθουν υπό τον έλεγχο ενός ισχυρού άνδρα όπως ο υπουργός άμυνας Γαρουφαλιάς, με την βοήθεια του Βασιλιά –και ίσως της CIA και του Αμερικανικού στρατού. Μετά, ο αποκλεισμός των τουρκοκυπρίων θα τερματιστεί. [Ο Άτσεσον σκέφτηκε ότι η κατάλληλη στιγμή είναι η αλλαγή του τουρκικού αγήματος Τουρδύκ στην Κύπρο, που οι έλληνες τώρα εμποδίζουν. Εάν αυτό θα χρειαστεί σύγκρουση με τον Μακάριο θα την έχουμε. Ούτως ή άλλως, ο Παπανδρέου ανίκανος να κάνει ένα τέτοιο βήμα. Η συζήτηση του (πρέσβη) Labouisse μαζί του δείχνει πόσο ελαφρόμυαλος και ανόητος είναι. Όταν αυτά επιτευχθούν με ένα έμμεσο και μυστικό τρόπο, βοηθήστε τον τουρκικό στρατό να αναπτυχθεί, ως και να ήταν δική τους ιδέα, μια νέα στρατηγική σχεδιασμένη να ξεγελάσει τους πάντες, συμπεριλαμβανομένης της Κυβέρνησης των ΗΠΑ. Στην συνέχεια, μετά από ένα πραξικόπημα του Μακαρίου για ανεξαρτησία ή της Ελλάδας για ένωση, ο τουρκικός στρατός θα κινηθεί και θα εισβάλει στην Καρπασία και θα καταλάβει όση περιοχή χρειάζεται. Μετά από κάποιες συμβιβαστικές δηλώσεις διατυπωμένες με τέτοιο τρόπο ούτως ώστε να κάνουν τους έλληνες να μην προχωρήσουν περισσότερο, οι τούρκοι θα διαπραγματευτούν από θέση ισχύος».

          Το σχέδιο παρουσιάστηκε στον Πρόεδρο Τζόνσον. Ο Μπώλλ και ο Άτσεσον υποστήριξαν στον πρόεδρο, στον Μακναμάρα, τον Μπούντι και στον Ράσκ ότι η μόνη λύση είναι τα τετελεσμένα που θα προκαλέσουν την κατάληψη της Καρπασίας προκαλώντας ανακήρυξη της Ένωσης και την καταστολή του Μακαρίου. Ο Μπούντι ερώτησε τι θα πυροδοτούσε την τουρκική επίθεση. Χαρακτηριστικά ο Άτσεσον απάντησε ότι «σχεδόν οτιδήποτε θα μπορούσε να εξυπηρετήσει αυτό το σκοπό» Προσπάθησε να πείσει τον πρόεδρο ότι το πρέπει να προχωρήσει στην υιοθέτηση αυτής της στρατηγικής και το ζήτημα όπως θα προχωρήσουμε «είναι κατά πόσο θα έχουμε μια χαώδη κατάσταση ή μια ελεγχόμενη και τελικά παραγωγική σύμφωνα με τα σχέδιά μας». Είπε επίσης ότι οι Έλληνες δεν πρέπει να πληροφορηθούν για το σχέδιο γιατί πιθανότατα θα το διαρρεύσουν ξανά στον Μακάριο. Όσο για τους Βρετανούς είπε ότι αν και ο Μπάτλερ θα θορυβηθεί ο Λόρδος Μάουντμπάτεν, αρχηγός του Επιτελείου θα είναι φιλικός και οι Βρετανοί θα προστατευτούν (ως προς τα συμφέροντά τους) με αυτό το σχέδιο. [αναφορά σε πολιτική σκοπιμότητα αναβολής του σχεδίου για μετά τις προεδρικές εκλογές του Νοεμβρίου. Τον Σεπτέμβριο σε συνομιλία του με τον Μπάτλερ στο Λονδίνο είπε ότι «δεν υπήρχε χώρος για ένα κυπριακό κράτος όσο δεν θα αναπτύσσεται σύμφωνα με τις επιθυμίες των ΗΠΑ».

 [Σημείωση. Και σύμφωνα με τον αρχηγό του επιτελείου και άλλους ανώτατους του ΣΕΑ «σύμφωνα με τις τότε επιθυμίες της Τουρκίας απέρριπτε όλα τα σχέδια και τροχοδρομούσε-ανέβαλλε την εφαρμογή των «σχεδίων» μέχρι να πατήσει ο Παπανδρέου, ο Γαρουφαλιάς ή κάποιος άλλος την πεπονόφλουδα του πραξικοπήματος κατά άλλων Ελλήνων και την διολίσθησή μας στο τραπέζι των στρατηγικών παιγνίων]     

 Υστερόγραφο

Τα πιο πάνω, βέβαια, είναι αρχικά, προκαταρτικά και ενδεικτικά. Πολλά έπονται. Αποτελεί σίγουρα παράκρουση να πιστεύει κανείς ότι το 1964 ήταν μια «χαμένη ευκαιρία για την ένωση». Στην κόψη του ξυραφιού βρέθηκε ο λαιμός μας και την γλιτώσαμε εκ τύχης ή και … ανικανότητας του Παπανδρέου [όπως οι αμερικανοί συνεχώς έλεγαν στις συνομιλίες τους]. Οι επικείμενες εκλογές στις ΗΠΑ ήταν και αυτές καθοριστικός παράγων αναβολής των σχεδίων. Οι ΗΠΑ όπως γίνεται φανερό είχαν τόσους πολλούς έλληνες υπηρέτες έτοιμους να συνεργαστούν με την CIA ούτως ώστε ένοιωθαν ασφαλείς. Να θυμίσω ότι στην Κύπρο όπου κυριαρχούσε το παρακράτος και στην Ελλάδα όπου ο Παπανδρέου όταν γυρνούσε στα μπαλκόνια διχάζοντας την μετά-εμφυλιακή ελληνική κοινωνία, κάτω από τα πόδια του εκκολάπτονταν 5-6 πραξικοπήματα (πέραν αυτού που ο … ίδιος υποσχόταν κατά της Κύπρου). Και στο υπόβαθρο η Φρειδερίκη, το Βασιλόπουλο, ο Γαρουφαλιάς και άλλοι που θα … έκαναν την ένωση.   

 Σε επικείμενες παρεμβάσεις τα πιο πάνω θα ενισχυθούν με πρωτογενείς πηγές τις οποίες μόλις τώρα ταξινομούμε σφαιρικά και ιεραρχούμε, θα εξεταστούν υπό το πρίσμα του στρατηγικού περιβάλλοντος της εποχής, θα συνδεθούν με την τουρκική στρατηγική και θα ενταχθούν στο πλαίσιο της κατάστασης που επικρατούσε στην Αθήνα, την Λευκωσία και στις μεταξύ τους σχέσεις. Κυρίως όμως θα γίνει ανάλυση του τρόπου λήψης στρατηγικών αποφάσεων των ΗΠΑ εν μέσω κρίσης (τα περίφημα contingency plans) που θα καταδείξει τι σημαίνουν όλα τα πιο πάνω και πολλά άλλα.

 Μπορούν να συναχθούν πολλά συμπεράσματα και αυτό θα κάνουμε. Ήδη, ο λογικός αναγνώστης θα κατάλαβε ότι το σχέδιο Άτσεσον ήταν συμπληγάδες πραξικοπημάτων που θα οδηγούσαν στο σφαγείο των στρατηγικών παιγνίων. Περίπου οι ίδιοι άνθρωποι ή τουλάχιστον οι ίδιες καταστάσεις που υπηρετούσαν προκάλεσαν την διαίρεση των ελλήνων στις αρχές του 1970 και στην συνέχεια στο πραξικόπημα.

Παρομοίως, στις διζωνικές παρακρούσεις, στο σχέδιο Αναν και στους φανατικούς οπαδούς του που στην Κύπρο διεκδικούν την προεδρία της ΚΔ για να προσέλθουν στο τραπέζι επικύρωσης στρατηγικών σχεδίων πολλών δεκαετιών.

Όποιος συνεχίζει να κρίνει τις ελληνικές υποθέσεις με όρους σάπιων κομμάτων και ιδεολογικές διαιρέσεις της εποχής των δουλοπαροίκων (δεξιοί / κομμουνιστές κτλ) αυτοκτονεί ο ίδιος και ίσως ανεπίγνωστα δολοφονεί την πατρίδα του. Βέβαια, υπάρχουν και αυτοί οι οποίοι όπως  και σε παρελθούσες εποχές και άλλες παρόμοιες περιπτώσεις διακατέχονταν από τέτοια ηττοπάθεια και ιλαροτραγικό ανορθολογισμό ούτως ώστε προτιμούσαν να υποταχθούν στον εχθρό για να διασφαλίσουν έστω  και μια αναξιοπρεπή βιολογική επιβίωση. Η ιστορική πείρα μας διδάσκει ότι τέτοιες στάσεις δεν διασφάλιζαν καν αυτό. Περιέργως όμως τέτοιες αυτοκαταστροφικές στάσεις και συμπεριφορές επαναλαμβάνονται ξανά και ξανά.

 Π. Ήφαιστος – P. Ifestos

www.ifestosedu.gr – info@ifestosedu.gr

23.1.2013

Παραρτήματα

Παράρτημα Ι Ο χαρακτήρας των ηγεμονικών παρεμβάσεων στην νεότερη ελληνική ιστορία και στην διεθνή πολιτική της ύστερης εποχής.

εκκρεμεί συμλήρωση

Παράρτημα ΙΙ Φάκελος με αρχειακό υλικό (υπό κατασκευή)

9. Αποσπάσματα του αρχειακού υλικού που καταμαρτυρούν την χαώδη κατάσταση του πολιτικού συστήματος στην Αθήνα και τον τρόπο που αντιμετώπιζαν το ένα δέκατο του Ελληνισμού

Την επιφύλαξή μας για την χρήση αρχειακού υλικού σε αναφορά με το εμβληματικό έργο του Edward H. Carr τις έχουμε ήδη διατυπώσει. Εδώ παραθέτουμε μερικές δεκάδες από τα χιλιάδες έγγραφα του Πενταγώνου και των πρεσβειών που διαθέτουμε. Αυτά που χρησιμοποιούμε και αυτά που θα χρησιμοποιήσουμε μελλοντικά αναφέρονται επειδή φωτίζουν λίγο-πολύ γνωστά γεγονότα εντός του προσανατολισμού των στρατηγικών σχέσεων του Ψυχρού Πολέμου και κυρίως του προσανατολισμού της στρατηγικής των ΗΠΑ την οποία έχουμε αναλύσει εκτενώς σε αγγλικά κυρίως βιβλία. Ο καθείς διαπιστώνει ότι στην Ελληνική πλευρά κυριαρχούσαν παλινωδίες, αντιφατικές αποφάσεις, διαιρέσεις και βασικά πειθήνια υιοθέτηση ηγεμονικών θέσεων. Αν κάτι μπορεί να ειπωθει εκ των υστέρων είναι ότι η στάση της κυπριακής ηγεσίας παρά το γεγονός ότι συχνά κινήθηκε σπασμωδικά είχε ως αποτέλεσμα να μην συντελεστούν τότε τα εγκλήματα του πραξικοπήματος, της αποβίβασης Τούρκων στην Κύπρο, την πολύ πιθανή έναρξη εμφυλίου και δικτατορίας στην Ελλάδα από τότε και την κατάργηση της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας. Συμπληρώνεται ότι σε ζητήματα τόσο μεγάλης στρατηγικής σημασίας τον πρώτο λόγο πρέπει να έχει η Μητρόπολη, με όρους όμως στρατηγικής αξιοπιστίας και υπευθυνότητας. Ο με Γεώργιος Γρίβας ήταν ένας στρατιωτικός ο δε πρόεδρος Μακάριος ήταν ένας ιερέας που βρέθηκε στην προεδρία ενός εξαρτημένου κράτους. Δεν ήταν σε θέση να πάρουν αποφάσεις στρατηγικής εμβέλειας και το μόνο που έκανανβ, σίγουρα εντονότερα ο δεύτερος, είναι να προσπαθήσουν να αποφύγουν το πραξικόπημα και την τουρκική απόβαση.  

 VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 2 2. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)1Washington, January 25, 1964, 2:05 p.m. LBJ: I’d try to get NATO to go in if I could. (in Cyprus)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 3 3. Memorandum of Conference With President Johnson1Washington, January 25, 1964, 6:30 p.m. SUBJECT Cyprus Mr. Ball reviewed for the President … Prime Minister Inonu is in charge of a weak government in Ankara and may have trouble keeping civilian control of the Turkish military. In Athens, where there is a caretaker government, there may be a military coup. The prospect of such a coup would be greatly increased by serious fighting in Cyprus.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 7


7. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State1

Ankara, February 9, 1964, 1 p.m.

1004. For Ball from Hare. Deptel 781.2 Immediately on receipt reftel I went seeErkin and we had very down to earth talk. In essence his line was similar that of Tuluy, maintaining GOT had agreed original proposals despite sacrificing very important points. Fact that Makarios had done opposite and that adjusted proposals drafted so as take his conditions into consideration necessitates GOT present its views in order regain balance. Furthermore GOT has Parliament looking over its shoulder and already under pressure for having been too supine. Paper giving GOTresponse would be given me and British Ambassador at two o’clock.3 He said most important points would be application of all treaty provisions (para numbered two of Embtel 1002)4 and reference to “Government of Cyprus”, existence of whichGOT does not recognize, should just refer to Archbishop Makarios and Dr Kucuk by name (para numbered four of Embtel). I commented along following lines:

1) Revision of proposals made with Turkish interests in mind and represents no derogation of them.

2) GOT may have problems re proposals but so do we. Matter is urgent and if time lost discussing detailed points whole effort could collapse, including our own steps to be helpful.

3) Purpose of presenting revised proposals was to obtain GOT acquiescence in order present them to Cypriots. In so doing we of course expected GOT would make comments and observations as Greeks had done but I trusted these would not involve changes in document itself but would rather be for information and clarification.

4) Point re general validity of treaty provisions represents no substantive problem since it has been our view from beginning that proposals do not affect such provisions. We have so stated repeatedly and I could now say so again under authority of message from Ball.

5) Point re “Government of Cyprus” was quite another matter since, regardless ofGOT reservations, we just could not put ourselves in position of challenging legal status of GOC. We recognize that GOC not functioning normally but that is practical, not legal, consideration. Fact that proposals had been submitted to Kucuk as well as Makarios was illustrative this point.

At end, Erkin said GOT reply would cover number of points, including proposed revisions of text but that point regarding general application of treaty provisions was most important.

Referring to my previous warning re danger of delay involved in redrafting, I asked whether these suggestions would be in the form of requirements for GOTacquiescence or as expression of what they would want if possible arrange. Erkinreplied that we would be given paper and would be up to us what to do with it. I asked what this meant in terms of submission of proposals to GOC. To be specific, could paper go forward even if decided changes inadvisable? Erkin replied “What else can you do?”

This not too satisfactory but better than expected. At any rate your message afforded timely opportunity to get crack at Erkin and give him time do a little thinking before seeing him this afternoon.

Hare

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to London. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, USUN, CINCEUR, andCINCSTRIKE.

2  Document 6.

3 The text of the note was transmitted in telegram 1005 from Ankara, February 9. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 8


8. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to theDepartment of State1

London, February 9, 1964, midnight.

3824. Following is uncleared memcon of Under Sec Ball’s talk with Cypriot FonMinKyprianou:

1. Under Sec and Amb Bruce met 1730 today with Kyprianou at AmEmbassy.Kyprianou was accompanied by Cyprus HICOM in London Soteriades. Under Sec explained US concern with Cyprus problem prompted primarily by our concern with peace. We believe establishment peace-keeping force, coupled with mediator concept, offers best way to proceed. US participation in force depends on working out acceptable arrangements to avoid entangling problem in cold war and on willingness of GOC to accept and request such force. Under Sec asked for GOC’s frank views re US participation.

2. Kyprianou affirmed GOC reply given earlier remains basic GOC view.2 GOC has no objection in principle to participation by any country. It is not the force that will provide permanent peace. If it is necessary have such a force because UK not prepared assume full responsibility, GOC believes it should be under Security Council. GOC has no wish create further complications. In its view, however, such force needed primarily for external purposes. Once danger of intervention is removed, atmosphere will automatically improve. Greeks will know no need exists to prepare for invasion; Turks will know they cannot hope for intervention. Influence and interference of outsiders primarily responsible for present troubled situation. Turkey more to blame than Greece. While primary purpose of such force should be to deter outside aggression, internal peace-keeping obviously also desirable. Force should assist GOC restore normal conditions.

3. If these are to be missions of force, it preferable force be under Security Council. Cyprus is small country with bitter past experience. If force under Security Council aegis, Cypriot public opinion will find it much more palatable. Kyprianou stressed GOC not trying blackmail. It remains ready discuss question before going to SC. Once agreement reached on composition of force, GOC wonders why US and UKshould consider it dangerous go to Security Council.

4. Under Sec explained part of problem revolves about meaning of “under Security Council.” We do not object to some connection with Security Council. We are seeking work out with other objective and competent countries establishment of force able to provide both power and a psychological framework designed to restore calm while political solution is being sought. Rather than inject question of composition of force into cold war politics at UN, we believe composition should be pre-arranged before going to Security Council. Formula by which link with Security Council is established is important. We do not wish make force subject of Soviet veto. Also, it is impractical to organize force if Security Council is going to be asked finance it because of already existing controversy revolving about Article 19. To get into this range of questions will merely delay its organization. We think it possible agree with GOC on a force where each participating govt pays its own way. We would also agree with GOC on what nations should participate. Thereafter, we see no reason why matter could not be brought to Security Council in manner where Soviet veto and cold war confrontation are avoided.

5. Kyprianou disclaimed GOC responsibility for present situation. He then alluded to various other factors which allegedly increased tension. Manner in which proposal prepared and projected in Cyprus, with other nations and press apparently apprised before GOC, increased suspicions. Under Sec noted original idea was Greek. HMG had called Greek proposal to our attention. In order to test its feasibility, we have explored it with other govts. Kyprianou insisted GOC equally interested party and should have been consulted earlier. Greeks had told GOC it was not their proposal, although GOC knows it was. With respect to force itself,Kyprianou said once agreement is reached on composition, GOC wants to go to Security Council. It would explain its desire is to place pre-arranged force under Security Council control. He wondered if Soviets would in fact veto such force since they appear to be trying assist GOC.

6. Under Sec pointed out “under Security Council” can embrace Security Council “taking note,” “reporting,” etc. What did GOC have in mind? Kyprianou replied Security Council should authorize SYG to have the right to control the force within the scope of agreed terms of reference. Security Council should be competent to take decisions with respect to the force if called upon to do so by SYG, GOC or the participating countries. The Security Council might also have the mission of working out terms of reference for the force. He envisaged a two-stage procedure. The Security Council should first pass a resolution asking all states to refrain from threatening independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus. GOC would inform Security Council that talks are also taking place on the composition of a force about which it would report back to Security Council once agreement is reached. Such procedure would have a calming effect in Cyprus. Security Council endorsement, in GOC’s view, is a deterrent. Kyprianou added he was thinking of going to New York on Wednesday or Thursday to initiate Security Council action, although his trip might be postponed until Saturday. Under Sec said we will have to examine Kyprianou’s idea. Meanwhile, he hoped we might move forward on composition and terms of reference of force.

7. Kyprianou also suggested SYG might, even in absence any specific proposal, go to Cyprus himself for a day. He need have no specific mission, but would simply seek inform himself of situation. This too would have calming effect. Kyprianousaid he had instructed Rossides to sound out SYG on this. Did we have any objection?

Under Sec said he would want to consider this further with his UN experts. His initial impression was that there should be no objection.

8. With respect to US participation, Kyprianou thought this would be inadvisable. GOC would not object, but US participation would adversely affect the “popularity” of the US in Cyprus and could give rise to public feelings against the US. Under Sec pointed out that we must consider if any force can in fact be organized on viable basis if US does not participate. If force could be organized without us, we would prefer it. We have been inclined to doubt that it can. Many nations who speak boldly of peace-keeping force become less so when it comes to paying for it. Some states have said they will join only if US does so. In any case, there is no intention of taking any action without full agreement of GOC.

9. Kyprianou contended that, psychologically, if force had come in context of political settlement, it might not have been viewed differently in Cyprus. Fact is, however, that it developed while London talks were taking place, thereby heightening Cypriot suspicions. He asked Under Sec if US has formed any views re political settlement.

Under Sec replied that on basis our knowledge of Cyprus situation, we have not felt able to contribute any useful suggestions at this time. Kyprianou then asked what purpose of mediator would be? Under Sec pointed out it was not proposed he try to put American ideas into effect. His task would be to sound out all interested parties and seek to persuade them come to some mutually agreeable settlement. Kyprianouwas skeptical about mediator’s prospects. He opined that if there were some way to get Greece and Turkey out of picture, chances of success would be greater. He recalled that ten years ago enosis might have been better arrangement. Through no fault of Greek Cypriots, it could not be worked out. Such “radical solution” probably not possible now.

10. Under Sec told Kyprianou he planned meet with Sandys again and, together with Sandys, might perhaps be able to hold second meeting with Kyprianou later. During subsequent talk with Sandys, it became clear that further discussions with Greeks desirable before saying anything more to Kyprianou. Under Sec then telephoned Kyprianou to explain his inability meet with him again today and his wish to reflect further on Kyprianou’s observations. Under Sec said he hoped be in Nicosia sometime Tuesday and suggested Kyprianou might wish to consider meeting him there. Kyprianou will probably do so.

Bruce

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Flash. Repeated to Athens for Ball. Relayed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, USUN, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.

2 In a February 2 statement to the London conference, Kyprianou announced that the Government of Cyprus accepted the idea of a NATO peacekeeping force in principle, but insisted that it operate under the authority of the United Nations. Subsequently, President Makarios outlined further objections to a NATO force under U.N. aegis. For text of Makarios’ February 4 statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 557.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 9


9. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

Athens, February 10, 1964, 10 p.m.

1197. For Secretaries of State and Defense and Ambassador Stevenson from Under Secretary.

I have had useful detailed discussions today with Hare, Labouissse and Wilkins. In sum, they reinforce and support the tentative views of the overall situation I expressed yesterday. (Athens 1184)2

1. I am now even firmer in my view that the US should not put troops in Cyprus.Wilkins (who supports wholeheartedly views contained in Athens 1184)3 together with his Army Attaché [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] are all convinced Makarios does not want Americans. They fear US forces would be special target of hit and run tactics of Greek Cypriots. According to Wilkins, Pickard also agrees that US troops would be singled out more than other Western powers because of our position of leadership in NATO.

We explored possible ways that US military support might be provided while minimizing exposure of US forces on assumption some form of US involvement may be useful or even necessary to keep Turks from standing down. This included possibility of putting US troops in British bases on standby basis. However, we concluded this not desirable since US unit would be thrown into breach at such time as serious fighting broke out, which would be worse than being in from beginning.

2. Today’s discussion highlighted importance and delicacy of handling Turks so as to minimize adverse repercussions on our relations and to dampen any desire they may have to intervene in Cyprus unilaterally. As a result, it is more than ever important that responsibility for our non-participation be placed squarely onMakarios’ back. As Hare puts it, US failure to participate in an international force would remove keystone to arch, so far as Turks are concerned.

It seems increasingly likely that Makarios will cooperate with us on this since opinion of our Nicosia [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is thatMakarios could not survive acceptance of US troops. He believes Cypriot “fighters” would throw him out if he tried it.

3. What are the alternatives to plan as presently agreed by all but GOC? We concluded best alternative we can probably hope to achieve is modest international force under UK com and made up of Benelux, Scandinavian countries, Canada and possibly Ireland.

Force would be approved by SC but not put under its control. While such force not as effective militarily as original concept, it would provide political deterrent and help spread responsibility as UK desires. If Makarios wants such a force—and there is still real doubt that he wants any international force at all—a prearranged deal along these lines might be feasible. Hare is clear, however, that this fallback—while probably the best we can hope for—would cause Turks great anguish.

4. If we are to keep the Turks from feeling we have sold them down the river, we must make strongest effort to avoid any suggestion we are weakening in our decision to contribute US contingent to international force. Any leak or suggestion from any US source indicating such weakening would be catastrophic.4

5. Kyprianou told me in London that GOC was planning—before dealing with question of international force—to seek Security Council confirmation of “territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus”. This was confirmed by Greek FonMin this afternoon5 who added information that Makarios planned to go personally to New York for that purpose but had agreed to defer this junket until after Greek election next Sunday (February 16). I described to FonMin how I am tentatively planning to deal with this proposal when I meet Makarios. However, I would appreciate suggestion of Ambassador Stevenson and Department as to best tactic. I have in mind saying following to Makarios:

a. We have been the major support of the United Nations from the beginning while certain other nations that make great pretense of interest in Cypriot situation have consistently sabotaged UN and failed to provide financial support for its peacekeeping efforts.

b. We are practical nation and trust that Makarios will take a hard look at the practical consequences of his proposed action.

c. A move toward the Security Council on this issue will almost certainly result in the interjection of cold war politics. It will provide the forum for charges of genocide against Cypriots while speeches in Security Council will only serve to inflame passions that are already too high.

d. We must concentrate on first things first and that means getting agreement on international force before involving Security Council.

Obviously this ploy may not work. Makarios apparently has naive idea that Security Council is like General Assembly and filled with Afro-Asian pals. If he insists on going ahead, however, we could probably not frontally oppose kind of resolution Cypriots have in mind. We should seek to finesse it by developing formulation we could support. In that event, each member of Council would put its own interpretation on language. Net result might be resolution putting Security Council on record that all parties concerned must keep their shirts on and avoid action that would exacerbate situation.

6. We also grappled briefly and inconclusively with nature of long-term settlement. All were in full agreement we should not get into middle of mediating process. If there is a solution it is certainly not in sight in near future. Movement of population within federation seems offer some possibility but has the great draw-back of being rational and therefore not feasible. Best we can hope for in foreseeable future is to help keep lid on boiling cauldron and thus prevent southern wing of NATO from blowing up.

Tomorrow I go to Ankara to begin process of preparing Turks for turn down byMakarios and possible modest UN force alternative described above.

I plan to see Makarios Wednesday.6 I have asked Wilkins to get categoric assurances from Makarios there will be no demonstration as condition precedent to my visit.7

Labouisse

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to USUN. Passed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, CINCEUR, andCINCSTRIKE.

2 Telegram 1184, February 10, reported Ball’s view that the United States should not put troops in Cyprus and should avoid taking a firm public position on the issue so that the United Kingdom, Greece, or Turkey would not back off from their commitments. (Ibid.) A summary of this telegram was provided to President Johnson in a February 10 memorandum from Bundy. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Lunch with President)

3 In telegram 685 from Nicosia, February 8, Wilkins warned that the British plan would fail to win Cypriot acceptance and urged U.S. support of a peacekeeping force under U.N. aegis with the participation of forces from both Greece and Turkey. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)

4 In telegram 789 to Ankara, February 10, Secretary Rusk responded: “First purely personal reaction your telegram is that Turks might be saved if there is U.S. naval or air participation not involving U.S. ground troops.” (Ibid.)

5  Ball reported on his meeting with Foreign Minister Palamas in telegram 1199 from Athens, February 10. (Ibid.)

6 In telegram 793 to Ankara, February 11, the Department of State commented thatMakarios had an “exaggerated idea” of what he could get from a Security Council meeting without U.S. and British support and provided Ball with a series of talking points designed to impress on Makarios the limits and dangers of over-reliance on this approach. (Ibid.)

7 In telegram 355 from Nicosia, February 11, Wilkins reported that he had Makarios’ assurances that no demonstrations would take place during Ball’s visit. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 10


10. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State1

Ankara, February 11, 1964, 6 p.m.

1017. From Under Secretary. We met this morning first with Foreign Minister Erkinand then went with him for session with PM Inonu. In both cases, I explained our interest in problem of Cyprus, our concern over its dangers and our support for peacekeeping-mediator proposals. At same time I made clear we and other non-guarantor powers could only participate if Makarios agreed, and I indicated considerable concern at what I understood to be his rather negative attitude. Said I was going to Nicosia tomorrow and intended to press hard for his agreement. They asked what could be done if he refused, to which I replied that this would depend upon nature of his refusal. We had no specific present plans in this regard.

I also discussed report that Makarios plans to appeal to UN after Greek elections are over and seek resolution warning against aggression or interference with independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. Assured them I intended try to dissuade him from this and make point that there should be reference to Security Council only after full agreement reached among parties concerned. Turks agreed premature Security Council debate would be harmful and wished me well in my efforts.

I emphasized that continuing tense situation on island and Makarios’ idea of rushing to UN made it imperative for us to get quick decision and that I would work hard to this end. Was prepared stay over day or two in Nicosia if satisfactory answer not forthcoming tomorrow.

Erkin asked about Greek position. I said they supported peacekeeping plan but had told me they had little influence on Makarios. Erkin questioned latter statement, but we said our own information from various sources confirmed it. He commented some Greek moves had been displeasing to Turkey, but government exercised restraint despite heavy pressures on it to act, including severe criticism by Parliamentary opposition. I said we appreciated this and told him Greek Foreign Minister Palamas had himself expressed admiration for restraint displayed byInonu.

Erkin indicated he fully realized dangers Turkish intervention, saying British would withdraw and Greeks would intervene “not with us but against us”.

He asked whether we intended answer Soviet note. I said we were studying question, thought British answer was good one.2 Erkin commented Turkey would have something to say about note3 and referred to TASS articles criticizing Turkish position, which he said were particularly annoying because Soviet Ambassador had promised his government would support Turkey.

Both Inonu and Erkin remarked position Turkish community in Cyprus was getting worse rather than better, “massacres” still continuing. Longer international force delayed, worse situation would get, because Makarios and associates have “no scruples left”. Inonu added, Turks have no confidence in guarantee enforced solely by British, although British have enough troops on island for purpose. Problem was British instructions to their troops. They were instructed not to shoot but confine themselves to giving advice which was not enough. Asked if British could not be induced to act more effectively, I said I would talk to them about it.

They asked for our suggestions for proposed mediator, and I mentioned names of van Roijen, Plimsoll, van Kleffans. Said Spaak and Lange probably out of consideration because both occupied in important full time positions. Inonu said he was not familiar with first three names but made no suggestions of his own. Expressed hope man chosen would have full opportunity to learn facts and would realize Turkish community cannot be left to mercies of Makarios.

Erkin asked our reactions to proposed Turkish changes in joint proposals. I said we had given them consideration and thought we had been able to meet most important points. Jernegan would meet later with Foreign Office officials to explain what we had done.

Hare

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Nicosia, London, USUN, and Athens. Passed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.

2 For text of the Soviet note and the U.S. reply, see Department of State Bulletin, March 23, 1964, pp. 446–448. For text of the British reply, see The New York Times, February 9, 1964.

3 The Turkish reply was released on February 25. A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Cyprus.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 11


11. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1

Nicosia, February 13, 1964, 1:45 a.m.

732. Dept pass White House and Defense. For President, Secretaries of State and Defense and Ambassador Stevenson from Under Secretary.

1. In the last few days, we have succeeded in clearing our Cyprus proposals with the British, Greek and Turkish Governments. This has required a substantial output of persuasion.

2. I spent the day today largely with Archbishop Makarios and his colleagues. I had two long meetings—one this morning and one this afternoon.2

3. While we were meeting, fighting was going on at various points in the island yielding a number of dead and wounded, both Greek and Turk. This is a daily occurrence. Cyprus is a battlefield. We travel about Nicosia with police escorts, followed by RAF units with sub-machine guns. There is a pervasive atmosphere of imminent crisis.

4. Our morning meeting consisted largely of my own long and hard-boiled presentation. Makarios seemed willing to consider our proposal. This afternoon the psychotic element in the Cyprus drama fully emerged and the atmosphere chilled.

5. At the conclusion of lengthy technical discussions, Makarios indicated that in spite of my most vigorous arguments he was going ahead with his foolish plan of sending an expedition to ask the Security Council to try to undermine the Treaties of Guarantee by seeking a resolution reaffirming the territorial integrity and political independence of Cyprus. He indicated quite casually that he would deal with the creation of an international force at some later date.

6. In view of the fact that the murder rate is rising steadily and that the tempo of fighting is increasing, such conduct by Makarios is criminally foolhardy.

7. In view of this, the British High Commissioner and I told off Makarios and his extremist ministers in a manner unfamiliar to diplomatic discourse. In an exchange which lasted 45 minutes or more, we painted a lurid picture of the consequences that would entail from the folly he has proposed.

8. When the discussion got past the boiling point, I proposed that we adjourn until Thursday morning, to which the Archbishop agreed.

9. I think we shook the Archbishop. Even his beard seemed pale. But the big question is whether he is really in command of the situation. The two ministers who led the discussion on the Cypriot side—Clerides and Papadopoulos—are fanatical and over the edge. They reflect the death wish that seems endemic in this wretched island. Both also have some Communist coloration in their backgrounds.

10. The question we face tonight is who is in charge? If the Archbishop is as scared as I think he is, we may be able to salvage something tomorrow morning. I plan to see him alone before the meeting. But if he is a prisoner of his own folly—which seems likely—he will commit Cyprus in the morning to a disaster course.

11. The issue that must be faced is the only simple question in this complex situation. Is the Cypriot Government prepared to work with us and other countries in organizing an international force immediately? Or does it want to throw the issues into the United Nations in the hope of attracting enough Soviet bloc and Afro-Asian support to embarrass the Turks while the island continues to fall apart?

12. As of tonight, Cyprus is very near civil disintegration. I talked with the Commander of the British Forces, General Young, this noon and he felt despondent and frustrated: A battle occurred today in a town that has heretofore been quiet; something on the order of 5,000 Turks are encircled. There have been casualties on both sides. The pace is accelerating and a general bloodbath just over the horizon.

13. Against this background, I told Makarios that if he did not proceed immediately to organize an international peace force, he would condemn his country to total anarchy. But I have little confidence that he is enough of a free man to act rationally—even if he had the will to do so.

14. I have sent him word through covert channels that if he would agree to the organization of an international force immediately, we and the British would help him achieve one. We would call on the Commonwealth countries and on some of the Western European neutrals. If he would postpone throwing his problems into the Security Council until after such a force had been agreed, order might be restored and the situation salvaged. In that event, we would talk to the Turks and try to hold up their hand while efforts were made to develop a formula for a general settlement. Such a force cld not involve US troops.

15. I hope we can agree on something but I am not too sanguine.

16. The position of Turkey in this affair is a critical one. From my talks in Ankara, I am persuaded that if Makarios is enough of a fool to go to the Security Council and try for a resolution designed to hamstring the Turks in exercising their rights of intervention, without first dealing with the internal situation through the organization of an international force, he is likely to trigger an incisive Turkish reaction. The Turks may move, and the Greeks will respond.

17. Our only hope, it seems to me, is to scare Makarios sufficiently to compel him to concentrate on the creation of an international force that will stop carnage. If he does not do so—and I will know tomorrow—we have some hard decisions to make. I have promised the Turks and Greeks to report on our meetings here.

18. One possibility of preventing a Greco-Turkish war is to persuade both governments to exercise the rights of unilateral intervention granted them under the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and move into Cyprus peacefully and together in order to stop the destruction of the Greek and Turkish communities. This obviously would not be feasible until after the Greek elections which take place on Sunday.

19. For the moment, we have considerable influence with Inonu, who has made clear to me his gratitude for the US manifestations of interest in the Cyprus situation. Hopefully we may be able to establish a relation of confidence with whatever new government emerges from the Greek elections.

20. I have the impression that Britain, as the third guarantor power, would be willing to associate itself with a peaceful joint intervention by Greece and Turkey and would simultaneously increase present British troop strength in Cyprus.

21. To arrange a common action by Greece and Turkey would require considerable diplomatic skill and the maximum use of our leverage. Yet I am inclined tonight to think this may be about the only remaining hope of preventing a major collision of two of our NATO allies—if, as I fear he will, Makarios turns out to be a prisoner or a fool or both.

22. I am sending you this cable tonight not with the thought of immediate instructions, since it is hard to make a definite plan until we know the full results of tomorrow’s meeting with Makarios. I must emphasize, however, that the atmosphere at this end of the Mediterranean is supercharged and that an explosion may be imminent. I shall try tomorrow to send you more considered recommendations as to the options open to us and the immediate actions we should take.

Wilkins

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to USUN. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.

2 Detailed reports of the morning discussions were transmitted in telegrams 726 and 727 from Nicosia, February 12. (Ibid.) Ball presented Makarios with an “adjusted proposal.” The text of this proposal was transmitted in circular telegram 1482, February 12. (Ibid.) The Embassy provided a detailed report on the afternoon discussions in telegrams 728 and 731 from Nicosia, February 12. (Ibid.) Makarios presented Ball with the text of the Cypriot proposal “preconditioning” acceptance of an international peacekeeping force. This document was transmitted in telegram 742 from Nicosia, February 13. (Ibid.) Ball also met with Vice President Kuchuk in the interval between his two sessions with Makarios. The Embassy reported on this meeting in telegram 729 from Nicosia, February 12. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 12


12. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, February 13, 1964, 10:55 a.m.

·         SUBJECT

·         Situation in Cyprus

·         PARTICIPANTS

·         British

·         Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Prime Minister of Great Britain

·         R.A. Butler, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

·         Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador

·         Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office

·         N. Henderson, Private Secretary to Mr. Butler

·         Tom Bridges, Second Private Secretary to Mr. Butler

·         Denis Greenhill, Minister, UK Embassy

·         M. Hadow, Press Secretary, Foreign Office

·         US

·         The President

·         The Secretary of State

·         Governor Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

·         David K.E. Bruce, Ambassador to Great Britain

·         McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

·         William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR

·         Richard I. Philips, Director, P/ON

·         M. Gordon Knox, Deputy Director, BNA

Secretary Rusk reviewed the situation in Cyprus. He pointed out that ArchbishopMakarios had seemed willing to see a peace-keeping force composed not of troops from NATO states (except for the UK), but from the Commonwealth and from nations like Sweden. Mr. Butler remarked that the idea of such an alternative force was hopeful. Secretary Rusk said that Mr. Ball would see Makarios again the morning of the 14th. Meanwhile, reports of heavy fighting in the southern part of the island were disturbing, however, and Secretary Rusk stated that Mr. Ball would proceed on the 14th to Ankara to counsel prudence to the Turkish government.

Mr. Butler remarked that the Cypriot government would surely bring the issue before the Security Council and the Cypriot delegate, Rossides, would introduce a resolution. If it were unreasonable, the British and the US could be negative and would have the votes. If the resolution were reasonable and two-sided, we could be reasonable about it.

Secretary Rusk remarked that the best and most likely kind of resolution which would get a majority at the Security Council was one of the “don’t fight, talk” resolutions which are customary in the Security Council under circumstances such as now prevail in Cyprus. The US and UK could back such a resolution in order to head off other ones of the sort the Cypriot government would want. Namely, one to cast a shadow on the Treaty of Guarantee.

Sir Alec doubted that Makarios can control matters in Cyprus any longer. He hoped that Canada would continue to be one of the states making up the peace-keeping force.

Secretary Rusk referred to the fact that the Turks, Greeks and British have forces on the island by right; this could be a concept which could be used to keep Makariosfrom calling in forces from Egypt or the Soviet Bloc, for example, which have no right on the island.

Sir Alec supposed that if the Turkish army invaded Cyprus, the British government would call on it to stop at a certain line. The British forces certainly would not fight a NATO ally.

The President suggested that it would be important to have the Turkish and Greek armies agree not to fight each other, should their governments decide to send forces to occupy portions of Cyprus. It would also be desirable that each side should protect the other’s minority population. He recalled that Queen Frederika of Greece had told him during her recent visit to Washington that the Greek Army would move to Cyprus if the Turkish Army did.2

He then asked Sir Alec what motivates Makarios.

Sir Alec called Makarios a stinker of the first water. He wants a central government in Cyprus which would rob the Turkish minority of its rights. Makarios seemed to rely on a Soviet promise that it will keep the Turks from invading the island.

Sir Harold Caccia stated that any action of this sort by Russia against Turkey would bring NATO into action.

Mr. Rusk observed that this was a matter of extreme danger. Before there would be a response to a Soviet action affecting the Soviet-Turkish border the question would be in the Security Council.

1 Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret. Drafted by Knox and approved in S on February 20 and in the White House on February 24. The meeting was held in the White House. The source text is marked “Part I of II.” Prime Minister Home visited the United States February 12–14.

2  Queen Frederika visited Washington on January 27. Her comments on Cyprus were reported in a memorandum from Komer to the President, January 27. (Johnson Library National Security File, Country File, Greece, Vol. 1)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 13


13. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State1

Ankara, February 14, 1964, 6 p.m.

1031. For Read from Hainy. Following uncleared memo of conversation withMakarios. From Under Secretary. Mr. Pickard and I called on the Archbishop this morning.2 I reiterated the concern of the USG for the situation in Cyprus not merely because of the loss of life on the island but the threat to peace which was posed. I expressed my disappointment that we had not been able to arrive at an agreement on concrete measures but stated that my government was not prepared to abandon efforts to contribute to an alleviation of the dangers that threatened.

I said that I had been instructed to return to Washington today by way of the capitals of Turkey and Greece. I would try to use what influence we had to persuade the governments in Ankara and in Athens to exercise restraint. Of course, the effectiveness of that would depend on the absence of any incidents on the island. Before leaving I had been asked to obtain the assurances of the Archbishop that he would make a public declaration of the determination of his government to restore peace and order and to take effective measures toward that end.

I said that I did not intend to discuss further the question of the application by the GOC to the Security Council but could only reiterate my regret that they were pursuing this course before taking effective steps to bring about an international force that could contribute toward peace. I said also that the Archbishop and I had established, I thought, a basis of personal friendship during the past three days and that I felt it necessary to say to him that the debate in the Security Council in the manner in which the issue was being presented by the GOC would have a lamentable effect on the world’s conception not merely of the Government of Cyprus but of the leadership of the Archbishop.

Pickard then went on to say that he had also proposed to his government that he should return to London via Ankara and Athens to discuss the future of the British peace-keeping force on the island. He said that it was impossible for the British forces to carry out their tasks in present circumstances unless it was clear beyond all doubt that it was the intention of the Government of Cyprus to restrain their forces and avoid such attacks as have happened in Limassol.

The Archbishop had previously given assurance that the government forces would not retaliate even if attacked. In fact, however, an attack had been carried out in Limassol with very little provocation from the Turks. Peace could only be kept by the Cypriots themselves and no force however it was composed could do the job keeping the peace unless it was the intention of the Cypriots to find a peaceful basis of living together.

The Archbishop again reiterated his assurances about the peaceful intentions of the Cypriot Government. He agreed, however, that the present basis for peace-keeping was totally inadequate and that there must be discussion of practical measures to restore the life of the community on a normal basis. He undertook to proceed with such discussions immediately on Pickard’s return from London and to do his utmost to establish a basis of confidence with the Turks which would enable a return to normal conditions on the island.

Pickard stressed that this required compromise on the Greek side as well as on the side of the Turks. There was no question of forcing the Turks to comply with Greek requirements. What was required was an overall negotiated agreement on practical measures for restoring life on the island to normal. It was only on the basis of such a settlement that a peace-keeping force would have any reality.

The Archbishop accepted all this and undertook as a practical first step himself to visit Limassol in order to give public expression to his concern that the peace should be kept on both sides.

We left the meeting on the basis of a firm undertaking from the Archbishop that he will get to work at once on practical ways of reassuring and finding a basis for returning conditions to normality on the island.

The Archbishop also promised to make some form of public declaration asserting his government’s intention to keep the peace.

The Archbishop was undoubtedly sincere and on the face of it the proposal of working out the details of practical measures for peacekeeping is a sensible next step. It would, however, be a mistake to underestimate the great difficulties of bringing any such discussions to a conclusion acceptable to both sides.

I did not discuss the compromise plan at all with Makarios, and in view of Turkish and British anxieties, I believe the less said regarding it the better for the moment.

Hare

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Athens, London, and USUN. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA,CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.

2 Sir Cyril Pickard, Assistant Under Secretary of State for the Commonwealth Relations Office, was Acting U.K. High Commissioner for Cyprus. Pickard’s report to his government on this meeting was transmitted in telegram 748 from Nicosia, February 14. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 14


14. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey1

Washington, February 14, 1964, 8:48 p.m.

817. Following highlights telecon between Secretary and Under Secretary (in Ankara) February 14, 1830Z, are in addition verbatim portion sent action Paris repeated info other posts.2

Under Secretary reported meetings with Inonu and Erkin showed PriMin under enormous pressure which greatly intensified after bloody Limassol affair. However he determined act in consultation with US and wishes withhold any decisive action until after disposition Cypriot case in UN provided there no new incidents. It clear situation extremely precarious but Under Secretary trusts PriMin’s assurances he will not move before telling US unless something occurs making intervention imperative.

Under Secretary stated PriMin presented several questions and wants answers before Monday:

1. What will US reaction be if Russians want intervene?

2. How should GOT act during UN consideration this matter?

3. If US advises patience, what will be advice to all other parties concerned in order maintain even temporary peace and security?

4. Will US release Turkey’s troops from NATO command to be available and ready?

5. In case nobody intervenes except Turks, may GOT expect attitude benevolence and neutrality US Government?

6. Wish clear-cut indication as soon as possible US’s UN tactics and close cooperation with Turk Ambassador Washington who will handle in UN.

In addition, two questions put to British Ambassador: if troubles go on in Cyprus what will UK do? Is UK ready exercise its right intervention with Turkey?

Commenting on UN tactics (transmitted separately)3 Under Secretary said this exactly right course which can make major contribution hold back Turks. Stated he had made clear to PriMin it would disastrously prejudice chances defeating CypriotUN move if Turks took action giving credence GOC claim Cyprus was in imminent danger Turk aggression, and that request to NATO for release Turk NATOcontingents on standby basis would be exploited by GOC in UN and make efforts defeat GOC tactics immensely more difficult. He had told PriMin emphatically US would never support resolution questioning Treaty Guarantee and expressed confidence that by working together we can defeat GOC ploy, and assured PriMin closest consultation.

Under Secretary asked if Turks could be told of plans for preemptive move to SCon Saturday.

Secretary noted Caccia and Dean were with him and that Limassol casualties not as great as first reported. Gave first reaction some of GOT questions as follows:

See no prospect Russians would attempt intervene Cyprus but assume Western powers including US would find way prevent. Noted other possibility of Soviet pressure on Turkey in event Turkey moved unilaterally under Treaty would raise gravest questions for NATO generally and underscores necessity finding answer Cyprus problem which would prevent that contingency.

Believe US and Turkey should act in closest harmony during period UNconsideration and all parties, especially UK, should make maximum effort keep situation calm.

Added that presumably British will shortly answer questions put to British Ambassador since PriMin has returned London.

Re UN tactics, Secretary stated we contemplate British letter will go SC President Saturday afternoon but no SC meeting before Monday because of Greek elections. Said Turks must not give publicity to British letter since could have adverse effect on Greek elections.

Emphasized importance that Greeks not be informed of British letter before its approximate time of delivery which roughly 1430 Saturday NY time.

Noted that possibility Soviet pressures on Turkey underscored necessity closest Turkish consultation in NATO re Cyprus. Mentioned planned Saturday meetingNAC on Cyprus and suggested Turks should keep closest touch with Secretary General Stikker.

Secretary suggested Under Secretary proceed on itinerary to Athens. British Ambassadors Athens Ankara would inform GOG and GOT at appropriate time Saturday re British letter to SC.4 Ambassador Hare could at same time give suggested assurances to Turks, and that Under Secretary need not discuss BritishSC letter either capital.

Rusk

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Drafted byBracken, cleared by Burdett, and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Athens and repeated to London, Nicosia, Paris for USRO, and USUN.

2 A transcript of the telephone conversation is ibid.

3  Ball’s comments were transmitted in telegram 816 to Ankara, February 14. (Ibid.)

4 In telegram 1227 from Ankara, February 15, Ball reported that he had explained the “preemptive initiative” to Turkish officials during an evening meeting. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 15


15. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1

Washington, February 18, 1964, 5:55 p.m.

5185. Please deliver the following letter from the President to Prime MinisterDouglas-Home: Begin verbatim text.

Dear Prime Minister:

I have had a good talk with George Ball about the impressions he gained on his trip and we have given further thought to the explosive situation stemming from the troubles in Cyprus.

George Ball reports he had a particularly useful meeting with Rab Butler andDuncan Sandys and I am glad to find that there is no difference in our appraisals of the Cyprus crisis.2

I think you were wise to beat the Cypriots to the Security Council.3 It seems very likely that we should be able to prevent the use of the Council to scrap the guarantee treaty. I hope we can also obtain a satisfactory resolution for the creation of an international force. However, the Council may well be heading into a mean and protracted debate, and I fear that an international force will not be landed in Cyprus quickly.

Meanwhile, there is the increasing nervousness of the Turks. In more than three hours of conversation with Inonu, George Ball came away convinced, as you know, that the Turks are poised to intervene and that they will certainly move if a further nasty incident like Limassol should occur. In that event, we would be in for deep trouble since the Greeks have made it clear that they will not stand down.

I conclude from all this that we cannot safely depend merely on the results of the Security Council action. Even an international force may not secure order in Cyprus. As your own people on the Island have pointed out quite perceptively no peacekeeping force will be able to maintain order unless something can be done to change the attitude of the two communities—and the encouragement each is getting from the mainland. Yet Turkish passions will not subside, even with a force in being, if the killing continues.

For that reason, I would strongly urge you to give serious thought to convening the guarantor powers under Article IV of the Treaty for a summit conference within the next few days. There are clear advantages in acting promptly. First, we need immediate insurance against a unilateral Turkish move. Second, we have, at long last, a Greek Government with a solid majority. Papandreou is rumored in the press this morning as possibly intending to get together with the Turks as his first order of business. This may well be the psychological moment for an effort to break the impasse.

I should think that the subject matter of such a summit meeting could well be the security problem in Cyprus and support for the international force in the United Nations. At the same time, I think you might use such a meeting to develop standby contingency arrangements against the possibility that the Turks may be stimulated by events into a unilateral move.

Such arrangements could take the form of a pledge from each of the guarantor powers that, if one party felt compelled to move, it would confer with the other two powers to make arrangements by which the move would be made on a tripartite basis. Military representatives of the three countries could work out plans for some kind of a combined operation—perhaps along the lines suggested in a paper which George Ball gave to Rab Butler and Duncan Sandys in London.4

If such a meeting were to be held, it might be useful to ask the United States to send observers in order that we could add our influence to yours in injecting some rationality into the present situation. If you thought this a good idea, I would be glad to send George Ball and perhaps General Maxwell Taylor.

Of course, it is important that whatever the guarantor powers do as a group should reinforce rather than cut across the current effort in New York to establish the basis for an international peacekeeping force. Both the draft resolution you expect to put into the Security Council and the ideas floated by U Thant include the provision that the guarantor powers should reach agreement, along with the Government of Cyprus, on details of a peacekeeping plan. I have no doubt that a meeting of guarantor powers could be fitted into the track now being pursued in the United Nations.

With my strong feeling that time is of the essence, I am at your disposal to help in any possible way to avoid the fearful consequences of a Greek-Turkish war. Sincerely, End verbatim text.

Rusk

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Ball and cleared by Komer for the White House. Repeated to Ankara and Athens.

2  Ball reported on this meeting in telegram 3969 from London, February 16. (Ibid.)

3 On February 15, following Makarios’ formal rejection of the U.S.-U.K. proposals for an international military force, the British Government requested a Security Council meeting to discuss Cyprus. See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 561–562.

4  Ball flew to London on February 14. His “Action Plan for Cyprus” was transmitted in telegram 3961 from London, February 16. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 16


16. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Papandreou1

Washington, February 20, 1964.

I have sent you separately my congratulations on your landslide victory in the elections.2 We are particularly happy that a government can now be formed soonest with a clear majority, because of the grave crisis which confronts the Western Alliance over Cyprus.

Truly, this is a time which requires the closest collaboration of all the allies concerned if we are to surmount the crisis. The US, because of its deep commitment to the NATO alliance, will do whatever it can to help. Nor are we pressing for any specific long-range solution. On the contrary, as we have repeatedly sought to make clear, the United States has no position on terms of any final settlement. What we all need immediately is the reestablishment of law and order so that the parties can proceed to the search for solutions acceptable to all.

And let me assure you that we are neither favoring Turkey at the expense of Greece nor vice versa. Our interest is—as it has been since 1947—that of supporting the security and well-being of two close NATO allies. As we see it, the common need of Greece, Turkey, the US, and the UK to stick together is paramount.

It will take the highest statesmanship on all sides, but especially in Athens and Ankara, to prevent a wholly unnecessary debacle—and one which threatens the very security of both Greece and Turkey—from being precipitated by the Cypriot extremists of both sides.

For this reason I am grateful that you won by a majority that gives you the necessary freedom of action, because we count heavily on the wise heads of you and Inonu to help find some way of stopping the drift toward communal tragedy. I have seen with interest reports that you may have been considering a new effort in partnership with Inonu, and while I do not know the details of what you may have in mind, I do want to say that in principle nothing could be more helpful than joint action by the leaders of Greece and Turkey in the spirit which I am sure you have in mind.

In this critical period it is important that our representatives keep in close touch with each other, in Nicosia and New York as well as Athens and Washington. We recognize the special responsibilities which Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom must continue to bear, but you may count on us as well.3

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson4

1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Cyprus. Secret. A copy of the message was transmitted in telegram 943 to Athens, February 20. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP) The President also addressed similar letters on the Cyprus issue to Prime Minister Inonu and President Makarios. The text of the February 21 letter to Makarios is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Cyprus. The text of the letter to Inonu was transmitted in telegram 848 to Ankara, February 20. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)

2 A copy of Johnson’s message is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Greece, Papandreou. In telegram 1261 from Athens, February 19, the Embassy commented that the main characteristic of the new Papandreou government was its “moderate nature,” noting that Papandreou had placed conservatives in key positions. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 GREECE)

3 In a February 27 response, Prime Minister Papandreou stated his opposition to direct negotiations between himself and Inonu, reaffirmed his opposition to the use of force to settle the Cyprus issue, and called for close consultations. (Ibid., POL 23–8 CYP)

4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 17


17. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

Athens, February 21, 1964, 3 p.m.

1272. Cyprus.

1. I called on PriMin last night. I found him looking tired but mentally alert. After I extended our congratulations on his great political victory, we immediately got down to discussion Cyprus problem.

2. I recalled to him that our only interest was reestablishment law and order so that parties concerned could work out political solution in atmosphere of calm. For our part, we had no pre-conceived ideas of what ultimate solution should be—this was matter for parties concerned. Papandreou indicated he understood and appreciated our position, but said that many considered we were supporting Turks. He smilingly added that if the US fully supported the “right”, we would have to take sides—Greece’s—for London-Zurich Accords had created impossible situation. I suggested one of reasons for public misunderstanding was irresponsible and wholly misleading articles in Greek press which led the public to believe that US either had ulterior motives or was supporting Turkey versus Greece. I pointed out that Paraskevopoulos caretaker govt had either been unwilling or unable tell facts to public.

3. While on the subject of our support of GOT position, I said that it was obvious we could not accept the view—apparently advanced by Makarios—that the SC could amend or nullify treaties. This could only be accomplished through negotiation of the interested parties. Papandreou nodded assent. I stressed that, even though we took above position on treaty, we had been using very strong pressure on GOT not to exercise “right of intervention.”

4. I then went on to say that, during these past days, the situation on the island had deteriorated and was extremely dangerous. Not only was Makarios apparently acting on very bad advice, but individual guerrilla bands were growing in strength and independence. Consequently it was of transcending importance that peacekeeping force be organized and despatched quickly and, meanwhile, that every effort be made to prevent further violence on the island. In view great danger confronting us all, I added that it was indeed fortunate that Papandreou had achieved his overwhelming electoral victory, for this put him in key position to play constructive and decisive role on Cyprus question; his election could well prove turning point in history as he was probably only man who could move problem toward solution.

5. After we agreed on need for peace force and also on fact this only temporary expedient, I said it seemed to me only hope for any solution, long or short term, was agreement between Greece and Turkey—certainly no permanent solution could be found without their agreement. Meanwhile, what could Papandreou do to getMakarios in hand and also control Greek-Cypriot irregular leaders? This was essential and extremely urgent.

6. Papandreou said first that he already moved to gain control over Greek Cypriots as he had told me he would do if elected. He repeated his statement to me of last week (Embtel 1205)2 that it was inadmissible for Greece’s future to be decided byMakarios and stated firmly that he intended to enforce discipline on Greek Cypriots. To achieve this, he had been in touch with Makarios and had also just that afternoon met with General Grivas and a “representative” of Cypriot Interior Minister Georgatzis; he expected Georgatzis to arrive during the night. He also said he was contacting Sampson, Lyssarides and the Commander of the Greek forces in Cyprus, Col. Petridies. He said he would demand that Greek Cypriots undertake no violence against Turk Cypriots unless attacked first. He stressed importance GOTholding Turk Cypriots in check. Otherwise, he seemed confident that he could exert the necessary control over the Greek Cypriots to create an atmosphere leading to negotiations.

7. The PriMin agreed completely that first step was to bring about peace and calm atmosphere in which negotiations could take place. However, he said long-term solution requires removal of Greek and Turkish forces from Cyprus; their presence there, facing one another was unnatural and created constant tension. Their place should be taken by an international force, he continued, that would stay as long as needed. Long term solution would require “international” guarantee rather than present impossible system. He did not spell out “international” but seemed to have in mind a UN guarantee of some sort (I don’t think he would rule out NATO) which would give “complete” guarantees to Turk Cypriots for protection of their minority rights (he repeated word “complete” several times).

8. Papandreou said he thought time had come when Grivas could play constructive role in Cyprus; he observed that as Makarios’ prestige was going down, Grivas’ was going up. However, he emphasized that he did not want to play one off against the other, and that it was essential that they cooperate or the Communists would gain. He apparently had not thought through how Grivas’ appearance on scene would affect British or Turks. He seemed to be toying with idea that Grivas would pull all irregular elements together and ensure discipline, leaving Makarios as President—for the moment at least. This is all in “feeling out” stage and I doubt that Papandreou sees clear path ahead as yet.

9. I stressed again that it was vital that there be understanding between Greece and Turkey. He agreed and said that if he were to meet Inonu, he would tell him that it is insane to consider war between Greece and Turkey; however, he added that if Turks “open door to insane asylum, then he would have to accompany Inonuinside.” I did not press him on meeting with Inonu, since I thought it would be counter-productive to do so at that particular moment. However, I have very definite impression he would go along with meeting if we can set proper stage. President’s letter to Brit PriMin may show the way, but this should be researched by Brits.

10. Papandreou expressed optimism about outcome of talks at UN; he said info he had received during afternoon sounded promising. He strongly favors giving U Thant proposals a good try.

11. Comment: I was impressed by speed with which Papandreou has started action aimed at gaining control of Greek Cypriots as he had told me he would in our meeting last week. He seemed fully cognizant of dangers involved in Cyprus crisis and said several times he wanted to move Cyprus from the “danger” status to the “problem” status. Whether he can really gain control of Greeks on island remains to be seen, but he apparently is confident that he can and is going to make real college try. Meanwhile, I urge that we restate to Turks importance controlling their brethren on island in order prevent incidents such as those mentioned in Nicosia’s 405.3

Labouisse

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to USUN, Ankara, London, and Nicosia. Passed to the White House, COA, JCS,OSD, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.

2 Dated February 11. (Ibid.)

3 Telegram 405 from Nicosia, December 29, 1963, reported the Ambassador’s talk with Clerides. (Ibid., POL 25 CYP)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 18


18. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece1

Washington, February 24, 1964, 8:46 p.m.

933. We are pleased to see from urtels 1279 and 12802 that Papandreou (a) aware of Communist dangers in Cyprus; (b) working on Makarios to accept U Thant proposal; and (c) agrees that main thing now is for Greeks and Turks to sit down together and work out solution.

Dept gratified at constructive dialogue which you have conducted with Papandreou since election. We are anxious have you continue full and frank exchange with him on all aspects of Cyprus problem both to establish mutual confidence and to create positive atmosphere for eventual Greco-Turkish (or tripartite) meeting. This connection, we wish give him our appraisal of current situation in New York, as follows:

As we read situation at UN, there has been substantial agreement among all concerned on same basic elements accepted in earlier US–UK proposal, to wit, need for international peacekeeping force and need for mediator. However, in our judgment, prospects are extremely remote that SC session will result in any kind of action giving reality to either of these two concepts. Reason for this perfectly clear:Makarios remains obdurate in opposing any UN resolution which does not have effect of negating Treaty of Guarantee. He presumably has Soviet veto in his pocket and we assume will not hesitate to use it. We and the UK, on the other hand, are equally determined that SC shall not be exploited to nullify Treaty of Guarantee, and most members of Council agree this should not be the case. We are not seeking get SC reaffirm Treaty of Guarantee; however, we cannot agree to type of resolution sought by Makarios which by completely ignoring Treaty and by giving an international force mandate that appears to be directed against Turkish intervention has effect of negating Treaty.

We hope GOG is under no illusion about futility of Makarios’ efforts get kind of action from Council he wants. (We assume Bitsios has so reported to Athens.) Only way we can see to prevent total impasse at UN is if Makarios relents in his position. We hope GOG doing what it can get him adopt more flexible attitude toward SCresolution. SC President Bernardes (Brazil) is now consulting with non-permanentSC members in hope of working out a formula which both sides can accept. We wish them well in this endeavor, but looking at problem realistically, we are convinced Bernardes will fare no better than U Thant has unless Makarios prepared abandon his objective of getting SC to vitiate Treaty.

Our present assessment is that efforts to get an acceptable resolution in Council may run for another two or three days. But we deeply concerned that if SCproduces nothing, as we anticipate, vacuum may be created in which there will be further violence in Cyprus and renewed temptation for Turks to move in. We would be interested in any thoughts Papandreou has on possible lines of approach toInonu. We glad he planned to see Turkish Ambassador and would be interested to learn whether he did so and what came of meeting. If US, as friend of both sides, can in any way facilitate Greek-Turkish dialogue, we shall be most happy to do so.

With future course of events in Cyprus murky in face of almost certain Council inaction, we would warmly welcome any thoughts Papandreou has on steps that might be taken now to avoid a dangerous vacuum when deadlock reached in SC.

FYI: We think an early Papandreou-Inonu meeting would be best next step. This could be without prejudice to later participation of UK (and US) if this proves desirable. We believe such meeting could provide vehicle for keeping lid on situation in Cyprus and convincing Makarios to accept international peacekeeping force along lines of Thant Plan.3 Possible outcome of such meeting could be to: (a) address an appeal to Makarios to take all possible measures to maintain law and order; (b) urge him to accept international force along lines of Thant Plan; and (c) reassure Makarios, as in Allied Plan, that rights of intervention under Treaty of Guarantee would be suspended for period during which international force operating and while mutually-agreed mediator was seeking political solution. We also believe that Makarios’ willingness accept international peacekeeping force along lines of Thant Plan would be decisively influenced if the Greeks and Turks could make clear to him that alternative to such an international peacekeeping force would be tripartite military intervention under Treaty of Guarantee. Confronted with choice between international force along lines of Thant Plan and tripartite military intervention, Makarios might well see former as lesser of two evils.

We have outlined the above rather fully to give you the flavor of our present tentative thinking. We leave it to your discretion as to how much of this would be appropriate for you to reveal to Papandreou at this time. We would like you to see Papandreou soonest, largely in context of an exchange of views on where we are in New York, and to have you probe further possibility of an early high-level meeting.4 End FYI.

Rusk

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Buffum and Sisco; cleared by Bracken, Talbot, and Cleveland; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, and USUN.

2 Telegrams 1279 and 1280, February 20, reported on discussions with Papandreou regarding Cyprus. (Ibid.)

3 This plan, which was rejected, proposed establishment of an international peacekeeping force and provided for a mediator under special circumstances. For text, see U.N. Doc. S/5554, February 15, 1964.

4 In telegram 1298 from Athens, February 26, Labouisse reported he had passed on the Department’s views to Papandreou who outlined his efforts to restrain Makarios and stressed the need for the United States to restrain Turkey. (Ibid)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 19


19. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1

Washington, February 26, 1964, 6:05 p.m.

5393. For Ambassador from Under Secretary. Would you please deliver the following message from me to Messrs. Butler and Sandys:

Begin verbatim text

Denis Greenhill has told me2 of your plan to approach the Greek and Turkish Governments tomorrow to urge a meeting between Papandreou and Inonu. I told him that we would ask our Ambassadors in the two capitals to coordinate with yours in order to give whatever reinforcement seemed useful.

While I see great virtue in a bilateral meeting, I am not at all sanguine it can be achieved at this point. Our own tentative soundings have indicated that it will be difficult for either Papandreou or Inonu to move without at least some third party invitation and a juridical excuse for conferring.

I would strongly urge, therefore, that if the answer is negative—as I fear it will be—you consider going back promptly with a request for tripartite consultation under Article 4 of the Treaty of Guaranty. As I read this Article, consultation is not merely a privilege, but an obligation of the parties—if there is reason to believe that the state of affairs under the constitution has been altered. In order to bring the Greeks along it might well be necessary to suggest that Makarios and Kutchuck be invited to participate in the consultation.

Alternatively, we might propose to Inonu that the Turks themselves extend the invitation for tripartite consultation. This would have, however, two disadvantages. First, based on my conversations with Erkin, I doubt that the Turks would be prepared to call for a tripartite consultation unless it were clearly understood that this was a prelude to tripartite intervention. Second, the Greeks might be less responsive to a Turkish request for consultation than to an invitation from your Government.

I feel more than ever that some move of this kind is imperative. It seems evident that the Greek Cypriot game is to try to keep the United Nations proceedings going. This is a forum where they can draw support from their Communist friends. It provides them with insulation against a Turkish move while eroding Turkish intervention rights.

Bernardes, the President of the Security Council, is trying to work out a compromise resolution before Thursday afternoon. If the Cypriots continue to dig in, however, I think it may become apparent by then that no resolution can be forthcoming. The Cypriots are exploiting to the maximum Soviet and Czech support. Kyprianou has played the Council skillfully, and there is developing evidence of softness on the part of the Ivory Coast and Morocco. The increasing pro-Makarios line being pursued by Bitsios is having its effect on the Council members.

Meanwhile, in Cyprus Makarios is moving with his characteristic Byzantine deviousness. The regularizing of 5,000 irregulars looks to us as an effort to lay a basis for a request that your troops be withdrawn. There is plenty of evidence thatMakarios does not want a peace-keeping force of any kind. By asking the withdrawal of British forces, he would probably discourage countries from contributing components even if the Security Council should produce a satisfactory resolution.

If Makarios can keep the matter going in New York, he probably feels that he can deal with the Turkish Cypriots without much fear of Turkish intervention—particularly with his exaggerated belief in the nature of Soviet assistance.

Against this background, we see his call for the disarmament of the population as laying the basis for a move to disarm the Turkish Cypriots. In this connection we have good report that Papadoupulos made speech on the 24th to the Patriotic Front Deputies saying GOC has decided definitely to rely fully on Soviet support having lost hope in UN.

All these events in Nicosia have certainly not been lost on Ankara, which is presumably feeling an increasing claustrophobia. I do not think we can count onInonu holding the line, once it becomes clear that an international force is not on. And, if the Turks sense the erosion of their treaty rights to intervene, they may feel compelled to move before it is too late.

All of these considerations seem to me to urge a tripartite meeting if Bernardes is not successful and if we cannot secure the promise of an immediate bilateral Greek-Turkish dialogue. Such a meeting would seem to offer several opportunities:

(a) To convince Makarios that the Turks mean business and that he is playing too risky a game;

(b) To press Makarios to accept and support an international peace-keeping force along the lines of the Thant plan; and

(c) To undertake contingency planning for a possible tripartite intervention as an alternative to unilateral Turkish move.

I do not think I am being alarmist in feeling a deep sense of urgency. I cannot believe that the arms build-up in Cyprus can continue much longer without grave danger of an explosion.

I think it very likely that if the Security Council fades out and the Cypriots prove unable to secure an emergency General Assembly meeting the present superficial calm will give way to a bloodbath. End verbatim text.3

For Ankara: Would appreciate your comments on foregoing together with results your soundings with GOT on its views and possible actions as result of developments in Security Council and on Cyprus.4

For Athens: You are requested to comment similarly.5

Rusk

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exclusive Distribution. Drafted and approved by Ball and cleared by Burdett andJernegan. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, USUN, DOD, and the White House.

2 At a noon meeting at the Department of State; a memorandum of their conversation is ibid.

3 In telegram 4189 from London, February 27, Bruce reported that he delivered Ball’s message to Caccia who outlined British doubts about the utility of a guarantor powers’ meeting and suggested that a Makarios-Inonu summit might jolt the Greek Cypriots to their senses. (Ibid.)

4 In telegram 1090 from Ankara, February 28, the Embassy reported that Turkish patience with Makarios was wearing thin, but the Turks remained receptive to the idea of a “high level meeting” with Greek officials. (Ibid.)

5 In telegram 1306 from Athens, February 27, the Embassy reported that Papandreou was unwilling to enter into direct high-level talks with the Inonu government and would probably oppose any proposal involving action by the guarantor powers. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 20


20. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

Athens, February 27, 1964, 5 p.m.

1302. 1. I think we have reached a stage which warrants reevaluation of some aspects of our policy and tactics dealing with the Cyprus question. Our main concern has been to prevent a situation from developing which would embroil two of our allies, thus precipitating NATO disaster. To this end, our basic drive thus far has been to gain time and keep the Turks from making a military move on Cyprus which the Greeks would inevitably feel bound to counter. We have consequently worked for measures which would effectively suppress violence on the island and thus deprive the Turks of the provocation which might trigger off a legally justified intervention on their part. In order to avoid antagonizing either of these two allies of the US, we have studiously avoided taking a position as to the form or the shape of a final settlement of the Cyprus problem. We have said many times that the solution is a matter for the parties concerned. This was probably the proper stand for us to take at first, but is it right and is it good enough to meet the situation which faces us today?

2. It must no doubt be difficult for the more sophisticated to believe that the US has been willing to accept an important role in the efforts to bring peace to the island without also attempting to form a considered judgment as to how the matter ought to be settled on a long-term basis. In our conversations, PriMin Papandreou has been probing for a US position and obviously does not believe that we do not have one. In fact (as has become increasingly clear during UN debate) our studious avoidance to take a position is in itself a position—one that is inevitably interpreted as favoring the existing set of arrangements rather than acknowledging the pace of events and the impetus to change the agreements which have been established and theoretically govern Cyprus. Moreover, while continuing to adhere to this noncommittal attitude of neutrality on the question of a long-term solution, we have been supporting—in effect if not in words—the Turkish insistence that the Treaty of Guarantee affords the Turks a legal cover for intervention. We are thus inevitably taken to be supporting not only the Treaty of Guarantee but the other aspects of the London and Zurich Agreements as well—in short, the status quo.

3. It has already been vividly and painfully demonstrated that the present arrangements for Cyprus do not work and will in due course have to be changed. In Cyprus, in Greece, and at the UN, the pressure for “self-determination” is increasingly strong. I do not see how the US can ultimately escape agreeing to the application of more self-determination for Cyprus than is presently permitted in the existing arrangements without laying itself open to the charge of moral inconsistency. Only last Saturday the communiqué issued after President Johnson’s meeting with Pres. Lopez Mateos reaffirmed “support of the principle of self-determination of all peoples and of its corollary, non-intervention. They agreed … to promote the acceptance of such principles, not only with words but with deeds, in the Americas and throughout the world.”2

4. Much more will be heard in UN halls and out, from the Soviet and Afro-Asian blocs, and indeed from the Greeks, on the necessity for applying the principle of self-determination to Cyprus. Will it not then become increasingly embarrassing for us to avoid taking stand? In the end our strategy of neutrality (generally interpreted as support of the existing arrangements) will not only hurt us in the UN but spread the wrong impression about US policy around the world. Here in Greece, adherence to this strategy over a long period of time, with the resulting vocal reactions in the press, among the public and in government circles, may do serious and lasting damage to US-Greek relations that will have repercussions more far-reaching than Cyprus.

5. Since it seems to me that we will inevitably be driven to conceding in the end that the present arrangements cannot be made to work, would it not be well to make a virtue of necessity by saying at once that, in our opinion, the agreements will, in due course, have to be altered by negotiations between the interested parties? I believe that this would clear the air considerably, put us in a less uncomfortable position to deal with Makarios, the Greeks and the neutral and Soviet blocs—thus improving the chances for the creation of a peace force—and give some negotiating substance to future discussions between Greeks and Turks. While, in the recent past, the cruelty of the Greek Cypriot irregulars toward the Turkish minority and the deviousness of Makarios have damaged the majority’s case for control by it of the island’s affairs, the fact remains that the Greek Cypriot 82 percent majority has the right to a preponderant voice in determining what the island’s government and policies ought to be.

6. Obviously, the Turks will hardly welcome this evolution in our position. We can, I believe, relieve some if not all of their concern by emphasizing that our position in favor of modifying the agreements is rigidly conditioned on complete protection of the rights of the Turkish Cypriot minority—rights which, however, cannot include a veto over the 82 percent majority’s right to control its foreign affairs, defense and taxes. This guarantee of the rights of the minority would, in the first stage, have to be insured by the presence and appropriate authority of an international force. Such a force would have to stay on the island long enough to make sure, for the future, that the Government of Cyprus would not and could not use the principle of self-determination as a means of destroying or oppressing the Turkish minority.

7. While the course of action proposed may not curb overnight the neutralist and leftward drift of the island’s present government, I believe that it would somewhat restore the position of the West in Cyprus and make the island a less open target for Communist intrigue and penetration. It would make it easier for the US to maneuver amidst changing events. Our first step ought to be an acknowledgement that the present arrangements have less chance than ever to become workable in practice. (The setting up of the London conference and the subsequent Anglo-American suggestions for appointing a mediator implied, in a sense, that changes were needed.) Our main goal should continue to be the elimination of communal strife through the dispatch of an international force or in any other way that might appear practicable. Looking further ahead, it may be that, in the end a NATOguarantee or some other form of association of the island with the West will become desirable and feasible—for a Cyprus remaining a permanent apple of discord between Greeks and Turks would continue to be a grave threat to Western and US interests.

8. The foregoing observations and recommendations have been set down in full awareness that

(a) A shift in our public position in the direction of self-determination will be taken as a victory for Makarios (who bears such heavy responsibility for the present impasse), and

(b) That if the Turkish minority were to continue to be permitted to retain a degree of control over the island’s affairs out of proportion to its voting strength, it might help frustrate neutralist and leftist tendencies on the island. (The Greeks, of course, argue forcefully that continuation of present situation is driving Cyprus into Communist arms.)

Although these considerations are important and must be weighed, I firmly believe that the United States stands to lose less by modifying our position along lines suggested.3

Labouisse

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, and USUN. Relayed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD,CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.

2 For full text of the statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, Book I, pp. 303–305.

3 Telegram 880 from Nicosia, February 29, endorsed Labouisse’s arguments, adding that the United States “should not abandon hope of finding basis of cooperation with Greek Cypriots” that would permit a settlement protecting the legitimate interests of both Cypriot communities. In telegram 906 to Athens, March 4, Ball responded that while Cypriot constitutional arrangements appeared unworkable, the United States continued to insist that changes could not come through Security Council actions. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 21


21. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1

Nicosia, March 3, 1964, 4 p.m.

898. Makarios told me this morning GOC had decided accept draft SC resolution on Cyprus submitted by five non-permanent members (USUN’s 3246 to Department).2

He said Clerides had telephoned him from New York last night to recommend some minor changes. Clerides had told him USSR very disturbed about provision that commander of peace-keeping force would be appointed by and report to SYGbecause USSR felt bound by Congo precedent in that commander should be appointed by and report to SC. Makarios commented he would ask Soviet Ambassador Ermoshin request USSR not to veto resolution on this basis.

Since Makarios obviously expected some reply, I commented that it was quite understandable USSR would take such a position because it could thus hope, through threat or use of SC veto, to exercise continuing, if negative, influence on development of Cyprus problem for its own purposes. After mentioning Soviet abuse of veto in past, I reminded Makarios of analogous situation existing under Constitution of Republic of Cyprus. Under this constitution Turkish minority in House of Representatives could never by themselves procure adoption of legislation but were in position, through exercise of veto, to prevent adoption of legislation which majority of House considered necessary for good of country.Makarios nodded agreement.

Makarios, who usually appears reposed, seemed unusually relaxed today but did not, it will be noticed, miss opportunity to discredit a pretender (Clerides) in American eyes.

McKiernan

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to USUN, Ankara, Athens, London, and Paris for USRO. Passed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.

2 Not printed. (Ibid.) For text of Security Council Resolution 186 (1964), adopted unanimously on March 4 (U.N. Doc. S/5575), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 566–567. The resolution recommended that the Secretary-General create a peacekeeping force in Cyprus and designate a mediator to promote a peaceful solution.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 22


22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus1

Washington, March 7, 1964, 6:26 p.m.

621. After interview with Secretary reported separate telegram,2 Kyprianou,Clerides, and Rossides had brief talk with President March 6. President expressed hope machinery set up by SC would be sufficient to work out Cyprus problem. Thought it was best we could hope for and stressed extreme importance of peaceful settlement, remarking that most people would rather talk things out than fight. He expressed regret there had been misunderstanding of U.S. attitude. Sent his regards and best wishes to Makarios.

As in prior talk with Secretary, Kyprianou emphasized need for unitary state in Cyprus “with everyone equal” and understanding that Greece and Turkey should have nothing to do with Cyprus.

President commented that unfortunately neither Greek Cypriots nor Turkish Cypriots seemed to think this way. Greek Cypriots thought of themselves as Greek just as much as Turkish Cypriots thought of themselves as Turkish. Feelings ran high on both sides not only on island but in Greece and Turkey as well. Kyprianoustuck to his position.

Conversation was amicable throughout.

Rusk

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Drafted and approved by Jernegan and cleared by Komer for the White House. Also sent to Ankara, Athens, London, and USUN.

2 Telegram 619 to Nicosia, March 7. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 23


23. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations1

Washington, March 9, 1964, 9:05 p.m.

2377. There are number important points which we believe need to be pursued re establishment and operation of UN Force in Cyprus:

1) Three month period for which force established is absolute minimum within which we can reasonably expect mediator to make any headway toward permanent settlement. It therefore desirable that date at which writ for force starts to run not begin prematurely. We note that Cypriots themselves consider logical date for three-month period to begin is date of placement of UN troops in Cyprus rather than date res adopted. We hope Thant will bear this in mind by formally designating establishment of force only when he has sizable contingents (2,000 to 3,000 non-UK troops) on the ground. If UK has not yet turned over British units to SYGcontrol, as London’s 43572 would indicate, this should give U Thant additional time to maneuver on effective date on which UN force becomes operative.

2) Septel deals with question size UK contribution to UN.3 In discussions withSYG and Bunche, you authorized draw on this message to indicate our views on this subject.

3) We understand Sweden insists it not be only neutral country and hope SYGcontinuing press Irish and Finns to contribute at least some troops. (We understand Brazil will probably not contribute troops because of domestic considerations, and in view of their extraordinarily high per diem requirements would not be disposed to push them to participate.)

4) We concerned that as things are now going SYG will not be able muster minimum force of 10,000 men unless UK keeps all its present forces in Cyprus and we assume they will be most reluctant if not totally unwilling to do so. We find it difficult believe that Cypriots would not accept Danish contingent if they can accept UK and Canada. Since Danes apparently willing and eager serve, we think SYG should at least urge Cypriots reconsider question Danish participation.

5) Major problem which will confront force once it established is precise terms of engagement under which it will operate. We note that Canadians, Swedes, and UKconcerned on this score. It is unrealistic to expect that countries will put their troops into field under SYG’s command until they know more clearly than they are told in SC res what ground rules are under which troops will be used.

One of most difficult questions likely to be what UN force should do re armed irregulars and Greek Cypriot police. Makarios will undoubtedly try use UN Force to help disarm Turkish Cypriots. Any such move, of course, would be totally unacceptable in Ankara. Since dispute in case is between two communities in Cyprus, UN would need to operate in even-handed fashion and can hardly lend itself to disarming one party to dispute while leaving other in control of security force. Alternatively, Makarios might try use his augmented police force to disarm Turkish Cypriots while UN Force is on the ground, assuming latter will restrain Turks from invading Cyprus. This would pose much more difficult problem sinceMakarios would argue this is exercise of sovereign powers of GOC. In fact, of course, Constitution gives Turkish Cypriots veto power in field of security, and use of police force clearly falls within this provision. UN could refuse permit disarming of Turk Cypriots by police since this would inevitably lead to violence between communities and SC res calls on UN Force to prevent recurrence fighting.

6) With a mandate of only 3 months and resolution directing force “to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and as necessary contribute to maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions”,UN’s role would be that of UN policeman. That is, UN Force should interpose itself between two communities preventing hostilities, arranging cease-fires and taking any other steps it finds necessary to maintain law and order. This will involve certain amount initiative on part of UN Force and necessitate practical cooperation from both communities.

7) We assume that—unlike Congo where use of force authorized in certain specified circumstances—UN Force in Cyprus would use force only in self-defense.

8) There may also be danger that Makarios will seek to exploit the phrase “return to normal conditions” as meaning that Turkish Cypriots will have to be moved back to domiciles where they were located before current fighting began; he may argue that de facto partition has been created and must be abolished if “normal conditions” are to prevail. We assume UN would not lend itself to any effort at forced population movement. Turk Cypriots deserted mixed villages in fear for their lives and would resist any attempt send them back. For UN to do anything to abet such effort would be widely regarded as pro-Makarios move.

Request USUN discuss foregoing questions as appropriate with U Thant, Buncheand Rikhye, urging that they clarify UN policy as soon as possible so that potential contributors will know what to expect re utilization their forces.

For Nicosia

Appreciate any comments you have on foregoing.4 In addition without going into details of above, request you seek Pickard’s views on problems to be anticipated in connection with UN Force and suggestions for coping with them.

Rusk

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Drafted byBuffum and Moffitt, cleared by Jernegan and Cleveland, and approved by Ball. Also sent to Nicosia and repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Helsinki, Dublin, and Ottawa.

2 Dated March 6. (Ibid.)

3 In telegram 5722 to London, March 9, the Department expressed concern about the size of the proposed British troop contribution to the peacekeeping force. (Ibid.)

4 In telegram 936 from Nicosia, Belcher expressed his view that Makarios would seek to limit the powers of the peacekeeping force. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 24


24. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State1

Ankara, March 10, 1964, 2:13 p.m.

1143. Embtel 1136.2 I had rather expected that completeness with which reftel and Embtel 11343 covered GOT misgivings re Cyprus would give breathing space for their consideration but on contrary I was again called in by Erkin this morning for presentation which, from standpoint of intensity and gravity, unequalled since that of Christmas day.

As I came in Erkin had report in his hand of new attacks this morning by Greeks in western part of Cyprus using mortars, bazookas, heavy machine guns, etc. At first I assumed this was immediate cause of his agitation but it later came out that he had asked see me before receiving this report on basis of general deterioration of situation on island, including presumed death of large number of Turk hostages, and increased dissatisfaction with implementation of resolution. Specific points mentioned were:

1. GOT had always assumed that Turkish contingent would be included in peace force but it now learns that GOG has told SYG it prepared withdraw its contingent and that, at their instigation together with GOC, SYG has confirmed he considering their recommendation that withdrawal of Greek contingent be accompanied by that of Turks. GOT is lodging strong protest with SYG on this point.

2. Report received yesterday which causes GOT have increased reservations re Gyani4 since appears that he has made statements to effect that Turks must as minority give in to Greeks; that he has seen much of Makarios and Greek Ministers but Kucuk practically ignored; that he has been available to Greek journalists but only received Turks reluctantly, etc. In circumstances, GOT will advise SYG it remains unconvinced that Gyani man for job but will give him benefit of doubt for time being. However, if events should give reason for dissatisfaction, GOT will say so publicly and give reasons.

3. Specification of qualification for mediator mentioned reftel will now be followed by clear-cut refusal to accept [garble—Gyani?].

4. Deterioration of situation in Cyprus is direct result of SC resolution. We can now see what “additional measures” mentioned in Article 2 really mean.

5. GOT addressing notes to SYG, UK and US stressing need for British forces in Cyprus being more effective in peacekeeping until new force arrives.

6. Cabinet met this morning and was very dissatisfied with way things going.

7. GOT listened to our advice re exerting restraint and then accepting resolution, only to find itself in steadily deteriorating situation.

8. Throughout crisis Inonu has been very patient but this morning he said for first time that situation approaching point where Turkey would be forced intervene unless effective measures taken to bring it under control, and asked Erkin so advise me.

I spent some time trying reassure Erkin and at same time ferret out what had happened since we talked on Saturday to generate so much heat. Among other things I stressed danger of becoming overly exercised re reports from Cyprus which had been notoriously inaccurate in past; observed that BBC and VOA this morning credited Gyani with having been helpful in effecting a cease-fire in Paphos area; said I still felt GOT had been wise accept resolution and would be stretching things pretty far for GOC to attempt justify recent incidents under Article 2, etc.5

In end Erkin was perhaps a little less tense but there was certain note of finality on which conversation closed that was disturbing. I hope I am not imagining things but impression Erkin seemed to be trying convey was that GOT had gone long way with us but was now finding situation very hard to bear and might have to strike out on own unless present trend reversed both in New York and in Cyprus.

British Amb Allen immediately followed me and we compared notes afterward. Apparently conversation covered same points including message from Inonu, and, although Erkin had begun on lower key, he had ended on bitter note that GOT now in backwash of resolution it should not have approved and at loss defend itself before Turkish people and Parliament. (Fact that High Military Council opened semi-annual meeting here this morning and had Cyprus as first item on agenda may have been another contributing factor.)

Allen and I carefully checked our memories on Inonu message concerning possible intervention and agreed it did not reflect indication of intention to intervene but rather that intervention could become necessary unless something done to avert present deterioration in New York and Cyprus and that it was especially up to UKand US to see that action taken.

Comment: It is possible that conversation which Barnes happened have simultaneously with SecGen Bayramoglu6 may cast some light on what troubling Turks, at least as far as we concerned. After expressing similar unhappiness re resolution and other developments, Bayramoglu wondered whether we still as interested in Cyprus as before or whether now that resolution was passed, we would not be inclined pull out. If, as possible, this may be doubt which Erkin hesitated mention, it could partially explain vigor of his approach, i.e., to try to keep us interested while at same time seeking goad British to bear down harder until peace force arrives.

In sum, this may not be crisis but no doubt that we have some very restive Turks on our hands and that it would be helpful if we could do something to make them feel our interest is continuing and active.7

Hare

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to USUN, Athens, Nicosia, London, and Paris. Passed to the White House, CIA,JCS, OSD, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.

2 Telegram 1136, March 8, reported Turkish concerns about the Secretary-General’s proposals for a Cyprus settlement. (Ibid.)

3 Telegram 1134, March 7, reported on Barnes’ farewell talks with senior Turkish officials. (Ibid.)

4 Lieutenant General Prem Singh Gyani, the Secretary-General’s Personal Representative in Cyprus since January 17 and his nominee to command the peacekeeping force.

5 Reference is to Article 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee signed at London on February 19, 1959. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, p. 770.

6  Barnes’ talk with Bayramoglu was reported in telegram 1134.

7 In telegram 934 to Ankara, March 10, the Department replied that while it agreed with the Turkish position on the right to intervention, it believed that more attention needed to be paid to putting a peacekeeping force into place. The telegram also urged the Embassy to stress the need for cooperation with the U.N. efforts to establish a peacekeeping force and outlined steps the United States had taken to promote peaceful resolution of the problem. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 25


25. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts1

Washington, March 12, 1964, 11:06 p.m.

1675. 1. Critic Message from Ankara,2 repeated to you by Department, told of warning Turks have given to Makarios,3 that they would move if attacks on Turkish Cypriots did not stop. Ambassador Hare asked for 24 hours consultation, and Erkin said he would so recommend.

2. Secretary spoke with Ralph Bunche at UN Headquarters directly. Bunchereported substance of above to SYG and Canadian FonMin Paul Martin who there with SYG at the time.

3. In subsequent telecon directly with Paul Martin, Secretary gave him substance of Ambassador Hare’s reports, and asked him to start Canadian troops moving toward Cyprus, even if they had to stage through some Near Eastern base or British sovereign bases in Cyprus. (When President called Prime Minister Pearson earlier in day, Pearson had said only obstacle immediate movement ready Canadian battalion was need for SYG’s assurance some other countries (other than British) would also be participating in international force.) Martin said he would “see what we can do immediately.”

4. In absence British Ambassador, Under Secretary called in British MinisterGreenhill Thursday evening, gave him substance of report from Ankara and indications of Turkish troop movements. Under Secretary said we should move along several lines simultaneously. Rapid formulation of UN force was one route being vigorously pursued. But seemed to us moment had now come for calling of summit conference under Treaty of Guarantee, Greece, Turkey, UK (and possiblyMakarios and Kutchuk) previously agreed with UK to be useful fall-back at some stage of game.

5. Greenhill said as we knew London had been thinking along same lines. He asked where we thought conference should be held. Under Secretary said he remembered British suggestion was to hold it in Geneva. Under Secretary and Greenhill agreedMakarios and Kutchuk would need to be invited, and Greenhill mentioned also representative of SYG. (If held in Geneva, Spinelli would be obvious choice.)

6. Under Secretary noted Makarios in Athens for funeral. British said their understanding was Archbishop intended stay in Athens until Friday but British had offered fly him back to Nicosia via RAF whenever he wished. Greenhill, as own idea, suggested SYG might go to Nicosia to help calm things down. US reaction to this idea was inconclusive. Under Secretary said regardless of what was done, summit meeting nevertheless was not in conflict with any UN moves at this juncture.

For London: Ambassador Bruce should press British on immediate summit as political deterrent to Turkish action.4

For Nicosia and Athens: You should convey to Makarios and Papandreou andClerides our judgment that Turks are serious, and that immediate turning off of violence is essential.5 Note that Greek Cypriots demonstrated during entire period of Security Council session that they had sufficient control to insure relative absence of bloodshed on Island.

For Paris USRO: Ambassador Finletter may inform Stikker of developments stressing that it is for his personal information only and not for NATO action.

For Ottawa: Press Canadians for immediate action moving troops toward Cyprus.Martin said he would let us know through Embassy Ottawa what action being taken.6

Rusk

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Cleveland, cleared by Burdett, and approved by Jernegan. Also sent to the White House, JCS, and CIA.

2 Dated March 12. Hare reported that the Turkish Government had sent an ultimatum to the Cypriot Government to impose an immediate cease-fire or face unilateral intervention by Turkey. (Ibid.)

3 The text of the Turkish message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 1161 from Ankara, March 13. (Ibid.)

4 In telegram 4474 from London, March 13, Bruce reported that the British Government did not think a Greek-Turkish summit meeting would prove useful. (Ibid.)

5 In telegram 1392 from Athens, March 13, Labouisse reported that Costopoulos was irritated with the Turkish action but had cautioned moderation on the Cypriot Government. (Ibid.) In telegram 956 from Nicosia, March 13, Belcher reported that Acting President Clerides stated that every effort was being made to secure a cease-fire. (Ibid.)

6 Telegram 1196 from Ottawa, March 13, recommended inviting the Canadian Government to any peace conference on Cyprus. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 26


26. National Security Action Memorandum No. 2861

Washington, March 12, 1964.

·         TO

·         The Secretary of State

·         The Secretary of Defense

·         The Director, Bureau of the Budget

·         SUBJECT

·         United Nations Cyprus Force

The President has decided that the U.S. will provide troop airlift free of cost to the United Nations where countries contributing forces to the United Nations Cyprus Force are unable to furnish their own transportation. The President expects that this particular airlift will be absorbed within the airlift capability of the Department of Defense and that no additional funds will be required by the Department.

McGeorge Bundy2

1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Cyprus. Confidential. A copy was sent to Komer.

2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 27


27. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1

Nicosia, March 23, 1964, 9 p.m.

1015. During discussion this morning, Makarios reviewed recent political and military developments. Makarios thought that peak of crisis had passed, that worst difficulties were behind him and that, although further troubles could be expected, situation would improve from now on. Discussion of political and military situation revolved around three aspects:

1. Creation and establishment of PKF in Cyprus: PKF was now settled. It would become clear during next two weeks whether it would be successful or not. PKFcooperation with GOC and nature of its terms of reference were essential to success.

2. Mediator: Makarios said name of Sakari Severi Tuomioja had been suggested.Tuomioja was agreeable to GOC, Greece and Britain.2 He had not yet heard whether he was acceptable to Turkey. Makarios said he was “pessimistic mediation would soon result in political settlement.” It depended on whether Turkish Cypriots would be willing to return to their villages and not insist on some form of partition or federation. Success or failure of Mediator would begin to emerge within one month.

3. Return of Greek and Turkish Cypriots to their homes and jobs: Some estimates were that there were now 6,000 displaced Greek Cypriots and 45,000 or 50,000 Turkish Cypriots and it was estimated former would increase to 20,000 and latter to 80,000 within next month or so. Makarios thought these estimates high, but nevertheless figures were substantial for Cyprus. It was important all Cypriots, especially Turkish Cypriots, have confidence in government and return to their homes and jobs. Makarios hoped those Turkish Cypriots who did not wish to do so might go to Turkey.

He said GOC would assist all Cypriots, including Turkish Cypriots, in various necessary ways to return to their homes and jobs. Cost of rebuilding homes would be formidable. Makarios hoped international financial assistance would be available. GOC had been losing one million pounds monthly in income during recent troubles and he hoped it would soon be possible resume development program.

I said attitude of GOC toward needy Cypriots, including Turkish Cypriots, was most statesmanlike and would indicate to world GOC was ready to take care of all of its people rather than only one segment.

I added I had been disappointed, following my return from US, to read articles in Greek Cypriot press indicating US activities were being curtailed and Greek Cypriots being let go for purpose of bringing economic pressure on GOC. This type of analysis was wholly inaccurate. I wished to assure him there had been no change in attitude of USG toward Cyprus and that we continued ready to help Cyprus with its economic development as we could within scope of our resources.

It had been necessary to suspend some programs such as Peace Corps and to curtail others such as technical assistance for time being because American staff could not function in many parts of Cyprus because of present difficulties and because Greek Cypriot press continued to foment anti-Americanism by charging that US was pro-Turkish. Fact of matter was US was not only friendly to Turkey, but also to Greece and to Britain and especially to Cyprus. I hoped Makarios would use his influence with press to explain true American attitude and thus bring stop to this unfriendly criticism which might have unsettling effect on friendly relations which had been built up between US and Cyprus over years.

Makarios said he understood true situation and realized US had always been friendly to Cyprus. Makarios ducked issue of Greek Cypriot press by saying American press (especially Christian Science Monitor) seemed to be unfriendly to Cyprus. I commented it was not exactly fair comparison. Greek Cypriot press might be expected to respond to suggestions from him more readily than American press would respond to suggestions from us.

Wilkins

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD,CIA, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.

2 Secretary-General Thant announced Tuomioja’s appointment on March 25. For text of the statement, see U.N. Doc. S/5625 and Corr. 1.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 28


28. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus1

Washington, March 28, 1964, 2:54 p.m.

699. Ankara’s 1254 to Dept; Nicosia’s 1035 to Dept; Nicosia’s 1039 to Dept.2Agree with Embassy Nicosia’s conclusion reftel that Makarios’ action in appointing acting ministers to replace Turks designed underscore Turk non-participation and strengthen formal GOC control Turkish-allocated ministries. This connection, Cyprus UN PermRep Rossides has informed SC President that civil servants who “deliberately refuse report to office” could not expect “continue indefinitely be paid out of public funds”.

Timing these Greek-Cypriot tactics is interesting. Makarios apparently fully understands that (1) Turk-Cypriots could strengthen their case and weaken his by participation, (2) that such participation was not likely while security forces were primarily GOC and British, and (3) that formal establishment UNFICYP is strategic moment for Kutchuk to insist on participation. He appears to have made moves re Denktash and acting minister appointments to goad Turks into frittering away energies in protests and legal arguments until opportunity has passed. Makarios’ tactics will probably succeed if Turk-Cypriots continue to sit on hands and feel sorry for themselves.

If Kutchuk would return to his office because of UN presence, he could be serious embarrassment to Makarios. Even if Makarios could insist successfully that all measures of GOC taken during Kutchuk’s absence are legal and not subject to Vice-President’s veto, he would have difficulty not forwarding future bills or measures to Kutchuk as required by constitution. His only effective alternatives would appear to be: (1) to maintain that Kutchuk was rebel who tried to set up separate Turk-Cypriot administration and therefore had lost authority in government (difficult argument to sustain if GOC has, as it claims, been sending invitations to Kutchuk and other Turk-Cypriot officials to attend scheduled meetings) or (2) to maneuver Turk-Cypriots into holding back from participation until too late.

He appears to be operating under second alternative. With each passing day that his tactics perpetuate Turk-Cypriots boycott of government, he increases general acceptance GOC as presently constituted, strengthens his contention that Turk-Cypriots are insurgents and weakens ability UN to remain neutral between two communities.

In this connection, British Embassy informs us GOT has asked HMG to intercede with Makarios and protest to UNSYG on behalf Denktash. HMG has informed GOTBritish forces Cyprus part of UNFICYP and they cannot make independent intercessions with GOC. (FYI. UKUN, however, has been instructed to call Denktash problem to attention SYG on humanitarian grounds. End FYI.) Turk Embassy informed Dept of GOT concern re Denktash but made no request forUSUN action and Dept plans none.

For Nicosia: Explore problem with UK HICOM and in your discretion reiterate points made in Deptel 6683 to Kutchuk and Turk-Cypriot leaders as to advantage renewed participation government. Re Rossides claim regarding payments, would appreciate clarification on situation since other reports indicate Turks paying relief because no salaries paid by GOC to absentee Turk-Cypriots.4

For Ankara: In your discretion, discuss Turk-Cypriot non-participation further with GOT. We would be interested any indications GOT is planning or willing actively push Turk-Cypriot leadership into participation.5

Rusk

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Drafted byGordon D. King; cleared by NEA, UNP, and BNA; and approved by Jernegan. Also sent to Ankara and repeated to Athens, London, and USUN.

2 Telegram 1254 from Ankara, March 27, reported Turkish press reaction to Makarios’ refusal to permit Denktash to return to Cyprus. (Ibid.) Telegram 1035 from Nicosia, March 27, reported that Makarios’ appointment of “temporary” ministers appeared to avoid violation of the Cypriot Constitution. (Ibid., POL 15 CYP) Telegram 1039 from Nicosia, March 28, reported negative Turkish Cypriot reaction to Makarios’ actions. (Ibid.)

3 Telegram 668 to Nicosia, March 18, stressed the need to get Turkish Cypriot support for UNFICYP. (Ibid., POL 23–8 CYP)

4 In telegram 1051 from Nicosia, April 1, the Embassy reported the British believed that Turkish Cypriot leaders preferred partition as a solution and would avoid returning to the Cabinet. It also reported that Turkish Cypriot civil servants who failed to report to work were not being paid. (Ibid.)

5 In telegram 1278 from Ankara, the Embassy reported Turkish assurances that they were urging Turkish Cypriot Ministers to rejoin meetings of the Makarios government. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 29


29. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1

Nicosia, April 7, 1964, 3 p.m.

1078. Cyprus mediation. Deptel 707.2 Department may recall that during 1959 Constitution-drafting period I was reporting from Nicosia that Rube Goldberg contraption could work, but only given magnanimity on part of Greeks and good will from all.

So much has happened since then to show that neither quality has many exponents on this unhappy island that another attempt at a patchwork solution can only breed further trouble. Situation obviously calls for drastic action involving major effort by NATO allies to support solution based on security needs of area, but also recognizing generally accepted democratic principle of majority rule.

Our own ideas as to once-for-all (para 5 Deptel 707) solution somewhat like Alexander’s approach to Gordian Knot, although without resultant “partition” as in myth. Our recommendations will require considerable selling to GOT since we are proposing recognize Greek Cypriot ascendancy and intransigence and their insistence on a solution in accord with generally accepted standards of self-determination based on majority rule. On this basis following proposals submitted as outline of plan designed achieve over-all peace and security in area.

1. Constitutional framework providing for one person-one vote majority rule, with elections on basis of proportional representation.

2. Adequate safeguards for minorities (perhaps as with Swedes in Finland).

3. Cyprus to be tied to Greece either by enosis or in some “associated” status such as Puerto Rico. Greece would at minimum control foreign policy and defense, perhaps leaving other facets of government to Cypriots.

Would seem that only through some such device could GOT be convinced that security interests being preserved and safeguarded. Do not see how independent Cyprus with strong Communist Party organization could be accepted by Turks. Cyprus could continue to be “used” in one way or another as shuttlecock in Soviet-Western cold war in the area. Only as part of Greece and thereby included in NATOsecurity system could GOT fears be mitigated. Part of such concept could be transferring of Izmir joint Greek-Turkish headquarters to one of British bases (probably Dhekelia) and UK giving up sovereignty over all or most of area in favor of NATO base on sovereign “Greek” territory.

Whatever Mediator may propose that would be acceptable to Greek Cypriots in their present ascendant position will require major selling effort with Turks, and in this respect Greek Ambassador Delivanis correct in his statement to AmbassadorWilkins (Embtel 1070)3 that US must play major persuasive role—but this does not mean that efforts other NATO partners will not be needed.

Further factor which Embassy considers essential to any lasting solution is some form of assisted emigration for Turks who are convinced they can no longer live with Greeks in Cyprus. This should involve setting up of commission to handle transfer of properties on equitable basis as well as other details of moves, including some provision for compensation for damages. Agree with Department’s observations para 3 Deptel re best course of action for Mediator except with regards manner handling proposals once formulated. Experience with Cyprus “solutions” which presented publicly or leaked in some fashion not encouraging in past and no reason believe one or other side would not act same way now, particularly given existing inflamed and emotional situation.

At very least, believe proposals should be worked out and accepted by GOG andGOT (USUN’s 3598 to Department)4 before being “surfaced” in effort bring international pressure on Cypriots. (This would require support of Erkin’s desire for Greek-Turkish “summit” meeting—Ottawa’s 1270 to Department.)5

We must bear in mind how sensitive is Cypriot pride and how convinced Greeks here are of right and justice their cause—and that they can win out eventually even if this means going to UNGA.

In summary, advantages we see in enosis or “associated” status would be:

1. Tie Cyprus firmly to West, thus eliminating security concerns of UK, Turkey and ourselves.

2. Reduce danger of further growth of Communism on island.

3. End nuisance of Cypriot “neutralist” foreign policy maneuvering.

4. Remove constant irritant in Greek politics and same time weaken Soviet ability exploit issue in Greece.

5. Effect set-back for Soviet (and UAR) policy in area, which is adamantly opposed to enosis.

6. Give us friendly government with which to negotiate satisfactory status for our communications facilities.6

Belcher

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN.

2 Telegram 707 to Nicosia, April 1, stressed the Department of State’s desire for a quick solution to the Cyprus problem and requested comments on the shape of a permanent political solution to the Cyprus question. (Ibid.)

3 Telegram 1070 from Nicosia, April 5, reported that Delivanis appeared to be taking a harder political line after his return from consultations in Athens. (Ibid., POL 17 GR–CYP)

4 Telegram 3598 from USUN, April 2, reported USUN’s belief that the mediation should be carried forward with a minimum of public comment. (Ibid., POL 23–8 CYP)

5 Telegram 1270 from Ottawa, April 1, reported that the Canadian Government was interested in an active U.S. mediation role in Cyprus. (Ibid.)

6 In telegrams 1510 from Athens, April 8, and 1315 from Ankara, April 8, the Embassies reported similar conclusions: that either independence or enosis was the only likely solution to the Cyprus issue and that union with Greece would require political concessions to Turkey. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 30


30. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1

Nicosia, April 8, 1964, 3 p.m.

1085. In conversation yesterday with Acting FonMin Soulioti, she brought up role of Mediator. She said GOC had not as yet made any contribution in way of written draft, although she admitted that two statements by Makarios to govt mouthpiece Cyprus news agency (reported separately)2 could be interpreted as laying groundwork for Mediator’s understanding of GOC position.

For instance, they had not prepared any new draft Constitution, although some thought had been devoted to this. She indicated her preoccupation with certain difficulties involved in persuading Turkish Cypriots and GOT accept Greek Cypriot line regarding “adequate safeguards for minority.” She said it all very well to spell out minority rights including free access to government jobs on basis of merit, etc., etc., but when it came to describing method of guaranteeing application these rights, she ran up against seemingly insuperable difficulties. What recourse would Turks have in event they claimed discrimination? Constitutional Court had not proved effective under old regime and no reason believe it would necessarily be so under any new setup. International supervisory group for appeals would be distasteful infringement of sovereignty and difficult sell to Greek Cypriots. She admitted to sense of frustration, particularly since she recognized how vital this aspect of problem was.

I agreed that under present circumstances of distrust and consequent lack of confidence, it would be difficult persuade Turks that law would be administered impartially, but suggested that there must be numerous examples in other countries where experience of minority problems could be drawn upon. In fact, experience of Swedish minority in Finland might be instructive. I also took opportunity to play on old theme of restoration of confidence in Turkish community by cessation of harassment of Turks attempting to move in Nicosia area. I said I recognized there was harassment on both sides, but with UN here, surely government could assume posture of magnanimity and put onus for continuation of efforts keep two communities apart on Turks. Mrs. Soulioti agreed that this might be useful gambit, but that there had been a continued hardening of Greek attitude towards Turkish community in view of unwillingness see UN open Kyrenia Road and restore freedom of access Iozablesia itself. I commented that I too had noted an increasingly hard line in talking to Ministers and other leading members of Greek Cypriot community.

This took form of maintaining that until such time as there was political settlement satisfactory to Greeks or at least until Turkish community here recognized fact that GOC was undisputed government, there was no possibility of Turkish Ministers or even Turkish civil servants returning to work. Mrs. Soulioti said that she did not go this far, but that unless there was freedom of access for Greeks who have legitimate business in present Turkish-controlled areas. (i.e., area north of Nicosia and Kyrenia Road), she saw no reason why Turks should be allowed come back to work in government in Greek area. (This strong attitude reflects position taken byMakarios in farewell conversation with Ambassador Wilkins and me reported in Embtel 1060.)3

I find it very disturbing that Greek Cypriots seem determined push on with hard line. We note series of event such as refusal allow Denktash free access to Cyprus, appt of acting Ministers, treaty denunciation, pressure on Turk Army contingent all seemingly designed with some idea of “unconditional surrender” and thereby complicating already almost impossible problem faced by Mediator.

Both Ambassador Wilkins and I have preached rather forlornly a policy of moderation and restoration of confidence with Makarios as well as his Ministers.

Would it not be desirable do what we can to reinforce presumed GOG desires to do same when Archbishop visits Athens this weekend?

Following telegram gives our assessment reasons for visit at this time.4

Belcher

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN.

2 In telegram 1084 from Nicosia, April 8. (Ibid., POL 15–1 CYP)

3 Dated April 2. (Ibid., POL 1 CYP–US)

4 In telegram 1086 from Nicosia, April 8, Belcher reported that Makarios’ proposed visit was apparently part of a Greek campaign to pressure him into a more moderate line that would also meet the demands of more pro-enosis Ministers in his Cabinet. (Ibid., POL 7 CYP) Makarios visited Greece April 11–15.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 31


31. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

Athens, April 10, 1964, 8 p.m.

1527. 1. I called on PriMin today at his home to introduce Anschuetz, new DCM.

Conversation devoted largely to Cyprus. I expressed our satisfaction along lines of Dept’s 11722 for Papandreou’s restrained reaction to recent Turkish moves (i.e. abrogation 1930 Treaty etc.)3 and stressed need continued moderation on Greek side, particularly since events moving in Greek favor. I said in order create conditions conducive to ultimate settlement it essential that damage to Turkish prestige be held to minimum and that his cooperation in restraining Makarios this regard would be essential. I pointed out that US had made conscious effort following Cuban crisis to spare Khrushchev as much humiliation as possible.

2. PriMin agreed emphatically. He said that in his recent message to Inonu—which he said was verbal one—he had stated that he recognized Cyprus presented Turkish Govt with foreign and domestic political problems (as it did for Greece), that it was difficult for either country to retreat publicly from respective positions, but that two countries must think of overall general interests in reaching final settlement. Message emphasized importance to both countries of continued Greek-Turkish friendship and that it was essential to resolve Cyprus question in order that these relations could continue. Papandreou said that Inonu had agreed but had commented that Cyprus treaties must be honored.

3. I reiterated importance of preventing Makarios from following line which would only provoke Turks. In reply, PriMin said he agreed completely, and said that he now has established “complete discipline” over Makarios. He asserted he regrettedMakarios’ trip to Athens at present time,4 so soon after Makarios’ denunciation of alliance treaties, since it might be considered “conspiracy” between two leaders. PriMin said his own prestige was now at high point in Cyprus itself. In response to question he expressed opinion that if vote for enosis were held in Cyprus now, it would be unanimously supported by Cypriot public, whereas two months ago—before his accession to power—Greece’s position was such that majority would have opposed enosis.

4. I said I hoped he would caution Makarios about taking any action against Turkish unit on island. He agreed, and said he had already forbidden Makarios to do such thing and would reaffirm this warning when they met. Papandreou said he was holding Makarios responsible for the irregular Greek-Cypriot forces as well as the police. The PriMin said his plan was for Greek unit to remain in its camp (to which it had already retired) and then for the UN to pressure the Turks to do same—in this way, he pointed out, Turks would be isolated if they refused to follow suit.

5. PriMin in his frequent references to Makarios spoke disparagingly of Archbishop. He said laughingly that while Makarios was concerned with personal, temporal triumph, he preferred that Makarios be a sacrifice to “the cause of Hellenism,” following which he would be prepared to accord Makarios a hero’s role in Hellenic history. Papandreou continued that vis-à-vis himself Makarios had lost greatly in recent weeks. When Anschuetz noted that Makarios had met recently with Bishop of Kyrenia,5 PriMin said this was proof of Makarios’ present weak position, since Bishop was Makarios’ old rival, and never in the past would he have consented to meet with him.

Concerning role for Grivas, Papandreou said he preferred not to have General go to island since he would rally support against Makarios and thus divide Cypriot struggle. He said it was essential that unity be preserved.

6. PriMin then went on to discuss his policy for Cyprus. He said that in order not provoke Turks he would not push for enosis at this point, or even self-determination. Rather, he would press idea of “independence” which he felt was principle that no one could oppose. The new character of this independence would necessitate the abolishment of all recent treaties which had been proved unworkable. However, the final settlement should provide full and complete rights for minority, protected by international guarantees. Self-determination and enosis would follow naturally since independent state could take any action it wished. He noted that Krishna Menon, in UN, had spoken against enosis, and that world opinion would be solidly behind principle of independence but might balk at enosis with Greece as part of settlement. By demanding complete independence rather than enosis or self-determination defeat for Turks would be softened and victory for Makarios would be more modest. PriMin seemed to feel enosis would be even less palatable to Turks at present time than solution based on “independence.”

7. Papandreou said he would cooperate with us in policy of “moderation” re Cyprus question. However, he stressed again need for quick settlement, since “time hurts.” He said he had told Makarios, and he would repeat it, that Greek Cypriots must avoid all provocation and that, even if a Greek is killed, not to make reprisal but call upon UN. He emphasized that policy of Greek Govt was “peace” and he would make every effort to achieve that goal. PriMin said we must give full support to UNMediator in his effort to find “democratic” solution.

8. PriMin then went on to stress importance for West of a quick end to Cyprus question. He said it was unfortunate that Cypriot crisis had occurred at all since it had given Khrushchev opportunity to pose as champion of people struggling for liberty, while US and Britain were cast in light of opposing it. He continued that Communists had exploited this fact to hilt, not only in Greece and Cyprus, but throughout world and had scored point in world ideological battle. He noted thatKhrushchev in particular had increased his prestige by supporting the “peaceful way” against Chinese on one hand while posing as champion of liberation movement on other. The longer the Cyprus crisis remains unsettled the greater the gain to international Communism.

9. At this point Papandreou noted newspaper report of a possible Khrushchev visit to Cyprus. He said he was going to tell Makarios such a visit was completely out of question.

10. PriMin said he was deeply pleased by fact Greek public opinion undergoing change for better in recent weeks regarding Americans due to report about change in UN policy towards Cyprus. He said he understood perfectly difficulty of US position, which was to steer impartial course between two trusted allies and he could understand our reluctance to take sides. However, as between two friends this policy could only be determined on basis essential merits of case and justice of cause. In case of Cyprus it was impossible for 18 percent of population in Cyprus to run country at expense of majority 82 percent.

11. PriMin said he was concerned about position Greek communities in Turkey, but he did not think it fruitful to talk of exodus of Istanbul Greeks. Concerning Patriarch, he said he personally would not mind transfer of the Patriarchy to Mt. Athos, but that the Communists were pushing for the expulsion of the Patriarch, so that Moscow could lay claim to world leadership of Orthodoxy. This, he said, made him uneasy, since religion was one of main stakes in world ideological battle between Communists and democracy.

12. PriMin then launched attack against British policy in Cyprus. While he understood US position, he could not understand British, which had been “frantically” pro-Turkish. When I noted Turks were criticizing British also, he said that was because Turks wanted even more support. He referred in passing to newspaper reports that British had undermined MacArthur position against Chinese in Korea and added that British policy could not be trusted.

Comment: PriMin was in great form and did most of the talking in 75 minute session. His optimistic mood reflects the feeling here that the Greek cause is winning out. We believe we must take with a grain of salt his assertions about his control over Makarios until we have more proof of it than we have at the moment. He seemed acutely aware of the domestic Turkish problem regarding Cyprus which I think explains moderation of Greek responses up to present point. On other hand, it seemed clear that he had done little thinking about ways to sweeten pill for Turks if final settlement goes against Turk interests.

We have reservations about Papandreou’s estimate of preference for solution based on independent Cyprus rather than on union with Greece. His policy seems designed more to satisfy Afro-Asian bloc and exigencies of UN tactics rather than to appease Turks. We interpret his solution as meaning that under circumstances, “independence” solution would be enforced by weight of UN opinion and thereby hopefully avoid direct confrontation between Greece and Turkey which would be provoked by solution based on self-determination or enosis.

Labouisse

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia and Thessaloniki.

2 Telegram 1172, April 9, instructed the Embassy to suggest that Papandreou extend an “olive branch” to Turkey in order to facilitate a favorable settlement of the Cyprus issue. (Ibid.)

3 The 1930 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. (125 LTS 371)

4 See footnote 4, Document 30.

5  Bishop Kyprianos, a strong proponent of enosis.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 32


32. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey1

Washington, April 11, 1964, 4:27 p.m.

1076. Acting Secretary Ball gave following response to Turk Ambassador’s request for US views on Turk Government’s intention request SC consideration recent developments on Cyprus:

1. Question of calling SC meeting essentially GOT decision. USG would not oppose meeting if GOT decides call SC. However, we do not see constructive results; in fact, we see risk discussion might be turned against Turks and in particular focus on position Turk contingent. In that event, we are not sure SC action would be a good one, since SC might insist on Turk contingent’s returning to barracks.

2. We have considered whether there are ways in which we could limit SC consideration to debate and airing of issue. We doubt SC consideration can be limited to this. Our Embassy in Ankara indicates your Government has in mind a simple res making it clear Makarios is offending party. We doubt such res could be obtained. At best, res would be even-handed exhortation to both sides and, more likely, res would seek to pressure GOT move its contingent to barracks.

3. As result careful study and appraisal, we suggest following steps as alternatives:

a. that GOT send letter for circulation to Members SC stating its views and reserving right to call meeting at later date;

b. that GOT continue its informal démarches with SYG in New York and with Gyani, with view to bringing end to incidents and pressing UN take action to find ways give relief to some localities where Turk-Cypriots find themselves in difficult position;

c. in view indications that SYG appreciates Turk concern over pullback to barracks, perhaps GOT should make counter-proposal to UN which might be suggestion that Turk contingent move into encampment near road rather than into barracks;

d. USG will increase our consultation efforts both in New York and in Nicosia to be as helpful as possible. In particular, USG prepared press UN see what further it can do with respect Turk localities and villages under siege and to urge UN have its force interpret its mandate as vigorously as possible. In addition, we would consider any other steps that GOT might develop.

4. We see certain encouraging signs, perhaps because we in position get more accurate information than Turk Ambassador in Nicosia and perhaps because of our close relations with Gyani. These include:

a. while it true UN plans use joint patrols employing Greek-Cypriot policemen in Greek quarters, UN also plans use Turk-Cypriot policemen in Turk quarters;

b. UN seeking increase number its forces and to get them in place as well as develop a non-Cypriot police contingent which should contribute further to stabilizing situation. (specific mention was made of Austrian police increment);

c. UN has stated its readiness to provide adequate security for Turk members of Government so that Vice President and Ministers can attend meetings, although we recognize impediments Makarios has placed in this regard;

d. we understand your Government has now received confirmation that UN force, and not Cypriot police, has taken over one road.

Menemencioglu responded he pleased hear about international police contingent. Police force currently monopoly Greek-Cypriots. Constitution provides for 2,000 police force, of which 600 should be Turk-Cypriots. Turk-Cypriots no longer in force, and Makarios had illegally increased size of police force by 5,000 without consultation with Vice President. Ambassador understood Gyani had said he could accept as legitimate police with appropriate authority only those persons who had card identifying themselves as such issued by Makarios. Ambassador said it obvious no Turk-Cypriots could obtain such a card from Makarios and that, therefore, no Turk-Cypriot could be recognized by Gyani as policeman, even former 600 Turk policemen.

Talbot said he assumed UN would not have told us they would use Turk police unless they had plans to do so. (Would appreciate USUN and Nicosia comment on question UN acceptance of cards issued by Makarios as evidence member of police force. If this is system envisaged, how can Turk-Cypriot police obtain card?)

Menemencioglu said his Government very unhappy and worried about Makarios’ visit Athens. GOC seeking Greek assistance in getting Turk contingent off island. In response Acting Secretary’s question, Ambassador said his Government views possibility Grivas return Cyprus as serious. Ambassador continued he personally very unhappy with Greek Government’s actions. He said GOG had at no time condemned Makarios’ actions; in fact, Papandreou had encouraged Makarios by saying Greeks would stand with Cypriots to the end. No Greek has said anything against the bloody actions of Makarios. It is Papandreou, he continued, who brought Makarios and Grivas together. Situation would be grave if Grivas went Cyprus since it would mean encouragement of military action. GOG should emulateGOT action following anti-Greek riots Istanbul 1955 when GOT condemned these riots, paid damages, passed parliamentary res against action, and had Greek flag, which torn down during riots, raised with military honors by Cabinet Minister. GOGhas not acted this way, and has instead closely associated itself with Makarios with result that situation in Cyprus now out of hand. In conclusion, Ambassador said emphatically that Makarios should not do anything rash about Turkish contingent.

Ambassador said he would convey USG views to his Government, which he was sure would be most appreciative. In particular, GOT would appreciate our increased activity at the UN and in Nicosia. He would also hope this would include Athens. Acting Secretary said we have in mind further consultations with Greek Government.

Acting Secretary stated that Belcher arriving Ankara Monday for two-day visit. He believed Belcher should have opportunity discuss current situation with GOT. (Ankara please arrange appropriate meetings with Turk officials for Belcher.)

Comment: While we agree final para Ankara’s 1335,2 unlikely, as indicated above,SC meeting could be limited and directed in order obtain results GOT wants. You may wish convey above position to Erkin. All addressees may use appropriately with respective Foreign Offices or in event Turkish démarche.

Menemencioglu seemed gratified receive alternative proposals.

Ball

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Helseth, cleared by Sisco, and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Nicosia andUSUN and repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Oslo, and Athens.

2 Telegram 1335, April 10, reported Erkin’s views on the possibility of successful Cyprus negotiations. The final paragraph reads: “In this context, projected SC meeting, despite our reservations, might be used to advantage if properly directed and also afford appropriate opportunity for us to reassert our interest.” (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 33


33. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations1

Washington, April 14, 1964, 7:08 p.m.

2670. Re Cyprus. For USUN: Following aspects of Cyprus situation give cause for concern. In view seriousness of problem, including current reports Turkish contingent under fire, request you raise matter directly with SYG. (Nicosia’s 11142just received reinforces this concern.)

1. While Dept considers Aide-mémoire (S/5653)3 issued by SYG generally good directive to UN Force, we both surprised and concerned by that section which deals with reaction of UNFICYP when unit arrives at scene of actual conflict. As we understand para, it would in effect give both parties veto over effective UNFICYPaction in circumstances described. Either side could refuse interposition of UNForce, and whoever enjoyed advantage at time likely do so, thereby nullifying UN’s peacekeeping potential. We disagree with Narasimhan’s view that UNFICYPmandate less broad than that of UNOC. March 4 Resolution calls upon UN Force prevent recurrence fighting and contribute to restoration and maintenance law and order and return normal conditions. Certainly this mandate sufficiently broad permit UNFICYP unit commanders insist on cease-fire and, if this refused, interpose force between combatants or take any other action necessary end fighting. We recall that Bunche explicitly envisaged this possibility in conversation with Yost March 16. (Urtel 3400)4

We understand, of course, that document having been made public, it not feasible get it modified on public record in near future. We would hope, however, that in actual practice UNFICYP will exert every reasonable effort in stopping violence. Perhaps this could be accomplished by insuring that Gyani encouraged interpret liberally phrase interposition should not “normally” be done if not acceptable to those involved in conflict. It is for him to determine what is norm for situation. At minimum he should be given to understand he has broad flexibility in interpreting force directive. Should be emphasized to Thant that, if UN Force action limited as in para cited above, this would practically give Greek Cypriots carte blanche to bring Turk Cypriot community to its knees since they enjoy such numerical superiority. Clearly this is not intent of SC res.

(Dept notes Rolz-Bennett statement UNFICYP directives stronger than those of UKForce. This does not appear to square with our understanding of role UK troops during Limassol and Ktima episodes and explicit UK authority to fire on individuals crossing truce line in Nicosia. You may wish check this with UKUN.)

2. Dept disturbed also by almost daily eruptions fighting in Cyprus and fact that Greek Cypriot forces apparently continue move about at will in their campaign against Turk Cypriots. These forces today estimated to number 15,000, or more than twice planned strength of UNFICYP. (Rolz-Bennett assertion UN Force now at 7,000 does not agree with our figures which place operational strength at less than 5,500.) We recognize impracticability seeking disarm Greek Cypriot forces. We believe, however, that unless they are soon disbanded or otherwise stopped from continuing their campaign against Turk Cypriots, UNFICYP will not be able successfully carry out its mission. We believe Makarios cannot be permitted floutSC res and intent by continuing maintain or utilize what amounts to small army of armed guerrillas. GOC accepted terms of SC res and should be held to them. We think that Thant should make an appeal to Makarios, either publicly or privately. There is urgent need as deterrent, lest situation get out of hand, for some concrete step by UN demonstrating its intent take vigorous action.

As you note (USUN 3719),5 Ankara becoming disillusioned with UN role in Cyprus, and we can expect further protests from GOT unless UN acts effectively re guerrilla force. Dept would make same points re Turk irregulars but would be unrealistic call for their disbandment while numerically superior Greek Cypriots move about with impunity. We recognize number of recent incidents actually provoked by Turk Cypriots, but feel burden of evidence makes clear Greek Cypriot intention bend Turk Cypriots to their will.

3. We note (USUN’s 3719) that SYG is continuing his efforts bring Greek and Turkish contingents under Gyani’s command and Eralp statement GOT would accept this provided Turk contingent not ordered to return to barracks. We see immediate problem as need to move Turk contingent from Kyrenia road area making it possible open this road to regular traffic. We understand UN prepared assure GOT that road, which runs through Turk business and residential areas, would be patrolled by UN Force and not Greek Cypriot police. We can appreciate SYG’s unwillingness publicly accept any conditions to placing contingent under UN command. We feel might accomplish this through suggestion you have already made, i.e., that contingent not be asked return to barracks but be permitted encamp in location which would clear Kyrenia road without forcing GOT lose face by appearing bow to UN request which essentially same as that made by Makarios on March 29 prior to repudiating Treaty of Alliance.

Dept feels it important that problem of Turk contingent be resolved quickly. Ankara has put Makarios on notice that any move against contingent would bring vigorous response. Although GOG appears understand serious consequences any incident involving contingent and has probably made this clear to Makarios, there is always possibility fractious Greek Cypriot irregulars who not completely controllable may provoke situation to which Ankara would feel called on react.

Please also suggest that SYG defer publication next report to SC if possible untilGOT responds to our suggestions re putting its contingent under Gyani.

Request you inform Eralp of efforts we making with UN and urge he strongly recommend to Ankara that GOT adopt liberal attitude toward placing Turkish contingents under UN command.

For Ankara: You authorized inform GOT we making repeated demarches with UNin effort assure that SC res of March 4 equitably implemented and that Turks on Cyprus given fair play. With GOT suggest you stress generally satisfactory nature of force directive, which Eralp has also recognized (see USUN’s tel 3719).

In addition to standard urging that Turks do nothing rash now that UNFICYPnearing full effectiveness, you should strongly urge GOT agree give serious consideration to making counter proposals re location of Turk force which mentioned to Turk Ambassador Saturday by Acting Secretary Ball.6 There may be other ways that Turks can develop to put force under Gyani without requiring it return barracks.

For Nicosia: Request you maintain particularly close contact with Turkish Ambassador in effort improve his reporting to Ankara.

Would also appreciate your evaluation of performance of UN Force during most recent incidents.

Ball

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Drafted byBuffum and Moffitt, cleared by Jernegan and Sisco, and approved by Sisco. Also sent to Ankara and Nicosia and repeated to London, Athens, Stockholm, Dublin, Ottawa, Helsinki, Copenhagen, and to USDOCOSouth (Naples) for POLAD.

2 Telegram 1114 from Nicosia, April 14, transmitted the “terms of reference” forUNFICYP. (Ibid.)

3 Dated April 10; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 573–575.

4 Telegram 3400 from USUN, March 16, reported the intention of U.N. officials to interpose UNFICYP troops between the factions in Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)

5 Telegram 3719 from USUN, April 13, reported the U.N. estimate of the military situation on Cyprus and on subsequent discussions of Yost with Turkish officials. (Ibid.)

6 See Document 32.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 34


34. Telegram From the Military Attaché in Turkey to the Department of the Army1

Ankara, April 16, 1964, 1645Z.

C–92. No foreign dissem except Canada and UK. DA for ACSI. Pass to State. On occasion Turkish party for US National War College students, ARMA had following conversation with General Sunalp, TGS Operations Chief. Resuming where he left off in conversation reported my C–84 airgram,2 Sunalp stated Turks not concerned about Cypriot real estate and although they abhorred continued killing Turk Cypriots, their major preoccupation danger from highly effective Cypriot Communist organization. GOT policy now to be that this essentially a Turk-Greek matter and that GOT approach will be put all possible pressure on GOG. When I protested that this likely drive the two nations farther apart rather than facilitate mutually acceptable solution Cyprus, he replied that to contrary due centuries of experience with Greeks, Turks regard this as only method force Greeks collaborate. He likened Greece to house cat which would defy man until forced in corner from which no escape where man could pin it down and if necessary kill it. Current series of GOT anti-Greek actions designed force Greece into this corner. He protested that from the outset Turks had tried to get the Greeks to solve the problem jointly with Turkey without avail and present measures seem only solution. I remarked that Turkey’s much publicized preparations for amphibious operations had seemed to me to have exactly the opposite effect and that in fact, the Greeks had shown no indication of willingness cooperate but rather favor a withdrawal even when they expressed greatest concern over reported exchange of Turkish troops for border guards in Thrace. He replied that Turkey would not move into northern Greece in any case as such an operation would have no value for them. He said he felt that should the Turks undertake a military operation, it might very possibly be against one of the Greek islands. In further development of the theme that Turks must have some sort of a face saving solution before too long and that if the US does not take steps to assist in the realization of such a solution, Turkey will do so herself, he said somewhat ominously “I tell you that there will be action—maybe tomorrow, maybe next week, maybe next month, but there will be action”.

Comment:

1. General response Turkish senior officers (notably Admiral Eyiceoglu, J–2) (General Atalay, J–3) to queries War College students on Cyprus situation was one of continuation Turk military feeling close affinity US military, nor was there any indication this feeling would diminish despite political developments. One gets the impression that all briefed and reiterating same party line and that in fact, Turks desperately seeking any measures reach solution to the problem without too much loss of face and still hoping against hope US will be able assist. Sunalp’s remarks probably part of larger design scare us into doing something to keep Turks from taking action inimical to NATO interests. We assessed earlier threats to conduct amphibious operation on Cyprus as same technique and they may be trying it once again.

2. Both Atalay and Sunalp depart Ankara 19 April for CENTO conference Washington. Both speak excellent English and this might provide good opportunity further exploitation these sources.

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated toDIA, USCINCEUR, USAREUR, USDOCOSouth (Naples), USDOCOLandSouth (Izmir), Nicosia, Athens, and the Department of State. The source text is the Department of State copy.

2 Not found.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 35


35. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1

Nicosia, April 22, 1964, 9 a.m.

1133. Tuomioja told me yesterday evening UN mediation effort is at “impasse” following his discussions at Ankara April 18–19 and his first working meeting withMakarios April 20.

Both Turkish Cypriots and GOT have told Tuomioja federation is only acceptable solution. Federation they have now defined as division of island into Turkish area in north and Greek area in south with compulsory population exchange. Tuomiojalent me in confidence copy of memorandum from Kutchuk setting forth “Principles of Federal Constitution of Republic of Cyprus.” Text in next following telegram.2Tuomioja said he received very similar communication from GOT. GOT adamant that Turkish Cypriots are “separate community” and not “minority.”

Tuomioja sounded out GOT views on enosis as lesser evil than independent Cyprus ruled by Greek majority. GOT refused contemplate enosis under any circumstances. GOT argued continued presence of Turkish troops on Cyprus essential for security of Turkey although there no objection to presence of Greek troops also.

Visit to Ankara gave Tuomioja more vivid realization of Turkey’s interest in Cyprus. He seems to have been very much impressed by Turkish military strength and readiness to intervene and twice commented that Greek Cypriots did not know what great risks they were taking and that Turkish forces could sweep island in two days. He also commented favorably on Inonu’s political wisdom and restraint.

Re possible “summit” meeting of Inonu and Papandreou, Tuomioja said Inonu was not opposed in principle but thought way would have to be prepared by meetings at lower level. Tuomioja himself thought such meeting might eventually be useful or even necessary, but felt he should first have more time to explore possibilities of mediation.

Tuomioja discussed Turkish federation proposal with Makarios showing latter copy of Kutchuk’s memorandum. Makarios rejected Turkish proposal out of hand, evidently arguing federation identical with partition and insisting Turkish Cypriots had to be satisfied with normal minority rights.

Present situation Tuomioja described as “total impasse,” with “no light at end of tunnel.” While he admitted all concerned might be starting at beginning positions from which they might retreat as mediation progressed, he appeared seriously concerned about rigidity of Turks and Greek Cypriots and by their apparent willingness to run risk of war not only on island but also between Turkey and Greece. Tuomioja professed to be at loss to understand how there could be such bitter animosity between nationalities who had every interest in maintaining friendship and who have no basic ideological differences. He added that pessimism would not, however, be consistent with his role as Mediator. Citing as his motto for present situation Finnish saying that “the pigs will come home with the frost,” he expressed hope that decline of island’s economy and increased difficulties of living would gradually make Cypriots on either side more tractable. He thought there might be moderate elements in both communities whose voices are yet to be heard. He furthermore took note of value of UNFICYP political staff’s efforts to restore some normality to intercommunal relations.

Tuomioja confirmed that he will go to Athens for talks with GOG next weekend. He thought he might find more divergence between Greek and Greek Cypriot views than between Turk and Turkish Cypriot. He will also go on to London and to Paris, where he will report to U Thant April 29.

He was expecting his political advisor Robin Miller (New Zealand) to arrive last night.

At end of our conversation I asked Mediator whether there was anything we could do to help. He replied “no, not yet” and then added wryly “except to have your government keep persuading Greece and Turkey not to go to war.”

McKiernan

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN.

2 Telegram 1134 from Nicosia, April 22. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 36


36. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations1

Washington, April 28, 1964, 5:38 p.m.

2779. Our sense of the situation in Cyprus based on reliable intelligence is:

(a) That the Greek Cypriots are undertaking the attack on St. Hilarion Castle as a systematic operation designed to test the strength and will of the UN Force. If this attack succeeds it will almost certainly lead to a series of systematic attacks in order to achieve a fait accompli to present to the Mediator.

(b) At same time there is a developing Gotterdammerung spirit among the Turkish Cypriots that may at almost any moment result in a widespread and suicidal violence which could quickly lead to civil war throughout Island.

(c) We believe that events can rapidly get out of hand unless: First, the UN Force moves quickly and vigorously to take all necessary steps to stop St. Hilarion action. Second, SYG issues strong and unambiguous statement calling on Makarios to call off Greek Cypriots. Third, SYG sends strong private appeal to Papandreou urging him exercise necessary restraint on Makarios.

(d) The consequences of failure to act definitively would not only be tragic and dangerous situation in Cyprus; it could discredit UN peacekeeping for future and could well lead to Turkish intervention with all frightful consequences which that would entail.

We suggest you also make following additional concrete suggestions:

1. Urge SYG to send instructions to Gyani to have UN Force exercise greater initiative;

2. If UN Force needs more equipment to increase mobility and cope with situation, it should seek such assistance;

3. Reiterate strongly our interpretation of the mandate based on Security Council Resolution of 4 March 1964; and

4. Make two suggestions contained in paragraph 6 and penultimate paragraph of Nicosia’s 1161, repeated USUN 386.2 You should fill in Bunche confidentially, particularly on Nicosia’s comments re immediate need of high-level political adviser who can be helpful to Gyani. We are glad to learn that SYG’s report indicates UN desires to go ahead in this regard.

Confirming Ball-Sisco-Plimpton telecon,3 you should support Canadian initiative and urge strongly that SYG go to Nicosia. While we doubt SYG will feel he can go at this time, it should help convince him at least take kind of actions cited above.4

Rusk

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted and approved by Sisco and cleared by Jernegan. Also sent to Athens and Nicosia and repeated to Ankara, London, Ottawa, and Paris.

2 Telegram 1161 from Nicosia, April 27, reported on the difficulties UNFICYP faced in trying to enforce a peace settlement in Cyprus. (Ibid.)

3 No record of this telephone conversation has been found.

4 Telegram 3928 from USUN, April 29, reported that Yost had raised with Bunche the issues outlined in this telegram. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 37


37. Memorandum for the Record1

Washington, April 29, 1964.

·         SUBJECT

·         President’s Meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin

·         PARTICIPANTS

·         Foreign Minister F. C. Erkin

·         Ambassador T. Menemencioglu

·         The President

·         Asst. Secretary P. Talbot

·         R. W. Komer

The President, after greeting Erkin cordially, said with emphasis that he wished to commend the Turks on how they had acted with such great restraint and statesmanship in recent weeks. He knew what a trial the Cyprus crisis was to Turkey and how lucky we all were to have so great a man as Inonu at the helm during such a period. “So don’t lose your heads now,” he said to Erkin. “It’s always darkest just before the dawn. Give the UN a little more time to work out a solution.” Erkinagreed that Turkey had acted with “great restraint” but “we must avoid that the bill should now be paid by Turkey.” Erkin said he had told his Prime Minister the previous night how very pleased he was with his talks here and with the US attitude.

The President came back to the theme of how it was important to avoid a shooting war over Cyprus. War, as he put it, solves nothing. Our experience has been that theUN can finally work something out which will be acceptable to all parties in situations like these. But if people start shooting, the whole situation is changed. Other powers are drawn in and a new and far graver problem is created.

Erkin pointed out that so far Turkey had refrained from exercising their undoubted right of action in this case. Now that the UN was there, it was “not possible for us to intervene any more.”

“Inonu is a hero”, the President said. We applaud him and his policies. We will do anything we can to support the UN in working out a peaceful solution. Let’s try everything to avoid a clash. Some solution can and must be found. The President analogized to the problem of our railway settlement. It had taken five years but we finally settled it last week. We salute Inonu and were tremendously grateful that he had acted with such statesmanship at a time when others did not display the same qualities. Erkin interjected that “our antagonist took advantage of our moderation and is seeking to inflict humiliation on us.” The President granted that they were bullies but world opinion would know what they had done. He wished Erkin to tell Inonu that the President was his friend; he, the President, remembered extremely well his visit to Ankara and how he and Inonu had been waylaid by the crowds.

Returning again to the importance of avoiding a shooting war, the President commented that we are worried about some signs of Turkish preparations, for example, the cancellation of leaves. Erkin explained that “we have to be prepared.” The President replied that he should tell Inonu right away of our admiration for him and how we count on his continued restraint. “Tell Inonu”, he said, “I haven’t got a better friend. And I’m proud of your people. We are always going to be stout allies.”Erkin again assured him that the Turks would not intervene.

The President then told Messrs. Talbot and Komer to see what we could do with the Greeks and Cypriots. When Senator Fulbright was in Athens we could send him to Papandreou and tell him how concerned we were.2 Talbot mentioned that we had just urged restraint on the Greek Government the previous night. The President’s view was that we should be as tough as necessary. The Greeks must not humiliate the Turks. We should go in and press Makarios as well. When Talbot commented that we had used up most of our leverage with Makarios, the President’s reaction was that we should use up whatever was left if necessary.

Foreign Minister Erkin expressed his great appreciation for the President’s words and assured him that his message to Inonu would be sent immediately. AmbassadorMenemencioglu mentioned that the Turks had a second bit of good news while here—they had been assured by the Department of State that the US would not support any solution which would humiliate Turkey. The President fully agreed.

As Foreign Minister Erkin left, the President gave him two medallions, one for the Prime Minister and one for himself, as a token of his admiration for Prime MinisterInonu and for the Turkish nation.

R.W. Komer3

1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Turkey, Vol. 1. Secret. Drafted by Komer. The source text is marked “Draft.”

2 On May 2, President Johnson asked Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to visit Athens and Ankara for the purpose of “reinforcing” U.S. efforts to preserve peace in the Aegean region. The President outlined his objectives in sending Fulbright in a May 6 press conference statement; for text, seeAmerican Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 577.Fulbright visited London May 4–6, Athens May 6–7, Ankara May 7–8, The Hague and Copenhagen May 8–13. He reported to the President on his trip on May 15. In telegram 1304 to Athens, May 2, the Department of State informed the Embassy that in addition to “fact finding,” Fulbright would seek in talks with Papandreou and Inonu, “To move GOG to restrain Greek Cypriots more effectively and to assure GOT that its policy of restraint is appreciated and will prove fruitful. He will avoid any impression that USG has preconceived plans for ultimate solution.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/FULBRIGHT) Documentation on the Fulbright mission is ibid., Greek Desk Files: Lot 67 D 192, POL 7-Visits, Fulbright.

3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 38


38. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1

Nicosia, May 4, 1964, 6 p.m.

1189. Saw Makarios and after exchange of pleasantries regarding my confirmation by Senate,2 I raised points set forth in Deptel 807.3

I explained that during my stay in Washington I had been particularly impressed by fact that very difficult situation in island was a matter of great concern at highest levels USA. I said President himself was kept fully informed of developments on day-to-day basis and that he had taken personal interest in events in Cyprus. Said we were pledged to support UN efforts find solution and added that one of most difficult events to place in proper perspective had been fighting around St. Hilarion which appeared to have been deliberate use of force to gain purely military objective during time when all govts concerned had been pledged to carry out terms of SC res.

The President said he could appreciate fact that fighting at St. Hilarion might not be fully explicable to people abroad but that in his view this was defensible objective on part of his govt (Gen Pantelides, Comander of Home Guard, had made similar presentation to me just before going in see President). He claimed that Turks had been extending their positions both to east and west of Castle and that UN had appeared unwilling or powerless to stop them. He added that UN appeared to be acting as “conciliatory commission” rather than peace-keeping force. He asked what might be expected on the part of Greek Cypriots in face of this sort of “provocation” which was not so easily identifiable as gun fire. Quiet infiltration by Turks in effort to consolidate their hold on northern range was more difficult pinpoint than outright hostility involving gun fire. Having accomplished objective of rolling back Turkish forward positions, he had issued the statement claiming Greeks had reached their objective and they had no need to take the Castle itself.

He added that something had to be done about continued harassing indiscriminate fire from Castle into Karmi village. Roll-back helped but probably would not completely stop. (Comment: Turks were extending positions and have been firing into Karmi but Greeks have accomplished more than mere roll-back. They now command Turk airfield at Krini as well as Aghirda and other villages on south slope.)

I said that everyone in Washington had been much relieved and encouraged at recent statements by both himself and Dr. Kutchuk of renewed determination to cooperate with UN in creating a situation which might be more conducive to finding of a political solution.

In discussing need to avoid further violence and take steps restore confidence among Turk Cypriots I raised question of SecGen’s report.4 President said that he felt that this was a very useful report and that his govt was ready to cooperate in every possible way toward achievement of UNSYG’s objectives. He did say that there would be great difficulty with some of items mentioned, in particular reintegration of police force and the opening of area north of Nicosia. With regard to Kyrenia Road, I said I hoped that some compromise might be worked out whereby his govt would not necessarily insist on Greek Cypriot patrols but might as first step agree to merely UN patrols. His Beatitude said he was prepared cooperate on this point but that he felt UN presence would not be sufficient to permit Greek community to use road. He pointed to fact that the road through Kokkina area was presently being patrolled by UN but there were many new Turkish fortifications and Greeks were most reluctant to use it.

We discussed arrival of Gen Karayannis5 and Archbishop indicated that there were two purposes in bringing him here. First was establishment of discipline among various fighter elements in hope of avoiding undirected and dangerous action by irresponsible elements within armed groups. Second was to create disciplined, well-trained and well equipped force which could meet at least for time the external threat posed by possibility of Turkish invasion. He said Karayannis was not needed for purpose of bringing Greek Cypriot force efficiency up to enable it control Turkish Cypriots. They were already in position to do so.

We discussed briefly question of General Grivas with me expressing opinion that it was perhaps better that objective be accomplished through Gen Karayannis because of predictably adverse Turkish reaction to Grivas’ return. The Archbishop agreed but added that in his own opinion General would not have directed his energies against Turks but on contrary would purposely have asserted restraining influence on those elements in fighter group who were particularly anti-Turkish.

Archbishop said he had had very interesting talk with Mediator after his return from Ankara confirming that he had received from Mr. Tuomioja written copy of Turkish position as given in Ankara. He said that Turkish position was so far from anything which could be considered by Greeks that he feared Mediator’s job would require much longer time than anyone had at first expected. He was seeing him Monday or Tuesday when he returned from his trip to Athens, Paris and London and he hoped there might be something more encouraging to tell me when he next saw me. President reiterated his oft-repeated pledge that he hoped work with Mediator Gyani in spirit of cooperation and in atmosphere of peace and tranquillity.

Conversation concluded with reference to my looking forward to an early opportunity present credentials once signed copy arrived from Washington.

As usual, Archbishop was pleasant, witty and the soul of reason. However, I have no reason be encouraged believe he will keep his word to the letter, although I doubt we shall see more such direct actions as that at St. Hilarion unless there is direct provocation.

Belcher

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN.

2 Belcher’s appointment as Ambassador to Cyprus was confirmed by the Senate on May 1.

3 Telegram 807, April 30, instructed Belcher to inform Makarios of both the U.S. concern about the situation on Cyprus and its support for U.N. peacekeeping and mediation efforts. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)

4 For text of this report, dated April 29, see U.N. Doc. S/5671. Annex I to the report is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 576–577.

5 Newly-appointed Commander of the Cypriot National Guard.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 39


39. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

Athens, May 6, 1964, 7 p.m.

1663. DCM, who prior to my return last night acting as Charge, called on FonMin Costopoulos yesterday evening at latter’s request. Pilavakis, Director Fourth Political Division (including Cyprus affairs), was also present.

Conversation, which lasted almost three-quarters of an hour, was dominated by highly emotional recapitulation by Costopoulos of well-established GOG theses on Cyprus question.

Costopoulos began by saying that he was speaking as friend and that he would like to know what is real mission Senator Fulbright. It must be clearly understood that Greece cannot be expected to make further sacrifice with regard to Cyprus problem. Greece had received the visits of Ball, Tuomioja, Stikker and now Fulbright; Mr. Rusk and the Canadian Minister for External Affairs had only that morning requested to see Costopoulos at The Hague—obviously in connection with Cyprus. There is no reason in justice why Greece should be called upon to abandon the basic principles of democracy in Cyprus because Turks are obstructing self-determination and exerting unjustifiable pressures in other areas of Greek-Turkish relations.

DCM replied he was certain FonMin appreciated personal stature as well as key position of Senator Fulbright in conduct American foreign relations, that Fulbright was coming principally reflect deep concern felt at highest levels of USG with regard possibility increasing deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations and to inform himself at first hand with regard to views of GOG. He emphasized Senator Fulbright not coming to propose a solution and that USG strongly supports role of UNMediator in evolving political solution.

Costopoulos spoke with considerable heat and bitterness regarding recent emergency session of NAC and Birgi’s attack2 during session. He said he wantedUSG clearly to understand Greek-Turkish confrontation during forthcoming Ministerial Meeting would be catastrophic and that precise consequences might be difficult to anticipate. History of Greek-Turkish relations did not begin only in December 1963, and in the event that this question became a matter of debate in theNATO Ministerial Meeting, Greeks would be forced open long dossier of grievances against Turks. Costopoulos was particularly bitter in his references to Stikker. GOGhad been shocked hear NATO SYG say that in event of a Greek-Turkish conflict it would be difficult for NATO allies to intervene and that foreign aid would likely be terminated.3 Costopoulos said GOG had impression Stikker’s activities were encouraging Turks pursue an intransigent policy, and that even though as a legal proposition there might not be an obligation for NATO allies intervene, it was impossible to consider that the allies (by inference the US) could stand aside indifferent to the moral obligation support Greece in event of Turkish attack.

DCM said that he was confident NATO SYG not encouraging Turks adopt more aggressive attitude but that Stikker expressing personal point of view based on his own responsibilities to the Alliance. Moreover, Stikker was personally convinced that GOT on verge of military intervention at moment of attacks on Saint Hilarion. US is well aware that open debate during NATO Ministerial Meeting might well not be constructive but that we do hope that it might be possible during forthcoming meeting to create situation where Greek-Turkish discussions on bilateral issues might be contemplated. Visit is precisely in order to avoid intolerable circumstances in which US would be placed in event of Greek-Turkish hostilities that US bending every effort to encourage restraint on respective parties and wholeheartedly supporting efforts of UN Mediator. US believed enhanced effectiveness of UNFICYP, the recent statements of Makarios, and Papandreou’s recent intervention with Makarios would produce circumstances in which more rational atmosphere would prevail in Cyprus and make more rapid rehabilitation of situation possible. USG had been gravely concerned at moment of Greek-Cypriot attacks in Kyrenia Road area that Turkish military intervention might occur. Because of impossible situation which would have been created in event of Greek-Turkish hostilities USG had intervened with Papandreou and Inonu and PresidentJohnson had asked Senator Fulbright to visit Athens and Ankara. Moreover, although GOG quite naturally separates Cyprus problem from other Greek-Turkish bilateral problems, it is perfectly apparent that GOT possesses capability of exercising tremendous pressures on Greek interests in Istanbul and elsewhere. Consequently, we must proceed in full recognition of tactical situation as it exists and in such a manner as to limit damage to Greek interests, to Greek-Turkish relations and to Alliance.

Costopoulos alluded to recent Khrushchev statement regarding Cyprus,4 pointing out Soviets are very skillfully taking position which would commend itself to Greek opinion. DCM acknowledged GOG faced with delicate political problem in attempting to prevent Communists and extreme leftist elements in Cyprus and in Greece from monopolizing strong nationalist role and exploiting deep-seated popular emotions on this issue. Costopoulos suggested that if Greece were abandoned by all of her allies in her search for democratic solution to the Cyprus problem, it would be only natural for the Greek people to look with increasing favor on those who were prepared to support them, i.e. USSR. He also observed that if the situation deteriorated further it would not be British, concerning whose policies all Greeks are cynical, but the Americans who would be held responsible in public mind.

Comment: Although courteous, Costopoulos was so deeply emotional that comprehensive, rational discussion would not have been possible. GOG obviously suffering from deep-seated apprehension that Greece will be called upon to make unacceptable sacrifices (exchange of populations, territory, etc.) as price for Cyprus settlement. There is little question Fulbright visit following that of Stikkerand recent more cheerful utterances of Erkin following Washington talks present themselves in Greek eyes as preliminaries to such a maneuver. In light volatile quality Costopoulos’ presentation, we concur Department’s effort (set forth Paris Topol 1695)5 encourage discussion Greek-Turkish problems through bilateral conversations rather than in plenary NAC session.

Labouisse

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Ankara, Nicosia, and Paris for USRO.

2 At a May 2 special meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Turkish Permanent Representative Nuri Birgi read a long statement attacking Greece’s support for Makarios. Polto 1593 from Paris, May 2, reported on Birgi’s statement and the Greek response. (Ibid.)

3  Stikker made this point to both Greek and Turkish officials. (Telegram 1651 from Athens, May 2; ibid.)

4 In a May 4 interview in Izvestia, Chairman Khrushchev supported Makarios’ position.

5 Topol 1695, May 4, cautioned that continued discussion within NATO forums could further exacerbate tensions between Greece and Turkey and suggested instead thatStikker encourage a direct meeting between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers during the NATO Ministerial Meeting at The Hague May 12–14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 40


40. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1

Nicosia, May 7, 1964, noon.

1201. Embtel 1136.2 Tuomioja called on me yesterday evening and gave quite discouraging account of mediation efforts to date.

In Ankara Tuomioja had found GOT adamant on “federation” which would separate Greek and Turkish communities. In Athens GOG had said it would accept any solution acceptable to other parties and had talked “nonsense” about “majority rule” and “self-determination” while professing to reject enosis. In London HMG had “no policy”, and this seemed to be position of USA as well. Turkish Cypriots repeatedly refused discuss, even on hypothetical basis, anything but their “federation” proposal. Makarios had not yet furnished promised written proposals re guarantees of Turkish Cypriot rights, but would probably do so within week.

Since mediation getting nowhere, Tuomioja said he plans proceed wrap up activities here, at least for present. He intends, without waiting for Makarios’ proposals, to put to both Makarios and Kutchuk certain written questions re measures to guarantee Turkish Cypriot rights. He believes Turkish Cypriots may well not reply. He will give them two weeks and then will submit his report to UNSYG. He is determined return to his post in Stockholm, where he can “meditate in comfort”, in mid-June. There he will remain available if developments warrant further intervention by Mediator.

Tuomioja had little to say about contents of his report, probably because he has not yet finished putting his thoughts in order. He did say that as international lawyer he condemned repudiation of international agreements “whether by Russians, Hitler, or Makarios” and would so state in report. He also seemed be pondering idea of recommending proposal for solution which would proceed from Constitution of 1960 but would give Greek Cypriots more in way of majority rule while assuring greater protection of Turkish Cypriot rights and security by providing for (1) quasi-federal system under which “five or six” areas with predominantly Turkish population would have certain measure of autonomy in communal matters, (2) long-term UN observer role, and international participation in or supervision of court system.

Since he had not yet decided whether he should do so, I urged Tuomioja make concrete recommendation for solution in his report, as this would at least provide impetus for further discussion of negotiated solution. Tuomioja said he saw advantages of specific recommendation.

Asked for his views on possibility of progress on “UN Program for Cyprus” annexed to UNSYG’s April 29 report to UNSC,3 Tuomioja again expressed pessimism and said he would like to be able give UNFICYP Commander Gyani at least some moral support but could not.

Comment: I believe Tuomioja would give considerable weight to any proposal for solution to which USG was prepared lend its support, but I recognize complexity of our interests in this area make it very difficult commit ourselves to such proposal in time to influence mediation. Failing this, we can best assist Tuomioja by redoubling our efforts to make clear to GOT that one cannot in Cyprus, any more than in other former colonial areas, successfully impose any solution—especially an undemocratic one—on population which is prepared to fight, is assured of assistance from outside, and believes it can mobilize world opinion on own behalf inUN. Turkish position on island is being steadily weakened, in comparison to growing Greek Cypriot resources, as present situation continues, and Turkish community’s best hope is to cut its losses by reasonable compromise. Continued smuggling of arms to Turkish Cypriot forces would seem at best futile effort and one which can only lead to bloodier clashes as time wears on with no solution.

I urgently recommend Secretary make these points in meeting with Erkin May 11 and attempt persuade Erkin be more responsive to Mediator’s honest efforts find some middle way. If Tuomioja fails, next round of discussion of Cyprus question will undoubtedly take place in atmosphere even less conducive to reaching political settlement and will probably find Turkish position further eroded while that of Greeks strengthened through inevitable appeal to UNGA where Afro-Asian and Communist support probably assured.4

Belcher

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN.

2 Telegram 1136, February 2, reported on Cypriot student demonstrations against “NATO intervention” in Cyprus. (Ibid.)

3 See footnote 4, Document 38.

4 In telegram 837 to Nicosia, May 8, the Department of State expressed concern regarding Tuomioja’s plans for the mediation and instructed Belcher to discourage any public statement by the Mediator of his findings. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 41


41. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at The Hague1

Washington, May 10, 1964, 3:25 p.m.

Tosec 27. For Secretary from Acting Secretary. Disturbing developments in the Cyprus situation lead me to think that you should probably have some talks in The Hague with key NATO Foreign Ministers, looking toward possible common action at the appropriate point. In this telegram I shall try to sum up the situation as I see it.

1. Tuomioja, the Finnish Mediator, while a reticent man, has given some vague foreshadowing of his thinking. Proceeding from the Constitution of 1960, he is considering proposals that would give the Greek Cypriots more in the way of majority rule. In order to assure the Turk Cypriots of their rights and security, he is toying with the idea of (a) a quasi-federal system under which five or six areas with predominant Turkish populations would have a certain autonomy in communal affairs and (b) a long-term UN observer and international participation in or supervision of the court system.

2. While this represents progress over what appeared as his first thoughts, I am confident that the Turks would not presently be prepared to accept a solution along these lines.

3. While it is not entirely clear what his plans are (and there are conflicting stories) Tuomioja has indicated to us that he intends to put both to Makarios and Kutchukwritten questions regarding measures to guarantee Turkish Cypriot rights. He will give the parties about two weeks to respond. He believes Turkish Cypriots may not reply. He intends then to submit his report to UNSYG. Thereafter he will return to his post in Stockholm where he can “mediate in comfort” until mid-June and remain unless developments warrant further intervention by the Mediator.

4. Tuomioja’s proposed course of action could result in a gravely dangerous situation. Makarios might well make the heroic gesture of agreeing to accept the Mediator’s proposals. Kutchuk would almost certainly reject them. Makarios would then go into the Security Council and demand that they be given effect. The GOGwould almost certainly have to support Makarios and the USG and other NATOgovernments would face the discomfort of having to vote against the proposals of the UN Mediator.

5. The Soviet Government would presumably seek to play a double game of supporting Makarios while at the same time exploiting the growing disenchantment of the Turks. What the Soviet Union is most afraid of is “enosis” which could lead to the presence of NATO in Cyprus.

6. Under the circumstances we have instructed Belcher to emphasize to Tuomioja that he should not put in a non-agreed report. If he feels it necessary to make a report in the near future, he should simply state his inability to reach an agreed solution and indicate his determination to continue the effort. USUN is also making the same representations to the SYG.

7. Even if Tuomioja goes along with this formula, we shall face serious problems in the SC. There are only six weeks to go until the present resolution runs out.Makarios will use the occasion of the further extension of UNFICYP in June to try to put further hamstringing conditions on the use of the UN force. We shall have great difficulty getting the members contributing forces to agree to supply further financial support and we shall be hard put to scratch around and find the necessary money. Troops will be difficult to hold and replacements even more difficult to find. A number of countries will wish to withdraw their units and there is a danger that the SYG will have to reach farther out to less desirable suppliers. We shall have difficulty holding Tuomioja to a longer term than the initial three months.

8. All of this confusion is made to order for Makarios, who has already shown a notable ability to do mischief in the SC. He may make an effort to get a special meeting of the UNGA called in order to achieve an even better forum.

9. Meanwhile time is not running on our side. The GOT is getting in a mood of greater moroseness and despondency and the Turk-Cypriots are capable of a kind of Gotterdammerung psychology that could lead to a blow-up all over the Island.

10. There seems to me only one sensible procedure and that is for the Greek and Turkish Governments to move into the situation and take charge of it. From Papandreou’s talk with Fulbright and from other sources there are indications of an increasing Greek Government disenchantment with Makarios. I find Papandreou’s repeated references to “enosis” a healthy sign. From the point of view of all ofNATO, we should regard “enosis” as a useful component in any final solution since it would mean that a NATO government would have charge of the Island rather than the wolf in priest’s clothing. Obviously, “enosis” would be possible only if some provision were made for those Turk-Cypriots to leave who wanted to leave. In order to make this palatable to the GOT there would have to be some kind of territorial concessions by Greece.

11. I doubt that there is much efficacy in trying to get Erkin and Costopoulos together in The Hague. But I do think that you might wish to have talks with some of the other Foreign Ministers in order to prepare their minds for possible joint pressure on both Papandreou and Inonu directed at persuading them to take matters in their own hands and work out an agreed solution somewhere down the line. Papandreou seems confident that he can bring off “enosis” by providing some kind of a plebiscite on the Island. While a Greek Cyprus would be hard for the Turks it would certainly be better for their interests than Cuba off their shores.

12. I have talked with both Harlech and Charles Ritchie about these matters and have told them that I would suggest to you that you have some conversations in this spirit with some of the other Ministers. I think you will find both Butler and Paul Martin prepared for this.

13. Meanwhile you might suggest to some of the other Foreign Ministers thatTuomioja’s role is to be that of quiet mediator and that they should make this clear to him. Nothing could be worse for our purposes than a report by the Mediator that would give the initiative to Makarios and drive the Turks into a greater sense of isolation and despondency.

Ball

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Ball and cleared by Talbot and Bracken. Repeated to London, Nicosia, Ankara, Athens, and Paris for USRO. Secretary Rusk was attending the NATO Ministerial Meeting May 12–14.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 42


42. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State1

The Hague, May 11, 1964, 4 p.m.

Secto 12. For the Acting Secretary. In my talk with Costopoulos this morning2 he said that he planned to make a statement this afternoon on Cyprus which would call for a stronger UN role in keeping the peace in Cyprus. I have not seen an advance copy of his statement but will relay it as soon as one is available. I asked him what President Makarios would think about such a stronger UN role and he replied “it doesn’t matter what President Makarios thinks about it.” There may be many hookers in his statement when actually made but it might provide some leverage for further strengthening of UN Force operations of a sort which would reassure the Turks. I leave it to you to follow up with UN if the Greek statement offers a further handle to take hold of.3

Costopoulos confirmed that Greece considers the Treaty of Guarantee to be still in effect but insisted that Article IV does not authorize unilateral Turkish intervention. He offered to have this point adjudicated. From Turkish point of view I would suppose adjudication would be interpreted as an attempt to throw doubt on Turkish rights during protracted period. On the other hand, it is just possible that some form of general adjudication as to the continuing validity and interpretation of the treaties might provide a means to put certain prestige factors on ice for a period if adjudication were to be applied to issues of interest to both sides. This is a very long shot but I mention it for Department’s consideration.

Reporting officer’s account of my talk with Erkin will be sent separately.4 After that conversation Erkin drew me aside and affirmed Inonu’s interest in talks with Greek Government although there seemed to be a strong implication that such talks would have to be on the basis of recognizing the validity of existing treaties. Erkinthen expressed dismay over the prospect of a greatly deteriorating situation in Cyprus at the end of the period of UN responsibility and said that Turkey may be forced to intervene. He asked me whether, in that event, the US will support Turkey. I reminded him that the President had referred to intervention as a “last resort” but that, in any event, a direct answer to his question could only be given by the President. I said that situation would constitute no solution and would be the very catastrophe which all of us should now work to prevent. I added that it might be necessary for the UN forces to remain beyond the period of their initial engagement in order to forestall the deterioration he feared. I did not get the impression that he was warning me of imminent military action by Turkey.

Rusk

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

2 Telegram 1136, February 2, reported on Cypriot student demonstrations against “NATO intervention” in Cyprus. (Ibid.)

3 In the statement, Costopoulos stressed the desire of the Greek Government to contribute to a solution of the Cyprus problem that would provide “Cypriots of Turkish origin” with every protection of law. He also stated that Greece would support any U.N. body that would provide long-term guarantees of the rights of Turkish Cypriots. The text of Costopoulos’ statement was transmitted in Secto 21, May 12. (Ibid.)

4 Transmitted in Secto 19, May 12. (Ibid.) A memorandum of the conversation regarding Cyprus is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2397.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 43


43. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State1

Ankara, May 12, 1964, 9 p.m.

1517. At informal family lunch today with only the Inonus, Metin Tokers and ourselves present, for which invitation only extended yesterday and which obviously intended to afford occasion discuss Cyprus, Inonu was model of courtesy and hospitality but burden of his remarks constituted heavy fare indeed.

Inonu began by saying everything had been tried to no avail and future dark. He was at wits end to know where turn. As far as he knew conversation of Erkin with Secretary2 had not brought out anything new and Greeks opposing discussion Cyprus in NATO Council. It was dismal business. He had done his best explain situation as seen here but still wondered if Washington really understood. At times we had seemed lose interest. I said that, referring first to his last comment, I could say Washington did understand matter but action must of necessity be suited to circumstance. If we had been less active for a time it had been in order give UNopportunity function effectively but when its performance seemed lagging we had not hesitated renew efforts.

Regarding what to do next, I said had always been my conviction that mistake to think of Cyprus as just thing in itself and that closer consultation in past between Ankara and Athens might have spared us much of present grief. I realized that consultation now more difficult but, difficult or not, it seemed necessary step in seeking solution. Could Inonu tell me if Erkin might be seeing Greek FonMin in Hague?

Inonu said he too had always favored direct talks with Athens and there had been some hope under previous Greek govts but Papandreou had now elected identify himself completely with Makarios. Talking with one would be same as talking with other. Regarding Erkin, no reason why he shouldn’t talk with Greek counterpart but Greek officials very high and mighty these days and didn’t know whether would be possible.

I said all this seemed be getting nowhere and asked if Inonu as man of great experience could not identify certain areas where effort might be made break through present barriers.

It was at this point that Inonu delivered what he apparently intended be punch-line of conversation by saying that time for persuasion now passed; no longer any role for “the old statesman,” as matter now stand there are only two alternatives, either submit to Makarios or beat some sense into his head by force.

At this point we were called to lunch but afterward I asked what Inonu meant by using force to bring Makarios to see reason. He said he meant military force; it wouldn’t be necessary to invade all of island, merely occupy part of it. This was something Makarios could understand.

I said needless point out this would probably result in Greek intervention, clash between Greek and Turkish forces and possible escalation of conflict to full-scale war between Greece and Turkey.

Inonu replied decision would be up to GOG. GOT prepared in either contingency.

I observed that, if only possible think of matter in terms of surrender or war, obvious that Turkey’s friends could support neither but I had gained different impression in conversation with Fulbright in which I had understood Inonu to have endorsed idea of strengthening peacekeeping function in order establish security which would in turn permit quiet negotiation.

Inonu said this correct and he still felt that way but doubted it would work. Must look facts in face. Service which USG might render would be to make Turkish determination clear to Athens.

I said this still opened no path toward solution and in this connection questioned accuracy of Inonu’s assumption in equating Makarios and Papandreou so completely. Information available to me did not indicate that situation so monolithic but rather that there were various aspects which might be exploited to advantage with Athens if communication could just be established. Furthermore there seemed to be certain change in pattern of Makarios’ behavior recently which might be more hopefully interpreted. Addressing himself to Makarios first, Inonu said he too had noted certain recent changes but now clear from bitter experience that Makarios is crafty schemer and that such changes merely for tactical deception.

Regarding Athens he was also dubious but, if it wished make contribution, it could announce clearly its recognition of validity of existing treaties. If this done and given several years time eventual solution could be worked out. Such an announcement would completely clear atmosphere.

Adverting again to our attitude, Inonu said he had been greatly troubled by apparent falling off of our interest following Ball Mission and also by persistent reports that USG favoring enosis as solution. This now cleared up but he still felt Washington not fully aware of depth of Turkish despair in finding road out of Cyprus imbroglio and its determination to use force if necessary. If I could convey this depth of feeling to Washington and it, in turn, could convince Athens our conversation would have served useful purpose.

Comments: As is usually case, much of foregoing repetitive and even punch-line re time for persuasion being passed and preparedness intervene by force was reformulation of standard theme. However, when this latter evaluated in terms of emphasis on strategic importance of Cyprus during Fulbright talks and of insistence that GOT could not allow Cyprus slip away as had other coastal islands, regardless of whether Cyprus became unitary state or devolved to Greece, there would seem to be strong indication that policy decision has been reached or is in making in accord with which GOT will insist on some form of Turkish presence on Cyprus or right of custodianship as essential ingredient in any solution involving abrogation of present treaties. As of now this is still somewhat dim shape emerging from mist but its outline has seemed to have become increasingly clear of late. If this correct and if—if such policy rigidly held, it is obvious that certain mixes which have been tentatively considered to meet Turkish requirements would no longer fill bill. Admittedly, this still somewhat “iffy” but trend seems increasingly strong.

In so saying I am also mindful that Inonu may have correctly assumed that his remarks would be promptly reported to Hague as background for discussions there. Even so, I should still hesitate to discount them on that score, given Inonu’s reputation for multiple purpose action.3

Hare

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, London, and USUN. Passed to the White House.

2 See the last paragraph of Document 42.

3 In telegram 1563 from Ankara, May 26, Hare commented that while Inonu’s statements were intended to maintain Turkey’s international bargaining position, they were not intended for domestic consumption. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 44


44. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

Athens, May 18, 1964, 8 p.m.

1722. 1. In rereading recent telegrams on Cyprus I have observed that whereas serious thought is being given by us to an eventual solution involving enosis as preferable to “unfettered independence”, this possibility has been linked at time with the suggestion of some kind of territorial concession to Turkey by Greece. As has been reported from here, I consider that question of territorial concession is out of the picture not only for Papandreou govt but for any other Greek Govt. All Greek politicians, govt and opposition, stand as one on this issue. It is difficult to envisage Greek politicians being brought to agree to what could be termed a partition of Greece when all are so dead set against a partition of Cyprus.

2. On the other hand, Papandreou and some other influential Greeks have expressed their awareness of the importance of trying to find something which might avoid or at least minimize feeling of “humiliation” on part of GOT, but none of them have been very helpful in pointing way. Unfortunately, so long as the Greeks are convinced that “justice” is on their side and that the UN will support their view of justice, there is precious little initiative to be expected from them to date. The only proposals to this end which Papandreou has advanced have been (a) his suggestion that enosis would meet Turkey’s security worries by having Cyprus become part of NATO; (b) that a formula be devised for continued UN presence on island to ensure minority rights; (c) that adequate compensation be paid to all Cypriots who wish to leave island; and (d) that GOT be helped financially.

3. This would doubtless be considered cold fare by the Turks, even if an enosis solution should include establishment of a NATO base in Cyprus, manned in part by Turkish soldiers. The only other thing which I believe to be in the realm of realism so far as the Greeks are concerned relates to Greek interests in Istanbul. The sacrificing of those interests, which is in fact already going on, might help salve Turkish feelings as well as providing ways of life for such of the non-rural Turk-Cypriot population as may leave Cyprus. The Greeks would, in first instance, certainly oppose a population move, but this would not be the determinant, particularly as GOT can throw the Greek population out at any time. Moreover, I believe that many Greeks are already reconciled to elimination of the Greek community.

4. The removal of the Patriarchate would present much more serious problem, but should not be ruled out if, in fact, it would help assuage the Turks for loss of position in Cyprus and lead to settlement without more bloodshed. One important politician not in the government has suggested to me the possibility of establishing the island of Patmos as sovereign seat of the Patriarchate, with cession of island by Greece and adequate international financing to create proper facilities. A few Greeks are privately talking of these terms, but this is highly unpopular concept for most. Any settlement involving removal of Patriarchate would have to be most carefully and quietly developed and suggestions should definitely not come from us.

5. I recognize that foregoing does not meet GOT desiderata and may not greatly advance prospects of a Cyprus solution. However, I feel it important that the Department appreciate that in our view concession of territory to Turkey would not be acceptable as element in any solution. Furthermore, in view of increasing tensions within Center Union and strong nationalist line on Cyprus taken by extreme left, it is doubtful whether Papandreou could make any meaningful concession to Turks at this juncture.

Labouisse

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Ankara.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 45


45. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations1

Washington, May 21, 1964, 7:44 p.m.

3018. Cyprus—Hostage Problem. Ref: Nicosia’s 1244, 1254.2 Dept agrees with Emb Nicosia that increased hostage taking by Greek Cypriots, and particularly likelihood that sizeable number those taken recent days are dead, has serious implications for efforts restore law and order on Cyprus and establish conditions under which rational efforts resolve basic political problem could be undertaken. We fear that when news breaks, as it doubtless will soon, that sizeable number of Turk Cypriots abducted have been killed, Turk Cypriot forces in Cyprus may respond by abducting and shooting Greek Cypriots or otherwise lashing out with acts of violence. Hostage taking and executions also fodder for militant elements Turkey and could stimulate further GOT moves against Greek community Istanbul and lead to renewed threat of intervention.

To try head off or blunt these ominous possibilities, we believe would be desirable for SYG call in Rossides and Bitsios and impress on them serious view which he takes of abductions. SYG could launch his démarche by stressing that SCresolutions March 4 and 11 call on all UN member states, including GOC, take no action likely to worsen situation in Cyprus and requests GOC in line its responsibilities for maintaining law and order in Cyprus to take “all additional measures necessary” stop violence and bloodshed. SYG could state forthrightly that large scale abductions which have thus far gone unpunished reflect clear failure GOC live up to its responsibilities under resolutions.

Since we could not be sure Rossides would faithfully reflect seriousness of SYGdémarche, we believe it would be extremely important that Thant impress on Bitsios grave implications of hostage taking and probable killing of hostages. SYGcould emphasize to Bitsios that, given support for Greek Cypriots by GOG, abductions and probable killings can only lead to further deterioration in Greco-Turkish relations and play into hands militant elements on all sides. We would hope Bitsios would get message and that GOG would in turn drive home to Makarios that abductions must cease and that hostages still living must be released.

As Galo Plaza will presumably be returning Cyprus next few days,3 we feel would also be useful that he carry strong message from SYG to Makarios along lines suggested démarche in New York and adding, in accordance last paragraph Nicosia 1254, that GOC has obligation to take whatever steps necessary prevent further abductions. Message might refer to reports that some or all those abducted have been executed, and ask that Makarios effect release of hostages still in hands Greek Cypriots. In light Makarios sensitivity foreign criticism and his vanity re personal image, such message might infer that, unless Makarios acts, SYG may feel compelled make public statement condemning abductions.

You requested suggest foregoing course either directly to SYG or through Bunche and urge that SYG act upon it while Galo Plaza in New York. Suggest you indicate we find abductions and potential trouble stemming therefrom particularly disquieting since through efforts of UNFICYP number and scale of incidents has been significantly reduced and gratifying progress being made on civil side particularly harvesting scheme. We believe would be desirable for Galo Plaza, with his on-the-spot knowledge, sit in on SYG meetings with Rossides and Bitsios; in case of former to ensure that Cyprus Rep does not attempt gloss over this serious matter, and with Bitsios to put in perspective seriousness abduction problem forUN peacekeeping effort and work of mediator. We have been impressed by Galo Plaza’s quick grasp of Cyprus situation. Statements made by him both public and in meetings with Cypriot leaders have, we feel, struck just the right note.

Rusk

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Drafted by Moffit; cleared by Jernegan, Buffum, and L/UNA; and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Nicosia, London, Athens, and Ankara.

2 Telegram 1244, March 15, reported the shared concern of U.S. and British officials in Cyprus about a renewal of the fighting. (Ibid.) Telegram 1254, May 20, reported that the issue of hostages “has been brought to head” by the announcement that 74 of the 91 Turkish Cypriots taken hostage by Greek Cypriots were unaccounted for. The telegram outlined efforts of U.N. officials to secure the release of the hostages. (Ibid.)

3 On May 11, Secretary-General Thant informed the Security Council that Galo Plaza was going to Cyprus as his Special Representative.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 46


46. Letter From the Ambassador to Cyprus (Belcher) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jernegan)1

Nicosia, May 21, 1964.

Dear Jack:

The Greek Cypriot leaders have made clear they intend to use the UN as a forum to press their case both in the Security Council in June and in the General Assembly in the autumn, by which time they expect Tuomioja’s mediation efforts will have failed. They expect to have adequate support not only to get the item on the agenda but also to secure endorsement of the general principles they espouse: an independent, unitary state; majority control; minority safeguards; right of self-determination. If this is secured, they will proceed, with or without Turkish Cypriot cooperation, to draw up a new constitution, have it endorsed by plebiscite, and implement it.

The Cyprus problem would remain, but in an altered state. The Greek Cypriots would have international moral endorsement of their efforts along the above lines, and conversely, justification for continued Turkish Cypriot legalistic opposition to these efforts would be thrown into doubt, particularly if convincing security guarantees were provided.

It appears inevitable that the GOC will seek General Assembly endorsement of the above principles, which underlie our own system and which command the obvious dedication of the overwhelming majority of the Cyprus population. The vote on some such resolution will obviously pose a difficult problem for the USG. The Soviet Union and East Europeans will have no such scruples as we and can pose as the “true supporters of democracy” unless we can find some way to appear on the positive side of the debate and the vote. While recognizing the very difficult problem this may pose vis-à-vis Ankara, we believe it would be harmful to our overall interests here and elsewhere for the US to oppose such a resolution or abstain. To prepare for this likely eventuality, we believe the United States should commence now to plan a policy evolution which would permit positive endorsement rather than awkward abstention. It might be well for us to coordinate such an effort with the British, who will presumably be in a similar position at the General Assembly because of the need to protect their Sovereign Base Areas.

I realize this will have to be undertaken with considerable finesse in view of the assurances given Erkin that the United States will exert maximum effort in the UNand among the parties concerned to see that justice is done and that Turkey does not suffer humiliation. The obvious problem here is the interpretation of what constitutes “humiliation.” The GOT can be expected to interpret this as broadly as possible. For our part, I believe we should from the first make clear that the key word is justice, and in our view a just solution must accord with the political facts of the situation in Cyprus. In this context, we should exert our maximum efforts to see that the wording, specific details and manner of presentation of any specific proposals are such as to avoid offense or humiliation to the GOT. Aside from the proceedings at an early Security Council meeting, I have in mind of course, the probability that Tuomioja will, as a minimum, make a report of his views on settlement to U Thant. As suggested in my tel 1235 to the Department,2 the use of his report by SYG is something we would want to influence.

Aside from considerations of face, the principal fears of both the GOT and the Turkish Cypriot Community appear to revolve around the question of security. To win even reluctant Turkish acquiescence to a Cyprus solution, some promise of security must be held out to Turkish Cypriots and Turks alike. Specific discussion of ways to cope with Turkish Cypriot and GOT security problems would demonstrate our appreciation of their legitimate concern in this area and should at the same time lead their thinking into more productive and realistic examination of practical problems rather than the present immobilism of extreme and adamant positions which ignore the political, economic and arithmetical realities of this Island.

Sincerely yours,

Toby

1 Source: Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 67 D 412, Letters from Post—1964. Secret; Official-Informal.

2 Telegram 1235 from Nicosia, May 14, reported Tuomoija’s views of the likely contents of his report to the Secretary-General. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 47


47. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1

Nicosia, May 22, 1964, 6 p.m.

1265. Deptel 860.2 Arms procurement. There is little doubt that GOC is determined to obtain substantial armaments. Most contacts here, including Swedish and Finnish Charges, agree with our assessment that UAR will be principal source, but financed by Soviets. We have received information (ARMA tel) that UAR-trained Greek Cypriots will be flying UAR-supplied aircraft. In addition, British-trained ground control parties were also trained to fly so they are available at least for light aircraft already purchased. Information received today [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] indicates Soviet Ambassador’s two calls on Makariosthis week concerned arms to be purchased on long-term credits. Shopping list reportedly being prepared by General Karayannis and our informant says “anything goes”.

We agree UN cannot allow this problem go unnoticed and believe best course would be to suggest SYG at least issue strong statement condemning not only GOC and Turkish Cypriots for action in attempting build up forces at this time, but also condemning those nations which furnish arms.

In practical terms, however, we doubt he would get far with such an “appeal”. (Gyani tells me he has urged SYG go further, having placed arms control question at top priority. He says Plaza agrees and will pre-sent forceful case to U Thant.) In first place, smuggling can probably continue largely undetected. Secondly, GOC is apt to argue that as legal government it has authority and responsibility to secure arms needed for national defense. We expect they may put this argument in connection with demand that SC resolution not only instruct UNFICYP to help GOC put down “rebellion”, but also state UNFICYP will be used to defend Cyprus in case Turkish “aggression” unless, of course, GOT will give further guarantee of no intervention while UNFICYP here. When SC does not comply, GOC will probably cite lack of guarantee against Turkish intervention as justification for continued arms acquisition.

Of course, arms acquired under this rubric can also be used against Turkish Cypriots. Swedish Charge Bundy fears this is real purpose of armaments and believes problem cannot be ignored by SYG.

In connection with SC consideration of arms problem, GOC is certain to raise question of Turkish clandestine arms and personnel shipments through Mansoura-Kokkina area, west of Morphou Bay area. Minister of Labour Papadopoulos told me yesterday that GOC was about to insist UNPKF do something to stop smuggling or GOC would be forced to take action. Said both arms and men coming in from Turkey in increasing numbers and UN unable or unwilling to stop. I pointed out UNefforts to stop it would mean clash with Turkish Cypriot fighter groups and I doubted Swedish contingent would take such action. (Swedish Charge later confirmed this.) Papadopoulos was insistent GOC could not permit traffic to continue. He went on to say that Minister of Interior Georkadjis had documentary evidence of complicity Turkish Ambassador in smuggling arrangements and that this might be used in UN proceedings.

Despite these complicating factors, I do not see how we can sit idly by and take no notice of GOC plans to exacerbate situation with extensive arms purchases. Therefore, come what may, we should urge SYG to make representations GOC, as well as to Greece and Turkey, to cooperate in stopping arms race on island. Naturally, appeal should be addressed to other nations as well, and if additional, usable information re UAR and Soviet implication in deals can be developed, statement can be directed at them specifically. (Eventually, of course, as equipment begins arrive, source will be obvious.)

We might also consider utility of requesting NATO embargo on arms to island as in keeping with SC resolution of March 4. This would embarrass Greece and Turkey, but would at least dry up certain other sources. In this connection, Israeli Ambassador says there is blanket prohibition by his government.

Have also spoken to British HICOMer Bishop and Finnish Charge Kawin, both of whom have sent strong reports their governments along foregoing lines.

All this is something which can be discussed with Plaza in New York on his return from Quito.3

Belcher

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, USUN, and Cairo.

2 Telegram 860 to Nicosia, May 20, stated U.S. opposition to the introduction of armaments on the island and speculated that Makarios was maneuvering to lay the groundwork for an agreement with the Soviet Union on arms supplies. (Ibid.)

3 Topol 1822 to Paris, May 26, instructed the Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to avoid any discussion of a NATO arms embargo since it would cause further deterioration of relationships with Greece, Turkey, and the Greek Cypriots without affecting Makarios’ ability to procure arms. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 48


48. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1

Nicosia, May 28, 1964, 6 p.m.

1282. During call on President made at my request, following observations worth reporting:

1. UN SC meeting. GOC will favor three months’ extension of UNFICYP and, despite rumors to contrary appearing in press will request no changes in terms of reference. (Min Labour told me later this latter point still not finalized.) Possibly due to recent unfortunate incidents involving individual British soldiers as well as considerable anti-British feeling current on island, GOC may request reduction in number UK soldiers in PKF. President has hopes that by concentrating British UNtroops in Limassol and Larnaca areas where situation much more [worse?] than elsewhere any further incidents can be avoided.

2. Arms procurement and conscription. Makarios said reports of GOC plans to obtain arms grossly exaggerated in press. Obviously GOC has no need for “heavy bombers, etc.” He had need, however, for fast patrol vessels, but so far was unable to obtain torpedo boats by purchase in West; therefore might have to turn to Soviets. Pointed out that he had now five planes in Air Force, including two helicopters. Said “all but one are yours, none are from the Soviet.” (This confirmed in previous reports from Embassy and ARMA.) We did not discuss possibility of jet fighters or already-reported arrivals of light arms. With regard to conscription bill, President said that bill basically designed to establish control and discipline and would incorporate and break up various private groups such as Lyssarides’ and Sampson’s under over-all control of General Karayannis. Training program would include initially 16,000, but present plans did not provide for eventual army of anything like that size.

Said they had considered expanding police force, but had rejected this as being more expensive than creating small standing army. Said he had in mind force of 3,000 to 5,000, but this might be somewhat larger, perhaps as high as 8,000, and hoped that there would be no need for more in order control situation here vis-à-vis Turkish Cypriots. When I mentioned hostage problem and my encouragement at recent editorials calling on Greek Cypriots to use restraint and not take vengeance on innocent people, Archbishop said he had instigated press items and added further strong condemnation such acts. Said he hoped conscription and new armed forces would put stop to such irresponsibility. Noted also that no further acts committed since his appeal. Added that Red Cross had now found another 30 of those allegedly taken prior to May 11 incidents in Famagust. Said he had askedKutchuk to issue statement on 30, but reply negative and he now would put matter on public record. (We checking this out with ICRC reps.)

3. Apparent growth of Soviet influence. I said we could understand GOC looking with favor on Soviet offers of assistance when country apparently in danger. However, I recalled that on previous occasion he had said that basic orientation of GOC and majority of people of Cyprus was and would remain with West.

Bearing this in mind, I said number of recent developments appeared to be pointing in other direction: Aside from arms question, there had been Aeroflot agreement, recently completed temporary air agreement with East Germany, establishment here of Cuban Mission, and possibility that Soviet petroleum products would be entering island through contract with electricity authority. President said he considered these were minor developments, and he could assure me that he would continue to act with utmost caution re possible entanglements with USSR. (This obviously means one thing to him and another to us.) With regard to Cuba, he gave me same argument as FonMin (previously reported) and he described air agreements as of little significance except that he was hopeful that East German agreement might possibly involve development in tourism. He said he was hopeful that contract for electricity authority would go to already established private firm here, but he thought it would be difficult to exclude low bidding firm simply on basis that their source of supply was Soviet Union. (It was apparent that he was reluctant to see electricity authority used as means to introduce sizable amounts of Soviet petroleum products, but he was at loss to see just how this might be prevented except perhaps through interpretation of bids based on price, experience and service.)

4. Easing of tensions in Nicosia. President said that in discussions yesterday with UNFICYP POLAD Flores re withdrawal of Greek and Turkish Cypriot positions from demarcations along Green Line, he (Markarios) had made radical proposal as follows: instead of 100-yard withdrawal by each side, if UN would take over several posts which he had designated on map, Greek Cypriots would dismantle all their positions. I said this was most encouraging development and expressed hope it would work out. President said he did not see how Turks could refuse UN offer to take over their posts as long as Greek side withdrew completely. (We shall follow this up with Flores.)

Our meeting was in private, extremely cordial and it was agreed we should meet at least every fortnight for general discussion.

Belcher

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 49


49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus1

Washington, June 1, 1964, 6:55 p.m.

885. We seem to detect just the beginnings of thinking in both Athens and Ankara that a territorial quid pro quo might be an ingredient in an eventual settlement of the Cyprus problem. We are anxious that these very fragile seeds be permitted to germinate and nothing be done which would interfere with process. This connection, we would want to be certain of UN Mediator’s plans.

For Nicosia: Your 12212 cited Tuomioja as saying he felt two months be required for him to prepare report to SYG. Your 12353 seemed suggest that Tuomioja’s report, when submitted, would include his ideas on solution but that substantive part of report would be confidential and it would be for SYG decide whether make that part public. If you believe there any prospect Tuomioja will submit report before SC meeting, you requested urge that report (1) either contain no recommendations for solution, or (2) any such recommendations be in confidential section of report and report for public record be along lines suggested in penultimate para Deptel 2890.4

For USUN: Your tel 40965 indicates Bunche appears understand danger of surfacing any recommendations re solution unless there were agreement among parties that such recommendations could serve as basis for negotiations, and that, in absence such agreement, Tuomioja should not attempt submit report for some months. We note also that SYG at meeting with representatives of troop contributing countries May 22 expressed view that mediator should give himself six months and said he would discourage Tuomioja from producing report too soon.SYG also said he felt an early report might prejudice prospects for extensionUNFICYP mandate. We assume from this that SYG would not pre-sent substantive report on mediation efforts to SC or, in any event, not a report with recommendations or proposals for settlement. You requested to confirm this assumption with Bunche or SYG. If you feel there is any doubt on this, or any change in their thinking, suggest you again emphasize to them dangers of surfacing even vague outline Tuomioja’s thinking re solution as expressed Deptel 2890 and your 4029.6

Ball

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Moffit, cleared by Jernegan and Buffum, and approved by Cleveland. Also sent to USUN and repeated to London, Ankara, and Athens.

2 Dated May 11. (Ibid.)

3 See footnote 2, Document 46.

4 Telegram 2890 to USUN was also sent to Nicosia as telegram 837; see footnote 4, Document 40.

5 Dated May 13. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)

6 Telegram 4029 from USUN discussed and analyzed Tuomioja’s proposal. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 50


50. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State1

Ankara, June 4, 1964, 6 p.m.

Critic 2. Immediately on receipt info transmitted [document number not declassified]2 I asked see Erkin urgently and was received at once.

Without revealing knowledge CAS report I said that as result constant association with Cyprus problem one tended develop certain sensitivity to situation and I somehow had feeling something out of ordinary might be in wind. Could he give me reading since I would not wish be caught unaware. Also referred our understanding his assurance to President.

Erkin said in talks with Tuomioja latter had said Makarios intent on pursuing his objectives regardless consequences. Fault lay with USG and UK for not having been sufficiently active and Turk cause lost unless two governments did something.

Erkin then added present situation on island very critical and Cabinet meeting at 8:30 (local time) tonight to decide what to do. I asked if intervention might be decided. Erkin said that possible.

I then said it was understandable but definite instructions warn most seriously against intervention and I gave reasons, adding that I had also been somewhat encouraged recently by reports from Athens indicating Papandreou was pondering some formula which might meet Turkish needs.

Erkin said he had heard nothing of more encouraging nature from Athens but, if there was anything firm, it could have important effect on decision of Cabinet tonight and he would endeavor postpone meeting for an hour in order to afford opportunity for us to communicate anything which we might have.

I then asked what Erkin meant by indicating agreement that we and British should have been more diligent. Erkin said support in Athens of Turkish demand for federation or “double enosis.” This essential and such ideas as exchange of population or giving Turks “some small island” out of question.

Erkin also said he had thought our attitude toward enosis had been clarified in Washington but he alleged have information that American official sources in Nicosia were in fact stating enosis was our approved policy.

Hope you or Athens can give me something urgently which I can convey to Erkin in effort deter precipitate action.

On leaving FonOff I by chance ran into Inonu and approached him in similar manner but Erkin apparently got wind that we were talking and joined us to say he had explained situation to me and would fill in Inonu. I told him make sure stress gravity our concern of intervention contemplated. He said he would.

I have never seen Inonu more relaxed, even jovial.

He did however confirm that situation critical.

Contents this tel must in no circumstances be revealed to other than Americans.

Hare

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Received at 12:19 p.m. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, London, and Paris. Passed to USUNand to U.S. Intelligence Board agencies.

2 Dated June 4. It reported a Turkish official statement that following Makarios’ rejection of his June 3 request for a Cabinet meeting to find ways to end the bloodshed, Vice President Kutchuk would proclaim the independence of certain Turkish Cypriot enclaves and request a Turkish intervention that would occur on June 5 or 6. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 51


51. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation1

Washington, June 4, 1964, 12:45 p.m.

·         SUBJECT

·         Possible Turkish Government Decision on Intervention in Cyprus

·         PARTICIPANTS

·         Turgut Menemencioglu, Turkish Ambassador

·         The Secretary

The Secretary apologized for taking up a matter over the telephone with the Ambassador but since time was of the essence he was taking the liberty to do so. He said that the President had asked him to call the Ambassador most urgently and say that the President is gravely concerned by a statement which the Foreign Minister made to our Ambassador to the effect that a cabinet meeting was scheduled for approximately 8:30 p.m. at which the question of intervention in Cyprus could be decided. We have considered we have had a flat assurance through the Foreign Minister such a step would not be taken and that there would be full consultation with allies. We would find this a very, very grave departure from our understandings and would have a serious effect on the problem of our security commitments with our allies. The President asked most urgently that we urge in the gravest terms that we have an opportunity for consultations on these matters.

The Turkish Ambassador responded that it was very difficult for him to get through quickly to Ankara and asked if the Secretary was also sending a message to Ambassador Hare. The Secretary replied in the affirmative, adding that he was requesting the Ambassador to exert every effort as well.2 Intervention would create most serious difficulties and we consider it cannot be done without consultation with allies. The Ambassador said he would attempt to get in touch with Ankara immediately.

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Drafted byBracken and approved in S on June 15.

2 Telegram 1285 to Ankara, June 4, 1:15 p.m., instructed Hare to see Inonuimmediately, “calling him out of cabinet meeting if necessary” to express U.S. opposition to a military intervention in Cyprus and to “use all arguments in your arsenal to pull them back from any such decision and to insist upon consultation.” (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 52


52. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Embassy in Turkey1

Athens, June 4, 1964, 9:30 p.m.

336. Ref: Ankara’s 500.2

1. We have nothing “firm” from Athens to offer Erkin. Embtel 1812 (333 to Ankara)3 contains confidential report Tuomioja-Papandreou meeting yesterday, which indicates Papandreou still holding to line of enosis. We continue to believe there is no chance of Greek support partition or federation of Cyprus, as apparently demanded by Erkin, although there could likely be guarantees for Turkish minority of Lausanne Treaty type. Other possibilities are those suggested Embtels 1722 and 1759 (318 and 325 to Ankara),4 but even these cannot be put forward as having Greek approval.

2. Required action for moment seems to me is for Turks to tell Kucuk firmly not to attempt establish de facto partition. I must emphasize that if Turks move to intervene on island, Greeks will react promptly and in force. GOT should be left under no misapprehension on this score.

Labouisse

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Flash. Repeated to the Department of State, Nicosia, London, and Paris for USRO. Received in the Department of State at 3:44 p.m. and passed to the White House. The source text is the Department of State copy.

2 Critic 2 from Ankara (Document 50) was repeated to Athens as telegram 500.

3 Dated June 4. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)

4 Telegram 1722 is dated May 18. (Ibid.) Telegram 1759 has not been found.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 53


53. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State1

Ankara, June 5, 1964, 1 a.m.

1598. Have just completed three hour conversation with Inonu while Cabinet waited. From start it was made clear that decision firm as far as Inonu concerned. Only thing wanted from us was understanding attitude on grounds that purpose was to move into only part of island as only way to reduce problem to manageable proportions. We would see and agree once operation carried out. Argument was tough and sometimes got on very sensitive ground with Inonu holding ground firmly and saying not only Cyprus but our relationship could hinge on agreement with Turkish decision. When Inonu made another move to join Cabinet I said was certain what I had been told would be great disappointment to President who has stressed importance of consultation and was only being given opportunity to agree or disagree on single proposition. This could hardly be called consultation.

Inonu and Erkin said that failure carry through as planned would cause great let down and results could be disastrous. Why hadn’t we put questions which could be answered? What would I suggest?

I said what we needed was time make our views known. Inonu asked how much time. I said twenty-four hours in belief that request for longer delay would be refused. Inonu agreed, saying would be difficult call off plans at this stage but that he would do so. He must however stress importance of strict secrecy. This I assured. Longer tel follows2 but this is guts of discussion and is being sent as preliminary report so you can get wheels turning since we shall need strongest and most forthcoming assurances and arguments possible if we are to head Turks off.

Although we didn’t finish till eleven o’clock they asked for our reply by nine o’clock (local time) tomorrow night.

Hare

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Flash; Limdis; Noforn. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, London, and Paris for USRO. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and USUN. The time of transmission on the source text is 1 p.m., which is incorrect.

2 Telegram 1599 from Ankara, June 5. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 54


54. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey1

Washington, June 5, 1964, 12:15 a.m.

1296. Deliver Inonu soonest following message from President:

“Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am gravely concerned by the information which I have had through AmbassadorHare from you and your Foreign Minister that the Turkish Government is contemplating a decision to intervene by military force to occupy a portion of Cyprus. I wish to emphasize, in the fullest friendship and frankness, that I do not consider that such a course of action by Turkey, fraught with such far-reaching consequences, is consistent with the commitment of your Government to consult fully in advance with us. Ambassador Hare has indicated that you have postponed your decision for a few hours in order to obtain my views. I put to you personally whether you really believe that it is appropriate for your Government, in effect, to present an ultimatum to an ally who has demonstrated such staunch support over the years as has the United States for Turkey. I must, therefore, first urge you to accept the responsibility for complete consultation with the United States before any such action is taken.

It is my impression that you believe that such intervention by Turkey is permissible under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. I must call your attention, however, to our understanding that the proposed intervention by Turkey would be for the purpose of supporting an attempt by Turkish Cypriot leaders to partition the Island, a solution which is specifically excluded by the Treaty of Guarantee. Further, that Treaty requires consultation among the Guarantor Powers. It is the view of the United States that the possibilities of such consultation have by no means been exhausted in this situation and that, therefore, the reservation of the right to take unilateral action is not yet applicable.

I must call to your attention, also, Mr. Prime Minister, the obligations of NATO. There can be no question in your mind that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces. Secretary of StateRusk declared at the recent meeting of the Ministerial Council of NATO in The Hague that war between Turkey and Greece must be considered as ‘literally unthinkable.’2 Adhesion to NATO, in its very essence, means that NATO countries will not wage war on each other. Germany and France have buried centuries of animosity and hostility in becoming NATO allies; nothing less can be expected from Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO Allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of itsNATO Allies.

Further, Mr. Prime Minister, I am concerned about the obligations of Turkey as a member of the United Nations. The United Nations has provided forces on the Island to keep the peace. Their task has been difficult but, during the past several weeks, they have been progressively successful in reducing the incidents of violence on that Island. The United Nations Mediator has not yet completed his work. I have no doubt that the general membership of the United Nations would react in the strongest terms to unilateral action by Turkey which would defy the efforts of the United Nations and destroy any prospect that the United Nationscould assist in obtaining a reasonable and peaceful settlement of this difficult problem.

I wish also, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your attention to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance. Under Article IV of the Agreement with Turkey of July 1947,3 your Government is required to obtain United States consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. Your Government has on several occasions acknowledged to the United States that you fully understand this condition. I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.

Moving to the practical results of the contemplated Turkish move, I feel obligated to call to your attention in the most friendly fashion the fact that such a Turkish move could lead to the slaughter of tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots on the Island of Cyprus. Such an action on your part would unleash the furies and there is no way by which military action on your part could be sufficiently effective to prevent wholesale destruction of many of those whom you are trying to protect. The presence of United Nations forces could not prevent such a catastrophe.

You may consider that what I have said is much too severe and that we are disregardful of Turkish interests in the Cyprus situation. I should like to assure you that this is not the case. We have exerted ourselves both publicly and privately to assure the safety of Turkish Cypriots and to insist that a final solution of the Cyprus problem should rest upon the consent of the parties most directly concerned. It is possible that you feel in Ankara that the United States has not been sufficiently active in your behalf. But surely you know that our policy has caused the liveliest resentments in Athens (where demonstrations have been aimed against us) and has led to a basic alienation between the United States and Archbishop Makarios. As I said to your Foreign Minister in our conversation just a few weeks ago,4 we value very highly our relations with Turkey. We have considered you as a great ally with fundamental common interests. Your security and prosperity have been a deep concern of the American people and we have expressed that concern in the most practical terms. You and we have fought together to resist the ambitions of the communist world revolution. This solidarity has meant a great deal to us and I would hope that it means a great deal to your Government and to your people. We have no intention of lending any support to any solution of Cyprus which endangers the Turkish Cypriot community. We have not been able to find a final solution because this is, admittedly, one of the most complex problems on earth. But I wish to assure you that we have been deeply concerned about the interests of Turkey and of the Turkish Cypriots and will remain so.

Finally, Mr. Prime Minister I must tell you that you have posed the gravest issues of war and peace. These are issues which go far beyond the bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States. They not only will certainly involve war between Turkey and Greece but could involve wider hostilities because of the unpredictable consequences which a unilateral intervention in Cyprus could produce. You have your responsibilities as Chief of the Government of Turkey; I also have mine as President of the United States. I must, therefore, inform you in the deepest friendship that unless I can have your assurance that you will not take such action without further and fullest consultation I cannot accept your injunction to Ambassador Hare of secrecy and must immediately ask for emergency meetings of the NATO Council and of the United Nations Security Council.

I wish it were possible for us to have a personal discussion of this situation. Unfortunately, because of the special circumstances of our present Constitutional position, I am not able to leave the United States. If you could come here for a full discussion I would welcome it. I do feel that you and I carry a very heavy responsibility for the general peace and for the possibilities of a sane and peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem. I ask you, therefore, to delay any decisions which you and your colleagues might have in mind until you and I have had the fullest and frankest consultation.

Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson”5

Rusk

1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Turkey, Prime Minister Inonu. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Bundy for the White House. Repeated to London, Nicosia, Athens, and Paris, also for USRO.

2 For text of the May 12 statement, see Department of State Bulletin, June 1, 1964, pp. 850–852.

3 For text of the agreement on economic and technical cooperation, signed in Ankara on July 12, 1947, and entered into force the same day, see 61 Stat. 2953.

4 See Document 37.

5 The letter was released by the White House in January 1966 and printed in Middle East Journal 20 (1966), pp. 386–393.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 55


55. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State1

Ankara, June 5, 1964, 7 p.m.

1609. Deptel 1296.2 Have just returned from presenting President’s letter toInonu who read carefully, said disagreed with certain points which he would explain later but that he agreed with final sentence to effect that GOT would delay any action on understanding there would be full and frank discussion with view reaching peaceful solution of Cyprus problem. Added would present this for Cabinet approval tonight but seemed regard their acceptance as taken for granted.

Said considered it important let public know that intervention postponed at our request and that American Government would assume active role in effort settle problem between allies, and asked my approval. I said unable give carte blanche but would be glad submit to Washington such text as GOT might propose.3

Further details in separate tel but gist is GOT agrees forego intervention on condition we take active interest in seeking solution.4

General Lemnitzer was seeing PriMin immediately after I left.5

Hare

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Flash. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Athens, and Nicosia and to the White House, OSD, CIA, and JCS.

2  Document 54.

3 The White House released a statement before the Turkish Government could provide suggested language. The text of the U.S. statement was transmitted in telegram 1460 to Athens, June 5. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP) In telegram 1617 from Ankara, June 6, Hare reported that Erkin had unsuccessfully sought a joint follow-up statement. (Ibid.)

4 Telegram 1616 from Ankara, June 6. (Ibid.)

5  Lemnitzer reported on his meeting with Inonu in an unnumbered telegram to the Department of Defense, June 5. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 56


56. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1

Nicosia, June 6, 1964, 1 p.m.

1322. Ankara tel sent Dept 1609.2 Latest Turkish invasion threat may well be climax of Cyprus crisis. Our acceptance of larger measure of responsibility for efforts find solution can be significant new element in problem. Whether our deeper involvement was precalculated objective of Turkish exercise or only way Turks could find out of impasse is not yet clear, but in either case we should seize resulting situation as opportunity to be exploited to fullest in effort achieve lasting settlement.

In planning role we are to play, I would hope Dept shares our belief it essential we keep eye on political, economic and demographic facts of life and avoid being drawn into quid pro quo with Turks which would involve our support of a Turk Cypriot solution in exchange for their agreement not to intervene.

June 5 exercise in Ankara may have been designed in part to take Inonu off hook politically and shift blame for Turkish inaction to us. In itself, this is not bad. We can accept that onus, but we must be wary of dangers of going beyond this possibly becoming involved in support of an unrealistic plan for federation or in giving some general assurance of support which could be interpreted as guaranteeing Turkish satisfaction in Cyprus.

GOT has called for us to become substantively involved. In so doing we must play it straight with GOT, pulling no punches in our analysis that the facts clearly require an essentially Greek solution, that partition or federation is anathema to 80 percent of population and therefore politically and practically infeasible, and that the prime problem will be to devise arrangements to give maximum protection to Turk Cypriot and GOT security interests. This is moment to grasp nettle and tell GOT plainly we believe security interests would best be insured by association of Cyprus with Greece—a NATO ally, a more mature and responsible state, and one whose interests are in no way served by perpetuation of difficulties with Turkey.

We can no longer remain on sidelines, expressing hope for solution satisfactory to both sides. There is no such solution. Unitary, Greek-run state, closely associated with Greece (perhaps with defense, foreign affairs and guarantees of minority rights left in hands of GOG) would offer following palpable advantages:

1. It should be acceptable to majority of Cyprus population.

2. It would allow us at least in Security Council and elsewhere to displace solution as defender of justice on Cyprus (c.f. my letter to Jernegan), thus stemming dangerous slide to the left here.

3. It would provide best guarantee available for security both of Turk Cypriots and Turkey, bringing island within NATO sphere and removing motive for further equivocating GOC role re East and West which has so encouraged growth of Communist influence on island.

4. It should contribute to improvement of Greek-Turkish relations, as GOG would have every reason to assure Turk Cypriot rights and reestablishment law and order on Cyprus. Partition, federation or hermaphrodite London-Zurich type solution would only guarantee continuing trouble on Cyprus.

Would seem that situation resulting from most recent crisis gives opportunity for new initiative in effort end once and for all this problem so fraught with danger to US and our allies, not to mention people of Cyprus.

If Inonu accepts invitation or if UK-US consultations considered advisable, I believe situation on island such that I could be available for consultation in connection therewith.

Foregoing dictated prior to Tuomioja meeting reported following telegram, but substance that meeting only supports above thesis.3

Belcher

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, USUN, and Paris for Under Secretary Ball and USRO. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, and CIA. Ball visited Paris and London for meetings with President de Gaulle and senior British officials, and Geneva for a speech to the International Trade Conference June 4–7.

2  Document 55.

3  Belcher reported on his meeting with Tuomioja in telegram 1323 from Nicosia, June 6. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 57


57. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

Athens, June 8, 1964, 10 p.m.

1844. 1. In absence Prime Minister in Crete I had talks with FonMin Costopoulos on Saturday and again Sunday evening and covered points mentioned in Deptels 1446, 1456 and 1464.2 I started by saying the events were causing USG to play more active role in Cyprus matter, observing that Turks wanted this and I understoodTuomioja and Greeks also did, provided this done within framework UN. We wanted to be helpful but needed help from parties themselves—and particularly Greeks and we must work closely together in finding way out of morass. I then made entirely clear how deeply concerned we were about recent developments, and stressed once more deadly seriousness situation to Greeks as well as to Cyprus and West. I recognized that, for political reasons, Papandreou felt himself in difficult position to oppose Makarios publicly at this time, but pointed out that GOG’s open support of Makarios coupled with such things as its failure publicly to protest at time of Saint Hilarion and in connection with hostages following Famagusta had left bad impression and that GOT seemed justified in assuming Makarios calling tune and Greece willingly following. It was therefore most important that something be done which would indicate an atmosphere of reasonableness on part of Greek Govt. I mentioned possibility of GOG influencing Makarios to have talks with Kucuk, delay in introducing conscription, and suspend reported importation heavy armaments.

2. Costopoulos expressed great appreciation for what USG had done. When I said this wasn’t the point, he replied that Greece would like to do something to help, but Turks made it very difficult. Latest Turkish threats were justification for Makarios’ worries and his actions. However, Costopoulos assured me Greeks had urgedMakarios to talk with Kucuk—not under conditions set by Kucuk but just to have general discussion. Makarios had refused, saying it would serve no purpose with Kucuk and Turk Cypriots in present frame of mind.

Costopoulos then referred to alleged heavy armaments imports and assured me that as of present time no deals had been made and the main thing Cypriots wanted was torpedo boats (“possibly three”). He believed Cypriots would stop at that and we could pass this on confidentially, but he added he could not guarantee whatMakarios might do in future. He shied away from conscription issue. He then referred to an earlier conversation and said Cuba not setting up establishment in Nicosia.

3. Concerning the current Turkish threat, Costopoulos was of two minds. I believe he understands seriousness of situation, but he also harbors theories re GOTmotivations which have somewhat offsetting effect. In first place, he believes—as do many Greeks—threat was timed for Senatorial elections—“it would not be first time they have done this.”

But in his opinion, even more important motivation was probably related to Turks’ “spoiled child” complex in which they seek to obtain concessions from USG to support GOT in return for latter’s better behavior. I acknowledge that these might be factors in matter, but that GOG would be making frightful error in judgment if it underestimated Turkish feelings and deadly reality of Greece’s danger. It was only President Johnson’s very strong message and Inonu’s statesmanship that had saved terrible catastrophe so far. I spoke of Inonou’s internal problems and repeated need to find some way of preventing Turkish humiliations. I also strongly urged thatGOG caution press against playing “bluff” theme it has used in past. He said he agreed with what I had said: his govt has been trying to influence Makarios along reasonable lines but there was not much it could effectively do in circumstances.

4. Costopoulos reverted to my remark about internal political considerations curtailing Papanderou’s freedom of action re Cyprus. He said this was entirely true but was only part of story. More important was fact that if GOG did not go along publicly with Makarios, then game might well be lost to the Soviets who were smartly supporting nationalistic aspirations, both here and in Cyprus. Situation was becoming more and more dangerous and only choice was between “a Mediterranean Cuba and NATO” (i.e. enosis). There was no hope of handling the Communist threat through partition or federation. This would only aggravate matters and play into hands of Communists. It was much better for Turkey’s security interests, as well as for Greece and Cyprus, to have Cyprus part of Greece with NATO base and with “Greek Govt monarch rather than someone like Lysarrides or worse in control.” Latter was only realistic alternative to enosis.3

5. I said it would be very difficult for Inonu and Turks to swallow such a proposal and pressed again for some other Greek suggestions. He acknowledged problem, but repeated there was only one sensible and effective solution in Western interests. It was useless to expect Greece to cede territory to Turkey to achieve this end. He did volunteer, however, that a population movement might be possible, although he asserted that movement of Greek population and of Patriarchate from Istanbul would cause extreme agonies for Greek people and it was possible that no govt could approve it.

6. I again asked about possibility of talks between Greeks and Turks to whichCostopoulos replied that talks between Papandreou and Inonu or between him andErkin should not be held without proper preparation. On his return from The Hague, he had suggested to Papandreou that Greek and Turk Ambassadors meet in some unspecified spot for discussions but Papandreou had turned this down at the time. I obtained impression that there was possibility of making some headway on this front and I shall continue probing.4

7. It came out during talk that Greeks believe that Tuomioja leaning toward Greek concept of satisfactory solution. Costopoulos had received report that USUNopposed to Tuomioja filing report of his own views with Security Council. He asked if this was USG position. I replied in the affirmative, saying that I understoodTuomioja’s job that of a mediator and that if he could not find agreed solution, he should keep on trying and should not come out with a personal opinion favoring one extreme or the other; this could only serve to cause trouble at this juncture.

8. At end, Costopoulos said that Greece had been informed during day (Sunday) that Kucuk was about to assert sovereignty over certain areas of Cyprus in expectation that Turkey (and possibly Pakistan and Iran) would support his action by some sort of recognition. His intelligence was that this would take place duringInonu’s absence in the States—probably in next couple of days. I said we had heard rumors about possible Kucuk action few days ago and this had given rise to some of our concern. I hoped new rumors were just old ones catching up. Costopoulos said that Greek Cypriots would have to react forcefully against Turkish Cypriots if Kucuk took such action. I strongly urged that in any such event GOG should use every possible influence to have Makarios refer matter to SC without resorting to force. He agreed and was to talk to Kyprianou about it.

Labouisse

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, Paris for USRO, USUN, the White House, CIA, JCS and OSD.

2 Telegram 1446 to Athens, June 5, instructed the Embassy to urge the Greek Government to relieve pressures in the region through action with the Greek Cypriots and gestures toward Turkey. (Ibid.) Telegram 1456 to Athens, June 5, instructed the Embassy to urge Papandreou to press Makarios for some concessions toward the Turkish Cypriot community in order to reduce tensions. (Ibid.) Telegram 1464, June 6, instructed the Embassy to reiterate that the United States had less leverage with Turkey after restraining it and urge that Greece take concrete actions to lower levels of tension. (Ibid.)

3 In telegram 1845 from Athens, June 8, Labouisse reported that based on his talk withCostopoulos and others he believed that a limited possibility of a Greek-Turkish accord based on enosis and a strictly controlled Turkish base on Cyprus existed. (Ibid.)

4 In telegram 1851, June 10, Labouisse reported that the Greeks were ready to begin secret Ambassadorial-level discussions with Turkey. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 58


58. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to theDepartment of State1

London, June 9, 1964, 6 p.m.

6120. Deptel 7854.2 In as much as Under Secretary Ball did not have opportunity raise subject of reftel with British during his crowded visit to London, Jernegan,Sisco and Eilts raised it today with Dodson (Counselor, Central Dept) and Wood of FonOff. We stressed that while appreciating great difficulties under which British soldiers are laboring in Cyprus, US is convinced that British element in UNPKF is key to success of peacekeeping effort. Any suggestion therefore of reduction of size British component creates greatest misgivings in US. We believe 7,000 manUNPKF needed to carry out mission and are concerned that UNPKF troop strength is slipping below this minimum level.

Dodson said HMG is operating on premise that UNPKF is essential to peace of Eastern Mediterranean and acknowledged that British element is major factor therein. Same time HMG has been concerned about treatment meted out to British troops by Cypriots and at suggestion that Makarios may attempt blackball further British military participation in UNPKF. In this connection, he cited Georgatizis statement following arrest of RAF Airman Marley that latter’s activities called into question further utility of British element in UNPKF, and more recent comment ofKyprianou to UK HICOM that GOC has not yet decided whether British should remain in UNPKF. Dodson pointed out HMG would not wish public rebuff by GOC re British participation.

Dodson said British element is now some 1800 strong. He claimed reduction of British element has in past been geared into availability other units from elsewhere. He said HMG has now taken policy decision that it is willing to continue in UNPKF, but for tactical reasons connected with its unwillingness incur GOC rebuff, has toldSYG continuation UK participation depends entirely on him. By playing reluctant, HMG believes SYG more likely make clear importance British element to success ofUNPKF. Re numbers, Dodson claimed Gyani came up with suggestion only 1200 British troops needed, e.g. one infantry battalion, two armored scout car squadrons and supporting troops. This estimate based on Gyani’s apparent belief additional Irish or Danish troops will become available. HMG now awaiting word from SYG re his wishes on British participation.

We stressed to Dodson that Dept has no information to suggest GOC might seek to blackball British participation. We reiterated great importance USG attaches to such British participation. We recalled two British troop reductions had taken place without our being consulted. We emphasized our strong hope that before any further reductions are decided upon, HMG consult with us. We also emphasized any further British reductions should be phased into availability other units and noted our impression SYG not likely obtain any substantial increase in other national contingents.

Dodson claimed British troop reductions arranged by UK military officer (Bailey) working with Rikhye in New York and seemed to assume matter should have been discussed with us there. He took note our point, however, and we are hopeful British now appreciate more fully great importance we attach to matter and will in future keep in closer touch with us on this one.

Bruce

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, Ankara, USUN, and Geneva for Ball.

2 Telegram 7854 to London, May 29, instructed the Ambassador to stress U.S. concern regarding plans for British troop reductions in Cyprus. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 59


59. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk1

Washington, June 9, 1964, 6:30 p.m.

Operator: Hello.

O: Secretary Rusk, please.

O: Yes, who’s calling?

O: The President.

O: Thank you.

MF: Miss Fehmer.

O: Miss Fehmer, Secretary Rusk for the President.

MF: Thank you.

LBJ: Get me Secretary Rusk.

MF: He’s on the phone.

LBJ: Hello? Mr. Secretary?

DR: Hello?

LBJ: How’d you get along?

DR: Alright with Fulbright, Hickenlooper, and Dirksen.2 I was not able to get a hold of Halleck, who is out of town, and Bill Bundy was up with the House Foreign Affairs Committee. And I will check with them. I haven’t been able to reach them this afternoon.

LBJ: Alright.

DR: But, uh, but the others were alright. They had no problem.

LBJ: Uh-huh, alright, now—

DR: Now, I’ve got a call in for George Ball. Mr. President, I think the problem here is that we need to get him back to be sure that we are all on the same track here and to see where we are going. That’s my concern about that. If he goes to Athens at this point, it could stimulate a good deal of excitement without putting one foot forward. I don’t think Ball is in a position yet to begin to move toward a solution to this thing. And, uh, we, our talks in London have not produced, ah enough agreement between us and the British about how we proceed here.3 I just think that since he now is not planning to stop off in London but he was planning to come right on back, that we’ve got to let him do it even though by the weekend we might want to send him out to the area.

LBJ: Alright. Now what’s the, if you can’t produce it while he is over there, how is he going to produce it here?

DR: Well, I think that …

LBJ: With the British?

DR: I think, the point is that we—that you and he and I and our people working on this should come to a final conclusion on what we ought to shoot for. And there is not a conclusion on that at the moment, and the conclusion that they have been talking about in London is something that will almost guarantee the Turks would intervene and this is what concerns me.

LBJ: Uh-huh.

DR: We’re not giving the Turks enough of a break here in the kind of solution that they have been talking about—in London.

LBJ: Well, is it necessary for him to get back here to do that? Is he an integral part of our—?

DR: Oh, I think that it would be extremely helpful to me because he is our most experienced man on this problem.

LBJ: Uh-huh.

DR: And he could take a real leadership on it.

LBJ: I think it’s a lot bigger problem to send him after he gets back over there than let him go while he’s there, don’t you?

DR: Uh-huh, well—

LBJ: It looks like it’s just a routine thing, if he’s there now. He’s been touring all over the continent.4 But ah—

DR: There’s another piece of information on this. The Greek Cypriot Prime Minister5 has just arrived in New York to ask for a Security Council meeting on this subject, so that is likely to take the play away from other matters here for a brief time.

LBJ: Uh-huh. Well, is that good?

DR: Ah, I think so, sir. I—

LBJ: Looks like we need some time to get some solutions, don’t we?

DR: I think we do need some time here. This is one of the most—

LBJ: I’ll defer to your judgment. If I were Secretary of State, I’d send him to Greece and say, “Now, Mr. Prime Minister, here is what happened. We were notified that they were going in and invade that night. We prevailed on them not to do it. We don’t think that things are going as they ought to there and we are very concerned about what’s going to happen so we—our people are concerned. And we appeal to you to exercise whatever influence you’ve got with Makarios to try to let the United Nations work this thing out for you instead of shooting at them and arresting them and capturing them and running off with them. And we just think that if you don’t take some leadership here and move in, as we had to move in with Turkey, that this is going to be a very bloody bath.” And now I don’t know what other specific proposals other than urging him to do that, but it seems to me, then that would give us something to say to the Turks that we’ve made an appeal to them and personally sent our man. Now if you think that he ought to come back before he does that, why—

DR: I think that if you said that to the Greek Ambassador when he brings you that message,6 that would be, that would have the greatest weight and influence in Athens. But let me talk to George Ball and get his judgment on this point.

LBJ: Alright. Ok. That’s good. And I don’t think, though, that Inonu is going to think that’s much—for me to talk to this little ambassador here.

DR: Uh-huh.

LBJ: I think that if he thinks that this man has crossed the waters and gone to Athens and put the heat on them just like we put the heat on the Turks, that he’ll think we are sincere and genuine and we’re really working at it and not going to sleep on it.

DR: Yes. Now there is a press report out of Ankara that Inonu is replying and conditionally accepting your invitation.

LBJ: Uh-huh.

DR: I don’t know what that kind of press leak means, but if he were to come here in the next few days, I think that would be an important step.

LBJ: Well, I look at it the other way. I think that the last thing we want him to do is let me be the peacemaker and later wind up on my lap. I think we ought to carry it right to Ankara and Athens. Now that’s my country-boy approach to it.

DR: Alright.

LBJ: And I think that we got in trouble the other night when we suggested to him that if he—I couldn’t come over there, but I’d be glad to see him but we were absolutely desperate and I let that go.7

DR: Right.

LBJ: But when I got home and thought about it a little bit, I thought, “Now what in the hell is Lyndon Johnson doing inviting this big mess right in his lap?” Bad enough for George Ball to go to them and see him without the President calling him over here. Because I have no solution. I can’t propose anything. He’ll come over here looking for heaven and he’ll find hell.

DR: Well, his message—if it’s a conditional message—will probably have that kind of thing in it and would be the basis for deferring until we get some further feeling out of it.

LBJ: Well, my feeling is—and I don’t want to be arbitrary and I won’t be a bit disappointed if he comes on—but I think you ought to let him know—

DR: Yeah.

LBJ: —that I think that, in the light of this strong message I sent to the Turks—

DR: Right.

LBJ: —that I need to follow through with the Greeks, and the easiest and simplest and least-noticed way to do it is while he’s there to spend two hours doing it.

DR: Right.

LBJ: Then I wouldn’t hesitate the slightest to say to them, “Now, we’re going on and appeal to the Turks to hold this thing in abeyance,” and he can go tell the Turks what he’d done—

DR: Uh-huh.

LBJ: —and although you wouldn’t have any final solution or division, you would have at least kept faith and made an effort and followed through on what I told them in this wire instead of saying we went off and went to sleep.

DR: Right. Well, let me talk to George and see.8

LBJ: Ok.

DR: Thank you.

LBJ: Bye.

1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary Rusk, June 9, 1964, 6:30 p.m., Tape 64.31, Side A, PNO 2 and 3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

2 According to Rusk’s Appointment Book, he met at 4:45 p.m. with the three Senators at the New Senate Office Building. (Ibid.) There was no indication of the topic of the meeting.

3 See Document 58.

4 See footnote 1, Document 56.

5 Foreign Minister Kyprianou.

6 See Document 62.

7 See Document 54.

8 No record of this conversation was found.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 60


60. Letter From Prime Minister Papandreou to President Johnson1

Athens, June 9, 1964.

Dear Mr. President,

The Honorable Henry Labouisse, Ambassador of the United States in Athens has imparted to Mr. S. Costopoulos, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, the concern of the American Government in view of information about an imminent Turkish landing in Cyprus. He also informed Mr. Costopoulos of the action taken by the American Government with the Government of Turkey, in order to avert the landing.

The Greek Government wishes to express its warm thanks for this appropriate and wise initiative of the President of the United States, which agrees with the tradition of the American Nation as well as with the mission of the United States as leader of the Free World.

We do not know if the above step has been decisively effective. Information is reaching us that Turkey persists in the policy of landing and is preparing for it; and that, in order to justify the landing, she is staging the proclamation, by the very small Turkish minority of Cyprus, of a federative or an independent State.2

The Greek Government has repeatedly declared and reasserts today that its policy is peace; but, in case of aggression, it will be defense.

The Greek Government most assuredly regards a Turkish landing in Cyprus as an aggression; because the resolution of the Security Council of the 4th of March would thus be violated and also because such an action aims at the strangulation of the rights of the great Greek majority of the island.

This will be one of the consequences of an eventual Turkish landing: a Greek-Turkish conflict and the dissolution of the Southeastern flank of NATO. But this will not be the only consequence. Communism will become omnipotent within the island of Cyprus; and, we unfortunately fear, within Greece, where, with our policies, we have reduced it to 12%. Besides, it is inevitable and human that the Greeks of Cyprus, threatened by a Turkish invasion tolerated by the Allies, should seek help wherever they can find it. And it is known, under the present circumstance, whence this help will be offered. An objective assessment of the future, unfortunately leads to the certain forecast that, under these conditions, Cyprus will end into another Cuba and that the Greek Government will no longer be in a position to exercise any restraining influence.

We feel that a critical hour has struck and we regard it our duty to define responsibilities before the Greek nation, before the Free World to which we belong, as well as before History. And this is the meaning of the present message.

Yours sincerely,

George A. Papandreou3

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. No classification marking. The source text is a copy of the letter given to Secretary Rusk by the Greek Embassy on June 9; it is typed on Greek Embassy stationery. Rusk passed it to the President at lunch the same day. Ambassador Matsas formally presented the original of the letter to President Johnson at a June 11 meeting; see Document 62.

2 In telegram 1848 from Athens, June 9, 5 p.m., the Embassy reported that a “revived atmosphere of crisis gripped Athens” as a result of renewed reports of Turkish preparations for an invasion of Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)

3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 61


61. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1

Nicosia, June 10, 1964, 1 p.m.

1347. Embtel 1346.2 Greek and Turkish Cypriots look on forthcoming SC meeting on Cyprus as crucial test of US attitudes, influence and abilities. After events of June 5, all parties consider we are now deeply involved and look for us to take positive position in New York. It is common belief our policy on Cyprus has changed, but SC will be regarded as acid test of this belief.

Reading the political temper in Cyprus, we believe either emergency or scheduledSC meeting may prove major watershed in Greek Cypriot attitudes. As we have reported with increasing frequency, Communists have been going all out to enmesh Greek Cypriots by espousing principles of freedom and democracy, offering assistance and promising support. Having a favorably conditioned audience, the Communists have up to this point made extensive progress with most elements of Greek Cypriot society. Their accomplishments have been impressive and give cause for serious concern, but thus far we estimate them to be generally shallow in nature. The fickle, politically immature Greek Cypriots could quickly change their view of their “real friends”, if given the occasion.

The show down which now appears to be at hand, would threaten to give Communist accomplishments in Cyprus a deeper, more lasting character where permanent damage might be done to the orientation of the Greek Cypriot leadership as well as many other elements of the society.

Given this ticklish situation, the problem for the US will be how to handle itself on policy without alienating the Greek Cypriots and giving the Soviets the opening for which they hope. In this circumstance perhaps it would be best to let troop contributing countries carry the ball on sensitive terms of reference issue (assuming discussion this issue cannot be avoided) where US involvement in substance would probably range us among opponents of GOC.

There is, however, one point where US might be able to make major productive contribution to work of SC, a contribution which relates to principal concern of Greek Cypriots about threat of Turkish military intervention. If US could produce as its contribution a Turkish commitment not to intervene in Cyprus for the duration of UN involvement, this would be major accomplishment which should go far toward re-establishing our damaged position here.

Belcher

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, the White House, JCS, CIA, and OSD.

2 Telegram 1346 from Nicosia, June 10, reported the observations of the Syrian Ambassador on the U.S. position following President Johnson’s actions to prevent an invasion of Cyprus. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 62


62. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, June 11, 1964.

·         SUBJECT

·         President’s Meeting with Greek Ambassador Matsas

·         PARTICIPANTS

·         The President

·         His Excellency Alexander Matsas, Ambassador of Greece

·         Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

·         Robert W. Komer, The White House

After the President greeted Ambassador Matsas cordially, the Ambassador said he understood that the President had already taken action on the letter now being formally delivered. However, Matsas had no report as yet on the Ball conversation in Athens.2 The President then carefully read Prime Minister Papandreou’s letter.3

The President made clear our position on the Cyprus crisis. Outside powers could not solve it. The Greeks and Turks must settle it themselves. He believed the Prime Minister of Greece should get together with Prime Minister Inonu, or have some representative talk with the Turks. We had told Turkey that there could not be war but we didn’t know how long this would stick. Moreover, we were “disappointed” that the Greek Government had not taken the initiative to meet and talk with the Turks. It was much more dangerous not to get together than to get together. As we saw it, there were two requirements for a solution: (a) whatever was done must be permanent; (b) the solution could not be humiliating to either side. It was much more dangerous not to have a solution. War could help nobody. Therefore, the President continued, he had told Ball to urge Papandreou to take the initiative in getting together somehow with the Turks. The US people were becoming quite worried over the Cyprus problem; they couldn’t understand why “two of our close allies were growling at each other.” As for Makarios, he didn’t seem to care. He thought he had the Greeks supporting him. Meanwhile, the Soviets were meddling and fully expected to win in the end. So we thought the Greeks must show some statesmanship and get moving toward agreement.

The President returned to the theme of American public attitudes. Some Americans were already wondering if they should go to Europe and to the Eastern Mediterranean now. There was no reason why Turkey and Greece couldn’t agree to talk about their problem. It would be dangerous if they did not. To repeat, this solution should be permanent and not humiliating to either side. We had gone to the aid of Greece and Turkey in the Truman Doctrine. We had helped through the years, and wanted to help now. But Greece and Turkey must grasp the problem. We had stopped the Turks from moving, but we couldn’t drop the matter there. We wanted to see them at the conference table. Greece should take the initiative.

The Ambassador asked what response his government had given to Ball. The President replied that they seemed to be considering our démarche. But he urged a Greek initiative. Action was what was needed.

Matsas explained that the chief need as his government saw it was to stop the constant threats of invasion. The President interrupted him, saying we had stopped it already but couldn’t stop it always. We had acted vigorously when trouble was imminent, but we might not be able to stop the Turks again.

Ambassador Matsas agreed there were still dangers ahead. His government had disturbing reports in the last day or so, including reported overflights of Rhodes. The President replied, “If I can’t get you to talk, I can’t keep the Turks from moving.”

Matsas again sought to explain the Greek position. He reported that the whole trouble lay in the continuing Turkish threat to invade Cyprus. The President interjected: “Or in your support of what Makarios is doing—or in arms imports.” The Ambassador replied that otherwise Makarios would have felt isolated. There were two dangers: The Greek-Turkish tensions and the risk of Makarios drifting to “the other side.” Both are the consequence of the Turkish threats. If only the US could secure Turkish agreement not to invade, then tensions would be reduced and there would be no need for arms imports to Cyprus, etc. etc. The President emphasized that we could not get the threat called off until the Greeks had agreed to talk. This called for statesmanship. Papandreou was a statesman. Matsas should tell his Prime Minister to call Inonu today and arrange a meeting. We had done everything we could. Our troubles around the world these days were not our own; our troubles turned out to be mostly disputes between our allies. Certainly Greece and Turkey would not be justified in destroying NATO over this issue.

Matsas asked if the President thought it impossible to get the Turks not to invade. The President said: “Nothing is impossible if people will act.” But Papandreou must act in this case if we were to have peace and not war. Matsas tried to point out again that Turkish agreement not to invade was the key to the situation. The President said bluntly that we could not get the Turks to turn off until there was some basis on which to argue with them. He noted that the Greek Government was apparently willing to have secret talks (this surprised Matsas who was obviously unaware of this. So Mr. Komer confirmed that the Foreign Minister had said secret talks were possible). Matsas then asked whether any US proposals had been mentioned byBall. The President said that we were not going to make proposals ourselves at this point. Any US proposals would be seized upon by one side or the other and used to blame us. We want the Greeks and Turks to start making proposals to each other. This should be a matter between the two of them. Matsas added: “And the Cypriots.” Matsas said that “talks are difficult under the threat of invasion.” The President immediately came back: “Of course they’re difficult. But it’s more difficult to talk after an invasion. Get together and work something out. If not, allNATO will become involved.”

The Ambassador contended that the Greeks from the beginning had sought to keep the dispute damped down and avoid actions which increased the threat of hostilities. He gave examples of proposals advanced to the British, cooperating with the UN, etc. In contrast, he said, the Turks have done everything to spread the dispute, as by their treatment of the Greeks in Istanbul. The President said he thought Papandreou should appoint someone and talk with Inonu immediately. Talk was far better than the way of the jungle. Matsas attempted to return to the theme of calling the Turks off. The President interrupted him again saying: “I have only a temporary hold-off. What we want is for your Prime Minister to sit down with the Turkish Prime Minister and work out an agreement. Our people are getting terribly worried.” Matsas said that temporary cessation of the invasion threat won’t solve the problem: it won’t keep Makarios from building up arms supplies. The President responded that nothing would. The President said: “The Turks are the only ones I have gotten to do anything till now. All I want is for the Greek Prime Minister to sit down and talk. This is not so difficult.” He pointed out that by just this means he had gotten the railroad strike settled in ten days. But Greece always wants Turkey to do something to ease tensions and Turkey always wants Greece to do something. What was the Greek program for settling the crisis?

Matsas described the desire for a fully independent state with self-determination and guarantees of minority rights. He noted this was a “compromise” position (i.e. not enosis). He asked what the President thought of this approach. The President said that we couldn’t negotiate for the Turks. All we wanted was for Greece to get together with them. It wasn’t up to us to say what agreement should be reached. “We stopped an invasion the other night. Now we want a conference. Let’s start discussing this thing.” He again mentioned the problem of American tourists going to the threatened area. It was easier to talk than to fight. The President told the Ambassador: “You will only be admired for saying ‘let’s talk’.” It was a matter of the Biblical injunction, “Come let us reason together.” Matsas said he would so report to his government.

The President then changed tactics and pointed out the strong American affection for Greece. The President himself would like to travel there again soon with his family. But there could not be a war. We had turned off the Turks. Now we want talks. As Speaker Rayburn had said, “It’s always better to talk than fight.” Matsastried once more to press the theme that the US or the UN Security Council should get the Turks to call off their invasion threats. The President said, “Let’s see what you can do for us and we will see what we can do for you.” Matsas sought to inquire whether this meant the President would get Turkey to agree permanently not to invade. The President carefully avoided any such commitment. He said: “I made a positive request of the Turks and they said that even though they didn’t agree they would comply. I now make a positive request to you to talk. If you comply, we will then make some suggestions to the Turks. That’s better than fighting.” The President did not tell him what these suggestions would be, but promised that if Papandreou would try to bring Greece and Turkey together, we would help all we could to move things along to an agreement. Otherwise we’d have a disaster.

The President asked Matsas to tell his Prime Minister of the President’s deep sense of friendship for him and for Greece. The President was counting heavily on Papandreou. We did not want the US people to get the idea that Makarios was “using” the Greeks. “Greece must avoid at all costs humiliating its ally Turkey. Even in the Cuban missile crisis, we always left the enemy a way out. With an ally it was even more important to leave a way out.”

The President observed that negotiating with Makarios was impossible. Makarioswasn’t interested in the security of the West. But Greece, Turkey, and the US were.Matsas interjected that Greece could not negotiate without Makarios. The President indicated understanding that the Cypriots would have to be consulted at some point but the important thing was Greek-Turkish agreement. Greece talked about its responsibil-ities to the Greek Cypriots. Didn’t the Greeks see that the fate of 100,000 Turkish Cypriots was a matter of honor for Inonu too?

Ambassador Matsas assured the President that he would promptly inform his Government.

1 Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Memcons Other Than Visits. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Talbot and Komer and approved in the White House on June 15.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 63


63. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1

New York, June 11, 1964, 8 p.m.

4455. SC—Cyprus. Cypriot FonMin Kyprianou called with PermRep Rossides onStevenson June 11. Fol are highlights:

1. Kyprianou stressed that principal reason he decided for time being not call urgentSC mtg was his awareness Pres Johnson’s efforts with GOT which he did not wish upset as he hopeful it would produce something. Stevenson emphasized seriousness present situation stressing GOT concern with Cypriot arms imports, conscription, disappearance hostages, ties with SovBloc. Situation deteriorating and there need work actively for solution agreeable to all parties before situation deteriorates further. Said he hoped GOC had given thought to this as obvious that in any solution no party will get everything it wants.

2. Kyprianou responding to Stevenson mention of GOC moves cited provocativeGOT acts (including use UK soldiers for smuggling) leading to GOC arms and conscription decisions and defended these as right and duty of GOC. Stevenson said situation difficult to control. Was worse than in March and GOC had not exercised restraint he had hoped, or avoided provocations as he hoped. Kyprianou stressed GOC had avoided number of moves and Rossides provided chapter and verse on Turk contingent, “rebels” at Hilarion, obstruction on Kyrenia Road.

3. Yost stressed need create feeling of confidence among Turk Cypriots. Kyprianoureplied “ If GOT wants them have confidence they’ll have it. Their unease ordered by Ankara. Everything calm where GOT not stirring them up.” Turk Cypriot discontent is manufactured as result longstanding GOT partition plan of which GOC amassing more and more evidence. Denied arms imports and conscription designed have any effect on Turk Cypriots stating they reaction to: (1) invasion threats; (2) need to discipline Greek Cypriot forces. In response Stevenson question,Kyprianou said regular GOC army would disarm irregular Greek Cypriots.

4. Stevenson again stressed seriousness of situation mentioning GOT fear of new “Cuba.” Kyprianou said this new idea but Rossides emphasized Greek Cypriot Communists few and without arms and nationalists in control. Nationalists got main outside support from SovBloc as result Western lack of sympathy.

5. Stevenson asked Kyprianou state of negots with Sovs and Czechs on arms.Kyprianou, hesitating somewhat, denied there were such negots. Rossides noted GOC would abandon arms acquisition if SC guaranteed territorial integrity.Kyprianou defended acquisition of arms “from US or anywhere,” not necessarily from Sovs and Czechs.

6. In reply Stevenson query on SC, Kyprianou said 1) not abandon idea urgent mtg; 2) planned in regular mtg raise question Turk threat, exit of Turk contingent along with Greek.

7. Yost stressed GOT feeling that they have been pushed back steadily from Zurich agreements and cannot tolerate this, particularly in view of method by which this done. Kyprianou noted initial method was negots.

8. Stevenson emphasized US effectiveness in restraining GOT diminishing because of GOC moves, urged Kyprianou “bend over backwards avoid provocations”, saying would be wise not take any actions which would exacerbate Turk feelings and plan quiet SC mtg instead to extend UNFICYP on basis SYG report and then might be possible move forward toward solution. Kyprianou countered asking how fact recent GOT preparations can be hidden and mentioned expanding SC mandate to include UN guarantee against attack. Stevenson remarked this unlikely.

9. Referring ideas in press for population exchange, Kyprianou stressed Turk Cypriots wanted return to villages but cannot because of Turk Cypriot terrorists’ threats. With choice, only 20 per cent would leave Cyprus, he said. Yost suggested offering reassurances in SC to Turk Cypriots to improve atmosphere but Kyprianouresponded that this would be admitting GOT threats justified.

10. Referring again GOT threats, Kyprianou said “We not importing planes and tanks to fight Turk Cypriots.” Went on describe Mansoura as center smuggling of Turk arms and men which GOC cannot and UN does not stop, implying this would be exposed in SC and would have been publicly described previously except for bearing it has on trial UK airman.

11. Rossides called for “bold move”—dismantling all fortifications by both sides leaving security to UNFICYP.

12. On problem hostages, Kyprianou said there had been regrettable incidents but not as many as charged. Claimed many on Turk list solely in Ankara or hidden in villages. Claimed Kutchuk had not deplored hostage taking as Makarios had and had no accounting for 39 Greek hostages.

13. Stevenson suggested further talk prior SC mtg. Again stressed US efforts withGOT. Urged avoiding clamorous SC mtg in order move on to next step.

Comment: Fol mtg, MisOff encountered Asiroglu (Turkey), informed him thatKyprianou testing idea of calling for withdrawal Turk contingent, SC guarantee for Cyprus but that Stevenson had argued strongly against it. Expressed hopeKyprianou would find similar discouragement elsewhere. Asiroglu stated he confident in Norway, UK, perhaps France. MisOff suggested he talk to others particularly Bernardes, prior his departure for consultation. MisOff stressedStevenson urging non-polemic mtg. Asiroglu had earlier told MisOff GOT not now planning bring Turk Cypriot leaders to New York but would do so if solution warranted it.

Barring new developments, present expectation SC finish apartheid June 17 and take up Cyprus June 17 or 18 on basis SYG report. SYG had not yet called for mtg on financial contributions presumably because Comptroller still having difficulties figuring up estimates for present and future periods as UK and Swedish bills coming in and being argued.2

Stevenson

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Nicosia, London, Athens, Ankara, and Paris for USRO.

2 In telegram 4470 from USUN, June 12, the Mission added that Kyprianou also argued that enosis would provide Turkey with the best guarantee about future Cypriot political orientation to the West. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 64


64. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to PresidentJohnson1

Washington, June 11, 1964.

·         SUBJECT

·         The Cyprus Problem

My conversations in Athens and Ankara2 have led me to reappraise the play of forces in the Cyprus problem and to modify my thinking as to where we should go from here.

Athens

The significant impressions I gained in Athens are the following:

1. For the first time the Greek Government is scared—scared at the reality of the danger of a Greek-Turkish war and at the progressive extension of Communist control in Cyprus.

2. The GOG is fed up with Makarios. Papandreou wants to deal him out of any settlement talks. (This is a marked change from a few months ago when the GOGwas insisting that Cyprus could not be discussed without Makarios participating.)

3. The GOG is now pleading for a strong American intervention in the search for a settlement. (This again contrasts sharply with its earlier attitude when it supportedMakarios’ efforts to exclude us from a serious role in the Cyprus situation.)

There were strong indications that Papandreou would like to have the USG force a settlement on the GOG that it could accept only with the excuse of outside pressure.

Ankara

On the Turkish side, Inonu is doing everything possible to maneuver us into taking responsibility for bringing about a settlement. The Turks are clearly frightened of the Cyprus situation. They are perplexed and sad. They also want us to force a settlement on them—provided adequate face-saving aspects can be devised.

Washington

Under these circumstances we are now in position for the first time to bring the Cyprus matter to a conclusion if we are prepared to invest time, energy and prestige. The alternatives are dismal.

The UN is totally unable to make even a beginning on a solution. Tuomioja has flopped around for three months and has achieved nothing whatever except to discredit himself with the Greek and Turkish Governments. This is not altogether his fault since the UN holds no cards in this game. Moreover, it is under the disability of having to genuflect to the Makarios Government. But Tuomioja quite clearly has operated on the wrong assumption—that the Cyprus problem was an affair between the two communities on the Island and not an argument between Greece and Turkey. His efforts to work out a solution from the vantage point of Nicosia were doomed to failure. It would have made quite as much sense for a mediator to try to solve the Kashmir problem by sitting for three months in Kashmir.

U Thant knows that the UN cannot succeed in settling this question. Tuomioja is sick of it and wants out. I think it altogether likely that we could get their tacit acquiescence to a vigorous USG initiative.

Quite obviously Papandreou needs a far greater shock than I was able to give him Wednesday night but I made a start. We need to lay on a crash effort to bring theGOG up short. But the GOG is a hard nut to crack and we are far from being home with this one.

Even so there are indications that Papandreou is ready to start low-level conversations with the GOT. Certainly the GOT is dying for a chance to start talking with the Greeks. But it won’t occur without us. Both Papandreou and Inonuindicated quite clearly to me that they envisaged a successful negotiation only under active USG tutelage. I am convinced that a meeting between representatives of the two Governments, without the active presence of the USG, would be likely to lead only to a deepening crystallization of positions. Certainly this was the result when Sandys tried it out in London last January.

Recommendation

I think therefore, that the central thrust of our effort should be directed at bringing representatives of the two Governments together with a strong USG representative as a catalyst—under quiet conditions. The pattern, in other words, would not be unlike that which we followed successfully in disposing of the West New Guinea problem.3

I doubt that the United States should try to put forward any plan for settlement. Certainly it should not do so at the outset of negotiations. The Greek and Turkish Governments are now latched on to enosis and double enosis respectively. There should be room for bargaining under these circumstances. In fact, Erkin made it clear that there was—so far as the GOT was concerned.

I would suggest, as one possibility, that we think of trying to arrange a meeting at some quiet, neutral spot such as the Villa Bellagio on Lake Como where representatives of the two Governments—perhaps at the Ambassadorial level—would be brought together with a respected but hard-boiled American, such as Dean Acheson, who knows the score and is not afraid to use American pressure.

Every effort should be made to keep this meeting secret, although we should quietly tell the British and perhaps U Thant what we were doing. Given the present state of Greek feelings, I think it possible that Papandreou could be persuaded to arrange this without letting the word pass to Makarios.

As a condition to our undertaking this, we should exact from the two Governments a firm commitment to try to hold still the two communities on the Island pending the outcome.

I think we must put this show on the road right away. Time is definitely not running on our side. We can get Turkish approval when Inonu comes to Washington. Meanwhile we should give thought to whether Papandreou might not be invited to pay us a visit.4

George W. Ball

1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 7. Secret.

2  Ball visited Athens and Ankara June 10–11. Documentation on the visits is in Department of State, Central File POL 23–8 CYP. Ball’s account of the trip is in The Past Has Another Pattern, pp. 352–355.

3 Reference is to Ellsworth Bunker’s role in the 1962 Netherlands-Indonesian talks regarding West New Guinea.

4 In telegram 1513 to Athens, June 13, the Department of State instructed Labouisse to sound out Papandreou about a visit to Washington. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GREECE) A letter of invitation was transmitted in telegram 1513 to Athens, June 13. (Ibid.) The letter was delivered on June 14.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 65


65. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, June 12, 1964, 11:45 a.m.

·         SUBJECT

·         US–UK Approach to UN Secretary General Regarding Cyprus

·         PARTICIPANTS

·         His Excellency the Right Honorable The Lord Harlech, British Embassy

·         Mr. Patrick R.H. Wright, First Secretary, British Embassy

·         Under Secretary George W. Ball

·         Assistant Secretary Harlan Cleveland (IO)

·         Mr. George Springsteen (U)

·         Deputy Assistant Secretary John D. Jernegan (NEA)

Mr. Ball explained to the Ambassador our revised view on double enosis, saying that we now thought it should be put forward to the Greeks and Turks as a serious basis for discussion (rather than dismissing it too quickly from consideration, as had been implied during the discussions in London June 8).2 He also explained that he did not think it would be well to have the mediator make the proposals of enosis and double enosis to the parties.

We were giving serious thought to doing some “arm twisting” with the Greeks and Turks to induce them to negotiate realistically for a settlement. Prime MinisterInonu was probably coming to Washington and we planned to invite Prime Minister Papandreou as well. The President would bear down on both of them. Our tentative plan of action after that would be to get Greek and Turkish representatives together with an American representative as a third party. This meeting, which should be kept absolutely secret, would have as its object to hammer out an agreement which the mediator could then pick up and work on. We thought this plan had a chance of success because Mr. Ball had found during his most recent visit to Athens and Ankara that both Papandreou and Inonu had a changed attitude and wanted the United States to take an active direct role in bringing about a settlement.

We and the British should, therefore, tell U Thant and the mediator that we were going to make a real effort to get the problem settled, as it must be, between Athens and Ankara. We would not ask U Thant and the mediator to propose any bases for solutions to the Greeks and Turks (as had been contemplated in the papers worked out in London). We would just let Tuomioja keep on doing what he is doing now, for the time being.

Lord Harlech said he would tell London we thought it would not be helpful for the mediator to take any initiative.

It was agreed that the Department would prepare a new draft of proposed instructions to Ambassadors Stevenson and Dean in New York, and send a copy urgently to Lord Harlech for transmission to London.3

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Exdis; TUG. Drafted by Jernegan.

2  Rusk’s conclusion that “hard bargaining” might result in “enosis plus territorial and other compensation to Turkey,” was reported in Unsec 32 to Geneva, June 9. (Ibid.)

3 The instructions embodying Ball’s comments were sent to the Embassy in London in telegram 8231, June 12. (Ibid.) Telegram 8250 to London, June 12, reported that Lord Harlech had informed the Department of State that the British Government could not take immediate action on the U.S. proposals because many senior Cabinet officials were away from London. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 66


66. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1

Nicosia, June 12, 1964, 3 p.m.

1357. Athens 1845 to Dept.2 We assume comments desired are our views on feasibility of new approach to Cyprus problem in form of secret bilateral negotiations between Greece and Turkey with objective of agreement on union of Cyprus with Greece compensated by some mix of following elements: minor Greek territorial concession to Turkey, emigration of Greek minority from Turkey (with assisted voluntary emigration of Turkish Cypriots to Turkey?), transfer of Patriarchate from Istanbul, and Turkish military base on Cyprus.

We not only concur that it would be useful explore this possibility but also believe satisfactory settlement can only be achieved along these lines.

At same time we wish point out that, while Turkish Cypriots have no alternative to accepting whatever deal Turkey may make, Greek Cypriots have greater independence from Greece. Despite their protestations about Panhellenism, it might take considerable persuasion to win Greek Cypriot acceptance of some elements of deal along lines suggested above.

While there has been marked intensification of enosis agitation in recent months, two very significant elements of Greek Cypriot community are at best lukewarm and at worst hostile toward it. Makarios and GOC officials obviously have vested interest of being large fish in small puddle. A strong and apparently growing Communist movement would obviously resist submersion and probable suppression in Greece. Coalition of these two elements would be quite likely insist in first instance on “full sovereignty”, “self determination”, “neutrality rather thanNATO” as dodges for avoiding enosis. For this reason we believe that, if enosis is agreed on as basis for solution, every effort must be made bring it about as integral part of immediate settlement rather than agreeing on “full independence” or “self-determination” on understanding Cyprus state will wither away and enosis will inevitably occur.

We would not anticipate any serious Greek Cypriot opposition (though there would probably be a lot of noisy protest) about Greek territorial cessions elsewhere or about population movements. Greek Cypriot attitude is wholly self-centered. On other hand, we would expect strong resistance to Turkish base on island, in part as desecration of “holy soil” but even more out of fear it would be used as center for agitation among remaining Turkish community. Limited Turkish military presence might eventually be palatable if it were on NATO base within what is now British sovereign base area.

Another area in which Greek Cypriots might demonstrate independence of Greece, as recent history makes only too clear, is by reneging on agreement once made in order attempt eliminate any special concessions to Turkey or Turkish Cypriots on island. Fact Greek Cypriots cannot be trusted makes it all the more important enosis be part immediate settlement and not as goal to which settlement might eventually open way. Considering Cypriot temperament, strong Communist influences, resentments arising from current strife, and widespread holding of arms, we have every reason to expect Cyprus to be source of difficulties for years to come. It is certainly far preferable this be internal Greek problem rather than international problem of type now facing us.

Belcher

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris, USUN, OSD, CIA, JCS, and the White House.

2 Telegram 1845, June 8, reported that Greece remained firm on its ultimate objective of enosis but recognized the need for some limited concessions to Turkey and counted on the United States to achieve a mediated settlement. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 67


67. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

Athens, June 13, 1964, 9 p.m.

1891. Embassy notes with interest Istanbul’s 722 quoting Turk Press Attaché Athens Karaoglou to effect that Turkish invasion Cyprus would result in “immediate fall” Papandreou government and his substitution by military junta. If this belief also held by important GOT officials, Embassy believes it important clear up what appears to us to be misreading of situation. Our reading is that in event Turkish invasion Cyprus and subsequent Papandreou military response, government would have full backing of Greek nation. In our judgment only if government were to fail to take some action satisfactory to injured Greek pride would there be threat to Papandreou’s continuance in office. It should be noted that there is no important element in Greek political life calling for more “moderate” approach to Cyprus problem; on contrary, Papandreou being attacked by both right and extreme left for not pushing Greek and Greek Cypriot cause more vigorously. Opposition (ERE) press, for example, accuses Papandreou of “retreating” in face of US pressure to seek quick solution Cyprus question.

In any case, it important that senior GOT officials not labor under mistaken belief that Papandreou ahead of press and public in following “hard” line vis-à-vis Cyprus question. On contrary, in view inflamed public opinion here, great test for PriMinwill come if and when he agrees to compromise settlement on Cyprus which falls short Greek demands. It conceivable that if he agreed to what public opinion considered “sell-out” on Cyprus, his many enemies within and without party might combine to bring him down. In that event, successor would almost certainly be figure with more intransigent view Cyprus settlement. In sense, Papandreou now paying for fact that during last two electoral campaigns he tried win votes by riding Cypriot tiger and attacking Caramanlis administration for “sell-out” of London and Zurich Agreements. Although he avoided stating exactly what final solution he expected to achieve, public led to believe that Papandreou victory would result in Cypriot independence and enosis, if not immediately at least eventually. Thus, when and if Papandreou sits down to serious negotiations public opinion will expect him to deliver on at least part of his promises, explicit or implied.

To reiterate: in our view Papandreou would have full support of nation in military response to Turkish invasion. (Although once heat of battle passed there might be second thoughts about how Greece was maneuvered into such position.) Only if he failed to take some dramatic action would his position be jeopardized. In such case his successor would undoubtedly be advocate of harder line. However, in view Papandreou’s character—as well as his stated commitments to respond to Turk “attack”—it highly unlikely that he would follow passive course under such circumstances.

Labouisse

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to London, Ankara, Istanbul, Nicosia, and USDOCOSouth (Naples) for Burris.

2 Dated June 6. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 68


68. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

Athens, June 14, 1964, 11 p.m.

1898. I saw Papandreou this morning accompanied by Brewster. After preliminaries, I handed over President’s letter.2 Papandreou read it carefully and said he would be glad to accept, and that June 24 and 25 would be satisfactory provided Inonu had then left. He stressed that it would be most embarrassing if they were both there at same time and made this point a flat condition. He feels it would be most awkward if both were there at same time and they did not see one another, and he does not consider it politically feasible to have a meeting withInonu at this time.

I believe that Papandreou is sincere in his belief that an over-lapping with Inonuwould cause real difficulties, and I strongly recommend that the President set the date for Papandreou’s arrival and meeting with him so as to avoid possible over-lapping.

Papandreou then went on to say that, as practical politicians, President Johnsonand he would not want to have a meeting which failed. He said that he had tried to make the Greek position clear to me in previous conversations and to Mr. Ball last week. He hoped the President would understand that the Greek position had been formulated “objectively” and on the basis of principles of justice. I responded that it was not my understanding that President Johnson had in mind reaching a definite solution of the Cyprus problem during the proposed discussions. He was not attempting to short-circuit the UN. The purpose of the talks was to exchange views on ways to move toward a solution. He replied that he was not posing this as a condition to a meeting but he thought the President would want to know his views. He said he would put these in a letter which he would deliver to me this evening.

The PriMin then proceeded to outline his position, very much in the same way he has done on previous occasions and with Mr. Ball. There was nothing new in his presentation, except for his emphasis on fact that entry of Soviets in picture had made Cyprus issue a great deal more far-reaching than simply a Greek-Turkish problem. From the “security” point of view, the only hope was “Natofication,” including a NATO base which could have Turkish NATO personnel. From “moral” viewpoint there should be self-determination. The present limited independenceshould be lifted and self-determination exercised in the form of a plebiscite (resulting in union with Greece) to take place before the UN forces leave the island; i.e., within three months. He stressed that an independent Cyprus would mean a Cuba and a partitioned Cyprus would lead inevitably to conflict between the 400,000 Greeks and the 100,000 Turks which would only continue the crisis situation.

He asked what I thought about this. Reverting to his security argument, I suggested that Turks might well think double enosis would best serve purpose. He replied that even if he should order partition the population of the island would not accept it and civil war and chaos would ensue. In both cases the Communists would be the winners. Only by a close link with the West could this be averted.

I observed that even though his arguments might sound “objective” to many, there was still an important psychological factor and political realities which Inonu had to face. I suggested that if Menderes had been able to negotiate a deal which disallowed enosis, it would be expecting a lot for Inonu to accept it. I repeated the question I had often posed to him—what could be done to meet Inonu half way? He came to his “security” argument, repeating that the new factor since 1959 was that Sov Union was on scene and would be muddying waters. He felt that the US should stress heavily to Inonu that Natofication would achieve the security of the island within the NATO framework and Turkey would not have a Cuba off its southern shore. This solution could also get Makarios out of the way which should be helpful to the Turkish Govt with its problem of face. Also, compensation could be provided for the Turk Cypriots who wanted to move to the mainland, and further economic aid from the West might be promised. He underlined (more for US benefit, I think, than for the Turks) that this solution would be a lasting one and arrived at within framework of democratic principles.

I pressed him on score as to whether compensation he was offering would be adequate to meet the Turkish political and psychological problem facing Inonu. He had nothing to add to above. When I touched briefly on question of possible territorial exchanges based on news reports he took standard Greek line that giving up islands such as Chios, Mytilini or Samos would be inconceivable. It would lead to revolution in Greece.

Our talk, which was highly informal (no other Greeks present) and friendly throughout, did not touch on displacement of Istanbul population and Patriarchate.3

As to publicity concerning the visit, he stated that until he had sent a formal reply of acceptance and had received further word from us, he would not make any statement. He would parry questions with formula “I have received no formal invitation.” Publicity from US side should be held up also, pending consideration of content of formal letter, which will be cabled as soon as received. Meanwhile, I shall appreciate comments re date of meeting in light paras 1 and 2 above.4

Labouisse

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to London, USUN, Nicosia, and Ankara and passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, and CIA.

2 See footnote 4, Document 64.

3 In telegram 1899 from Athens, June 14, Labouisse reported that he had also told Papandreou that sending Grivas to Cyprus at this point could have deleterious effects. Papandreou had agreed with this analysis. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)

4 In telegram 1516 to Athens, June 15, the Department of State informed the Embassy that June 24–25 was satisfactory for a Papandreou visit and that it would arrange forInonu’s departure prior to Papandreou’s arrival. (Ibid., POL 7 GREECE)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 69


69. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1

Nicosia, June 18, 1964, 7 p.m.

1377. Deptel 951.2 Regret Deptel 9423 not received (although serviced) when I called on Makarios this afternoon. Came in while at palace. With regard SCproceedings,4 he said Kyprianou will go along with resolution merely extending term of UNFICYP. Said he realizes both sides want changes in terms of reference and would like see resolution continuing some condemnation, either direct of indirect, of other side, but it highly unlikely be possible obtain such res and therefore GOC will not attempt it. I said this would assist in avoiding probable acrimonious debate if other procedure followed. Said my govt would be pleased to hear that this was GOC plan. Makarios went on to say, however, that GOC presentation would have to refer to Turkish invasion threats and to most recent events in Mansoura-Kokkina area where for to him inexplicable reasons Turks have picked this time to create new and dangerous situation. I urged him to try keepKyprianou speech in as low key as possible.

While Deptel 942 not available and hence I unable act on specific suggestions, most of them covered indirectly. Items covered were Inonu visit; my frequent consultations his Ministers and himself; support for UN effort; gave credit several recent moves including offer Green Line pull-back; urged him make some unilateral gesture even in face Turkish actions in Mansoura area in effort improve Greek Cypriot image abroad and this particularly in his interest at this moment of SCmeeting.

With regard Mansoura and events of last two days,5 Makarios in most apparent show of anger I have yet seen said he would not permit Turks to take over small Greek villages in area. Said he had reports that UN had urged villagers at Mosphili to evacuate, but when they had inquired whether they should do so, he had refused allow them. Said he will move to protect Greeks if UN cannot do so and if Turks did nothing.

In this regard, he expressed oft-repeated Greek Cypriot position that UN not forceful enough in preventing such incidents and in particular in this northwest area they apparently unable control smuggling of arms and people by Turks. He said if present situation continues much longer or if today’s incident becomes more serious, he will move to isolate area from rest of island. In this connection said he had told Plaza (Embtel 1356)6 that he could not wait “long” for UN to open Kyrenia and Xeropolis Roads. When he said he would close all roads to Turks if these two roads not opened, I said I was sure he had estimated far better than I what probable reaction of Turks might be to such action. Said he had and (contrary to what he told Plaza) he expected they would react violently, but he was prepared to take consequences since present situation intolerable.

When he went on to say he was more pessimistic now than he had been in some months, I said this distressed me since he was usually optimistic. I asked him what he thought probable GOT reaction might be to any such action on his part, particularly in view of present delicate situation in which GOT leadership found itself. At this point he asked me whether USG really thought that Turks had intended invade two weeks ago. I said that this was matter of conjecture for some, but that we were satisfied they had intended do so and it was only with greatest possible pressure that we had dissuaded them. Expressed hope that we would not have to try again.

I said might be useful for me see Kutchuk and urge him use restraint to avoid new crisis. Archbishop told me feel free give “Vice President” full account his statements to me. Am seeing Gyani and Plaza tonight and will concert with them before seeing Kutchuk.7

We ended conversation by agreeing that at his usual Thursday evening press conference, he would say that I had called on him to inquire about GOC plans with regard to resolution and to express USG’s support for three-month extension ofUNFICYP and our willingness to provide another $2 million for expenses.

Belcher

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, USUN, and Paris for USRO.

2 Telegram 951, June 17, outlined U.S. strategy for the U.N. Security Council meeting on Cyprus. (Ibid.)

3 Telegram 942, June 14, outlined U.S. strategy for establishing the proper atmosphere for talks in Washington with Inonu and Papandreou. (Ibid., POL 7 TUR)

4 Reference is to the upcoming Security Council debate on the extension of UNFICYP for a further 3 months.

5 On June 16, the heaviest fighting since April broke out in Nicosia and Tyllonia. At the same time Turkish Cypriot spokesmen began charging that the United Nations and its representatives were not conducting themselves in an impartial manner.

6 Telegram 1356, June 12, reported on Galo Plaza’s discussions with Makarios. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)

7  Belcher reported on these talks in telegrams 1381, June 19, and 1395, June 23. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 70


70. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1

Washington, June 21, 1964, 5:52 p.m.

8463. For Bruce. We see coming week as crucial in long-smoldering Cyprus crisis. If Inonu and Papandreou talks should fail to yield constructive results, critical new situation might confront us as early as next week. Even while Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers here, impact of Grivas’ presence on Cyprus or of communal clashes on island could add complications.2 Role played by British will have great significance during these days. We sense UKG would prefer avoid facing hard contingencies that may lie ahead, and we look to you to help strengthen their realism and readiness to take any difficult actions that may become necessary.

On June 20, Under Sec Ball called in British Ambassador to explain how we view upcoming talks with Inonu and Papandreou.3 Ball said our objective is to get Greeks and Turks into serious high-level discussions in presence distinguished American. Dean Acheson has agreed to undertake this task. We estimate Turks will agree, but Papandreou will be more difficult. We expect tell Papandreou close vote of confidence in Ankara4 ominous sign that Turks deeply frustrated. If no movement on Cyprus, Inonu could fall. We should be under no illusions that Turks might then move militarily, whatever we said to them. If Turks moved there would be no question of stopping them with Sixth Fleet or other military means, because we would not fight our allies.

Object in taking this line will be to demonstrate to Papandreou what dangers Greece, Turkey and Western world could face on very short notice unless Greece and Turkey able to compromise their positions. Assuming Inonu will by then have agreed to talks, Papandreou will be told flatly that he will be risking security of his country and of Alliance unless he also agrees to substantive talks.

Harlech agreed Greeks must face up to dangers. US should “make their flesh creep” by spelling out prospects and making them understand US would not stop Turkish intervention if it were started contrary to American advice.

Ball raised question of British plans for such contingency. He returned to discussions of last February when London had agreed to consider possible tripartite intervention should Turks move. Harlech drew back fast from that particular suggestion. He left impression British would want no part of fresh military intervention in Cyprus. He did not think HMG had ever agreed to intervention though there had been talk of trying to get Turks and Greeks to limit their advances should they land on island.

On June 21 Ball met with General Taylor and Sec McNamara to review contingencies on which State-Defense planning should focus in immediate future.5

Our contingency problem is what US and UK could do if Inonu and Papandreou talks should result in impasse and if Inonu’s moderation was then eclipsed by more activist Turkish forces, leading to Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. This could now occur without our getting much advance warning. In any case we not at all certain we could turn Turks off again even if we had notice.

This would obviously be war nobody could win. We do not see how Greeks could stop Turkish landing or put effective Greek forces on Cyprus. Nonetheless, Greek and Greek Cypriots could harass Turkish action, delay actual landing of total Turkish force and plunge island into bloodbath. If Greeks widened attack to mainland areas, consequences could be disastrous. Meanwhile UNSC activity would be intense. Western security interests could only be seriously jeopardized and none but Soviets could gain, whether or not they threatened to intervene militarily in Turkey or Cyprus.

Turks, if they moved, would hold they acting legally under Article IV of Treaty after failure of Guarantor Powers to take effective joint action to restore constitutional position. Greeks of course would take opposite stand. In this situation posture and actions of UK could have determining effect. We believe plan proposed by Ball in February still has merit, but will be glad to hear any alternatives British may wish to put forward. In any case, we hope British studying this contingency carefully, for if Turks move it is clear US and UK will need to set their courses fast and to lead their public attitudes appropriately. US and UK must obviously stay in close consultation.

We are also looking urgently at possible Soviet actions in event of military operations over Cyprus, and hope British are doing same. Role of UN also needs study.

More immediate question is impact of return of Grivas to island. We assume British will be extremely agitated; British EmbOff suggested today UK might even withdraw contingent from UNFICYP. We appreciate Grivas’ presence reopens old wounds and we know how sensitive British public is to his earlier role. However, relationships have changed and it is conceivable Grivas could impose more discipline on Greek Cypriot irregulars, correct slide toward Soviets, extend hand of friendship to Turks and protect them from Greek Cypriot extremists, and actually contribute to solution of British difficulties on island. However this may be, it is going to be hard enough—yet essential—to calm down Turkish fears of Grivas and to forestall any rash Turkish reaction. It is equally essential that British not let appearance of Grivas upset our careful preparations to bring Inonu and Papandreou to effective substantive talks. Do try to persuade them of this.

Rusk

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis-TUG. Drafted by Bracken, Jernegan, and Talbot; cleared by Ball; and approved by Talbot.

2  Grivas returned to Cyprus on June 17. The Greek Government announced his return on June 21.

3 A memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP.

4 The Inonu government survived a vote of confidence on June 19 by a vote of 199 to 195.

5 No record of this conversation has been found.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 71


71. Editorial Note

Prime Minister Inonu and Prime Minister Papandreou visited Washington June 22–23 and June 24–25, 1964, respectively, for talks with U.S. officials. Prime Minister Inonu arrived in the United States on June 21 and spent the evening at Williamsburg, Virginia. He met with President Johnson at 10:30 a.m. on June 22 and held subsequent discussions with U.S. officials before departing for New York and meetings at the United Nations on the evening of June 23. For text of statements by President Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, Book II, pages 798–801.

Prime Minister Papandreou arrived in Washington on June 24, following an overnight stay at Williamsburg, for a meeting with the President. He held talks with other U.S. officials June 24–25, prior to departing for New York for discussions at the United Nations. For text of statements by President Johnson and the Greek Prime Minister, see ibid., pages 811–812, 814–816, and 818–819.

Andreas Papandreou, the Prime Minister’s son and Alternate Minister for Coordination, discussed the talks in Washington and New York in Democracy at Gunpoint, pages 133–136. Ball’s recollection of the meeting is in The Past Has Another Pattern, page 355. Documentation is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, County Files, Cyprus, Vol. 8; ibid., Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cyprus; Department of State, Central File POL 23–8 CYP; ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2415–2417; and ibid., Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Papandreou and Inonu Visits.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 72


72. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, June 22, 1964, 11 a.m.

·         SUBJECT

·         Cyprus Situation and Greek-Turkish Relations

·         PARTICIPANTS

·         United States

·         The President

·         Under Secretary of State Ball

·         Ambassador Raymond A. Hare

·         Semih Ustun—interpreter

·         Turkey

·         Prime Minister Inonu

·         Foreign Minister Erkin

·         Ambassador Menemencioglu

The President welcomed Prime Minister Inonu and thanked him for coming to Washington to discuss Cyprus and the Greek-Turkish dispute. The President said these questions have been of great concern to the United States and although the United States does not have ready answers for the many problems of the world, it is the responsibility of statesmen to meet and seek ways to find solutions.

As for Cyprus, the President said we do not have a magic formula to offer, but we are prepared to assist Greece and Turkey in finding a solution. He emphasized it would be unwise to engage in hostilities before making every effort to settle the dispute peacefully. He said that with this in mind, we are ready to make available the services of former Secretary of State Dean Acheson to sit down with Greek and Turkish representatives for quiet and frank talks at Camp David. The President was hopeful that such talks could narrow the gap between the two countries.

Prime Minister Inonu replied that these talks could make possible an exchange of opinions and that in principle he had no objections to the President’s kind offer.

Under Secretary Ball said the talks would be most effective if each country sent a highly responsible official short of the most senior ranks, but still a man holding the complete confidence of his Prime Minister. He said that the participation of responsible and trusted officials below the Foreign Minister level and the use of the special facilities afforded by Camp David would make it much easier to keep the talks completely secret. Foreign Minister Erkin and Mr. Ball agreed that the two Foreign Ministers might join the talks at a later date.

The Prime Minister asked when the talks could begin, and the President replied the sooner the better, perhaps within one week. Prime Minister Inonu and Mr. Ball each expressed some optimism that the talks might quickly help clear the air.

Prime Minister Inonu again expressed his thanks for the President’s help, but added that every time during recent months when there had seemed to be hope for a peaceful settlement, something had developed to block it. He said the President should know that he may have to overcome resistance on the Greek side to the proposed talks. He agreed with the President that there are no gainers in war, but pointed out that Greece appears to be acting under the impression that it can win an easy victory on Cyprus. The Prime Minister said if there is to be a solution satisfactory to both sides, Prime Minister Papandreou must decide that he wants one.

The President commented he had no illusions that his talks with the Greeks would be easy, but he would do his best.

Foreign Minister Erkin raised the subject of the Turkish-Cypriot refugees, now homeless and unable to return to their old villages. He suggested settling the refugees in new homes where they are now. Under Secretary Ball said the Greeks might interpret such a move as de facto partition, thus making the situation more difficult. He pointed out that the International Red Cross could help in the immediate problems of the refugees, and said the United States would view such assistance with sympathy.

Mr. Ball said we may have a new asset on Cyprus in the person of GeneralThimayya, the new commander of the United Nations force on the island.2 The Prime Minister said similar sentiments had been expressed when General Gyani was appointed to the same position.

Foreign Minister Erkin said the Cyprus situation would become serious indeed should the Turkish army contingent on the island be attacked. The President assured the Turkish officials he would do his utmost to persuade the Greek Prime Minister that the issues must be settled peacefully and that Mr. Papandreou should use his influence to maintain tranquility on the island.

The President concluded by saying that Mr. Acheson would be present at Mr. Ball’s luncheon the following day and that further details on the proposed talks could be discussed then.

1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2415. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Greene and approved in U on July 24 and in the White House on July 28. The meeting was held at the White House.

2 On June 20, Secretary-General Thant announced that Thimayya would replace Gyanias commander of UNFICYP. Thimayya assumed command on July 8.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 73


73. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, June 23, 1964.

·         SUBJECT

·         Cyprus

·         PARTICIPANTS

·         (See attached list on page 4)2

Mr. Ball opened the main conversation by saying that the United States did not want to put forward a formal solution for the Cyprus problem but to start by identifying the elements of a possible solution. The Turks, he said think that double enosis would be the best answer whereas the Greeks think that enosis is the solution. For the United States to say now that either of these or certain modifications of either was to be preferred would not be useful. He hoped that Mr.Acheson could push matters forward during the anticipated detailed discussions to come later and that at some time in the future we might then decide to propose something specific to the parties.

Mr. Acheson said he did not consider that these discussions should be regarded as a “lawyer’s dispute”. There was no sense in simply trying to score points on each other. This was not the way to make progress. Rather, it would be wiser to explore separately the vital elements which each country had at stake in this issue. For example, Turkey seemed to have three major concerns:

1) Turkey’s national dignity and prestige;

2) Turkey’s physical security, the question of the degree to which Cyprus in unfriendly hands would be a menace to Turkey;

3) The welfare of the Turkish Cypriots, the security of their lives and property. (He remarked that when the crisis arose this last concern had seemed to be Turkey’s principal worry, but he thought now it had receded into third place.)

Similarly, Mr. Acheson would propose to ask the Greeks to consider what was vital to their national interests, not merely what they would like to have. After doing this with both parties, he would propose that they try to develop a solution from these bases, instead of starting with broad concepts like enosis and double enosis. After these first steps, Mr. Acheson suggested all concerned must decide how to handle Archbishop Makarios and the Cypriots, who were somewhat less than responsible.

Dr. Erim3 commented that Mr. Acheson’s proposed method was a rational approach to a final solution but that the question remained how to preserve security on the Island until a solution could be reached. Mr. Ball replied that a condition to the talks must be that both Ankara and Athens would exert every effort to keep things quiet on the Island. Mr. Acheson added that he hoped the discussions would be very short and the security problem would not be with us for long. Dr. Erim said we could not count on a quick solution, to which Mr. Ball replied that we must not start with the expectation that the talks would be protracted, the situation was too urgent. Mr. Ball foresaw three problems during the talks:

1) Maintenance of security on the Island;

2) Possible disruptive activities by Makarios;

3) Possible Communist activity.

Therefore, we must hurry things along. Mr. Acheson concurred heartily, stressing that the present state of affairs would not permit long negotiations of the type which eventually resulted in the Austrian State Treaty; the situation was too explosive. Foreign Minister Erkin interjected that even next week we might have a moral collapse of Turkish Cypriots.

Mr. Ball said that we would like to have the talks begin right after July 4th. There was no dissent. He also suggested that Camp David would be the best site for the talks. Again there was no dissent.

Erkin urged that we try to make sure the Greeks don’t leak news of our plan toMakarios. Mr. Ball said we would do our best but could not guarantee anything.

At various times during the conversation, Turkish representatives voiced special concern not only about the general prospect for security on the Island but also about the situation of the displaced Turkish Cypriots who had left their homes. They asserted that relief for these people had been inadequate and that they were living in a state of dire need. Further, the British relief agencies would be withdrawing from the picture at the end of this month. The American side expressed belief that the International Red Cross would carry forward. The Turks expressed doubts on this and pointed out that the IRC can work only through the local government; if the local government were not willing to cooperate, nothing would be done. The American side gave general assurances of support for the relief effort.

The Turks further asserted that the Greek-Cypriot authorities were threatening to prevent the resupplying of the Turkish Army contingents on Cyprus and that this unit would soon exhaust its present stocks. They asked for American help on this problem, which was promised.

Most of the balance of the discussion was concerned with the wording of the joint communiqué. The text of the final draft as issued is attached.4

At one point Mr. Ball asked how the Turks interpreted the return of General Grivasto Cyprus. Erkin commented that it was not a good sign from a Turkish point of view, and others made similar remarks, but there was no noticeable excitement or special disturbance on the part of the Turks.

Summary: The conversation confirmed agreement on the following points:

1) Provided the Greek Government also agreed, Turkey would participate in secret talks with the Greeks and Mr. Acheson directed toward agreement on a final and permanent solution of the Cyprus dispute.

2) These talks should begin at Camp David promptly after July 4th.

3) The Turkish representative would be Dr. Nihat Erim. (Dr. Erim remarked that he was scheduled to come to the United States later this summer on a leader grant and that this could be given as the reason for his return here when he came for the talks.)

4) In the meantime, the United States would do its best to assist in assuring the welfare of the Turkish-Cypriot refugees.

1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2415. Secret;Exdis-TUG. Drafted by Jernegan and approved in U on July 13. The meeting was held during a luncheon aboard the Presidential yacht S.S. Sequoia on the Potomac River.

2 Not printed. Prime Minister Inonu, Foreign Minister Erkin, and AmbassadorMenemencioglu were accompanied by five Turkish officials. Under Secretary of State Balland former Secretary of State Acheson were accompanied by Talbot, Jernegan, andSpringsteen.

3 Dr. Nihat Erim, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Turkish National Assembly.

4 Not printed. For text of the joint communiqué issued on June 23, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 582.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 74


74. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, June 24, 1964, 10:30 a.m.

·         SUBJECT

·         Cyprus Problem

·         PARTICIPANTS

·         The U.S Side

·         The President

·         The Under Secretary

·         Ambassador Labouisse

·         The Greek Side

·         Prime Minister Papandreou

·         Foreign Minister Costopoulos

·         Alternate Minister of Coordination Andreas Papandreou

·         Ambassador Matsas

The President welcomed the Prime Minister for a discussion of a matter which he knew was of deep concern to both of them. The President stated that he had no desire to impose our will on anyone; we have no formula. However, he is worried that our friends differ among themselves, and he hopes very much that, rather than fighting, they can get together for talks which will lead to a solution.

The President referred to the recent threatened move by Turkey and the action he had taken in an effort to forestall it, saying that he was following the teaching of Isaiah: “Come let us reason together”. The President had asked the Turks not to act without talking with us and with Greece. After an exchange of communications, Prime Minister Inonu had agreed to come to Washington for talks.

The President then went on to say that he had not presented to Inonu any formula or recommendation re a particular solution but that he had urged as strongly as possible that the Turks sit down and reason with the people of Greece. The President stressed that statesmen should get together and reason. He had toldInonu that if the Turks would agree to talk with the Greeks, the United States would provide the arrangements and facilities, including an outstanding American citizen, Mr. Dean Acheson, to assist.

The President said that he knew that Prime Minister Papandreou felt very strongly in the matter of Cyprus—that he knew the Prime Minister’s viewpoint, and that Papandreou felt justified in it. The President added, however, that he hoped very much that Mr. Papandreou would agree that discussions be held with the Turks. He specified that he was not proposing talks on the Prime Minister or even Foreign Minister levels, but rather between duly authorized representatives of the two countries. He felt that the meetings should be secret and should be held in the immediate future, and he suggested they be held with the assistance of Dean Acheson at Camp David. The Prime Minister indicated that he had a high regard for Mr. Acheson.

The President went on to say that the Secretary General of the UN wanted the United States to help, in fact, he was anxious for us to do it within the spirit of theUN. There was no proposal to go around the UN.

The President said to Papandreou that he had told Inonu that he wanted history to remember him as a statesman who would reason and not as a warrior. While Inonuhad accepted this line of argument, the President did not know how long Inonucould keep his people behind him.

If the Prime Minister of Greece could designate someone who has his confidence who could meet with the Turkish representative and Mr. Acheson, PresidentJohnson was sure that this could be arranged very quickly. There was everything to gain and nothing to lose by trying to reason. The alternative could be very bad and bloody, and we would want no part of it; we cannot be in a position of fighting our allies. The President went on to say that we have exercised our very best efforts to prevent a disaster. He pointed out that anyone can start a war, but confidence,patience and wisdom were needed to prevent one. He said, therefore, he wanted to have meetings started during the next week and he was sure that all people would welcome this. He emphasized that he was not asking that anyone yield any right, but only that they try to reason.

The President then referred to the vote which had just taken place on the foreign aid bill2 and said that he could lead the American people if the people think he is doing all possible to prevent bloodshed and work with the UN. But the people are worried about growing tensions between Greece and Turkey and they do not want this to continue. He was sure that if we three try to reason this matter out, it will help a great deal.

He said to Papandreou that if the latter would cooperate and search for peace, he will have the approbation of the UN and of the people of this country; the alternative is too horrible to contemplate. If we cannot cooperate in this search for peace, the President will have to tell the American people what to expect, and he added again we cannot be in a position of fighting an ally. Under the circumstances, the President said what we want to ask is that talks be held in search of a solution and we do not think that this is an unreasonable request. He expressed the hope that before July 4 he could get Inonu to designate a representative and Papandreou to do likewise. They, with Mr. Acheson, could explore the roads to a solution.

The President continued that, with the help of Mr. Acheson, we can develop plans which will help both our allies down the years and he then referred to the need for economic development of both countries instead of wasting their resources. The President ended by saying that if the American representative recommends a plan for promoting peace and prosperity, he was sure the American people would follow along.

The Prime Minister then spoke. He said that we were before a very critical situation and we needed to avoid war. He wanted to explore what was the best procedure, for he thought that there was confusion between what we called absolute and relative questions.

He said that the two world wars could have been prevented if the leaders of those times had acted properly. He said that for this reason he expressed great appreciation for President Johnson’s interest in the Cyprus matter.

On the question of procedure, Papandreou asserted that the procedure suggested by President Johnson would lead to war—“if an understanding does not come about through Mr. Acheson, war will result”. He also asserted that we all have a common aim of avoiding war and this was why he could not accept the viewpoint put forward by Mr. Stikker that when an issue is between two members of NATO, NATO must be neutral. Since the arms of the NATO powers are for use against the enemy, is it possible that NATO would permit their use against an ally?

Papandreou stated that the Greeks have responsibility for bringing about peace on the island by influencing the Greek Cypriots; the Turks have a similar responsibility with respect to the Turkish Cypriots. This, he said, was his first point: differences should be settled only through peaceful means.

Papandreou went on to say that as the points of view between Turkey and Greece differed so widely, nothing could be expected from the meeting proposed by the President and consequently the extremists on both sides would contend that there was nothing to do but to fight. “When the presupposition is that no war will take place, we can then talk with safety.”

Papandreou said that he was prepared to go personally to Cyprus to insure calm and then there would be no excuse for a Turkish landing.

The Prime Minister asserted that he was not thinking just as a leader of Greece but as a leader belonging to a country of the Free World. This led him to the discussion of intervention, saying there were two arguments to be discussed—one legal and one substantive. On the legal side, the right of intervention had been lost when Cyprus entered the UN—there was no longer any basis for intervention. On the substantive side, there was an argument that both the Turks and Greeks must be satisfied. This, he alleged, was false. “Turkey does not lose anything. A century ago it sold Cyprus, so what valid right does it have?” He argued that security was the only basis for negotiation and he agreed that Turkey must be offered security. This, he said, is why he had put forward “NATOfication” as the most desirable solution of the Cyprus problem.

He alluded to other possible solutions, saying that in the case of partition, the non-Turkish part of the island would become Communist.

Concerning the possibility of Greece giving up something to Turkey as part of a solution, Papandreou said that Greece wanted nothing in Cyprus—its position was “merely that through democratic principles the majority can rule and the minority can be protected.” He put the question “if Greece does not take anything, why should Greece give?” He asserted that the question of enosis was a matter for the Cypriots; that self-determination would be good for Cyprus and for the Free World.

Returning to the proposal for a meeting, Papandreou said he was afraid that a confrontation of the two points of view at the present time would lead to war. Instead of this confrontation, talks should be carried on by the Mediator and, meanwhile, peace on the island should be maintained in order to avoid provocation.

Papandreou then repeated his argument that NATO should not permit NATO-furnished arms to be used by either Turkey or Greece to fight one another.

Papandreou concluded by expressing the view that if the meeting should be held with Mr. Acheson, the latter would have to report no agreement at the end of ten days.

President Johnson asked why Mr. Acheson would have to report no agreement if the two parties entered the discussions in good faith.

Mr. Ball interjected here to say that we cannot be sure that the Turks will not move. He suggested that we explore this whole matter further at luncheon.

1 Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Papandreou and Inonu Visits. Secret; Exdis-TUG. Drafted by Labouisse and approved in U on July 29 and in the White House on July 30. The meeting was held in the President’s office.

2 On June 10, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 11380, the 1965 Foreign Aid Appropriations bill, by a vote of 230 to 175. The bill authorized a total of $2 billion in assistance.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 75


75. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, June 24, 1964, 12:30 p.m.

·         SUBJECT

·         Cyprus Situation and Greek-Turkish Relations

·         PARTICIPANTS

·         United States

·         The Under Secretary

·         Dean Acheson, Former Secretary of State

·         Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense

·         Maxwell Taylor, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

·         Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary, NEA

·         Ambassador Henry Labouisse

·         John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA

·         George S. Springsteen, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary

·         Greece

·         Prime Minister Papandreou

·         Foreign Minister Costopoulos

·         Andreas Papandreou, Minister Alternate of Economic Coordination

·         Ambassador Alexander A. Matsas

Under Secretary Ball referred to President Johnson’s proposal of that morning that Greek and Turkish representatives meet quietly with Dean Acheson to try to arrive at some agreement on the main issues in the Cyprus crisis.2 In making this suggestion, the President did not intend that the U.S. replace the UN mediator. Rather, the mediator himself had realized he had come to an impasse and asked us to use our good offices. The U.S. agrees with the Prime Minister’s remark that a breakdown of these proposed talks would lead to a dangerous situation, but we are also convinced that serious danger exists now, and so negotiations are essential.

Mr. Ball continued that there are two elements in the problem: (1) to negotiate a just solution and (2) to do so in a way which will prevent irresponsible forces from taking over Cyprus. He said Greece and Turkey are thinking along the same lines; and so now is the time to talk about procedures which serve everyone’s interests. Mr. Ball added that the day before the Americans had taken a strong line with Turkish Prime Minister Inonu. Turkey now recognizes that a new basis for Cyprus must be negotiated.

The Prime Minister commented that the first requirement is security on Cyprus. Greece is trying to establish security; Turkey must try also. He said the Cypriots must then have an opportunity to exercise self-determination. Under any final arrangements, there would of course be guarantees for the Turk-Cypriots.

The Prime Minister said NATO needs a new principle: no member has the right to begin war against another. He continued that Turkey’s former right of intervention is not valid now that Cyprus is covered by the UN Charter. If there is no danger to the Turk-Cypriot community, then Turkey’s argument on the need to intervene collapses. As for solutions, Turkey suggests partition or federation, neither of which is anyone’s interest, including Turkey’s. The Prime Minister said partition would lead the non-Turkish part of the island into becoming another Cuba, and thus a grave danger to Turkey’s security. The other proposal, federation, would lead to civil war. The Prime Minister concluded that the only possible solution is unrestricted independence. This would be followed by a plebiscite and enosis, a solution which is certainly in the free world’s interests. Turkey would lose nothing and would in fact gain security. The Turkish-Cypriots would be protected just as are the Thracian Turks now. Prime Minister Papandreou said Greece would also be willing to offer international guarantees for the Turkish minority. The Cyprus crisis had now moved into the context of East-West rivalries, and the Prime Minister said he could not always exclude contacts by Makarios with the USSR.

Mr. Ball replied that he must question the Prime Minister’s statement that NATOshould oppose war between two members. He said he was certain that no NATOcountry would oppose Turkey if it tried to enforce its treaty rights on Cyprus. As for the United States, the President had said in the morning we would not fight an ally in a situation as complicated as this. The Under Secretary said we will not interpose the Sixth Fleet. The U.S. would certainly attempt to dissuade Turkey, but not by the use of force. With this background, he concluded, it is obvious that the talks as suggested by President Johnson are essential to avert danger and permit the mediator to get on with his work.

Prime Minister Papandreou said that this line of thinking leaves no conclusion but war. In a conflict between the old agreements and unrestricted independence, there is no bridge. Sooner or later Turkey will go to war, although he said he would be happy if his pessimism were shown to be unfounded. Turkey is too weak now to bridge this gap, and so there is no need for the Prime Minister to meet with Inonu. Rather the better approach would be to wait for the mediator’s report. Perhaps by the process of elimination and with the passage of time, we may find a way. For the moment, the Prime Minister said he thought Greece and Turkey should undertake a reconnaissance to see whether future negotiations are possible; if so, then the real talks might begin.

The Under Secretary said it would be a mistake to limit action to keeping the peace on Cyprus while awaiting the mediator’s report. We would only be deceiving ourselves, because if there is no progress, we could not expect the GOT to restrain the activist forces in Turkey.

Mr. Ball continued that what the Prime Minister suggests is an exploration—that is, a Greek representative, Professor Erim of Turkey, and Mr. Acheson would meet to explore quietly the possibilities of some kind of action and to narrow the differences between the two sides. During that interval, Turkey would attempt to keep the Turk-Cypriots quiet. We would certainly fear the consequences should we have to tell Prime Minister Inonu that, despite his desisting from military action, we had been unable to arrange any useful alternative.

Prime Minister Papandreou repeated that the GOG would be willing to begin exploratory talks with Turkey. If there appeared to be room for talks he would then appoint someone for real negotiations, but given the present positions of the two Governments, there is little point at present of undertaking actual negotiations. Even though Greece and Turkey may be close now, there must first be cautious preliminary contact.

On Mr. Ball’s invitation Mr. Acheson commented that in insisting that there be peace on Cyprus before serious negotiations, the Prime Minister was raising the old chicken-egg question. He asked whether any pacification is possible until the views of Turkey and Greece are closer than they are now. Mr Acheson said no solution can fully satisfy both parties, but what is important is maintaining peace. He said the Prime Minister speaks of principles and theory, but as Mr. Acheson grows older, he believes more and more that general principles do not decide specific cases. The Prime Minister’s suggestion would place the talks in too narrow a framework. There must be more room for flexibility.

The Prime Minister replied that in this case the principle comes from a concrete case on which he had generalized. The point is, he said, that if the impression is given that negotiations are underway and they then fail, there would certainly be trouble. So there must be a reconnaissance first. He said he defended the principle of self-determination. If he did not, the Greek-Cypriots would follow their own way, and he could not influence them. If the United States thinks negotiations are possible, does it have an opinion about a final solution?

The Under Secretary replied that Prime Minister Inonu had asked a similar question and Mr. Ball’s answer now would be the same: any USG-sponsored solution would be condemned to failure. But in the course of Mr. Acheson’s talks he could evoke certain points of view, and he might then be able to say that A is better than B. Mr. Ball turned to self-determination, saying that the USG had long advanced such an approach to international problems, but, in looking at Cyprus, there are a number of elements of which self-determination is only one. He said Mr.Acheson would try to identify all of the elements on each side. If we do not do something, America’s influence over the GOT would rapidly dissipate, and the consequences could be terrifying. Mr. McNamara and General Taylor are here to discuss these possible consequences.

The Prime Minister said the GOG has great esteem for Mr. Acheson and accepts in principle his offer to make contacts on both sides. If, after these contacts, Mr.Acheson thinks actual negotiations would be useful, then the Prime Minister would appoint a representative.

Mr. Acheson said there are several elements immediately obvious. One is that of prestige and dignity. No solution can humiliate either side; nor can it be a complete victory for either side. Secondly, is the question of security, which concerns Turkey more than Greece. Therefore, the GOG should be sympathetic on this issue. Next come the people of Cyprus. The Prime Minister has said this element is more important to Greece, but actually it is also important to Turkey.

Prime Minister Papandreou said he was glad Mr. Acheson had included the Cypriot people in his listing. The greatest weight must be given to that element—its rights to a majority decision and its right to appeal to the UN. He said he also agreed that the security element is more significant for Turkey. He continued, however, that Mr.Acheson must be aware that the Greek starting position for any negotiations is unrestricted independence for Cyprus.

Mr. Ball commented that this would be a negotiation beginning with the conclusion and, therefore, would not be a negotiation at all.

Mr. Acheson said the purpose of two-party negotiations is not to take an unchangeable stand, but rather to see what can be accomplished. If the GOG sticks to its position, the GOT will not change its views about the binding validity of the present treaties and Turkey’s resulting right of intervention.

Prime Minister Papandreou insisted that there is no alternative to unrestricted independence. Mr. Ball replied that he agrees the present system on Cyprus has not worked. We must search for others. There are dangerous forces at work, and we must be practical; as the President said during the morning meeting, the USGcannot make moral judgements on this crisis. We are in a grey area in which neither Cypriot community has met 20th Century moral standards. The only choice is a compromise solution.

The Prime Minister concluded that he had expressed his views and heard those of the Americans. He would give his reply to their proposals before leaving Washington.3

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Greene and approved in U on August 10. The meeting was held aboard the Presidential yacht S.S. Sequoia on the Potomac River.

2 See Document 74.

3 For text of the joint communiqué issued on June 25 by President Johnson and Prime Minister Papandreou, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 582–583.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 76


76. Memorandum of Conversation1

New York, June 26, 1964.

·         SUBJECT

·         Cyprus

·         PARTICIPANTS

·         U Thant, Secretary General of the UN

·         Mr. Tuomioja, UN Mediator

·         George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State

·         Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the UN

·         Charles W. Yost, U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN

·         Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs

·         Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

I.

In morning session with the UN Mediator Tuomioja, Under Secretary Ball and Ambassador Stevenson (with Ambassador Yost, Assistant Secretary Talbot and Assistant Secretary Cleveland) outlined upshot of Washington conversations with Prime Minister Inonu and Papandreou, and asked whether Mr. Tuomioja would be prepared to ask Greek and Turkish Governments to appoint representatives to assist him, ask the United States to provide someone to help, and arrange private Greek-Turkish talks as part of the UN mediation framework.

Mr. Tuomioja said he personally considered this “a practical approach”, but as “UNman”, he had to consider following angles and discuss them with the Secretary General:

(a) He saw no difficulty in his asking Greek and Turkish Governments provide representatives to assist him in finding a permanent solution.

(b) He thought something would have to be done to cut the Cypriots in. He was clear they should not be in the Greek-Turkish meetings as such, but should perhaps be available somewhere nearby so that Mr. Tuomioja could keep in consultation with the Government of Cyprus. Mr. Tuomioja made clear he regarded this as window dressing at this stage.

(c) He did not like Camp David as a site, preferring somewhere in Switzerland. Recognizing that Geneva is quite accessible to daily contact with the press, he mentioned Lausanne or Evian as possibilities.

(d) He found most difficulty with his designating an American to help him or asking the United States Government to do so. He clearly thought this would produce considerable political heat from the Russians, Cypriots and others, and wanted to consider with the Secretary General how much of this kind of heat the United Nations could properly take.

On the substance of the solution, he said in his opinion “only basis is enosis”, with whatever compensation is necessary to make it palatable to the Turks. But he also commented that the “Makarios solution”, which he defined as unrestricted independence leading rapidly to enosis, would not be so bad.

He was not surprised to learn that the Turks were relatively easy to deal with in Washington, while the Greeks were making difficulties. The Turks are in “very weak” position, unless they play their ultimate card. The Greeks naturally believe that the United States will prevent the Turks playing that card; counting on the United States, therefore the Greeks feel that they “have it their own way.”

II.

A meeting of the same Americans with the Secretary General (also Bunche and Rolz-Bennett) followed:

The Under Secretary opened with a summary of the events since February as the United States sees them, stressing the Turkish threats, and Turkish “bitterness and frustration” when dissuaded from action by the United States. The United States had decided we could help best by having the Greeks and Turks get together with Mr. Dean Acheson at a private retreat such as Camp David.

The Turks had agreed, but the Greeks evidently found difficulties with this proposition. Papandreou had made strong domestic commitments that he would not talk with the Turks under US pressure; and the Greeks anyway think time is on their side. Mr. Ball said the United States had made clear we would not fight an ally (“You couldn’t sink Turkish ships,” commented U Thant); the Under Secretary added that our influence in Ankara might prove a wasting asset.

At the end of the Papandreou discussions in Washington, Mr. Ball said, the Greeks agreed that they would do anything the Mediator asks them to do, including designating representatives or even meeting jointly with Mr. Acheson if the Mediator requests it. Mr. Ball then reported on our conversation with Tuomioja. The Secretary General said Tuomioja had also meanwhile reported to him.

The points the Secretary General made in reply were these:

(a) The UN Mediator is competent to adopt whatever procedures he wishes, but asked the Secretary General for political advice on US suggestions.

(b) The Secretary General and Tuomioja have agreed that it would be useful to ask Greek and Turkish Governments to provide representatives to assist in finding a permanent solution.

(c) The resulting discussions should probably be in Geneva rather than in the United States.

(d) The Secretary General thought that any formula for designating Mr. Acheson as counsel to the UN Mediator would create difficulties under the Security Council Resolution of March 4th.

(e) The Secretary General’s counterproposal was that Tuomioja would invite the Turks and the Greeks to designate representatives to meet with him in or near Geneva, on the understanding that Tuomioja was also free to consult with a representative of the United States (Dean Acheson). Mr. Acheson could be close by and in frequent touch with the Mediator as conversations proceeded.

The Under Secretary said in his judgment the contribution of the United States would not be worth anything on this basis, and a lengthy discussion followed.

The Secretary General made clear that he did believe “the United States is in the best position to contribute to a peaceful solution of this problem” and that it would be useful for the United States to be constructively related to the mediation process. But he was sure that if the United Nations served as cover for United States participation, it would make great difficulties for the Secretary General under the Security Council Resolution. His point was that the Security Council Resolution provides for appointment of a Mediator with the consent of all four governments concerned (Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom and Cyprus). If Cyprus, or any of the others decided that the Mediator was operating in an unsatisfactory manner, and so declared to the Secretary General, U Thant said he would have no alternative but to terminate Tuomioja’s services and get another mediator.

The Secretary General also argued that the presence of Acheson as a UNrepresentative would increase likelihood Cypriots would want to be represented too and he predicted the Soviets would ask for a Security Council meeting to complain of manner in which the Secretary General was discharging his responsibility under March 4 Resolution. Some political risk was acceptable, but as Ralph Bunche put it, the risk was too high if the Mediator provided cover for a US operation. “Perhaps the mediator is expendable but the Secretary General is not.”

In the course of this discussion, the Secretary General and Mr. Bunche came around to a somewhat more flexible proposal, under which Mr. Acheson, operating not as UN counsel but as a representative of the United States Government, would meet not only with Tuomioja but also with the Greeks and Turks, together or separately as seemed most useful. But such meetings would have to be worked out on spot with the Greeks and the Turks rather than taking place under the UNMediator’s direct sponsorship.

The Secretary General seemed not to share fully our sense of urgency in a quick solution, though Ralph Bunche commented at one point that the United Nations Force in Cyprus is in an increasingly untenable position, with the continuing inflow of arms and growing bitterness between the two ethnic groups.

In the course of discussions, the Under Secretary mentioned that the Mediator had made known to the Turks his personal view that a likely permanent solution was enosis with Greece. This was clearly news to both the Secretary General andBunche, who said this had not been included in any report by the Mediator; they could fully understand the dangerous effect of such comments by a UN Mediator on sensitive Turkish nerves. The Under Secretary made clear that the United States has no position on an ultimate solution, but doubted that any straight enosis recommendation by the Mediator was a useful starting-point for the substantive discussions.

III.

After luncheon for Prime Minister Papandreou, the Secretary General informed Ambassador Yost of the substance of his conversation with the Prime Minister before lunch, as follows:

Papandreou had said he is entirely willing, if the UN Mediator so requests, to designate a Representative to meet with a Turkish Representative and withTuomioja at any time. If meeting is to take place in New York, the Prime Minister would designate the Greek Permanent Representative to the UN, AmbassadorBitsios. The Secretary General replied that Tuomioja would be making his headquarters for the time being in Geneva and the meetings could be held there.

When the Secretary General raised question of the presence of a United States Representative at these meetings, Prime Minister Papandreou replied he would not wish a US Representative to be formally designated by Mr. Tuomioja as advisor or counsel or to take part in meetings of Greeks and Turks chaired by Mr. Tuomioja. When the Secretary General proposed, however, that Mr. Dean Acheson as US Representative might be available in Geneva, “even in next room or in next building”, to meet separately with mediator, and with Greek and Turkish Representatives, in order assist in search for settlement, Prime Minister Papandreou replied that this would be entirely agreeable to him.

The Secretary General commented that this seemed to him a reasonable arrangement which should take account of our views and needs without risking the kinds of difficulties which he had outlined to us this morning. He added that Prime Minister Papandreou and Mr. Tuomioja were at that moment discussing details of the proposed arrangement.

Subsequently, Ambassador Yost called Mr. Tuomioja who said he had reached agreement with Prime Minister Papandreou along the lines the Secretary General had described, and would be addressing to the United States about July 6 an invitation to send a representative to Geneva to be available for consultation. He has in mind himself proceeding to Geneva from Cyprus July 4, and opening the meeting with Greeks and Turks early the following week. He would keep closely in touch with Mr. Acheson, and believed the Greeks and the Turks would do likewise.

He said he plans to hold conversations with the Greeks and the Turks at UNheadquarters in Geneva (the Palais des Nations) but that meetings with Mr.Acheson might take place wherever convenient to all concerned. He was confident of his ability to carry on negotiations without undue press interference and did not contemplate any announcement to the press of the proposed Greek-Turkish talks until they actually begin. He did not intend before July 6 to address formal invitation to Greeks and Turks to meet with him.

Ambassador Yost emphasized the importance of extending an invitation to the Turks promptly so that they would know that the desired negotiations are about to commence and would hence be more likely to refrain from any hazardous action. Mr. Tuomioja saw the point and said that, after consultation with his UN colleagues, he would either address formal invitations to the Greeks and the Turks right away, or else would issue statement to the press announcing that he intends to extend such an invitation.

Comment: It is clear that the Secretary General cannot be pushed to provide United Nations sponsorship for mediation between the Greeks and the Turks essentially conducted by the United States. However, we must apply a sufficient proportion of US persuasion to a mediation process set up by the UN Mediator. Sine qua non is therefore that we make sure that all parties concerned at this stage (Greeks, Turks,SYG and Tuomioja) understand need for, and welcome, day-to-day discussions with US representative at or near the scene of mediation talks.

1 Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Memcons Other Than Visits. Secret; Exdis-TUG. Drafted by Cleveland and Yost and approved in U on June 29.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 77


77. Memorandum of Conversation1

New York, June 26, 1964, 6:30 p.m.

·         SUBJECT

·         Cyprus

·         PARTICIPANTS

·         Greek

·         His Excellency George Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece

·         His Excellency Andreas Papandreou, Minister-alternate for Economic Coordination

·         His Excellency Alexander A. Matsas, Ambassador of Greece

·         Mr. John Sossides, Chef de Cabinet of the Prime Minister

·         United States

·         The Honorable George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State

·         The Honorable Henry R. Labouisse, American Ambassador to Greece

·         The Honorable Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

·         The Honorable Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Mr. Ball called on Prime Minister Papandreou to confirm and pull together the results of several discussions earlier in the day that had involved the Greek Prime Minister’s party, the Secretary General of the United Nations, the United Nations Mediator, and Mr. Ball and his colleagues. The Prime Minister was extremely tired. Three hours earlier he had cancelled a talk at the Council on Foreign Relations. He was cheerful, however. He felt he had reached a “perfect understanding” with the mediator, and could leave the United States having overcome the “mood of dispute” that characterized his Washington talks. Nevertheless, when pressed on details of the proposed arrangements, he continued to resist firmly all suggestions that the Greek and United States Governments could, if necessary, agree together to involve an American representative in the Cyprus discussions.

Observing that the Prime Minister had had a busy day in New York, Mr. Ball asked how he now saw the situation. The Prime Minister replied that happily he and the mediator, Ambassador Tuomioja, had reached total agreement. The mediator would be in Geneva and Mr. Papandreou would name a representative to meet with him. After that the mediator would have the total initiative; whatever he asked, Mr. Papandreou would accept. The meeting with the Secretary General, on the other hand, had been rather more difficult. In passing, U Thant had said that all people were speaking to him today about Dean Acheson. The Secretary General believed an impression of conspiracy would develop if Mr. Acheson were brought directly into the negotiations.

Mr. Ball said that in considering possible arrangements we had been sensitive to the political problems of the Prime Minister. We wanted to see a satisfactory solution. As he understood the agreed plan, the mediator would invite Mr. Acheson to Geneva and suggest to the Greek and Turkish representatives who would be there that there be some talks with Mr. Acheson as well. The Prime Minister said the mediator had not told him Mr. Acheson would see the representatives independently of himself. Mr. Cleveland noted that we had understood from Ambassador Tuomioja that he would prefer not to have four-way meetings. The mediator would meet with representatives of Greece and Turkey, and he expected that Mr. Acheson would do so also. The Prime Minister said he had understood the essence of the mediator’s position to be that at the first stage any meetings with Mr.Acheson should be bilateral and not with the Greeks and Turks present together. The Greek and Turkish representatives would not meet together unless their Governments specifically agreed on that. However, he respected totally the initiative of Mr. Tuomioja.

Mr. Ball said we probably had the basis for the beginning of some talks. Success would depend on the will of the parties. Knowing it would not be easy, we were prepared to be helpful in any way we could. The Prime Minister expressed pleasure that we were now in agreement. He was also grateful for the initiative that had been taken by President Johnson. Greece needs peace, and for this it needs a final objective solution of the Cyprus dispute.

Mr. Ball commented that meanwhile we had received disturbing reports about conditions on the island itself. The Prime Minister replied that on those matters he would use all of his influence. We could count on that. He had told Mr. Tuomiojathat as soon as the mediator’s request arrived he would send a representative immediately to Geneva. The Prime Minister added that he was happy that we could meet today to show a change in the atmosphere to one of friendship and understanding rather than dispute.

The Prime Minister reiterated that so long as the mediator suggested a meeting between the Greek representative and Mr. Acheson it would be done. Mr. Ballconcluded that this formula should help move things along if the parties so desired. Mr Talbot asked hypothetically what would be the situation if the mediator invited Mr. Acheson to Geneva but for one reason or another was shy about specifically asking the Greek and Turkish representatives to meet with him. There would be a general invitation but from what the Secretary General had said in the morning it was conceivable that the mediator would hesitate to make a formal request of the parties to meet with Mr. Acheson. Mr. Talbot said that if something like this should happen he assumed our two governments could work things out together. The Prime Minister replied that this would change the basic situation. It was essential that the mediator take the initiative. He could send a general invitation to all the parties. Just four men would be involved so there should be no mystery. It would need to be at the mediator’s initiative, however.

Mr. Ball said that we understood the Prime Minister’s approach. In a situation like this, of course, people must proceed pragmatically. We would have preferred a simpler situation, but we will work within the practical framework. As the President had said to the Prime Minister, we had been disappointed that we could not work out a more straightforward arrangement. Faced with the dangerous situation in Cyprus, however, we must do all we can. He could assure the Prime Minister that the United States would do everything possible to cooperate. As the Prime Minister had observed, Ambassador Labouisse was greatly trusted by the Secretary of State and the President and he could speak with an authoritative voice in discussing these matters with the Prime Minister. We would do what we could to get us all out of a very dangerous situation.

The Prime Minister once again thanked Mr. Ball, expressing his appreciation for the reception that had been given him in Washington, and confirmed that AmbassadorLabouisse’s many qualities made him a valuable cooperator in Athens. The discussion was left at that point.

1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 74 D 272, CF 2417. Secret;Exdis-TUG. Drafted by Talbot and approved in U on July 11. The meeting was held at the Plaza Hotel.

77-155

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 78


78. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1

New York, June 27, 1964, 3:25 p.m.

4651. Re: Cyprus. Stevenson, Cleveland and Yost had rather discouraging conversation with SYG this afternoon.

When told that Tuomioja had informed us he intended to dispatch invitation toUSG to send representative to Geneva to be available during his conversations with Greek and Turkish representatives, SYG said he had never contemplated that Mediator would go so far and that it would be most unwise politically. He repeated what he had said yesterday that this might provoke withdrawal of confidence in Mediator by Cypriot Govt.

He was, however, prepared to advise Tuomioja that, if Acheson comes to Geneva during Greek-Turkish conversations, he would recommend to both parties that they meet separately or collectively with Acheson and express view US could make unique contribution to negotiations.

In course of conversation, SYG expanded somewhat on his conversation with Papandreou yesterday, reporting that PM, while prepared to have his representative meet with Turks and Mediator at latter’s request, saw no real use in meeting since he thought both parties would merely repeat known positions. As far as Greece is concerned, he added, Cyprus is independent state and UN member, and its only obligation is to decide its future by democratic principles laid down in Charter. Turks must simply accept such settlement, although there can be NATObase on Cyprus with Turkish participation and international guarantees for Turkish minority.

It was left that Stevenson would communicate with SYG after he meets with Papandreou this evening and that, unless new complications appeared, Thant would communicate with Tuomioja in Helsinki, urging him to dispatch invitations to GOTand GOG promptly, to get meetings started as soon as possible, and advising him under circumstances described above, he should recommend parties meet withAcheson.

Incidentally, it was also mentioned that Galo Plaza has informed SYG he intends to leave Cyprus end of first week in July since he believes there is nothing more he can do unless and until there is progress toward political settlement.

Stevenson

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 79


79. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1

Nicosia, June 29, 1964, 6 p.m.

1422. Re Deptel 978.2 In hour-long conversation with President this morning we discussed number of subjects, principal among them the problem of Tylliria area and Grivas return. (Latter covered in separate telegram.)3

Conversation opened by my reference to recent Washington talks in which I followed point by point suggestions outlined reftel 978. I made special point of fact that my reason for bringing up subject of Tylliria was with reference to present delicate situation outlined to me by my old friend Galo Plaza and General Gyani. As in past I was again urging restraint and patience since any dramatic development might well bring on new Turkish move which we might not be in a position stop again.

In response Makarios said first of all we should not read too much into his statement to Associated Press.4 His purpose had been to avoid possible adverse reaction to “expected failure” of Washington talks, hence his effort to play them down while at same time making clear that any decisions regarding future of Cyprus would have to be submitted to Cypriots and could not be result merely of talks between other countries. Said he quite understood US effort in context of over-all UNSYG attempt to find satisfactory solution but he wondered whether failure of Pres Johnson’s efforts had not perhaps left situation worse than it had been two weeks ago. I told him that although matter would be kept confidential for obvious reason we understood Mediator had some further thoughts regarding possibility of further consultations among parties concerned (I did not mention any US involvement and he would presumably be hearing from Tuomioja upon his return).Makarios went on to make surprise statement that in any bilateral talks that might develop with Turkey, Greek Government could only discuss solutions on the basis of enosis of Cyprus with Greece and that any solution other than enosis and/or complete independence could only be reached with participation of Cypriot representatives. (This would seem to explain Papandreou’s refusal consider any possible divergences from these two principles.)

Archbishop said that both Plaza and Gyani had called to impress on him need for patience and restraint but said he had told them that although he would not use armed force that the status quo could not continue indefinitely. He said he had feeling UN would consider its job well done in next three months if it could say that not a shot had been fired. Naturally this was most commendable aim but without some progress on political front basic tensions at least on Greek side could hardly be reduced. Some change would have to come before the end of the year when economic and political pressures would be severe.

President went on to say he could understand our apprehension regarding the present tense situation particularly with regard to possible Turkish intervention and all that would imply. Said he could assure me that for their part Greek Cypriots would not use force unless attacked. They were however giving serious consideration to use of other pressures which he had enumerated to me previously and he again said that if freedom of movement not restored in presently Turkish-held areas, his govt would be forced to deny freedom of movement to Turkish Cypriots.

I expressed gratification at this indication that Greek Cypriot side would do nothing to create a new crisis through military action and I urged him to give very careful consideration to nature of other pressures which he might feel were required in order not to bring on new danger of Turkish intervention which this time we might find even more difficult if not impossible to prevent. Although I had made it quite clear that US could not contemplate hostilities with an ally over Cyprus problem I am not convinced that Archbishop has accepted this as cold fact of situation.

President was more relaxed than during last meeting and seemed much less militant in his declarations of need for progress on political front. Perhaps UN reps plus Greek Amb Delivanis plus our representations have had some effect.

Belcher

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis-TUG. Repeated to USUN.

2 Telegram 978 to Nicosia, June 28, instructed Belcher to convey to Makarios the reality of the danger of a Turkish intervention and the likelihood that the United States would be unable to deter such action. (Ibid.)

3 Telegram 1427 from Nicosia, June 30. (Ibid.)

4 Apparent reference to Makarios’ rejection of the U.S. offer to provide assistance to the U.N. Mediator.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 80


80. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece1

Washington, July 1, 1964, 9:17 p.m.

6. For Chargé. Please deliver soonest following letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister:

“Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I want to tell you again how glad I am that we had an opportunity to visit together and to exchange views on the critical problem of Cyprus. I know that the course of the discussion was not altogether easy for either of us, but I am sure that it is of great importance for those of us who bear the responsibility for government within the Western Alliance to talk honestly together on such grave matters. It is out of just such hard work together that we can ensure a high degree of understanding.

Over this last weekend I have been thinking some more about our conversation and about the problem of Cyprus, and I think it may be helpful for me to continue our discussion by sending this message to you as you return to Athens.

First of all, let me say that the last week has only strengthened my deep conviction that the problem of Cyprus grows more urgent and dangerous with every day that goes by. Until we can get serious negotiations started, we must recognize that time will not work on the side of peace. Right now we are coming near to the last hour. That is why I hope our two Governments can agree in the view that in this very dangerous situation it is absolutely essential that serious and searching talks should be started promptly.

I promise you that my conviction that we are at the edge of a crisis is not lightly formed. It rests on two powerful facts: the first is that passion on Cyprus is now intense on both sides, and the second, that the build-up of armaments on the Island continues. This is a condition which is bound to become increasingly explosive; indeed, the build-up of armaments on the Island is already dangerously close to the flash point. And even without an immediate explosion the belief that danger is steadily increasing could at any time create pressures for intervention in Turkey which may prove irresistible. Having prevented such intervention by most strenuous personal efforts last month, I know very well that there is a limit to what any of us can do from now on, to prevent the Turks from exercising rights which are very real indeed to them.

I see only one way in the world to turn the course of events away from this pathway toward disaster, and that is by a prompt and determined search by Greece and Turkey for a permanent political settlement. I recognize that such a joint effort will have some critics and opponents on all sides, and I recognize also the quite understandable belief of many in your country that all that is needed is that the majority of the people of Cyprus should be allowed to settle their own future. But let me urge with all the force I can, that it simply is not enough, in this most dangerous situation, to have a belief in the rightness of one’s own argument. The pressures on Turkey for action are extremely strong, and they too derive from a deep conviction that Turkish rights are at stake.

As I said in our discussions, the United States most earnestly desires to be helpful in the search for a solution, but the United States does not seek to impose any outside view, or to take sides with one of its friends against another. Our conviction is that any successful solution must derive from the agreement of the parties and cannot be dictated or imposed from outside. But we shall be just as helpful as we can to both our friends, once a serious discussion begins.

Moved by my sense of the increasing danger of this question, let me say once again, as solemnly as possible, how much I hope that the Government of Greece will be able to join in a prompt and determined effort to seek through negotiation a lasting answer to this perilous problem. It is in this spirit that I hope your representative will be empowered to discuss all aspects of the Cyprus problem with the mediator and the Turkish representative. I hope also that his instructions may be so framed that our American representative will also be able to help in bringing about a settlement. In such discussions, neither side must insist that there is only one acceptable basis for discussion; both sides—and all of us who hope to be helpful—must approach these negotiations with a resolute determination to work out a peaceful answer.

Let me say again in closing that I fully recognize your responsibility not only to join in preserving peace but to uphold the principles of your Government and the rights of your people in accordance with your duty as the leader of Greece. You can be sure that the United States, in urging negotiation and in offering help to the mediator, intends no disregard whatever of the rights of Greeks and of Turks in their homelands and on Cyprus. My conviction is simple: that the real interests of the peoples and the real responsibilities of their leaders can be met if there is real negotiation—and that if there is not such negotiation, none of us can prevent a disaster for which all of us will be held accountable.

Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson”

Rusk

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TUG. Drafted by Bundy, cleared by Talbot, and approved by Ball. In a July 1 memorandum to the President, Bundy commented that Ball felt a letter to Papandreou was needed as a stern reminder of the dangers created by Papandreou’s resistance to real negotiations. Bundy further commented: “Papandreou will not like this letter, any more than Inonu liked your letter of June 5. But that is not the point now.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 6)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 81


81. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

Athens, July 2, 1964, 8 p.m.

18. Ref: Deptel 06.2 I transmitted President Johnson’s letter to PriMin Papandreou today at 1 p.m. As I arrived Papandreou was conferring with Defense Minister Garoufalias and Cypriot leaders Georkatzis and Illiades who excused themselves, leaving us alone.

During reading of President’s letter, PriMin’s expression was serious even grim. After having read letter he commented, “more of the same.” Everyone in Washington, he said, applied pressure on him to negotiate as though negotiation were the magic formula, but he had not heard one specific suggestion in Washington as to what he is to negotiate about, or what US would consider an acceptable solution. Because of danger of armed Turkish intervention, Greece is urged to make concessions. But what concessions is Greece to make, what rights are Turks giving up which require that they be compensated by Greece. Greece asks nothing from Cyprus. This is not basically a Greek-Turkish problem. There are questions of principle involved, one of which is independence, self-determination and integrity of Cyprus.

I am told, he said, that I must negotiate because if I do not negotiate the Turks will resort to armed intervention. The US has exhausted its efforts to restrain Turks and responsibility for the peace thus rests upon Greece. Mr. McNamara pointed out to me how powerful Turkish military forces are, but Greece cannot act under pressure of ultimatum. We did not accept an ultimatum from our enemies in 1940,3 and it is very difficult for us to accept an ultimatum today from our friends. How can a nation (US) maintain its position as the leader of free world unless it has a policy? How can it fail to continue to support principle of self-determination? How can US fail to say to Turkey—or to Greece for that matter: “the arms which you possess are arms which we have given you for the purpose of self-defense. We (US) will not accept that our arms be used in an aggressive manner, risking the danger of war, perhaps a small war, but one which could escalate into a large war.” How can Greece’s NATO allies fail to tell the Turks that they do not accept aggressive actions which may precipitate a war. Greece can accept a political struggle; Greece can accept debate in the UN and in NATO; but Greece cannot accept a policy which justifies the use of force.

Papandreou said de Gaulle had agreed that Cypriot right to self-determination must be respected and that Turkish threats of armed intervention were unacceptable. Papandreou gave no intimation that de Gaulle may have been alluding to right of both Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities to self-determination.

I replied GOG would be making a serious error in interpreting Washington’s analysis of current situation as an ultimatum, and I asked whether he did not have feeling that although there may be serious differences of view regarding tactics, US and GOG were, in fact, moving in same general direction. Prime Minister did not answer directly, but excused himself for bluntness of his statement and promised that he would reply tomorrow (sic) to President’s letter.4

I inquired whether press reports that Nikolareizis (Greek Ambassador to Belgrade) would be sent to Geneva were correct. He confirmed this and added that Nikolareizis arriving in Athens tomorrow to report to him prior to going to Geneva. I said that I was confident that Washington would be very much gratified by his decision to send such an experienced diplomat to Geneva.

Comment: Papandreou made no effort conceal his disappointment at failure Greek position evoke greater understanding and sympathy in Washington, as well as certain irritation at what he considers implied US threat to stand aside in event of new Turk decision intervene militarily. Papandreou’s Washington visit has probably produced some bruises which will be slow in disappearing. Although he spoke with obvious [garble—agitation] he was not abusive or discourteous.

I think we should consider appointment Nikolareizis as gesture in our direction even though it may not presage immediate substantive changes in GOG position.

Anschuetz

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TUG.

2  Document 80.

3 Reference is to the Greek Government rejection of an ultimatum from Italy.

4  Papandreou replied to this letter on July 6, defending Greek policy. A copy of that letter is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 6.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 82


82. Memorandum for the Record1

Washington, July 7, 1964.

·         SUBJECT

·         NSC Meeting July 7, 1964 at 12 Noon on Cyprus

·         PARTICIPANTS

·         See Attached List2

Secretary Ball led off the discussion of Cyprus by telling the President he thought it would be useful to report to the NSC on a situation which was like a time bomb that could blow up any time in the next six weeks. His report largely reflected the State Department memorandum submitted prior to the meeting.3

One of the principal problems, he said, is irrationality on both sides. The Greeks figure time is on their side. They think they can work out a plebiscite followed by enosis simply by sitting tight. The threat of Turk invasion has roused their stubbornness and Athens seems blind to its long-range interest in conceding enough to Ankara to provide a basis for improved relations after a Cyprus settlement. The Turks, on the other hand, see their position being eroded day by day. They resent our having restrained them when chances for a successful invasion were best, and they are bitter over Greek and Cypriot disregard of the London-Zurich treaties. They see a political solution as the only alternative to exercising their right of intervention.

Pressures are building up, Mr. Ball went on. The Greeks have sent 4000 troops to the island (CIA believes 5–7000), in addition to their regular garrison there. The Turks, who have to put their men ashore at night from small boats, have sent perhaps 1000 in addition to their garrison. The Turks see the Greek buildup outrunning theirs and their hope of successful intervention vanishing. Meanwhile, General Grivas—a fanatic, fortunately anti-Communist—has taken over the Greek Cypriot forces and hopes to build an army of some 35,000 men. The Turks have a lurking fear that Grivas may overthrow Makarios suddenly and simply announce annexation of Cyprus to Greece. So the pressure on the Turks to act soon is increasing. Moreover, the Turks know of the Greek plan, if the situation drags on through the summer, to throw the whole question to the UN General Assembly where the Greeks are confident they will get a blessing for self-determination leading to enosis. On top of this, incidents could trigger Turk Cypriot rebellion or island-wide fighting at any time.

We are staking our bets of necessity on the Geneva talks, Mr. Ball continued.Acheson has arrived. The arrangements made for him there are not good but are the best we have been able to work out. He had his first talk with the UN Mediator yesterday and reports an atmosphere of pessimism. However, we hope his further discussions before talks with the Greeks and Turks begin early the week of 13 July may improve the atmosphere. Meanwhile, we are doing extensive contingency planning to limit the scope of a Greek-Turk war if the Turks invade and to keep bloodshed on Cyprus to a minimum. We are also considering how we should handle ourselves in the UN Security Council and how we might develop safehavens for refugees on the island. On 9 July we are holding a meeting here with the British and Canadians to see what pressure they can bring to bear on the Greeks. We are also studying seriously the problem of evacuating officials and tourists should war break out.

At that point the President broke in to ask how many Americans are in the area. Mr.Ball replied that there are about 250 on Cyprus, mostly with our communications facilities there. Since we went through an evacuation exercise earlier this year, he contemplates little difficulty there.4 In Greece there are 5–6000 Americans and in Turkey 16–17,000. However, he felt that danger in the mainland countries of a severe anti-American reaction would not be great.

The President then asked whether Papandreou had replied to his letter (of 2 July).5 Mr. Ball said the reply had just come in and that it was simply a pro forma reiteration of the Greek position and really did not take us anywhere.6 The President said he wanted to see that letter as soon as possible.

There followed a detailed briefing by Gen. Burchinal on the military forces that would participate in any hostilities on Cyprus. The attached memorandum records the substance of this briefing.7 Mr. Ball, at the end of the briefing, highlighted the fact that the Turk goal is limited to establishing a beachhead for bargaining purposes; the Turks do not want the kind of war that complete conquest would require. Mr. Ball also estimated that perhaps 20–25,000 villagers might be slaughtered once an invasion started. General Burchinal suggested that Turk air mastery might prove some deterrent since Greek villages would be vulnerable. No one responded, but the feeling seemed to be that this would only increase the carnage.

The President summarized his understanding in these terms: The Turks have substantially greater forces than the Greeks in every respect; they could land and maintain a beachhead; and the Soviets would not intervene. General Burchinalconfirmed the President’s understanding, estimating Turk army superiority at 3–1 and air force at 4–1. [2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Secretary McNamara elaborated on the President’s last point, saying we didn’t think the Soviets would intervene militarily but they would unquestionably try to make political hay out of any disorder on Cyprus. General Wheeler added that a prime Soviet objective is the fragmentation of NATO and any Greek-Turk hostilities would further that end.

The President moved on to the question of what our next steps might be and asked whether there is anything further we can do to prevent Turkish invasion and to assure the success of the Geneva talks. He pointed out that the Greeks didn’t expect much to come of these talks and have shown a good deal of irritation at the way we treated them during Papandreou’s visit here.

Mr. Ball felt that the President had seriously shaken Papandreou with his statement that the US would not militarily restrain a Turkish invasion. He felt we had gained some ground with the Greeks during that visit. Mr. Bundy felt less optimistic, noting Greek peevishness over the President’s latest letter.

The President recalled that Papandreou had pressed for a US formula when he was here. Mr. Ball pointed out the pitfalls of providing one at the outset of discussions. He said that Mr. Acheson is well prepared to introduce the elements of such a formula in the course of the Geneva talks. However, if we presented a US solution in advance, he felt both parties would attack it and walk out. The President agreed.

Secretary McNamara brought up the desirability of using General Lemnitzer and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to bring home to the Greek and Turk military that a clash between them would be suicidal. Mr. Ball said General Lemnitzer was bearish on this idea because he did not feel the Greek military had much influence over its political leaders. His previous talks with them had netted little.8 However, theNAC will be meeting 8 July and we expect a strong Canadian challenge to the Greeks based on reports that Greek NATO units and materiel are now on Cyprus. Both Secretaries McNamara and Ball, however, favored instructing General Lemnitzer to go ahead and tell the Turk and Greek military again what we have told the political leaders. While Papandreou seems to have absorbed the President’s warning, the military leaders still apparently feel that we will stop a Turk invasion and that no move they make really risks a direct Greek-Turk confrontation.

The President asked General Wheeler whether we have taken into account the demands that a Turkish invasion would place on NATO. General Wheeler felt we had examined the consequences carefully. He was concerned particularly about how the Turks would receive a direct US rebuff. However, he did not feel Turkey would “fall into the Soviet Bloc.” He felt the strength of Greek Communists made Greece potentially very unstable. Ultimately he saw both Greece and Turkey lost toNATO if hostilities were permitted to go on very long.

The Attorney General suggested another approach. He asked about the possibility of organizing an effort to explain to influential elements other than the military and government in Greece and Turkey what the situation would be if either country took the steps it is contemplating. In other words, would the Turks like the situation that would exist after they secured a beachhead on Cyprus—carnage in the Turk Cypriot villages, world opinion against them, Greece less willing than ever to negotiate a settlement? Would the Greeks welcome a Turk foothold on Cyprus, the economic disruption of a Greek-Turk war, possibly defeat of Greek forces? Wouldn’t there be some deterrent effect in getting across to influential Greeks and Turks an objective analysis of the situation they will have to cope with if they don’t negotiate now?

Mr. Bundy asked Mr. Ball whether we could not do this sort of thing through our embassies. He felt that embassy involvement might create a clearer view in Ankara and Athens of our concern. Mr. Ball felt that it would be very difficult to do anything of this kind publicly because of the irrational atmosphere in both capitals. Anything we do, he said, gives the appearance of our working for the other side. For instance, if we described the terrible consequences of a Greek-Turk war, the Greeks would simply ask why, then, we would refuse to stop a Turk invasion. [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

When the President asked how much of the position we took in the Washington talks has “dribbled down to the Greek and Turk populace”, Mr. Ball said that the average Greek thinks we’re holding the gun of a Turk invasion at Greek heads to force a deal. The Turks feel that, because we restrained their invasion, we’re pro-Greek. So the people have very stereotyped views of our position. In the current hysterical atmosphere, it is very difficult to put across a reasonable explanation of our goals.

Secretary McNamara asked whether we couldn’t stimulate leading Greek citizens to brief their own press and make it more aware of the consequences of the present course of events. For instance, could we get Onassis and others of his importance to explain the economic consequences of provoking a Greek-Turk war?9 He did not feel we could do this directly but felt perhaps Mr. McCone might have some suggestions to offer.

The Attorney General said he did not see any objection to our being associated with such an effort. He felt that we would be talking simply about the facts of a potential situation, not about controversial positions. Mr. Bundy asked Mr. Ball how painful it might be if such a campaign came out of Paris—from NAC members and NATOofficers there. Mr. Ball agreed that the farther from Washington the better and pointed out that the UN Secretary General could also do some of this if he would.

Mr. Bundy wrapped up this part of the discussion by suggesting to the President that we draw up a program for mounting such a campaign just to see what it looks like. The President instructed him to do so with the help of the agencies involved.

Mr. Bundy then moved to the problem of how we get the Geneva talks going. He felt that the Greeks could get what they wanted if they would just sit down and talk and asked whether we shouldn’t use this argument with them. Secretary Ball said he had done just this during his luncheon with Papandreou. However, he pointed out that it is difficult to carry this argument much further than private conversations because the Turks could easily construe it as a US-Greek deal.

Mr. McCone asked whether the real problem wasn’t what the Turks would get out of these talks rather than how we could satisfy the Greeks. He said he hadn’t seen any evidence of a formula that would meet Turk needs. Mr. Ball said he felt we could put together a package which the Turks would think pretty good if we could once get the two parties together.

The President returned to the question of how we might bring pressure to bear on the two governments. He asked Mr. Wilson how seriously concerned the people of each country are about what is going on. Mr. Wilson responded that the people of Turkey particularly are frustrated by their government’s inability to act in the current situation and pointed out the danger that such frustration would lead to impulsive action. He did not feel, however, that the people had thought through the consequences of a Turkish invasion. He felt we could draw up a list of people in Paris, Athens, and Ankara who might be useful in creating a more realistic view of the consequences of invasion.

Mr. Talbot brought the discussion back to Geneva by pointing out that we can’t count on the Greeks to act in their own best interests. We can’t rely simply on a campaign to make people aware of the consequences of their action—especially when they are acting irrationally. Therefore, he felt our best hope was in pushing the negotiations in Geneva.

The President reacted by saying if we are to succeed there we will need more power than we have had to date. We did our best during the Washington talks to convince both Greeks and Turks to negotiate. Now we are going to make another approach to the Turk military in an effort to get them to throw their weight into the scales on the side of moderation. He saw no reason why we should not explore every way of getting a reasonable view of the situation across to important people in both countries.

In conclusion, the President outlined two courses of action: (a) our military in Paris would make clear to the Greek and Turk military what consequences they could anticipate if either nation moved militarily; (b) we should also draw up a plan for getting this understanding across to as many influential people in both countries as possible.10

1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 2. Top Secret. Drafted by Harold H. Saunders.

2 Not found.

3 A memorandum entitled “Talking Paper for the Under Secretary at NSC Meeting,” July 6, outlined the current situation in Cyprus and the options available to the United States. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meeting July 7, 1964)

4 In January 1964, the United States evacuated the families of officials working in Cyprus.

5 See Document 80.

6 See footnote 4, Document 81.

7 Not found.

8 See Document 5.

9 Documentation relating to subsequent contacts with Aristotle Onassis are in Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8, and ibid., Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Cyprus Miscellaneous and Cyprus: Proposed Solutions.

10 Efforts to make the consequences of military action clear were outlined in a July 8 memorandum from Talbot to Bundy. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 9) With that the meeting adjourned.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 83


83. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1

Geneva, July 11, 1964, 2 p.m.

92. From Acheson.2 We had amicable hour and quarter meeting this morning withErim and Alacam. I began by suggesting we consider Turkey’s security needs with regard to Cyprus. I mentioned possibility Turkish base on Karpas Peninsula. Erimcountered by putting forward Turkey’s desired partition line, enclosing whole northern part of island and went on to give us standard Turkish position: that first Turkish demand was implementation London-Zurich Agreements and that failing this Turkey could only consider partition or federalism. We tried to point out probable impracticality of achieving any of these.

I touched on probable great cost to Turkey and Turkish Cypriots of solution which Turks would have to impose by force. Erim then took new tack, saying that after all Turkey could let Greece effect enosis as fait accompli, without fighting Greece, but refuse to recognize it and maintain continuing pressures against Greece in hope situation would change for better. I expressed great doubts Turkey’s position would improve under such circumstances.

Speaking next about Turkey’s concern for welfare Turk-Cypriots we broached idea that this might be taken care of without partition and within context of enosis. For example, I said, there could be a Turkish base large enough to be safe haven for those Turks unwilling to live under Greek rule, while for the other Turks a special semi-autonomous regime could be set up. This might comprise one or more areas where Turks were in majority (such as strip from northern Nicosia to Kyrenia) which would be administered directly by Turkish local authorities: for those areas where Turks remained in minority, there might still be arrangement whereby a Turk-Cypriot authority would nevertheless control and administer local affairs of Turkish villagers.

Erim seemed intrigued with this idea and said he would like to think about it. He asked whether base-safe haven area would be sovereign Turkish territory, a part of Turkey. We stretched matter a bit and said yes. He then suggested it would be desirable for a Turkish military expert come here to discuss what would be needed on Cyprus to protect Turkey from military point of view. Proposed to send for General Sunalp. I raised no objection.3

Erim flatly admitted Turks were going to expel Greeks from Turkey at end six-month period following denunciation of treaty as reprisal for Greek policies toward Cypriots. He further strongly indicated that Patriarchate would also be expelled, even though Turk Government had nothing special against Athenagoros. I said that expulsion of Greeks was not sufficient lever to affect Cyprus question at present. It would be more sensible to keep this weapon in reserve to be used in reprisal if Greeks later failed live up to guarantees they might give Turk Cypriots.

When we were discussing Turkish security problem, Erim particularly pointed out location of Kastellorizon. I asked if Turkey’s security would be improved if it had this island, and he said that it would. At another juncture, Erim referred to remarks made to him while in Washington that possibly Greek islands of Lesvos, Samos or Kos might be ceded as compensation for Cyprus. We rather threw cold water on this. I do think, however, that his apparent interest in Kastellorizon may have some significance.

Expect to see Turks again early next week.

Tubby

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Exdis.

2 On July 4, the Department of State announced that Acheson would go to Geneva at the President’s request to provide assistance in helping to resolve the Cyprus crisis. Acheson held his first meeting with Turkish representatives on July 9.

3 In telegram 96 from Geneva, July 13, Acheson reported that he had put forward a scheme for a semi-autonomous Turkish area that would not require geographic division. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 84


84. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

Athens, July 12, 1964, 3 p.m.

76. 1. I had long talk with FonMin Costopoulos yesterday on Cyprus situation.2Reviewing Washington talks, he said Greek side had been struck and disappointed by rigidity of US position. Greeks had hoped for some substantive response to Papandreou’s proposals for a solution and were surprised that President and Washington officials “concentrated only on procedure without touching on substance.” They had feeling of great pressure exerted to force face-to-face talks with Turks, whereas they had cautioned us ahead of time they would not do so under existing circumstances, and they wanted our ideas as to a substantive solution.

2. For my part, I explained again great disappointment in Washington over what appeared to us to be most rigid position of PriMin, going over much of ground covered in talks and stressing what to me seemed to be “unconditional surrender” nature of Papandreou’s position.

3. During talk, Costopoulos acknowledged that there had been no pressure in Washington for Papandreou-Inonu meeting. (This has also been acknowledged byAndreas Papandreou in conversation with Embassy officer.)

4. Geneva talks. Although Costopoulos personally believes that Greco-Turkish talks could prove useful, he said that Papandreou still adamant against bilateral talks with the Turks so long as Turkish threat continues. “If either Turkey or the United States will remove that threat, such bilateral talks can be held.”

5. I then questioned Costopoulos about Nicolareizis’ instructions, saying I hoped very much that they were broad enough to permit frank discussions with Acheson. He replied that Nicolareizis’ instructions included authorization to talk to Acheson, to exchange views with him and to report, but not to engage in “negotiations.” Constopoulos said he would want to keep in closest touch with me as things developed in Geneva. We trust that Dept and Acheson will keep us fully informed to permit us to attempt to stimulate appropriate responses from GOG.

6. Grivas. Costopoulos believes Grivas is gaining control of irregular forces on island, and he observed that there had been no marked reaction either from the Turks or British about his presence there. He added that it was important to remember that Grivas is main hope against Communists and that Makarios had had to go along so far.

7. FonMin stated that there was no question of Grivas and Makarios acting together to establish enosis.

8. Greek troops. Costopoulos asserted figures about presence Greek troops in Cyprus greatly exaggerated. He admitted that some non-coms had gone to Cyprus in past months in effort gain control of irregulars (this stated to us some time ago by Papandreou). In addition, some 800 Greek soldiers of Cypriot extraction had gone to island—“lets call them deserters.” Only others were about one thousand Greek-Cypriot students who recently returned to island as part of Grivas’ following.

9. FonMin expressed irritation over Canadian criticism of Greeks, when Turks have infiltrated many more into Cyprus.

10. Suggested approach to solution. Costopoulos said that in conversation with de Gaulle, Greeks had taken same line as in Washington. But idea was developed during talks of some sort of “regionalism” on island—“something like Alsace.”Costopoulos was vague as to who suggested this, but gave the impression it came from the Greek side. He was explicit in saying that de Gaulle supported this idea. I probed to find what exactly was intended by suggestion, but Costopoulos was not clear as to practical workings. His explanation was to effect that an arrangement might be worked out which would ensure Cypriot sovereignty of whole island (subject to later enosis), full protection of minorities and some “Alsatian-type regionalism” which was neither partition nor federalism. Although I am not at all certain as to the implications of this suggestion, it seems to me to be well worth exploration.

11. Costopolous repeated that territorial concessions were out of question, “except possibly something like Kastellorizon.”

Recommend Dept pass foregoing Ankara and Acheson.

Labouisse

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

2  Labouisse met with King Constantine the same day for discussions on Cyprus. He reported on this meeting in telegram 75 from Athens, July 12. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 85


85. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1

Geneva, July 14, 1964, 10 p.m.

114. From Acheson. Met with Greek rep Nikolareisis for more than an hour this morning. I gave him fairly lengthy exposition of our informal ideas, prefacing my remarks by saying this should not be considered an “American plan” but rather suggests ways we would like to explore with all concerned. I spoke of the three Turkish requisites: national prestige, national security and welfare of Turkish-Cypriots. Also pointed out no solution could be pleasing to both sides and anything agreed upon in end likely to be displeasing to both. If this resulted in criticism directed at me or US Government, we were prepared to accept it.

As I had previously done with Turk, I spoke of possibility that sovereign base area on Cyprus, for example Karpas Peninsula, might meet minimum Turkish security requisites. Suggested this area should be large enough to provide sort of safe haven for Turk-Cypriots in times of communal disturbances.

I said it seemed to me that neither enosis by itself, nor double enosis nor federalism would necessarily solve problem of securing welfare Turk-Cypriots. Even under Turks own preferred solutions, there would undoubtedly still remain Turkish minorities in Greek-ruled part of island. I was inclined to dismiss double enosis or federalism in any case, I said, because I saw no way to impose these arrangements on hostile Greek-Cypriots.

Therefore, I had been thinking of arrangement within framework of some sort of enosis which would give Turk-Cypriots assurance that not only their lives but their property, business, and way of life would be safeguarded. This might be done through a special arrangement, under overall Greek sovereignty, which would take advantage of flexibility inherent in Greek administrative system. Perhaps one or two small areas on island, such as stretch north from Turkish quarter of Nicosia, might be designated as Eparchis and given local self-rule under Turkish Eparch who would, of course, be responsible to higher Greek authority. Another form of local self-rule could be devised for Turks in rest of island, also subject to overall Greek rule.

To ensure that Turks would feel confidence in arrangement of this kind, I considered it necessary that there be some international authority, possibly a UN commissioner of sort which had operated in Danzig and Saar between World Wars I and II, empowered to receive and investigate complaints and make recommendations for corrective action. In turn, there could be right of appeal to International Court of Justice.

Nikolareisis listened intently, took notes and asked number of questions. His only real comment was that he feared his government’s public position was pretty far from the sort of thing I had outlined. He pointed out that so far GOG talked publicly only about full independence with right of self-determination, not about enosis. I reminded him of my earlier comment that no solution would be fully agreeable to all parties. However, if Greece and Turkey could come to meeting of minds, we could then deal with the problem of how to get a solution accepted by Makarios and Cypriots generally. Jernegan suggested that at such time GOG should mobilize all its assets (propaganda and other) to create popular demand on island for enosis.

During our polite preliminary exchanges, Nikolareisis said that he had had a long talk yesterday with Mediator who had expressed pleasure at my presence here and had asked him to discuss matters with me. Nikolareisis asked that I get in touch with him whenever I wished. We agreed that each should feel free to talk to the other whenever he had anything to talk about, but I said I probably would want to give him time to report and get reaction from Athens on what I had said. He emphasized and I agreed that these talks should be kept extremely secret.

My impression is that Nikolareisis takes his function seriously and will do his best to convey our thoughts and relay those of GOG to us, but his attitude today certainly bears out previous word that he is not authorized at this point to negotiate. Real test will no doubt come when he gets Athens view on my remarks today. I certainly went rather farther in accepting enosis as good solution than, I believe, any of us has done previously. If anything will induce Papandreou to embark on meaningful dialogue, this should do it.

Tubby

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 86


86. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1

Geneva, July 15, 1964, 9 p.m.

132. From Acheson. We met again with Turks this afternoon, and I handed them copies of piece of paper in reply to Erim’s questions which he sent me following yesterday’s talk.2 My memorandum, text of which is being telegraphed separately,3 contained in fair detail outline compromise plan which I had previously sketched orally to Turks and to Greeks. It also contained certain arguments in rebuttal of military objections raised yesterday by Sunalp.4

After reading paper carefully, Erim opened by saying he still considered that full partition, with space for all Turkish-Cypriots, was only satisfactory answer to problem. Failing that, no safeguards could protect Turk minority against long-term pressures which would be exerted by Greek majority. Once again cited case of Crete and added Western Thrace as examples proving that Greeks always found means to make life unendurable for Turkish minority.

He then said paper I had given him, nevertheless, provided “first sign of way out” he had seen. Questioning brought out that he meant that paper accepted principle of Turkish sovereignty on part of Cyprus. Once this was granted, Turks would have firm basis for claiming full area they would need to accommodate all Turk-Cypriots. They could show, as they had explained to me yesterday, that they were entitled to an area of the island proportionate to their percentage of its population and its present land ownership, plus their proportionate share of public lands which were not privately owned either by the Greeks or the Turks. This would approximate areas they had suggested in their partition schemes.

I responded that if Turks considered full partition was only possible solution, I would of course be willing to present this to Greek rep, but I had absolutely no hope of its acceptance.

There ensued somewhat confused exchange, during which Erim once fell back on his earlier thesis that he would rather see a Greek fait accompli, which Turkey would denounce and refuse to recognize and for which it would exact political and economic revenge, than acquiesce in solution which would not be permanent and would not protect Turkish-Cypriots. I countered that Turkey would lose tremendously by such an attitude and that consequences would also be extremely rough on Turkish-Cypriots. Sunalp joined in with strong words about how Turks were ready to die for national good, himself included, and implied that it really wouldn’t mean too much if a lot more Turkish-Cypriots did get killed.

At this point Erim made a calming gesture and gave me to understand that perhaps after all there might be room for a little bargaining on the basis I had suggested. Possibly, he said, we could get the Greeks to expand area of Turkish base or, as he preferred to call it, “Turkish area” to point where it would accommodate substantial number of Turkish-Cypriots. Turkey could call this partition, while Greeks might call it something else. At any rate, Erim intimated he would go back to Ankara and see what reaction there would be. We could talk again next week.

I said I would do my best with Greeks but could guarantee nothing.

We agreed that if anything developed during Erim’s absence we would communicate with each other through Embassy Ankara and Turkish Mission here. (Turk Perm Rep has been present at all our talks.)

Would appreciate any suggestions Department has and especially comments on paper I gave Erim. Unless otherwise instructed, I have in mind giving Greek rep a suitably modified version of it if initial reaction from Athens to our conversation yesterday seems to warrant it.5

Tubby

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

2 Not found.

3 Telegram 129 from Geneva, July 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)

4  Sunalp posed a series of military objections to Acheson’s suggestion during a July 14 meeting. Acheson reported on these talks in telegram 117 from Geneva, July 14. (Ibid.)

5 In telegram 136 to Geneva, July 15, the Department of State noted the Sunalp’s comments indicated less flexibility in the Turkish position than the United States had been led to believe. It requested that the Embassy in Ankara sound out the Inonu government on these issues. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 87


87. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

Athens, July 19, 1964, 11 p.m.

116. 1. In hour’s talk with Prime Minister this Sunday afternoon, he elaborated on urgency with which he viewed need for solution Cyprus problem. He underlined that he wanted to facilitate Mr. Acheson’s work as much as possible and pointed out that, to this end, he had in radio address last night for first time stated that security of Turkish state, as well as protection of Turkish minority, was subject for discussion. Nikolareizis had been called back from Geneva and he was seeing him in evening to give him instructions for his future meetings. He said Nikolareizis could have full and frank discussions with Acheson.2

2. Papandreou pointed proudly to new picture of President Johnson on his bookcase and stated he felt very sorry that he had put on appearance of stubbornness in Washington in countering proposed procedure for getting on with Cyprus problem. He said that he genuinely believed then, as he does now, that until adequate preparations undertaken direct talks would very likely lead to a breakdown and possibility of a clash. He recalled Turkish riots in Istanbul in 1955 as example of what Turks do when talks not going their way. He stressed with great earnestness that he wanted to avoid Greek-Turkish clash at all costs; “war was one hundred times more serious for Greece than for the U.S.,” and it was for this reason that he wanted to get on with substance of problem rather than procedures. He had therefore been disappointed that there had been no conversation as to a solution in Washington and only the stress on sitting down for talks with the Turks. With Turkey’s continued threats and rigid position, this was impossible under existing circumstances. However, talks now under way in Geneva were right approach in moving toward solution and GOG intent on facilitating them as matter of urgency. The need for urgency was that Makarios was moving closer to Soviets and Nasser and was making moves without consulting GOG. He hinted that if too much time elapsed a full independent Cyprus, under strong pressure from the East, might not opt for enosis.

3. As to a solution he reiterated that Turkish minority should be provided all guarantees necessary, including UN supervision—“whatever you want.” For sake of Turkish security and meeting “national prestige” aspect of the problem, he stated Greece would agree to a conversion of British bases to NATO bases with Turkish troops and commander. From Kyprianou he had heard that both Wilson in the UKand certain HMG sources were prepared to consider this solution. He said UK could either retain sovereignty or relinquish it—in either event arrangements could be made for NATO take over under a Turkish Commander. This latter point (which could be provided for in agreement between parties), in Papandreou’s mind, should meet fully any claim by Turkey on security or prestige grounds. Papandreou did not see any possibility for a Turkish sovereign area on the island. After all, London-Zurich Agreements had only gotten Turkish troops onto the island; giving them a sovereign area now after nearly 100 years in which Turkey had no claim to sovereignty on the island, would be an unacceptable step for any Greek Government as well as for Cypriots. However, GOG would be prepared to turn over Kastellorizon as a base. (There was also hint that some other concession might be possible, but it was not spelled out.)

4. Papandreou touched on Greek troop increase on island, calling them volunteers and “tolerated deserters.” He gave no figures but insisted that they were there to prevent violence, whether from within or without, but most importantly to check and control Makarios and other Greek-Cypriot military groups.

5. When I raised question of Makarios’ harassing actions re materials for Turkish-Cypriot refugees, as well as Greek-Cypriot military moves in Temblos and Mansoura area, he stated that Makarios was being called to Athens July 26 and he would impress upon him how counterproductive these actions were in that they goaded the Turks.

6. Brewster’s and my over-all impression was that Papandreou very anxious to get on with a prompt solution and that he was eager to see gap between Turk and Greek position closed as soon as possible in Geneva. He fully supported actions of both the UN Mediator and Acheson in their efforts to reach a solution. He stated Greeks and US must at all time talk like “relatives”, because Makarios, USSR and especially UAR were now acting like “relatives.” But he cautioned that ultimate solution must be generally acceptable to Cypriot people or else fighting could not be controlled. We consider that Papandreou seriously believes his suggestion set forth in paragraph 3 is as far as he can push Cypriots.

Labouisse

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Geneva, Ankara, Nicosia, and London. Passed to the White House.

2 The Embassy reported on Nikolareisis’ meeting with Papandreou in telegram 126 from Athens, July 21. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 88


88. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1

Geneva, July 20, 1964, 8 p.m.

168. From Acheson. Erim and Sunalp reported to us this morning on their visit in Ankara, Erim discussing political aspects of problem and Sunalp expounding Turkish military point of view (although he wandered over into political elements at times).

Erim said he had given report to Prime Minister and Cabinet Thursday night. Reaction to this, as to his earlier reports on talks with me, had been one of disappointment. View of Turkish Government, he said, was that Greeks had no intention of making any concessions or negotiating seriously, because they believed that they would gain 100 percent of their objective by standing pat. Their military buildup on island would permit them to do this, defying threat of Turkish intervention, and to hold off until UNGA meets this fall, at which time they could either get two-thirds affirmative vote in support of their position for complete independence and self-determination or, if Turks took initiative, defeat any Turkish complaint against them. Meanwhile, there was continuing danger of Greek fait accompli bringing about enosis.

Erim said, however, that he had assured government of his belief in my good faith and that USG through me was making sincere effort to find way out. He thought I should be given chance to try. GOT accordingly had authorized him to return here and continue talks even though it shared his own pessimistic view of results to be expected. I thanked him for this tribute and assured him that I would not hold him here beyond moment when I became convinced there was no hope of agreement. Thought I might have good indications on this point when I next saw Greek rep after his return from Athens consultations. (Nikolareisis returned today and we have appointment to meet tomorrow at 17:00 local.) If I thought Greeks were clearly unwilling to continue discussions on basis offering some hope of success, I would feel obliged to tell Erim so.

I then asked whether they could tell me anything more specific about their consultations in Ankara. At this point Sunalp largely took over conversation. Said that Turk General Staff had been impressed by plan I had outlined in my memorandum (Mission tel)2 and had given it very careful and sympathetic study. As he put it, they had looked at it “with their white glasses rather than their dark glasses”. He produced map of Cyprus which he said showed some of results of this study. It showed three boundary lines corresponding to three possibilities I had suggested:

1. A line crossing Karpas Peninsula about 2/3 of way in from Cape;

2. A line from Peristeria village on north coast running across to Boghaz on south coast and in effect enclosing whole peninsula; and

3. A line running from just west of Karavas (north coast west of Kyrenia) irregularly southeast through Nicosia and on to Famagusta and paralleling but running north of main Nicosia-Famagusta road.

Sunalp called his first line “Greek line” and seemed to dismiss it without consideration. Second line he argued would still be “unsatisfactory as giving Turkey too little territory and, from military point of view, too little maneuverability. Third line would enclose about 21 percent, 795 square miles of island area and would be acceptable from military point of view as well as providing minimum space for Turkish-Cypriots. This last boundary would give Turkey port of Kyrenia and also access to deep water port of Famagusta although this need not necessarily be Turkish port. They would be satisfied if it were NATO base, which Turkey could use in time of war.

Sunalp admitted that there were no great obstacles to construction of artificial port on Karpas Peninsula, provided we put up the money, and indicated a site around Boghaz as logical location. He also admitted construction of air strip was feasible but indicated as preferred site something in the neighborhood of village of Trikomo, which is outside second line. He continued to insist, however, on military necessity of having greater space for defensive maneuvering and argued that minimum Turkish military need would be for line taking in pass from north coast through Kyrenia range down to Lefkoniko as well as high part of ridge lying to west of that as far as Pentadaktylos Peak. This, he said, would give Turks flanking position against any enemy which might approach sovereign area across plain from southwest. Without it, Turk forces would be penned in narrow peninsula with no way of countering attack.

Sunalp and Erim were both somewhat vague in their justification for third line, and in course of conversation it became clear that they did not contend this was military necessity but rather was modification of double enosis proposal, based primarily on political considerations. Sunalp especially emphasized importance of holding Kyrenia as means of quick access to Turk-Cypriots in Nicosia in case of trouble. I got impression they probably would settle for boundary line which included pass north of Lefkoniko but stopped just west of it.

In course of conversation I raised question whether defense against major military attack from land was really important, suggesting that Turks themselves might well be able to forestall any such thing and in any case it seemed unlikely to occur. I got no satisfactory answer. I also indicated gently that I thought it would be very difficult to get Greek consideration of sort of thing they were proposing. At the end, however, I said I would not try at this time to discuss their presentation; first of all, I wanted to think about it and secondly I thought it would be a waste of time for them and for me to argue unless and until we found out that Greeks were willing to talk on basis I had suggested. I would be in touch with them again just as soon as I had anything new.3

After seeing Turks I had a talk with Mediator Tuomioja and summarized to him Turkish ideas. He had no particular comment. I told him I would be glad to meet with U Thant, who is back in Geneva, but would not want to take up his time unnecessarily. Tuomioja said he would report to SYG and let me know whether the latter wanted to see me.

Tubby

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, and USUN.

2 See Document 86.

3 In telegram 166 from Geneva, July 20, Acheson further reported that during their conversation Sunalp had given a “’remarkably frank” outline of Turkish plans for intervention. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP) In telegram 172 from Geneva, July 21, Acheson reported on Turkish views on the defensibility of a base area also developed during this meeting. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 89


89. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1

Geneva, July 21, 1964, 8 p.m.

181. From: Acheson. One-hour discussion late this afternoon with Greek repNikolareisis may be summarized as follows:

1. He said he had been called back to Athens last Saturday and had gone expecting very negative reaction to suggestions I had put to him. He had long conversations with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister alone. Was pleased to find that they were determined to be forthcoming and conciliatory as possible. Papandreou had insisted on his great desire for peace and expressed appreciation of efforts I was making to avoid Greek-Turkish conflict. He had given him (Nikolareisis) reply to ideas I had thrown out, which PM thought really should be considered as tentative proposal rather than separate suggestions.

2. My proposal consisted of three parts: (a) minority rights for Turkish population of Cyprus; (b) international supervision of application of these rights; and (c) provision for Turkish national security. To these three points PM’s reactions were:

(1) Although it would be difficult for Greece, with its excellent record of treatment of all its citizens, to give special privileges to minority on Cyprus, he nevertheless would be willing to grant substantially what I had suggested, even including two Turk-Cypriot administered Eparchis under Turk-Cypriot Eparchs, provided these latter were appointed from Athens and not by Ankara. He would also accept establishment special Turk-Cypriot courts.

(2) It would likewise be very hard to accept international supervision of this arrangement, but Papandreou was nevertheless willing to agree to type of UNpresence I had outlined.

(3) Even though cession of Greek territory to foreign country would be extremely difficult to sell to Greek people, PM was prepared let Turkey have island of Kastellorizon as military base to protect its approaches. Question of sovereign Turkish base area on Cyprus, however, was another matter. Most he could contemplate in way of Turkish military presence on Cyprus would be a sharing of British base areas with Turkish forces, provided bases themselves remained entirely under British sovereignty.

3. I said that PM had indeed made genuine effort to bridge gap between Greece and Turkey and I was grateful for it. I thought this gave us real basis for continued discussion. In particular, I would now try to develop and give to parties in more concrete form ideas regarding character of minority regime and minority rights which I thought might be applied and which I had not tried to make precise in previous talks.

4. I said, however, that I should be less than frank if I did not express fears that Greek response on sovereign base question would fail to meet minimum Turkish demands.

Turks, in their conversations with me, had been arguing for a good deal more than I had proposed, whereas Greeks were not even accepting idea of Turkish sovereign area, regardless of how small. With regard to Papandreou suggestion that Turks might share British bases, I said I could not say definitely what Turkish reaction would be, since I had never put this idea to them. I doubted they would accept it, however. In any case, it was not useful for us to debate matter today since we did not even know whether British would be amenable. Nikolareisis commented that Papandreou and Costopoulos were now in London and he thought they would put the suggestion to British.2 We agreed that we would await some report on London meetings before trying to go further along this particular line.

5. There followed considerable discussion of the Turkish sovereign base question.Nikolareisis was quite firm in expressing opinion that GOG could not accept it and that in any case Greek-Cypriots would never do so. He asserted it would be regarded both in Cyprus and in Greece as form of partition. Furthermore, it would “give Turks more than they had before” and would establish them in position to interfere in affairs of Cyprus in future. This would be perennial cause of trouble. I took issue with some of his argumentation, especially thesis that it would give Turkey more than she had before, but I shall not bother Department with details. I admitted that question of sovereign base area might become breaking point which would make my efforts here useless, since I believed Turks felt just as strongly on their side as Nikolareisis said Greeks did on theirs. Nevertheless, I thought we could usefully continue our efforts and explore all aspects at least for a while longer.

I said I thought I should be as candid with Turks as I had been with Greeks and would therefore tell Erim and Sunalp substantially what Nikolareisis had conveyed to me. He agreed. Am seeing Turks again late tomorrow morning.3

Comment: At least we are still moving down the track, even though there is a very high hurdle between us and the finish line.

Tubby

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and USUN.

2  Papandreou visited London July 20–21. The Embassy reported on his talks at the Foreign Office in telegram 362 from London, July 22. (Ibid.)

3  Acheson reported on discussions with the Turks and their initial response to the Greek suggestions in telegram 188 from Geneva, July 22. Noting that the Turks’ basic demand was a sovereign base area, he commented: “It seems apparent that the hurdle of the Turkish sovereign base area is indeed very high.” (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 90


90. Memorandum for the Greek Ambassador (Nikolareisis)1

Geneva, July 27, 1964.

After reflecting on the Prime Minister’s message, I wish to repeat to you my deep appreciation of his constructive effort toward a fair settlement. I do not detract an iota of appreciation or admiration, in asking again for his understanding help. Though the gap has been narrowed, there still remains a gap. If both sides can find a way to help, it may be bridged. No one will understand the situation better than Your Excellency if I put it in Robert Browning’s words:

“O, the little more, and how much it is!

The little less and what worlds away!”

The gap which from the Turkish point of view the Prime Minister’s reaction to my suggestions leaves unbridged lies in the politico-military area. The protection of minorities seems in a fair way to being solved. If we look for a moment at the change in the Turkish position provided in the agreements of 1959–1960 to that contemplated by the Prime Minister’s views on my suggestions, we can see what seems to them a serious deterioration in it.

May I summarize the Turkish views as follows:

When the Ottoman Empire ceded Cyprus to the British in 1878, it was ceded to a great naval power for the most part friendly to Turkey, except when in the two world wars Turkey made the same mistake as the Germans in miscalculating American intervention to change the relative military power of the embattled forces. So far as life on the island was concerned, the two ethnic groups lived peacefully together under British rule until the mid-1950s.

Under the settlement of 1959–1960, the island passed from the control of a world power to qualified independence under the guarantees and quasi-guardianship of three powers. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, to protect their relative interest, gained the following rights guaranteed by treaties:

1. A position in legislative and executive branches of the government for the Turkish Cypriots giving them veto power, the same right on questions of judicial interpretation of the constitution and separate courts for intra-Turkish Cypriot disputes.

2. A treaty right to maintain troops on the island.

3. A treaty right to reinforce those troops by intervention, after complying with specified procedures, and to use the troops if necessary to preserve the constitution, independence and territorial integrity of the island, as provided in the Treaty of Guarantee.

President Makarios maintains—and I am not here disputing the fact—that some of these provisions are “unworkable”, and he is changing them unilaterally. Our present search is for a way to change them by agreement. Such a change by its very nature contemplates a diminution of the Turkish position from the present so-called “unworkable” one. The task is to gain mutual agreement to alteration by recognizing the essential elements of the various positions.

First: Turkish Position in the Government

The Greek and Cypriot views contemplate abolition of the veto power in the Government of the island as a whole. The Prime Minister has indicated a willingness to substitute for this a considerable degree of local self-government along the lines which I suggested and further spell out in an accompanying memorandum.2 But while this is a happy contribution to protection of minorities under a constitutional system akin to that of Greece, it would not offer security against a change in the regime which would produce a communist government on the island. While we hope this is unlikely, it cannot be called absurd. This question requires further consideration.

Second: The Legal Position of Turkish Troops on Cyprus

This right is now established by the Treaty of Alliance. The troops are to form part of a tripartite headquarters on Cypriot territory to defend the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. The Prime Minister’s proposal is to abolish this treaty right and—presumably by a new treaty, either a bilateral one with Britain, or a quadripartite one with Greece and Cyprus added—to have facilities provided by the British on one or both of their sovereign bases.

One sees at once—or if one does not, the Turkish representatives are quick to point it out—that by this exchange the Turks lose a right of military presence on the island which runs directly to them, and become instead tenants of the British. They point out that the British bases are already under attack in the Cyprus House of Representatives. Should the British come to believe that a change in their Middle Eastern commitments or other considerations might render the bases on Cyprus less necessary or desirable, the Turkish position as their tenants might be tenuous indeed. They also stress the difficulty of joint use of such small bases, even should the British be willing to consider it, and the complexity of the use of the rights ancillary to the bases provided the British under the Annex to the Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom.

In this situation, I respectfully urge the Prime Minister to reconsider his position on a Turkish military presence on the island running directly to them. If the conception of a cession of sovereignty presents grave difficulty, is there another conception which might be more acceptable, such as a lease of an area, or the grant of administrative control, or something of the sort?

The Turks now have a right for their troops to be in Cyprus—and they are stationed in the heart of the island. The right to be in Cyprus, of course, carries with it a right to a location. The mere force of gravity requires it. Surely our imaginations are equal to adapting to a changed situation a new, stable and secure situs for the exercise of this military presence.

Third: The Interest, Right and Duty of Turkey to Share in Protecting and Maintaining a New Settlement

If the settlement provides for the continued independence of Cyprus, while keeping open the opportunity for the people of Cyprus to choose enosis, an agreed change in the present treaties would doubtless contain treaty assurances from Cyprus that in the meantime it would not enter into engagements with a foreign power permitting the use of its territory in a manner hostile to the interests of Britain, Greece or Turkey. Turkey, as well as Greece and Britain, would have a great interest in maintaining the new settlement. The granting of military or other facilities to unfriendly foreign powers would be contrary to the interests of the three powers mentioned above and would be inconsistent with a new settlement. Doubtless enosis would be a safeguard against this danger. But enosis is not a foregone conclusion and Turkey cannot be expected to rely on this alone. A Turkish legal military presence on the island would still be necessary for Turkish security.

These considerations underline the importance of what has been said about a proper, stable and secure location for this military presence.

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Transmitted to the Department of State as an attachment to airgram A–44 from Geneva, July 27. There is no drafting information on the source text but presumably the memorandum was drafted by Acheson. The airgram indicates the memorandum was revised after discussions with Ambassador Nikolareisis and a copy was sent to the Embassy in Athens on July 27 for delivery to Prime Minister Papandreou.

2 Not printed.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 91


91. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1

Geneva, July 27, 1964, 4 p.m.

223. From Acheson. We had go-around yesterday with Turks with Gen. Oberbeck from HQ US CINCEUR and Col. Gussie from Nicosia participating. I began by telling Erim I had made new approach to Greek rep to urge that Papandreou make greater effort to meet Turkish security need.2 He thanked me. I mentioned that I still had no word as to whether British would be willing to share their base on Cyprus, as suggested by Greeks. Erim commented that this idea of using British bases not even within scope terms of reference given him and Sunalp by GOT; he was not prepared discuss it and hoped it would not be considered seriously. I said I had made clear to Nikolareisis my belief that bases would not do from Turkish point of view. I added that my military advisers (Oberbeck and Gussie) had agreed with Sunalp’s arguments that sharing base would be very difficult and unsatisfactory.

At my suggestion, we then reviewed at considerable length and with considerable argumentation what Turkey’s minimum needs might be. Taking idea of base on Karpas Peninsula as basis for discussion, Sunalp explained that Turkey considered it had to have on Cyprus facilities and space for one division, 14,000 men, plus a port, an airfield and one squadron of aircraft. For this, he said, TGS considered even whole peninsula would be inadequate, primarily because of its narrowness and lack of [garble—space for dispersal?] and also because it would be bottleneck from which deployment would be difficult. It also lacked major terrain feature for defense.

Oberbeck and Gussie vigorously and ably took issue with this thesis, pointing out that area of more than 200 sq. miles comprised within peninsula was considerably more than we considered necessary for all peacetime purposes for one of our own larger divisions. Gussie stressed that in fact there was good road network on Cyprus and deployment from base of peninsula should be easy. On score of defensibility, our side made point that if major attack threatened Turks would clearly not sit on base awaiting it but rather would move out into other parts of island before attack took place. Apart from this Gussie pointed out that relatively small number of men should be able to hold peninsula until reinforcements arrived.

Sunalp countered with various arguments, including: (1) political situation might not permit Turkish deployment in advance of attack (e.g., allies had repeatedly prevented Turkey from moving against Cyprus during present crisis); (2) outlets for peninsula were not in fact satisfactory despite Gussie’s assertion; and (3) because of location Cyprus, Turkish establishment there could not be regarded as being on normal peacetime basis; in Turkey, Turk Army units were always kept dispersed over a wide area because of imminent possibility of attack. Therefore, greater area was needed than would be required for American division in U.S.

At one time Oberbeck made point that if Turk military on Cyprus were threatened with major attack it was inconceivable that Turkey would be alone. To this Sunalp responded emotionally that Turkey’s allies had done it no good since last December.

Debate went on for some time. Finally Sunalp asked Oberbeck to give his honest opinion from point of view of member Turkish General Staff as to whether with one division on Karpas Peninsula he could fulfill three missions I had suggested in my earlier memorandum:3 (1) to deny island to an enemy as base of operations against Turkey; (2) to keep open approaches to ports of Mersin and Iskenderun; and (3) to provide guarantee against future mistreatment of Turk-Cypriots. Oberbeck replied flatly that he certainly could fulfill these three missions under circumstancesspecified, and gave reasons. Sunalp’s smiling rejoinder was that if Oberbeck were Turkish officer “he would be retired tomorrow”. Col. Gussie intervened along same lines and also got himself “retired”.

A couple of times I tried to get Turks to recognize that any arrangement would have to be compromise between what was ideal from military point of view and what was practical. I think Erim was probably fully conscious of this although he did not explicitly say so but Sunalp was stubborn to the last.

It is too soon to say what effect of all this may be; I think it was very useful exercise and probably impressed even Sunalp. Oberbeck, Gussie, Jernegan and I will meet again with Turks at lunch tomorrow.4

Tubby

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, and USUN.

2 See Document 89.

3 See Documents 86 and 88.

4 In telegram 241 from Geneva, July 28, Acheson reported that further discussions with the Turks had not yielded any progress. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 92


92. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1

Geneva, July 28, 1964, 4 p.m.

236. From Acheson and Jernegan for Talbot. Ref: Deptel 244.2 Your telegram raises question whether (a) Sunalp and Turks and (b) Greeks believe we are suggesting a Turkish right of intervention similar to that provided in present treaties. Taking “(b)” first Nikolareisis in candid talk yesterday raised this very question and asked a change in our memo pouched to you (Geneva’s A–44)3 to make clear that Turks military presence after enosis would be only to defend their own mainland and to help Greeks defend Cyprus against foreign attack. Before enosis Turkey would have additional right to prevent a change of regime that wouldbring about a Communist state on Cyprus. We are counting on Nikolareisis and our memo to make this clear in Athens.

Turning to “(a)”-(Sunalp), he undoubtedly wants to use base for protection of Turkish minority, which is not conferred in haec verba by present treaties. His method of discussion is to confuse all desirable uses of base, jumping from one to another to avoid being cornered. With the able help of our General and Colonel we have pretty well got him pinned inside the Karpas Peninsula as a base for military purpose of housing and training a military force to protect Turkey and Cyprus from foreign foe. From there we will go on to limit his other desired purposes both before and after enosis; but always aware that whatever is said on paper, Turkish military presence will be a deterrent against abuse of the minority and will be used as a corrective if large-scale abuse should occur. Sunalp does not suffer from incapacity to understand our position but from unwillingness to accept it. We shall watch out, however, that we do not give him ground for a plausible claim that he misunderstands.

Tubby

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Exdis-TAG.

2 Telegram 244 to Geneva, July 25, requested that Acheson seek clarification of Turkish views regarding enosis and their rights of intervention in relation to the sovereign base question (Ibid.)

3  Document 90.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 93


93. Summary Record of the 536th Meeting of the National Security Council1

Washington, July 28, 1964.

[Here follows a report by Secretary Rusk on the OAS and Cuba.]

CYPRUS

At the request of the President, Under Secretary Ball summarized the current situation on Cyprus:

1. We put money in the bank with passing of every week without serious fighting on the island.

2. Progress is being made in Geneva negotiations being conducted by Dean Acheson. These talks are in their second round. Acheson has managed to establish close relations with both the Greek and Turkish representatives. The talks will have to enter the third round before we know exactly how they will come out. The real problem consists of getting Makarios to accept an agreed Greek-Turkish solution.

3. We are using the NATO structure in an effort to gain some hold on the military buildup on the Island of both Greek and Turkish forces.

4. We are making a serious effort to build up the UN forces in Cyprus and prompt the UN officers there to act with firmness in holding down fighting.

5. Every effort is being made to play down the Geneva talks. Acheson is working quietly and without press attention. The talks are being carried on under the cover of the UN Mediator who is cooperating in this tactic. We have a moderately hopeful attitude toward the possibility of a solution of the problem.

McGeorge Bundy pointed out the importance of not letting the press know of our current optimism. It was agreed that no optimistic noises should be made to the press.

[Here follows discussion of Laos.]

Bromley Smith2

1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 2. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. McCone’s notes of the meeting are in Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 80–B01285A, Meetings with LBJ, 1964.

2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 94


94. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

Athens, July 29, 1964, 5 p.m.

163. DCM yesterday transmitted to FonMin Costopoulos second Achesonmemorandum to Nikolareizis (Geneva 34 to Athens and Geneva’s A–40 to Dept.)2

Costopoulos said Makarios had been apprised of contents Acheson memo to Nikolareizis regarding Turkish minority (Geneva’s A–40 to Dept) and also of Turk demand for military base.

Makarios categorically opposed both proposals. (Comment: We rather suspectMakarios has actually been shown and perhaps given copy of first Acheson memo to Nikolareizis and cannot exclude possibility these documents may some day appear in press.)

Costopoulos said he personally also disappointed in proposals regarding Turkish minority which GOG considered unnecessarily complicated and constitute in effect cantonal arrangement. He noted that Makarios had agreed to issue “Bill of Rights” for Turkish minority and that if this were done some sort of international supervision of this bill of rights would be entirely acceptable to GOG.

Costopoulos mentioned his own ideas of seeking removal Turkish minority in exchange for Turkish military base on Cyprus (Embtel 147 to Dept, 33 to Geneva)3 had not found favor with Papandreou who apparently considers this would be impracticable as well as inconsistent with excellent Greek record with regard to existing Turkish ethnic groups in Greece.

GOG concerned, he said, that concessions are being asked of GOG without any indication such concessions likely produce agreement with GOT acceptable toGOG. Nikolareizis will be instructed obtain clearer idea of what Turks actually prepared accept.

One of the most serious problems confronting GOG is fact Makarios would oppose any agreement between Greek and Turkish Govts providing for special civil organization for Turkish minority as well as Turk military base by asserting that such types of provisions would constitute only revision of London-Zurich Accords incompatible with completely independent Cyprus. Basically Makarios is opposed to enosis, but will not publicly admit it. Costopoulos did not assess possibilityMakarios himself might be prepared make concessions to Turks on his own initiative in effort preempt GOG-GOT agreement, if by so doing he could preserve independent status of Cyprus.

Costopoulos, speaking very personally and confidentially, said he did not see how under these circumstances it was going to be possible to reach an agreement with Turks which would also be satisfactory to Govt of Cyprus. If agreement on basic issues could be reached by Turks and GOG, perhaps best tactical procedure would be as follows: simultaneous declaration by Greek and Cypriot Parliaments proclaiming enosis followed by plebiscite in Cyprus and possibly Greece ratifying this decision. After proclamation of enosis, Greek Govt would then be in position to honor agreements reached with Turks and US Govt as result of current negotiations. In Costopoulos’ view such agreement would provide measures for guarantee of protection for Turkish ethnics as well as leased Turk military base (sovereign base unacceptable) for period perhaps as long as 25 years. Base would be purely military, probably on Karpas Pe-ninsula, limited in size, and without space required either for large number of Turkish troops or safe haven area for Turk ethnic civilians. If meeting of minds could be reached with GOT along foregoing lines perhaps prompt solution could be found before convening of UNGA and under circumstances which would avoid giving Makarios apparently valid justification publicly oppose enosis.

Comment: Obviously, Costopoulos‘ comments re possible GOG program involving understanding with GOT re possible lease base agreement and subsequent proclamation of enosis by Grk and Cypriot Parliaments extremely sensitive and should be tightly held pending further evolution of Greek attitude.

Labouisse

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Geneva for Acheson, Nicosia, and Ankara.

2 Telegram 34 from Geneva to Athens was not found. Airgram A–40 transmitted the first draft of the memorandum (Document 90). (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)

3 Dated July 26. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 94


94. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

Athens, July 29, 1964, 5 p.m.

163. DCM yesterday transmitted to FonMin Costopoulos second Achesonmemorandum to Nikolareizis (Geneva 34 to Athens and Geneva’s A–40 to Dept.)2

Costopoulos said Makarios had been apprised of contents Acheson memo to Nikolareizis regarding Turkish minority (Geneva’s A–40 to Dept) and also of Turk demand for military base.

Makarios categorically opposed both proposals. (Comment: We rather suspectMakarios has actually been shown and perhaps given copy of first Acheson memo to Nikolareizis and cannot exclude possibility these documents may some day appear in press.)

Costopoulos said he personally also disappointed in proposals regarding Turkish minority which GOG considered unnecessarily complicated and constitute in effect cantonal arrangement. He noted that Makarios had agreed to issue “Bill of Rights” for Turkish minority and that if this were done some sort of international supervision of this bill of rights would be entirely acceptable to GOG.

Costopoulos mentioned his own ideas of seeking removal Turkish minority in exchange for Turkish military base on Cyprus (Embtel 147 to Dept, 33 to Geneva)3 had not found favor with Papandreou who apparently considers this would be impracticable as well as inconsistent with excellent Greek record with regard to existing Turkish ethnic groups in Greece.

GOG concerned, he said, that concessions are being asked of GOG without any indication such concessions likely produce agreement with GOT acceptable toGOG. Nikolareizis will be instructed obtain clearer idea of what Turks actually prepared accept.

One of the most serious problems confronting GOG is fact Makarios would oppose any agreement between Greek and Turkish Govts providing for special civil organization for Turkish minority as well as Turk military base by asserting that such types of provisions would constitute only revision of London-Zurich Accords incompatible with completely independent Cyprus. Basically Makarios is opposed to enosis, but will not publicly admit it. Costopoulos did not assess possibilityMakarios himself might be prepared make concessions to Turks on his own initiative in effort preempt GOG-GOT agreement, if by so doing he could preserve independent status of Cyprus.

Costopoulos, speaking very personally and confidentially, said he did not see how under these circumstances it was going to be possible to reach an agreement with Turks which would also be satisfactory to Govt of Cyprus. If agreement on basic issues could be reached by Turks and GOG, perhaps best tactical procedure would be as follows: simultaneous declaration by Greek and Cypriot Parliaments proclaiming enosis followed by plebiscite in Cyprus and possibly Greece ratifying this decision. After proclamation of enosis, Greek Govt would then be in position to honor agreements reached with Turks and US Govt as result of current negotiations. In Costopoulos’ view such agreement would provide measures for guarantee of protection for Turkish ethnics as well as leased Turk military base (sovereign base unacceptable) for period perhaps as long as 25 years. Base would be purely military, probably on Karpas Pe-ninsula, limited in size, and without space required either for large number of Turkish troops or safe haven area for Turk ethnic civilians. If meeting of minds could be reached with GOT along foregoing lines perhaps prompt solution could be found before convening of UNGA and under circumstances which would avoid giving Makarios apparently valid justification publicly oppose enosis.

Comment: Obviously, Costopoulos‘ comments re possible GOG program involving understanding with GOT re possible lease base agreement and subsequent proclamation of enosis by Grk and Cypriot Parliaments extremely sensitive and should be tightly held pending further evolution of Greek attitude.

Labouisse

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Geneva for Acheson, Nicosia, and Ankara.

2 Telegram 34 from Geneva to Athens was not found. Airgram A–40 transmitted the first draft of the memorandum (Document 90). (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)

3 Dated July 26. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 95


95. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece1

Washington, July 30, 1964, 8:24 p.m.

165. Athens 170, 40 to Geneva.2 Reuters story (Modiano) received prior to your telegram. Greek Ambassador was called in for explanation of leak.3

Talbot explained we cannot understand reasoning behind “confirmation” by Greek Government spokesman of “Acheson Plan”. He noted Papandreou has insisted on essentiality absolute secrecy regarding talks. We understood his desire that information be held close so that various ideas could be discussed without governments having to take firm positions on one or another. Talbot assured Ambassador Matsas Mr. Acheson has worked very closely with Mediator, has not pushed himself forward and that we have been fortunate so far in that press has not covered his activities. Talbot asked Matsas for his explanation. Ambassador said he was completely in dark.

Talbot said we had two problems: (1) how to answer press questions; and (2) what do we say to Turks. As Papandreou aware, talks have proceeded with candor and Mr. Acheson has reported back and forth to each representative. Fact that some of points mentioned in Reuters story have been reported to Turks and others not might arouse suspicions of Turks we are not playing fairly with them.

Matsas asked if there were a coherent plan. Talbot said a variety of ideas had been discussed but there was not a “plan”. Matsas speculated that only first point “Union with Greece” would appeal to Greeks and other points, cession Kastellorizon, base, financial compensation, etc., would be detestable. Therefore he could not see it inGOG interest to leak this information. He surmised that since all of points at one time or another had been mentioned in press, Modiano had possibly read as “confirmation” a “no comment” reply by GOG official.

He proposed telephoning PM Papandreou for clarification and instructions. After talking to Papandreou Matsas reported that Prime Minister was very annoyed by the leak, indicating Greeks had endeavored to brief Cypriots on status of talks and Cypriots had talked too much. Prime Minister proposed to deny flatly that there was any such thing as “Acheson Plan”.

Subsequently Matsas reported second telephone call with Papandreou, after latter had investigated Reuters story on Makarios’ press conference. PM repeated his extreme annoyance and asked Ambassador convey to Department his sincere regret this had happened since he realized efforts at Geneva are being directed to fruitful results and this might be counterproductive.

No questions at noon briefing. Future queries will be answered: “Mr. Acheson has been discussing a whole range of ideas with Mediator, Greek and Turkish representatives. There is no such thing as an Acheson plan.”

If Matsas had correctly reported Papandreou’s regret and intention to deny along lines we are taking, we assume Nikolareizis will have early instructions on Mr.Acheson’s memorandum and that exchanges will not be interrupted.

For Athens: Impress strongly on Papandreou our distress at possible deleterious effect this could have on talks in Geneva, and Mr. Acheson’s efforts to help Mediator arrive at agreed settlement. We have understood and cooperated with Greek desire for secrecy because we recognize problem of domestic pressures onGOG as well as their difficulty in handling Makarios. The speed and forthcoming nature of Nikolareizis’ next instructions will indeed be test of Papandreou’s good faith and sincerity of his intentions to arrive at early negotiated settlement rather than “fait accompli” tack of Makarios, with all potential dangers of Turk resistance that approach implies. We understand Nikolareizis is returning Athens today. In order not to give Turkish public opinion leeway to suspect breakdown of talks and accelerate pressures by Turkish extremists, we hope he can return to Geneva earliest (certainly by Monday).

For Ankara: Drawing on above help Turks look at this in perspective. Mr. Achesonreports that Erim and Sunalp are calm about whole thing. Assure Turks that we hope that Makarios explosion will not have serious effect on negotiations.

As another sensitive period approaches when Turks might again think of intervention as their only alternative, we are dismayed at reports they might contemplate intervention by air bombardment. We recognize that neither Sunay nor Inonu has made such statement. However, we believe it useful if as opportunity arises you convey to appropriate quarters US position that we could not under any circumstances regard air bombardment as coming within purview of “action” contemplated under Article IV Treaty of Guarantee.

Rusk

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis-TAG. Drafted by Bracken, cleared by Sisco and Talbot, and approved by Ball. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, USUN, and Geneva for Acheson.

2 Telegram 170 from Athens, July 30, transmitted the text of the Greek press report outlining Acheson’s proposals for a Cyprus settlement. (Ibid.)

3 In telegram 265 from Geneva, July 30, Acheson expressed concern about the impact of press reports on the negotiations and stated that the Greeks had agreed to respond to inquiries with a “no comment.” (Ibid.) In telegram 269 from Geneva, July 30, Achesonreported that the Turks were “disgusted” with the leak, which they blamed on the Greeks. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 96


96. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1

Nicosia, July 31, 1964, 3 p.m.

141. Nicholas Farmakis (protect source), former Greek ERE Deputy, here conducting survey for Greek opposition group (composed ERE political elements and Greek military) has given Embassy his views. Farmakis has talked with Greek Cypriot leaders and has traveled extensively throughout island inspecting defense sites.

Farmakis has deep misgivings re Cyprus situation which follow:

1. Makarios intends use military force obtain political solution. He intends increase pressures on Turks and then attack Turk strongholds. He will act within forty-five days. Makarios will by-pass UN mediation and introduce resolution UNGA obtain recognition de facto state.

2. Makarios increasingly dependent upon Nasser. GOC has received UAR material and obtained Nasser’s permission use UAR airfields by Greek Air Force defend Cyprus. Claims Papandreou “50 percent” in agreement. Added GOC endeavoring obtain support Syria Air Force and promise of Syrian attack Iskenderun event GOTattack.

3. Cypriots under direction regular Greek officers installing ground-to-air missiles near Nicosia. Farmakis has visited site and witnessed construction, but has not seen any missiles. He assumed they were shipped from Greece and were US origin. (This may reflect rumors we have heard other sources.)

In order prevent escalation problem, Farmakis intends recommend his colleagues that Makarios be deposed. Claims GOG being out-maneuvered. If Makarios able submit resolution UNGA Greece will face dilemma. In this event Papandreou cannot resist clamor support Makarios. Result will be further weakening Greek ties with West. He claimed Greece drifting toward neutralism and shifting its focus away from Communist threat. On July 27, for example, he informed Papandreou transferred 150 key army officers to provinces; and he afraid GOG will transfer Greek army officers sympathetic ouster Makarios from Cyprus unless action quickly initiated.

With regard Papandreou’s position, Farmakis acknowledged Premier cannot be challenged at polls; and he does not wish participate any plan aimed removal Papandreou. Opposition group believes Papandreou will sanction Makariosremoval if faced with threat of force by military elements. Farmakis indicated they would not, however, let Papandreou stand their way. Otherwise if situation continues civil war will occur Greece within year. Once Makarios removed enosis would be proclaimed. Farmakis said Turks would be given small part island to administer and he seemed unconcerned re Turk attitude.

Farmakis made low key pitch for US support. He emphasized Greece and United States had same interest in problem. Personally he would rather be “dead than red.” Therefore, he favored action now. Added United States would be kept apprised, because United States would be expected offer its blessings.

Comment: We cannot judge extent plans described by Farmakis have progressed in Greece. We were impressed with deadly serious fashion which Farmakis revealed his views. If Farmakis’ worries are based on fact, as he assured us, then Makarioswith GOG being dragged along, has gone even further than we thought in playing brinkmanship game.2

Belcher

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Cairo, Damascus, Geneva for Acheson, and London.

2 In telegram 169 from Athens, August 4, the Embassy reported on further contacts with Farmakis and noted that his fellow conspirators included Nicos Sampson and Cypriot Minister of Labor Tassos Papadopoulos. (Ibid.)

VOLUME XVI, CYPRUS; GREECE; TURKEY, DOCUMENT 97


97. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

Athens, July 31, 1964, 9 p.m.

190. 1. I called on PriMin today at Kastri with Costopoulos, Sossides and Brewsterpresent. We talked for about ninety minutes. PriMin received us in his bedroom (he has been in bed for several days with kidney trouble which apparently developed while on London trip). He immediately apologized profusely for unfortunate impression leak of “Acheson proposals” was bound to create. He attributed this leak entirely to Cypriots who had been here this week, with whom naturally he had had to discuss certain aspects of Geneva talks and to whom he had shown some papers but not all (he did not distinguish). He said he had just completed a call to Makariosin which he had expressed his deep indignation at this leak and at Makarios‘ most unfortunate press conference. He said he had come to conclusion this week thatMakarios was “impossible to deal with” since he was completely intransigent on all points. He had “used” Greek press and all of this at expense of Greek Government which wants to maintain good relations with US. He had done the unforgivable by putting Greek Government in a position of looking soft and willing to bargain, whereas he (Makarios) was the hero standing up against the forces of the West. PriMin was convinced that Makarios was playing a completely “Nasser game” and wanted to set up an independent Cyprus “as an Arab state.”

2. He then stated that, after this meeting with Makarios, he had concluded there was only one solution, “a dangerously simple one”—enosis must come promptly because there could be no interim period in which Cypriots had unfettered independence. It was important to follow this course in order to get rid of Makarios. Although Makarios is working against enosis, Papandreou believed if action is taken at early date it can be achieved. His proposal was that enosis be achieved by joint action of the Greek Cypriot and Greek Parliaments, while agreements could be reached within the “family group” (i.e., US, UK, Turkey, Greece) to provide for a bill of rights for the Turk minority and a NATO base with Turkish Commander granted by Greece to Turkey. He mentioned frequently that he, as PriMin, could not force concessions out of Makarios who thought he would win an independent Cyprus. Only way to be rid of this was to have Cyprus a part of Greece. Enosis with aNATO base should offer Turks security both for their minorities and strategically. A Cuba-type Cyprus under Makarios’ aegis would certainly be dangerous forTurkey and for us all. GOG would also be prepared to indemnify any Turk Cypriots who might wish to leave Cyprus, and hopefully there could be some economic aid provided Turkey which would help meet its problems. He said foregoing was in essence what he would put to Nikolareizis who was arriving this evening for consultations, and which would in turn be passed on to Acheson.

3. Speaking personally, I stressed that I could not imagine Turks would accept such a proposal, even assuming that we all want to get rid of Makarios. The proposal did not take realistically into consideration the three basic factors which Turkish side considers essential to a solution. It was, in fact, asking Turks for complete and unconditional capitulation. After outlining some of events related to Makarios’ visit, including his Nicosia departure statement that there could be no “agreed solution”, the “complete identity of views” communiqué, and ending with Makarios’ homecoming statement that Cyprus would have full support of Greek armed forces if attacked,2 I said that, although I accepted his assurances re the Acheson story leak and his indignation at Makarios’ press conference, [no?] Turks and few others would believe this was not Greek-Makarios maneuver. He denied this heatedly, and twice said that he now considered Makarios “an enemy.”

4. I then pressed him on question of proposed appeal to UN on which he had apparently agreed a common line with Makarios. He replied that he agreed withMakarios on only three things: a) need to maintain peace on island (and here he saidMakarios had promised him to take no military action of any importance without prior consultation); b) Greece would defend Cyprus if attacked; and c) Greece will sup